In my mind, (heh),The problem of an ill defined infinite regress inherent in solipsism makes it more difficult for us to make sense of things or to be certain of them, but the dilemma of solipsism is not that it has much (if any) merit as a hypothetical model, it's rather that many of it's variations cannot be fully falsified or discounted as a possibility. When it comes to "things of which we are certain", I do not count the statement "solipsism is not true" to be among them. — VagabondSpectre
That we can draw distinction from self and not self falsifies solipsism.
If solipsism was true we would not be able to form such a distinction because of the infinite regress problem.
Consider the brain in a vat scenario. A powerful scientist could be feeding impulses from a simulation into your brain in exactly the same way as if your brain was in a skull, rendering you unable to determine if the world you perceive actually extends beyond your potentially simulated or deceptive perceptions. — VagabondSpectre
The brain in the vat is not useful to your point as it takes for granted that an objective world does exist.
Again if objective information did not exist (that which is not self) then you would have no way to define self (form subjective perceptions).
This isn't exactly full blown solipsism, but it establishes a primitive case which can cast some (albeit minimal) doubt on whether or not our perceptions even indirectly reflect an external or objective world. — VagabondSpectre
Again it is rather simple.
In order to form any notion of self there must exist a not self distinct and independent from that self.
If in reality there were no such distinction then you would lapse into an ill defined infinite regress of self referencing self ad infinitum.
That this is not the case is proof that solipsism is not the case.
Solipsism is not really a profound philosophical dilemma, but it is a proper hard dilemma none the less. Whether or not I (you) live in a solipsistic world in the end would change nothing of consequence as far as our perceptions are concerned, so I (you) don't have any reason to waste much time trying to validate or falsify it. — VagabondSpectre
My point was that it is not a hard dilemma at all.
It is rather simple.
The debate is a semantic one.
Those that argue doubt of the existence of not self as distinct and independent are merely arguing that we redefine terms to entertain a philosophical dilemma where one does not exist.
That is to say there is no force of logic that it is necessary to redefine the terms self and not self such that these terms are not distinct and independent.
In fact it is not logically possible to construct such an argument because of infinite regress.
It is quite literally logically impossible to actually doubt the existence of the objective world (not self) without also doubting the existence of the subjective (self).
If the not self does not exist then it is logically impossible to define the self because of infinite regress.
If you assert that the subjective (self) does exist, the only logically founded way to reach this conclusion is by referencing the objective world (not self).
Exclusive access to only self reference does not allow one to draw a conclusion of the existence of self it leads to infinite regress and from ill defined terms.
So I balk notion that all one can be sure of is only the self (subjective perception).
This can only be true if are also sure of the not self (objective information).
There is no logical way to be sure of the existence of self otherwise?!?
:s
Those that are sure of self, subjective perception, or what ever you want to call it, are not solipsists.
This is why the position is incoherent.
The position asks that all you can be sure of as existing is the subjective (self) even while in order for that to be true it logically entails the existence of the objective (not self) as distinct and independent.
The position claims that we are
ONLY sure of the existence of the subjective however, which is inconsistent logically.
In fact, from a foundation of logic, the opposite is the case.
We can only be sure of self if there is a definite distinct and independent not self.
I will grant that we may be subjectively wrong about what is the true state of objective existence, but what we cannot do is doubt that the objective exists in fact without also doubting that the subjective exists in fact.
You, perhaps hint at a true solipsist position.
If you claim we cannot be sure of the existence of the objective, then this logically entails that we are also not sure of the existence of the subjective.
These terms would be ill defined that there would be no distinction drawn between them.
That would be a consistent position at least, however you would nave no certainty about anything, subjective, objective or otherwise.
My response to this point is not only is that an unnecessary skeptical position, it is in fact logically impossible to prove that it is necessary.
Skepticism of about the existence of the objective is possible sure (granting that an infinite regress can be an actual occurance in reality) but just because it is possible does not make it necessary.
Again if it were not possible in reality to draw the distinction of not self and self then we would be stuck in an ill defined infinite regress in reality.
That is not the case at all, even those that argue the case for solipsism are claiming we can be sure of the existence of self, they simply fail to realize that this also logically entails the existence of some not self which is distinct and independent.