Ah--you're saying inside of world x? Yeah, inside of world x, nothing has any truth value. That has no implication on whether truths are judgments though.

For one, I want to be clear that you're not conflating truth value and facts. You're not doing that are you?

I am saying logic.

Okay, but there's no logic in world x, is there?

I am saying in logic your claims do not obtain truth value because they are claims that depended upon things without truth value.

I can't really make sense out of that last post: "I'm saying (that via?) logic your claims do not (possess?) truth value because they are claims that (depend?) upon things (what things?) without truth value"??

Yes I realize that you don't understand.
But there is nothing more I can do.
I have explained it as clearly as I can.
I am pointing out the contrapositive consequence of your claims about the absence of truth value.

I am pointing out the contrapositive consequence of your claims about the absence of truth value. — m-theory

???

What conditional are we referring to, first off?--"If there are no judgments, there is no truth-value"? The contrapositive of that is, "If there is truth-value, then there are judgments."

If there is no judgments = P (Which has no truth value because truth value is equal to judgement)
then there are no truth values (which cannot be considered true or false)
Q(there is no truth value to negate) therefor P (again no truth value to negate)

Are you talking about the contrapositive of some claim in world x, that is, inside that circle?

I have explained it as clearly as I can. — m-theory

You think that truth is mind-independent. Therefore, you think that there is truth in a world without minds. @Terrapin Station thinks that truth is mind-dependent. Therefore, he thinks that there is no truth in a world without minds. You think that this is a contradiction, because it would have to be a truth in a world without minds that there is no truth in that world. But that is not what @Terrapin Station is claiming; he is merely saying that in the actual world, where there are minds, it is a (mind-dependent) truth that there would be no truth in a world without minds.

I am talking contrapositives where there is no truth value.

Right, that's what I've been trying to make clear to him via clearing up what seems to be confusion about context with respect to possible worlds. (And hence my illustration above.)

I can't tell at all if he understands any of that stuff or if he's even paying any attention to it.

I am talking contrapositives where there is no truth value. — m-theory

It wouldn't be possible to talk about contrapositives where there is no truth value.

Yes I know I pointed out the issues with that already.
In post 484

It is possible to talk about the contrapositive, they simply have no truth value.

Yes I know I pointed out the issues with that already. — m-theory

Issues with what? With which part of my last post do you disagree, and why?

I addressed that issue in post 484.
It is a circular argument.

No, it's not. There are a couple possible reasons for this, depending on just what we have in mind contextually re the possible worlds in question:

Rather than drawing, because that's time consuming, I'll just do headings:

Either

(1)
IN POSSIBLE WORLD X
"I'm talking about . . ."

which isn't possible because there is no one in possible world x to talk about anything.

Or

(2)
IN POSSIBLE WORLD Y
"I'm talking about:"

IN POSSIBLE WORLD X
contrapositives (in world x)

But that's not possible, because there are no contrapositives in world x, because there is no logic in world x (aside from something like a book in world x that might have "logic" written on the cover etc.)

Of course, you could mean something like:

(3)

IN POSSIBLE WORLD Y
"I'm talking about contrapositives that I'm imagining would be in world X, or I'm referring to something in world X that we'd call a 'contrapositive' and assign truth values to in this world (world y) etc." but that's really talking about world y, things you're imagining about x from world y, etc.

How could it be true that there is no logic in world x if there is no logic in world x?

It is a circular argument. — m-theory

Which I'm challenging you to make explicit then. What specifically is a conclusion that's being mentioned in the premises of an argument?

Here is what you said in your post #484.

I am talking contrapositives where there is no truth value. — m-theory

What does this have to do with my summary? We are having this discussion in the actual world, where there are minds. Obviously we could not be having it in a world without minds - it would be impossible.

How could it be true that there is no logic in world x if there is no logic in world x? — m-theory

It's true in possible world y that there's no logic in world x.

In possible world x, nothing is true or false. It's simply a fact that there is no logic in possible world x. AGAIN, I want to make sure that you're not conflating facts and truth values. You're not doing that, are you?

In other words:

IN POSSIBLE WORLD Y
"There is no logic in possible world x" -- and then I assign "T" to that propostiion.

IN POSSIBLE WORLD X
"There is no logic in possible world x" --maybe that's text in a book that still exists in possible world x or something, but it's not true or false in this world.

I also pointed out another possible issue with Terrapin's views.
Terrapin might hope to argue that we can be sure that truth is entirely and exclusively dependent upon minds, because minds exist now and thus the truth of what is said about anything depends entirely and exclusively upon them and there is no issue because as of now those minds do exist.
This would be circular argumentation.
That minds exist now proves only that there are minds now, it does not prove that truth is entirely and exclusively dependent upon those minds and these are not logically equivalent things. — m-theory

Yes but it is not true in world x that there is no logic.

Right

IN POSSIBLE WORLD X
It is not true or false that there is no logic.

However, it is a fact that there is no logic.

It is not a fact that is true in world x

Terrapin might hope to argue that we can be sure . . . — m-theory

??? I'm not and I wouldn't be arguing anything about certainty. That doesn't imply that I'm not (psychologically) certain about something. But certainty for empirical claims is just a completely misplaced concern in my view.

It is not a fact that is true in world x — m-theory

Correct. It's rather a fact that it's not true or false.

I think that is where we disagree most when it comes to truth.
You believe that where you lack any doubt then there is truth.
That is not my view of truth.

How could it be true that there is no logic in world x if there is no logic in world x? — m-theory

If truth is mind-dependent, and there are no minds in world x, then:

• it is true in our actual world (where there are minds) that there is no logic in world x; and
• it is not true in world x that there is no logic in world x, because nothing is true in world x.