Does it solve the problem to say that the domain of morality is the possible and therefore trying to ensure the well-being of each individual is not contradicted by the fact we will never be able to secure the well-being of each one due to natural causes outside of our control?

Individuals separated by their interests, that is, making an individual much better off does not compensate another individual being worse off, and therefore unlike utilitarianism, morality can not be about maximising the good for the biggest number.

On the other hand, the problem of separateness of persons is whether it makes sense practically to try to secure the rights of each individual separately, knowing we will never be able to secure the rights of every individual anyway. So the question here is:

If separateness of individuals is true, is a world with only one individual suffering and all others well-off still better that a world with only one individual well-off and all others suffering?

In other worlds, does it follow logically from separateness of persons, that these two worlds are equally good/bad?

So let's assume for the moment that the domain of morality is the possible and its objectives are valuable even though they will never be fully achieved due to the inability to control natural causes that affect humans/animals. This might not be objective morality, but also not totally subjective/imaginary.

That assumed, we might say that morality is about making the world as good as possible by increasing the well-being of the worse-off as much as possible and increasing the well-being of everyone as long as that increase is not at the expense of the worse-off.

So, again, I think the attempt to arrive at a formula can only ever conform to some variety of utilitarianism, 'the greatest good for the greatest number' — Wayfarer

The main problem with Utilitarisnism is the lack of recognition of separateness of persons and therefore the tyranny of majority and allowing unproportional harm to minorities and individuals who are already worse off in society.

On the other hand, if we stick to the principle of separateness of persons we seem only able to achieve it partially as things are going to go out of our control at some point due to natural causes. Do these natural causes and our inability to secure the well-being of some individuals prove the very principle of separateness of persons to be wrong?

Can moral principles be true and still achievable only partially and exclude in practice some individuals even though these principles do not allow excluding anyone, still excluding some sentient beings occur due to lack of control over opposing natural causes like disease, disasters, carnivorous animals..etc?

So let's reformulate the questions:

If (semi-)objective morality aims at providing equal or sufficient well-being for each sentient being, even though we know this can not achieved for each individual, as we can not control nature to prevent some individuals ending up worse off than others or under a sufficiency threshold, could we still have morality that is neither subjective nor relative?
That is, could morality be somewhere between objective and subjective/relative?

For instance, if we can not prevent every individual from suffering, does it still make sense to try to lessen the number of people who will suffer (and still hold to our belief in the separateness of persons)?

There are not 100% identical cases concerning human beings. Hence there is no different judgement on identical cases. There is only different judgement on identical represented cases. — Tomseltje

I assume there might be morally identical cases even there are no identical cases concerning human beings. As long as all the relevant criterions are equally met for each individual, it might still be possible to have moraly identical cases.

I think your basic problem is that 'objectivity' is too narrow a criterion for the establishment of ethical claims. Objectivity is a very useful criterion across many subjects, but ethical judgements are a different matter, as in this context, you're dealing with the wishes, rights and demands of persons, who are not 'objects' as such. — Wayfarer

I think this is a good point, probably morality is not objective, but let's say might get close to being objective, the question is however, what could a suitable realist or semi-realist criterion that we can use to make a balance between competing moral propositions?

Unless it is recognized that life intersects morality, moral realism will never make sense. There will always be contradictions, exceptions, ambiguity. — darthbarracuda

Aren't contradictions against objectivity/realism?

Morality is objective, if you look at morality with the group/team in mind. Morality was not designed to maximize the individual. Morality maximizes the team. The team has the unique property of being able to become more than the sum of its parts. The team affect can elevate all the individuals on the team. — wellwisher

Morality is not designed to maximize the individual. — wellwisher

I agree that morality is not "merely" about the individual, but it seems to me that maximizing the well-being of a team/group at the expense of an individual who is worse off than average is against objectivism.

And if we only allow for the interest of a group to take priority before intersts of people who are already well off, then you are considering individuals again.

But it's objective only according to your preferred pretty pattern. There's no intrinsic reason, in nature, to prefer equal distribution. So what if peoples' lot is different, provided we ensure a lower "floor" below which no one need fall? Looking at it from my own point of view, it doesn't matter to me in the least that some have more than me, what matters is that I have what is due to me. That is objective justice. — gurugeorge

Provided we ensure a lower "floor" below which no one need fall? Looking at it from my own point of view, it doesn't matter to me in the least that some have more than me, what matters is that I have what is due to me. That is objective justice.

So that is a sort or Sufficientarianism, which is a possible candidate as a crterion of morality. The problem however with it is the same of the problem i am talking about in this topic, plus another one which is where to draw the line of being sufficient if we reject equality or even Rawl's theory of justice.

The same problem continues, we will not be able to ensure any moral good for each individual. That is, there will always be individuals that we can not provide with equal or sufficient well-being. Does this not stand at odds with any moral theory claiming to be objective?

Can we claim to be objective and have moral ideals that are not possible to achieve fully and still try our best to achieve sufficient good to all individuals even though we know nature will decide something bad out of our control for some individuals?

@unenlightened
You can call it justice or morality
To be honest, I am not really sure what is the difference between the two.
"that my joy and suffering is no different to another's joy and suffering despite the I feel the one and not the other"
That is where it seems to me that objective morality is grounded. But the question now for me is whether equal consideration is realistic/achievable considering all the conflicts?
If not, what about getting as close as possible to achieving equal consideration of interests? Still "objective"?

@Robot Brain
The ways to achieve morality according to my definition are unrealistic.
Actually my scope is the whole world and not only a society.

There are two possibilities I can think of:
Either my definition is too and unnecessarily demanding für objective morality to exist
or objective morality is probably really immaginary.

The problem is that I am not sure where I went wrong about defining objective morality, or there is no objective morality that can be real even in any other possible definition.

What could be other definitions that qualify for objective morality and still be realistic?


@Sherlock
The problem of utilitarianism ist he lack of seperatness of persons. It assumes that there is such a thing out there that is "the biggest good for the biggest number". I do not think that such a thing exists in reality. There are only interests of Individual A + interests of Individual B +…..
The sum is however, a mental construct, it seems to me.
How does the interest of many people justify the suffering of gladiators they are watching fighting each other?
It seems to be based on luck, which is arbitrary, therefore at odds with objectivism.
If your interests happenned to be aligned with that of the majority, you are well-off, otherwise, hard luck!

@gurugeorge
I am speaking about the aims people can objectively pursue. If that is not morality for you then give it another name. E.g. Utilitarianism has the aim of: “the biggest good for the biggest number”. So what you are saying is not entirely true.

You asked questions then answered yourself in a way similar to the way I would have answered them.
“What business of yours is the particular distribution of goods in society?”
Exactly luck and arbitrariness seem to me to be at odds with objectivism.
As every thing we have is obtained by luck, which is arbitrary, any objective moral theory should try at least to rectify the situation to make it, as if it were objectively distributed or probably as close as possible to that.
If x = Person, it seems there is no reason that x lives a better life than another x, unless if it benefits that worse-off x (if you accept Rawl’s difference principle).
It is not about fault of whom, it is about making the distribution of well-being (closer to being) being objective.
Is it necessary for objective morality to exist to (try to) rectify cosmic injustice as you called it?
Do you believe at all that there is such a thing as objective morality?

@Fool
Well, specifically the topic is about two questions:
1. What are the minimum requirements for a moral theory to be supporting objective morality or classified under moral realism?
2. Could objective morality be about objective distribution of good among individuals? i.e eliminating or reducing randomness in that distribution?

It seems the only possible way for objective morality to exist is through aiming at equally dealing with equal cases. So I could say:
Objective morality is equally considering equal interests of sentient beings per life time

Instead of sentient beings, you can also say humans for simplification.

"per life time" of each individual because that is what matters. Imagine you were asked before you came to life whether you want to be born. Rationally you would consider the advantages and disadvantages of all your life between birth and death.

But equally considering equal interests is so demanding that it is impossible to achieve. Still I do not find some alternative that I can call objective which is raising my doubt that objective morality is imaginary

I would define objective morality,as I suppose as something like this;
"equal consideration of equal interests of sentient beings per life time",
or to simplify discussion, feel free to say of human beings.

I think it is objectively wrong to have differrent judgements on identical cases. Of course, a moral nihilist would say he does not have different judgments, his life and suffering or pleasure is just as morally irrelevant as that of others. However, he still feels that suffering bad and pleasure good for himself regardless of what he says.

Now why per life time?
Imagine you have been asked before you came to life whether you want to be sent to live your life on earth, the advantages minus disadvantages of your whole life time should be rationally considered. The same should therefore be assumed in an objective moral theory, I assume.

The problem that I do not have an answer to is this:
If objective morality is true, and I still assume it is, how can separateness of persons and equal consideration of equal interests be both required for objective morality and impossible to achieve?

This is raising my doubt that something might be wrong about moral realism. Now I wonder if there is an answer from a moral realist to this problem.

E.g. you can not equally consider the interests of a terrorist and someone he is willing to kill.

Or you can not equally consider the interests of a lion and the animal a lion needs to eat to survive.

The is no point to meet in the middle, and suffering and pleasure will not be distributed equally.

Basically it seems that objective morality is demanding what is impossible in nature.