That your faith in God is on the same epistemological level as faith in Teapot and on the same epistemological level as guesswork that flying indetectable giraffes are all around us? — S
You might have noticed that I was careful with my wording. I didn't say that faith is guesswork, I said that it is on par with it. Good luck trying to argue otherwise. Your faith in God is on par with faith in Teapot. That which is on par with guesswork is very much in contrast to reason. — S
I know that there is at least one respondent here who is a theist. The question is, is he willing to admit that his belief is on par with guesswork? — S
It's conventional to think of "evidence (suggesting) that F does not exist" is the same as "there is no evidence for F. — Terrapin Station
It's conventional to think of "evidence (suggesting) that F does not exist" is the same as "there is no evidence for F." — Terrapin Station
"Evidence for it (for F)" to cover both. — Terrapin Station
Ah, then we agree on that. But who would even suggest that anyone is claiming that something doesn't exist on no evidence? — Terrapin Station
Sure. But if the drug trial fails to uncover any positive evidence, the conclusion will not be that we're agnostic about e.g. the effect of a drug. It will be that the drug is ineffective. — Echarmion
That sounds precariously close to a no true Scotsman. Anyways, as a matter of fact we make plenty of determinations based on lack of evidence. Drug trials come to mind. — Echarmion
"Science saying something" is scientists saying something. And scientists definitely say that completely implausible, incoherent, etc. things don't exist when there's no evidence for them. They don't remain agnostic on everything. — Terrapin Station
You're stuck with either tyranny of the majority or tyranny of the minority. I'll take the majority — ProbablyTrue
To me, the experience of god is something that comes before understanding. Before words — T Clark
↪Rank Amateur
As I've said a number of times, I don't think the terms are important. I'm fine with dropping the terms "objective" and "subjective." I've suggested dropping them a number of times, including earlier in this thread.
So I'm just saying that moral judgments are things we think.
Do you agree with that?
And on my view, I don't believe that moral judgments (or whatever else we might want to call them--moral whatevers) occur, as moral judgments (whatevers) other than as things we think.
And then what matters are the upshots of the fact that moral judgments are things we think. — Terrapin Station
↪Rank Amateur Of course it does, silly. Sheesh, your denialism is a real problem. You said that the analogy is a poor analogy, and the reasons you gave for this were bad reasons, so I set you straight. The analogy is a good analogy if you look at it in the right way, use it right, draw the right conclusions from it. Russell's teapot was being referenced and the lesson from that is a good one, so it's a good analogy if used right. You don't get to shift the burden of proof to others if you make the assertion that there exists a celestial teapot. Or rather, if you do, then you're not being reasonable. — S
Since I'm calling mental phenomena "subjective" and I'm reserving "objective" for things that aren't mental phenomena, then if we're talking about people making a moral judgment as mental phenomena--we're saying that what it is to make a moral judgment is to be in a particular mental state, then even if 100% of everyone, throughout all of history, has that same exact moral judgment, because of how humans have evolutionarily developed, and that led to their brain working a particular way so that they all make that same moral judgment, then I'm calling that moral judgment "subjective," solely because/only because we're talking about mental phenomena, and "subjective" is a term I use to refer to mental phenomena. — Terrapin Station
↪Rank Amateur There is no more or less objective the way that I use the term. Something either is or isn't. And morality isn't. Nor is it universal. Near universal isn't universal, so if a moral judgement is near universal, then it isn't universal. — S
Re this, for the umpteenth time, ALL that I'm saying by the term "subjective" is that we're referring to a mental phenomenon. We can just drop the terms "subjective/objective" and I can just say that "moral stances do not occur outside of persons thinking them." The reason that they think them is biological. Biology is as it is because of evolution and common environmental factors, which lead to near-universal agreement on some things. — Terrapin Station
What you continue to avoid answering is why you think that difference causes us to consider majority thoughts on morality as objective truths when not only do we not do this for any other class of thought, but we take great pains to avoid doing so. — Isaac
Under subjectivist morality, the only explanation that we need for near-universal moral judgments is that our bodies develop in similar ways--a notion that's quite uncontroversial for most things (otherwise medicine wouldn't work, we'd not be able to explain why almost everyone has ten fingers and ten toes, etc.). — Terrapin Station
s pertinent to something I wrote earlier today: "I can't help but think that some of this stems from misunderstandings--namely, believing that relativists and/or subjectivists are more or less saying that morality is wildly divergent from person to person, and that it's essentially arbitrary. But no one is actually claiming anything like that." — Terrapin Station
You understand that on my view it's biology that produces our moral stances, too, right? — Terrapin Station
Someone please make a coherent argument how moral relativism explains that near every human being on the planet would think torturing babies for amusement is morally wrong.
— Rank Amateur
It doesn't. Moral relativism explains how some humans do think torturing babies for fun is OK (by positing that there must therefore be no objective moral fact). Evolution is what explains why near every human being on the planet does think torturing babies for amusement is morally wrong (because it would be difficult to raise the next generation if we didn't).
Why must moral relativism explain what you want it to? Moral objectivism doesn't explain why most people have noses, but that isn't an argument against it. — Isaac
↪Rank Amateur
I can't help but think that some of this stems from misunderstandings--namely, believing that relativists and/or subjectivists are more or less saying that morality is wildly divergent from person to person, and that it's essentially arbitrary. But no one is actually claiming anything like that.
What I'm saying is that morality/moral stances are something that occurs in minds only (which I believe are brains functioning in particular ways). I'm saying that moral stances do not occur outside of minds. I'm not saying anything suggestive of moral stances being arbitrary, being necessarily widlly divergent, etc.
I'm essentially making a claim about the location of a phenomenon.
There are upshots to what I'm saying, upshots where it makes a difference if we're saying that something only occurs in brains functioning in mental ways versus elsewhere, but the core idea is that moral stances only occur in brains functioning in mental ways. — Terrapin Station
You're probably reading "Morality is subjective" as me saying something other than "Morality is of bodies" in the sense that "Noses are of bodies," despite the fact that I've tried to correct that misunderstanding tens of times (if not hundreds in general on the board) — Terrapin Station