True. Now what's that got to do with the point being argued? Need I remind you of it? — Isaac

Everything.

Why bring up the idea of Russia having legitimate security concerns when it didn't have them?

Think about those guys that years ago defended President Bush's decision to attack Iraq because of the threat that Saddam's then non-existent and fabricated by the White House WMD threat posed at the US? They too talked about legitimate security concerns being the justification for that war. Understanding the attacker.

And then they defended the decision that Bush just got "bad intel". As if the real culprits weren't in the White House with people like Dick Cheney.

To those like@ssu and Christoffer arguing that Russia has no legitimate security concerns because "it's a nuclear superpower", I wonder if you can explain why the US feels so differently about its strategic interests. — Isaac

Russia has no legitimate security reasons to invade a country that wasn't planning to attack it, didn't represented any threat to it and even it's hypothetical possibility of it joining NATO was extremely remote. Which btw wouldn't justify an all out war. Just as there was no legitimation for the US to attack Iraq, neither was there any legitimation to attack Ukraine in 2014 and continue the war with a full scale invasion this year.

So you can shove those legitimate security concerns up your ass, thank you.

Every fishing expedition, with the force of the American justice system, has found very little in the case of Trump. — NOS4A2

And now we have the defense team of Trump responding here... lol.

Fun fact, if and when Germany will now put it's defense spending at 2% of GDP, it's spending will be more than what Russia has in previous years spent. And let's not forget that 100 billion euro additional spending:



Then more arms to Ukraine. Now likely Germany will be the second largest supplier of arms to Ukraine.

Germany is considering to send €300 million ($335 million) worth of additional arms and military equipment to Ukraine, local media reported on Wednesday.

The Defense Ministry’s plan includes delivery of 2,650 anti-tank weapons, 3,000 night vision devices, thousands of protective vests and helmets, radar systems, 18 reconnaissance drones, and various armored vehicles, the Sueddeutsche Zeitung newspaper reported.

Likely Ukraine can form new infantry units or replace previous losses with such aid. Just the size of this aid makes it important.

It's funny how criticism and disagreement is immediately set aside as informed by ideology. — Benkei

If the criticism is going with the lies of Putin, it does reek of ideology. If the arguments are informative and respectful, I'm sure it's beneficial to engage in a discussion.

I also see exactly zero reason to applaud someone who purposefully states he's only here to share his opinion and not actual analysis and debate. — Benkei

To give just an example, that Putin's objective was a quick takeover of Ukraine is to my view good analysis. There aren't good counterarguments to think that somehow this wasn't the objective at the start of the war. That it didn't go the way he thought it would go should be obvious. What happens next isn't clear, of course.

Myriad investigations into Trump—lawsuits, committees, district attorneys peeking through his life. Nothing like that against Biden. — NOS4A2

The only consistency is that neither will likely ever be sentenced because of their corruption.

My view is simply that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is unjustifiable, unwarranted and fundamentally criminal. It has resulted in thousands of deaths already, massive destruction of cities and homes, and the displacement of millions of people. That is not 'western propaganda' nor is the war a consequence of western foreign policy meddling - it came about solely because of Putin's resentment at the demise of the USSR and his vain attempts to restore elements of it into a greater Russia. Every so often I will post something in this thread to register that view. That is all I wish to say, and I have no intention in becoming dragged into these interminable circular arguments which this thread seems to generate. — Wayfarer

:100: :up:

This is the correct way to proceed. I think the correct thing is to engage in discussion that is worth wile. If some have problems to see the real picture from their anti-Americanism or somehow feel that some facts seem for them to be too "pro-US" (starting from the fact that this war was indeed of Putin's making) or whatever, it's their problem.

Russia has likely far more political prisoners now that it had during the late Soviet era and the policies of Putin are making it a larger police state. His fear of "colour revolutions" in Russia won't make it easier. Things are now getting only worse there and the war will continue as Russia simply doesn't have today the ability for a new determined push Ukraine. It might take weeks before that happens.

More Biden family grift and corruption. Of course we knew about this for years, but we suppressed it for political purposes. — NOS4A2

As Republicans did with the Trump family. :wink:

Again, how it is that Trump supporters are not avid fans for Biden is beyond me. — StreetlightX

Don't ever think there is any logic to it. For Republicans, everything that Trump did was good. Everything (same) that Biden does is bad.

And the other way around for Democrats.

Never ever dare mention anything remotely critical about who you support! That's the logic.

This seems unlikely for the simple fact that Belarus is not so stable internally and they add little firepower anyways compared to Russia — boethius

Yes. I would emphasize more the tense political situation in Belarus. Remember the mass protests against Lukashenko? The last thing Belarus would need would be to participate in a war it has absolutely no appetite in participating in. That already quite openly Belarussians are volunteering to join the Ukrainian side tells something (and that the opposition leader is found outside the country).

It could be counterproductive for Putin to pressure Lukashenko to join the war even more.

Although this could be accurate, again I feel the need to debate it.

Agreed, total capitulation is what Putin, Kremlin and the Russia military would prefer (who wouldn't).

However, if you look at events on the ground, they go uncontested from Crimea, basically the first day to take Kherson and first couple days to link up with their forces in the East. These were insanely quick manoeuvres, and achieved 2 critical strategic objectives of taking a position South-West of the Dnieper, thus requiring Ukrainians to commit a large amount of troops to guarding a long defensive line to avoid Ukraine being cut North-South ... instead of a small amount of troops if they just blew-up all the bridges or defended Kherson with urban combat resulting in a prolonged siege. — boethius

I think that Ukrainian strategy hasn't been to stop the advances on the border, but defense in depth and to defend key cities. Defense in depth means to let the armoured spearheads to penetrate, wear the attacker down in depth and attack his supply lines and only defend key points like major crossings or cities. Do note the long advance that happen at the north to the eastern side of Kyiv also and also the various Ukrainian pockets. With the force levels and the size of the country, the front line can be quite sparse.

I remember also one commentator making the argument that the army responsible Crimean front came from the southern military district that has seen far more action than other armies (and hence it performance can be better).

Alarming? Not actually, but still...

(The Guardian) The Kremlin again raised the spectre of the use of nuclear weapons in the war with Ukraine as Russian forces struggled to hold a key city in the south of the country.

Dmitry Medvedev, a former Russian president who is deputy chairman of the country’s security council, said Moscow could strike against an enemy that only used conventional weapons while Vladimir Putin’s defence minister claimed nuclear “readiness” was a priority.

Russia would only use nuclear weapons in the context of the Ukraine conflict if it were facing an "existential threat," Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told CNN International Tuesday.

* * *

One possible way the conflict could become larger is if the fighting would have Belarus involved. But yet notice that here the talk is only about a "company", which could mean basically anything between 30 to 300 men (as voluntary groups aren't standard military formations). Yet I assume some would see sinister links here just with whom the Belarussian volunteers train with. Still it should be noted, that Belarus hasn't joined the fight. At least yet.

I'm talking about the derivative contracts to hedge your exchange rate risk. Those aren't currently exempted from what I understood because that's a regular financial contract between financial institutions and not commodity energy trading. — Benkei

Well, notice how this casino has worked: from negative prices to the present.

If prices go up enough or Putin switches if the gas, at least gas for heating won't be an issue. Electricity though... — Benkei

Depending on the price, Russia has gotten about half or one third of it's governments revenues from hydrocarbons. As stated even in this thread, the real sanctions that matter is the gas/oil trade with Russia.

Yet Russia is at war and however they claim the "tactical truth" of talking about special military operation, they now they are in a large war. Putin and his regime knows that. Hence that there is a severe economic depression doesn't actually matter. The it's estimated that the Russian GDP will fall 10% this year and Russia's economy will shrink to what it was a decade ago doesn't matter. For Putin it's nearly irrelevant: unlike in the case of Biden, there aren't any angry voters ready to vote for the opposition because the prices are so high.

In the European context basically the issue is about the existence of true political leadership of the lack of it. More closer you go towards Ukraine, the more likely it is that people would accept higher gas prices as costs of opposing Russia. The worst case is that politicians deny there's going to be any effect ...and then the country hits a crisis.

The worst possible option is for decision makers to put their heads into sand and pretend that alternative energy / renewable resources will save the day. They might do that, in a decade or two, but not now as we are going to face an immediate supply problem. And thus their actual decision (the one they don't publicly announce) will be to dig up more coal. And then in a year or so we notice that coal production has gone up and the promises of carbon neutrality (or coal phase out) aren't going to be met at all.

So you have to pay in rubles, based on a price that looks ok today but which could absolutely suck in 3 or 6 months time due to changes in the exchange rate. — Benkei

The Urals price is something like 30 dollars cheaper to the Brent price. But of course Putin announcing that the payments have to be paid in rubles is a breach of contract. But anyway, a lot of breached contracts in a war.

How are you going to pay for it when they're no longer on SWIFT? — Benkei

Do note that this wasn't taken off from SWIFT.

All this will just quicken the change out of Russia oil and gas for Europe.

The really annoying thing is that this will likely increase coal production, because of course nuclear cannot be an option.

But Biden's policies are even more confusing:

Biden administration officials traveled to Venezuela over the weekend for talks on potentially allowing the country to sell its oil on the international market, helping to replace Russian fuel. Biden may travel to Saudi Arabia as the US works to convince the kingdom to increase its production. And a looming nuclear deal could bring significant volumes of Iranian oil back to the market.
Caracas, Riyadh and Tehran would have been unlikely sources of relief for a Biden-led Western alliance before the start of the war in Ukraine. But Russia's invasion has upended international relations, forcing the US and other nations to seek out solutions in places they'd previously shunned.

So in order to put sanctions on one country, other sanctions on other countries are lifted? Yet this point is absolutely crucial for Biden because the higher gas prices will be in the US, the lower his approval rating will be. Already there is inflation (thanks to the insane monetary policies), and this will make it worse.

Of course the logical question here is, why not rely on Canada? Well, here the reasons are obvious result from past decisions. A Canadian commentator sums it up why Canadian oil/gas isn't the logical solution (as it could be):

Experts seem to agree that our (Canadian) contribution will be marginal at best, because our energy industry has been starved of investment for years. All because governments have scared away investors by consistently blocking proposed pipelines and LNG export terminals, which could now be supplying our allies in the U.S., Asia and Europe with oil and gas from a democratic country that abides by the rule of law, has strong environmental standards and has no imperial or genocidal ambitions.

The tragedy is that if governments — including the Biden administration, which nixed the Keystone XL pipeline on Day 1 — had simply gotten out of the way and allowed decisions over pipelines and other infrastructure projects to be made by private businesses and landowners, including First Nations, Canada would have a much greater ability to produce and export its natural resources, at little to no cost to the treasury.

In Europe now those LNG export/import terminals and everything else have to be built on a crash course and likely with more cost now. But they will be built and perhaps in a year or some time the West won't need Russia's hydrocarbons.

(note the country that has anticipated that Russian gas might be a problem and not only planning but already constructing more LNG terminals: )

Yes, Crimea was quite close to being an unmitigated victory for Putin, whereas this will be a problematic victory at best with quite a bit of downside in the short term. — Baden

Victorious military operations that went perhaps even better than planned typically later breed hubris and overconfidence.

I wish the war was an 'unmitigated disaster' for Russia, but the fact that they're winning, despite their problems, mitigates the disaster somewhat for me from any reasonably objective perspective. It still puzzles me how you'd refer to the war if Russia was losing or looked like any of its major goals (Ukranian neutrality, autonomy for Donbass) were under threat. But, whatever, we'll just have to agree to differ on that. — Baden

I think here it should be proper to consider a successful Russian military operation: that is the invasion and annexation of Crimea in 2014. There was a) total strategic surprise, b) extremely successful information campaign, c) swift overtaking of objectives and d) successful joint operations with the intelligence services and the army, which was then solidified politically by a referendum for Crimea to join Russia. And Russians were very happy about it! Nothing like the scenes below happened then:



Sanctions against Russia weren't similar as now, and we didn't see changes in policy like has happened with Germany. Yes, the time of the West "resetting" the Russian ties was indeed over. But I guess Putin had to show a lot for it. Or think it other way. How many Russian generals were fired, killed, put into house arrest? None.

If now the objectives are basically issues that Russia had already: a) Ukraine wasn't joining NATO and b) it held portion of the Donbas, then that is quite little to show for a war. I think Putin needs far more than that.

Once Russia captures Mariupol, then it can start to consolidate it's position and get the initiative firmly in it's hands. It hasn't happened yet... can happen tomorrow or next week.

That the war is going disastrously for Russia, which it demonstrably is, doesn’t mean that Russia won’t succeed in imposing itself on some or all of the country, or dividing it up in some way. — Wayfarer

Yep.

The US can win every engagement and then lose the war. The Russians can fumble in nearly every engagement, sustain a lot of casualties and then win the war. A good historical example of that (which cannot be said to be propaganda as it's now history) is the Russo-Georgian war. Only that the Georgians were caught even more off guard helped the Russians win the war. And even if the Russians won the war, Putin started a large reformation of the army because of the dismal performance. Seldom a side that won a war is so critical about it's performance.

What should be noted that the dismal performance in the start of this invasion is mainly due to the poor assumptions that Ukrainians wouldn't fight, which was an intelligence failure. Russians seemed to mimick the 2003 Invasion of Iraq and the way US armoured columns pushed into Baghdad. (If the Iraqi defense would have been more concentrated and motivated, even then it could have been different.) But now we are over that stage.

I am perfectly capable of recognising the biases in the media sources I read - CNN, SMH, ABC, and so on. It doesn’t alter the facts on the ground. — Wayfarer

Just to say that Russians had a bad start is enough to be a "cheerleader" for Ukraine / the West for some. Or to note the civilian casualties.

No, you made a comparison and then gave weighting to that comparison. — StreetlightX

Well, that's what I tried to say.

Do note that the wars Putin has started, the weapons projects he has established, the role of the military in modern day Russia. It's just a similar example, perhaps even more stark.

But of course, the US military industry is far larger. And going to get larger, thanks to this war...

Yeah, sure, and this has any bearing on the laughable claim that compared to the US, war as a racket is clearer in the Russian case. — StreetlightX

The real racket would be I guess the war in Iraq and Dick Cheney and Halliburton. Halliburton already became the largest construction company in the US during the Vietnam war ...because of the Vietnam war.

But one should not forget that Russia has this phenomenon too. Just my point. If you find that laughable, then laugh as hard as you want...

There's a lot fog of war and certainly anything is "possible", but while everything else has being going on in Ukraine, Russia has been bombarding and bombing the Dombas front for a month now.

There's a material and man-power degradation of these lines that is reasonable to assume is pretty severe.

There's also a psychological affect on these front line Ukrainian soldiers.

And then there is the fact that the Dombas line is 17 hour continuous drive from resupply in Poland but only 1 and half hour drive from Russia.

Of the news that comes from this area, it seems Russia has broken through in key places already. — boethius

I wouldn't say that would be reason to assume they are collapsing.

Finland accepted defeat to end the continuation war. Finland did not "win" against Russia. — boethius

Yet Finland existed, wasn't occupied. What else is there for Ukraine? Likely there won't be Ukrainian tanks on the Red Square either, so they can't "win" in the traditional sense.

didn't see all that much actual building anything in Afghanistan these last 20 years ... definitely felt more like a destructive process more than an act of love, the advertised. — boethius

Something was done, even if what the West did was to produce an extremely corrupt system which was totally unsustainable. One generation of women were educated, at least, now to face unemployment and being confided to the kitchen again. The simple fact was that Afghanistan couldn't in any way uphold such a government and a public sector (including the military) as it had without Western aid. It simply didn't add up. And hence when the Americans were constantly reminding everyone that they were going away ...and with Trump basically capitulated to the Taleban, then it was no wonder what happened.

Yes, when you pour money into a poor country, you will create corruption and theft. And such will happen in Ukraine, but Ukraine is still in a far better situation than Afghanistan was. Even after this war.

Lol, no one who has looked at where the proportion of money - the only thing that counts - — StreetlightX

And in a smaller economy, which is one tenth of the size of the US GDP, those Russian arms manufacturers are far more important that in the US for the US economy.

Russia's defense industry employs 2.5 – 3 million people and accounts for 20% of all manufacturing jobs in Russia.

Add then in the corruption in the society. If you don't understand that the link to the "military-industrial complex" is bigger in Russia to the Russian economy and politics, well...

Sure, Urkainian total capitulation would have been the most rosiest outcome, but there is no evidence Russia's core objectives aren't exactly what it's stated, — boethius

That is illogical.

You simply wouldn't attack like that if you would have alternative objectives. If the objective would never have been Kyiv, why then attack there? Then those Combined Arms Armies in Belarus / Russian border opposing Ukraine from the north would have just by existence prevented Ukraine from sending those brigades in defense of the Capitol into the Donbas or the South. And they could be still then act as reserves.

There's no question about the primary objectives that Russia had. They failed to be met as intended at the start of the invasion. And now Putin surely can come up with smaller objectives.

will be accomplished with the collapse of the Dombas front (which seems to me in the process of collapsing). — boethius

OK, on what do you base this assumption on? That's the area where Russia isn't yet on the defensive an making some progress? Not yet an imminent collapse.

If Ukrainians cannot, regardless of the amount of ATGM's and Manpads poured into Ukraine, actually push the Russians back to their borders ... how does a war of attrition (in a "stalemate") work in Ukraines favour? — boethius

Well, just like it worked with Finland both in the Winter War and the Continuation War. War of attrition does work.

I do not think any Ukrainian views this as a "win" ... and I fear Western generosity may run into all those "realists" after all, when it comes to pouring in tangible love rather than arms. — boethius

I don't think anybody considers it a win. Not even the future contractors that will build (again) Ukrainian cities after this war.

It's possible ... but, again, if this is the likely "cost" to the Russians, how does that help any Ukrainian? — boethius

Jingoistic imperialism usually fades away after wars that have been failures. Don't forget that Putin views independent Ukraine as an "artificial construct". If those kind of delusional attitudes can be changed, that would be a good start.

Of course, on the other side military industry is part of culture, with much admired cultural icons like Mikhail Kalashnikov:

Kalashnikov's daughter, Yelena, unveiled the statue Tuesday at a square off Garden Ring Road, a busy thoroughfare in Russia's capital city. - Tuesday's ceremony included military music and a blessing by a Russian Orthodox priest, The Guardian reports. Russian Culture Minister Vladimir Medinsky said the gun had become a "cultural brand of Russia."

So the issue of war being a racket is a far more clear in the Russian case. Which I think people rarely care about:

Corruption in Russian defense is not limited to the military-industrial complex. It penetrates the political level as well, likely altering the incentive structure for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s top security officials. Recent investigations show that top officials in the Russian Defense Ministry own property that significantly outmatches their income, pointing to possible involvement in corrupt deals.

Maintaining a luxurious lifestyle disincentivizes top security officials from giving expert advice that might disappoint the autocrat and cost them access to corruption networks. In the case of Ukraine, this would have meant the risk of reporting to Putin that the country he wanted to invade would put up a fight, that civilians were not looking forward to joining the “Russian world” and would likely greet troops with Molotov cocktails rather than bread and salt, as per local tradition. In this way, the corrupt loyalty of Putin’s top officials might have backfired and contributed to intelligence failures and erroneous risk assessments in Ukraine.

Of course, corruption in the Russian security sector does not predetermine the outcome of the war. Russia still has extensive capabilities and numerous troops to be thrown into combat. But whatever gains the military might make, they will have done so while battling the challenges caused by rampant corruption, from erroneous risk assessment at the top to expired military rations on the ground.

Biden's looking like a rock star. Couldn't Putin have waited a couple more years to do this? — frank

I thought his ratings were in the toilet. But anyway, do you think he'll run again? — Baden

I think Biden is still unpopular. So perhaps a rock star who has lost his fans, perhaps gained too much weight, cut his heavy-rock hair and now reminds the previous fans of their dad.



Americans first and foremost care about the economy (which isn't so much what the POTUS work is about) and now you have very high inflation, which started well before the war in Ukraine.

No, this was in 1997. So, he was specifically referring to the post Soviet era. — Baden

Ok. Then I stand corrected.

I just don't think there's been anything that would result in them not achieving their major objectives as outlined by Boethius. And their significance will be ovestated by our propaganda and understated or denied by theirs. — Baden

I understand that one has to be sceptical about Western media, however one shouldn't forget that:
a) Ukraine is a huge country, b) It has large armed forces, c) it has shown the will to fight and d) it is supported by a huge alliance and finally e) Russia isn't Soviet Union and hasn't the former's resources.

All the above facts make it totally possible that the outcome is a standstill with neither side reaching it's rosiest objectives. To assume that Russia will inevitably win and reach it's objectives is a long shot.

I'm on board with this. There is a solution there imo, i.e. acquiesce to basic Russian demands with maybe a bit of face-saving negotiation around them. — Baden

Neither side is yet, after a month, is really willing to cease operations and declare that their objectives have been met. Of course both sides will declare victory...but when and at what cost. Thinking that either side will abruptly now collapse isn't realistic.

The biggest danger though is that Zelensky hopes that the longer he draws out the war, the more there is a chance of some kind of accident or spark that gets NATO involved on his side. He may feel it's worth the gamble if he's painted himself into a corner of not accepting any loss of Ukraine sovreignty. — Baden

I think that NATO and US are far more timid than they were in the proxy wars during the Cold War. The Polish MiG-29 debacle clearly shows that. In truth if the fighters would have been painted to Ukrainian colours and flown by Ukrainian pilots to Ukraine wouldn't have resulted in WW3.

And note that Zelensky would be all too happy about a "no-fly-zone" made up with Ukrainian manned Soviet legacy system (that would have been imported from NATO countries).

I think this war will go on far longer than anybody anticipated and be more bloody and ruinous for both sides than anybody thought. At least Ukraine has the nice prospect of refurbishing all that old infrastructure after the "urban renovation" from the Russian Army and Air Force with Western aid.

For Russia this might be an ordeal like the Russo-Japanese war, which didn't go so well afterwards in the domestic scene for the Czar.

I think Vlad is right to be nervous. It may be more serious than the FSB having just erred in their assessment.

The US had access to tiptop intel prior to the war about what was planned (even though few believed their predictions of an all out aggression, even in Ukraine). Possibly they were tipped from the FSB (or another source). And two weeks ago the Ukrainian side said they fought back a Wagner force aiming to kill Zelensky, thank to tips coming directly from the FSB. — Olivier5

A dictator can interpret the "yes"-men behaviour of giving rosy pictures that then backfires as intentionally done deception. Add here that it really does seem that the Western intelligence did get tips about the invasion will make nearly anyone paranoid about the mole.

Of course, the pre-war intel was crucial here.

The invasion would have made total sense assuming the Ukrainians wouldn't have put up a fight. If they would have been as paralyzed as they were in 2014 (when from 160 000 army could only muster up a fighting force of 6000 men and had a handful of combat capable fighter aircraft) or would have caved like the Afghan Army and the Ukrainian leadership would have flown to the West, then indeed it would have been the way to go. Otherwise the invasion plan simply went against even basic Russian military doctrine. You don't attack an enemy force of 200 000 with 190 000 men.

Yet now the question is what to do now in this situation. And it might be now one possibility is simply to organize those reserves (which can take several months) and during that time take a time out and defend your positions and hope that you inflict losses to Ukraine if it counterattacks and only try advancing in the most favorable areas.

It's possible it could happen again, but it in the same order. — frank

Well, let's remember that before the Great War that started in 1914, the last huge European war were the Napoleonic wars. And that had been ages ago and there wasn't any historical memory of such total war as the World Wars we have now. And there were no nuclear weapons.

We have a totally different collective memory of World War 1 and it's continuation, WW2 and at least those that have been born during the Cold War remember quite well the scare of WW3 during the Cold War. Hence such sleepwalking into a bigger war isn't likely in my view as happened in the summer of 1914. It is already quite evident from the timid way that the US and NATO act in the support of Ukraine.

(In 1914, they were enthusiastic about the war, as can be seen in the pictures...)

A bit more analysis on whether the failure to advance further on Kyiv was a disaster or intentional or something in between. — Baden

Do notice that there obviously was a intelligence gaffe, which Putin likely hasn't been all too happy. The most likely reason is that Putin has had in his inner circle fellow minded people and anyone thinking that this "special military operation" wouldn't be a great idea was sidetracked. The three intelligence services (SVR, the FSB, which handles the near abroad, and the GRU) likely did give them intelligence that they wanted to hear. After all, the 2014 invasion had worked splendidly, hence the idea that it could continue similarly could be something that you could sell in the Kremlin. It's not hard to find such examples of this, when one remembers the way how the American intelligence services reacted to the wishes of the neocon White House before the invasion of Iraq.

Vladimir Putin has placed the head of the FSB's foreign service and his deputy under house arrest after blaming them for intelligence failings that saw his army handed a series of embarrassing defeats in Ukraine, it has been claimed.

Andrey Soldatov, a respected author on the Russian secret services, said sources inside the FSB told him that Sergey Beseda, 68, head of the agency's foreign service, has been placed under arrest on Putin's orders.

Also arrested is Anatoly Bolyukh, Beseda's deputy, according to Soldatov, who said Putin is 'truly unhappy' with the agency - which he ran before becoming president.

The fifth department of the FSB (Operational Information and International Relations), ran the "near abroad" and was responsible for missions in Ukraine, has been said to been raided by the both FSO, Federal Protective Service of the Russian Federation, Putin’s own security service.

But of course now this is old news and the reality now is that Putin might really be thinking of looking at just Donbas and the landbridge to Crimea. The question is what Ukrainians think about it and just how much Putin is willing to fight for. He hasn't lost a war yet, so it might be hard for him.

I personally fear that the war will just continue for far longer even if a conclusion could be made earlier.

"You may not humiliate a nation and think it will have no consequences." — Baden

I guess he was speaking on behalf of the Soviet Union. Wasn't also Ukraine a large part of it, or is just the Russian federation the only successor state of the Union? Just asking..

World war continued with a pandemic, yes, that's the history.

In that respect, if that was to proceed, I'm thinking that all Ukrainians throughout be allowed to freely attain citizenship either way (and relocate when they can, without coercion obstruction reprisals threats or whatever, I mean). — jorndoe

Over one and a half million people have fled the area, the majority to other parts in Ukraine, but also hundreds of thousands have fled into Russia. Before Russia's assault happened, many (usually women and children) were evacuated from Donetsk and Luhansk to Russia. Already in 2019 Putin declared that all citizens in Donetsk and Luhansk can get Russian citizenship. About 720 000 have now got Russian citizenship. Now it seems to be a higher number:

(DW) In 2019, Russia began to distribute Russian passports to the area's inhabitants. According to the latest reports, some 800,000 eastern Ukrainians are said to have Russian citizenship — an estimated 15 to 25% of the population, although exact figures are hard to obtain. This is the central argument behind the Kremlin's recognition of the independence of the separatist regions.

The idea of people freely choosing their citizenship either way in a warzone is unrealistic.

If true, interesting. And of course, the numbers can vary.

Yet what is likely that Ukraine hasn't used it's armored forces heavily as it tries to preserve it's strength, just as it tries to preserve it's meagre air force. A conventional counterattack might give a too good target to the Russian forces and cause severe attrition to the fewer Ukrainian armored units.

(Forbes) Ukraine has lost at least 74 tanks—destroyed or captured—since Russia widened its war on the country starting the night of Feb. 23.

But Ukraine has captured at least 117 Russian tanks, according to open-source-intelligence analysts who scrutinize photos and videos on social media.

In other words, the Ukrainian army might actually have more tanks now than a month ago—all without building a single brand-new tank or pulling some older vehicle out of storage.

The Russians meanwhile have captured at least 37 Ukrainian tanks—a sum inadequate to compensate for the roughly 274 tanks it is believed to have lost to all causes.

The disparity in captured tanks speaks to Russia’s lack of preparation for a high-intensity war against a determined foe. But it also speaks to the advantages any defender possesses over any attacker.

Tell me, if you and your best friend were presidents of two opposing nuclear powers, how would you approach the subject? Total disarmament? "I found president X very disarming" or would you plan for the day one or both were replaced my madmen, 'neocons' or imperialists? Would you win any elections. I don't think there will be any peacenick presidents in our future. — FreeEmotion

It's a long process for countries to change their views of others from "possible enemy" to friend. Now many politicians indeed can have "peacenick" ideas, but it takes a while before the militaries themselves have "peacenick" ideas.

Just think of the United States and the United Kingdom. After WWI they had been allies.

Even after the two countries fought WW1 together, the US had warplans called War Plan Red to fight the British alongside their plans for a possible war with Japan (War Plan Yellow).



Now how incredible does that sound? What's the reasoning behind it? Well, not much if anything. And just how easily tensions can rise is when you look at the relationship that China and the Soviet Union had. So from being on the same side in Korea, later they had a border war.

Nearly the last thing to disappear is the hypothetical possibility of a conflict, and a lot of integration and friendly ties and relationships happen before. And far more likely before total disarmament is that your generals and your best friends generals are cozily sharing planning joint actions towards a possible third country as a hypothetical threat.

t is entirely possible that at the end (if there is an end) the Russians will declare that their goal was always whatever it is that they will have decided to settle on, and that will be it. — SophistiCat

Not only entirely possible, but very likely. Putin's Russia has already moved a lot into the realm of Soviet style information policy and narrative.

The fact that calling the war a war is forbidden tells this totally clear. There are more political prisoners in Russia than there were in the Soviet Union in the 1970's according to some observers. The exact number is obviously unknown.

Just a year ago:

The number of political prisoners in Russia today is nearly five times higher than it was five years ago, according to the latest report from the Memorial Human Rights Center. Activists began maintaining a list of Russian political prisoners in the late 2000s, and for a long time it was made up of a few dozen names. But this tally has increased sharply since 2015. Today, the country has 420 political prisoners and is poised to catch up to the numbers seen during the twilight years of the USSR.

And now, btw, the Memorial Human Rights Center, the oldest human rights group in Russia, which now is being foreclosed. It's primary function was to record the crimes against humanity during Stalin and the Soviet Union.

Mutually Assured Commitment to Chickening out? — FreeEmotion

That has happened many times. Which is the good thing here. And that's why it's largely hypothetical the idea of "escalate-to-de-escalate" and the whole debate about the use of nuclear weapons is hypothetical. The use of let's say conventional ballistic missiles isn't: there in use, actually with both side in the Ukraine conflict.

I remember a story of Leonid Brezhnev. He was participating in a military exercise in the Soviet Union as head of the state. So when the exercise came to moment where he would confirm the launching of the Soviet nuclear weapons (and Soviet doctrine was based on using nuclear weapons to counter Western air superiority), he started to panic and fearfully started to ask: "This is an exercise, right?".

Another telling anecdote I read came from the memoirs of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Reagan and Bush, admiral Crowe. Usually high level wargames that had nuclear weapons ended with both Cold War sides refraining to use them. So they wanted to see what would happen when they were used and tilted the wargame that nuclear exchanges would happen. The result was that the wargame itself became so tense and nerve wrecking for the participants that one had to be hospitalized.

It's obvious that nuclear weapons aren't thought of as just weapons with more firepower than ordinary weapons. Which is a good thing.

Is there anything "morally wrong" about total disarmament? I am missing something here. — FreeEmotion

It's not just a moral question and when all war is morally wrong, I guess total disarmament is morally correct.

However:

Switzerland is surrounded by EU countries that likely won't invade it or militarily pressure it. Why would it need it's army? Well, the argument is that we cannot know what the future brings us and once you have disbanded your deterrence, hard to get it back. Similar with nuclear weapons. If someone accepts to disarm totally the nuclear arsenal and then simply lies and others go through with it.

A side with nuclear weapons when others don't have it can quite freely make military excursions and use military force, as can be seen from the example of Israel or Russia (with Ukraine).

I think it's quite rare for general to be killed. This many dead generals is far from good news from a military perspective. — Manuel

When things don't work and junior leaders don't take initiative, then it's a general that has to go to the front and sort it out. Which is a dangerous place.

That's one way to look at it, yes.

If the question can't be answered it is o.k, but I am simply asking, would, in your mind, a 'limited response' 'even a conventional response' be any less effective deterrent than a 'total response?' — FreeEmotion

The basic problem is that nobody of course does know how in reality any nuclear exchange would go. What could be said that neither side would be enthusiastic to continue the escalation. But a "tit-for-tat" could happen.

The time has passed when Curtis LeMay during the Cuban Missile crisis could think that having nuclear war could be the option: Russia had only a few ICBMs back then. LeMay and US generals could perhaps have the reasoning that "let's have it now" attitude, although there's no historical proof of this during the Cuban crisis. In the 1980's and afterwards it has been totally different.

What we can go with is historical events, where you obviously have had far smaller exchanges, but still:

Example 1:

President Trump kills Iranian general Qasem Soleimani in Iraq in January 3rd 2020 with a drone strike. Iran retaliates on January 8th with 12 ballistic missiles fired at US bases. 110 US Servicemen suffer from mainly concussions with few recieving later the Purple Heart.

No response from the US.

Example 2:

Turkey shoots down a Russian fighter bomber after it had veered into Turkish aerospace in 2015. The Russian pilot was killed, the navigator was rescued.

No military response from Russia. Russia-Turkish relations strained for a while, but got back to normal in 2016.

Of course these are totally minor events, but It should be noted that on both occasions neither Russia or the US escalated the situation afterwards with some punitive strikes (in the US case, Trump didn't counter the Iranian attack). The reality is that Iran isn't Saddam's Iraq and even the neocons didn't attack the country as it would be militarily a stupid move: it's a large country with reasonable armed forces.

So I guess that after a "limited strike" getting "limited response" back, what then? After two tactical nuclear weapons exchanged (likely on military targets), what would be the reason or the motivation to continue? Everybody would be panicking. It just isn't really smart in any way. The only way would be if you would be sure that the other side will chicken out.

:100: :up:

Well, it's been anticipated that Belarus would join the fight for a long time. And it hasn't.

Yet the fact is the Russian reality is absolutely strange. It's a myriad of strange occurrences and crazy events in the eyes of Westerners. I don't know what would come close to it: a perpetual Trump administration? It's really different from the West.

In a way it's on purpose organized to various different elements, a multitude of intelligence services with their own military forces and to army and national guard, in order that there wouldn't be some strong counterweight to Putin himself. Quite similar to the Third Reich, actually.

Could someone please enlighten me on this MAD strategy. — FreeEmotion

I think it's already has changed from mutually assured destruction to "reasonable" assured destruction as the amount of nuclear weapons have luckily been decreased radically. US and Russian politicians in the 1990's did some good agreements and many of those Russian warheads ended up as nuclear fuel for American cities (one of the rare nice stories about disarmament). The country that is increasing it's nuclear deterrence is China. But it's still way smaller than the US and Russian stockpiles:

The number of Chinese nuclear warheads could increase to 700 within six years, the report said, and may top 1,000 by 2030. The report released on Wednesday did not say how many weapons China has today, but a year ago the Pentagon said the number was in the “low 200s” and was likely to double by the end of this decade.