Check out Heidegger — macrosoft

Heidegger made in my view metaphysics. He suggested that only Germanic people are humans due to they construct their existential project (consisting for Heidegger in killing Jews, due to they are calculators ...). More, he thought that irationalism is rational, so he was either Nazi or absurd.

I think your post is based on a fundamental mistake about what philosophers, prior to modernity, thought that science was — Wayfarer

My point it that philosophy, as differentiate discipline, is not supported by several famous philosophers, including Aristotle, the only pre-modern in my list.

Thanks for the responses.

Thank for the comments.

an exploration of the limitations of linguistic understanding and what language means beyond the colloquial use — I like sushi

In my view, it is "semantic" matter, or linguistic one in general.

pure human thought without any fallacies, prejudices, or contradictions — hks

Kant would not be agree that philosophy is contradictions free.

focused on critically examining assumptions that we make, as well as trying to describe, account for and occasionally prescribe things about the world based on abstract structural relations — Terrapin Station

Science works on assumptions (theoretical side). The prescribing role could be interesting. Some philosophical accounts have turned to psychological theories (e.g. the mental files theory of Perner, grounden in Frege`s semantic). But it is (theoretical) science after all.

Philosophy is logical investigation which provides a coherent concept — Galuchat

Again, it is science. Science is not just to make experiments, but to design the experiments, which is often the claimed matter of philosophy, contrarily to the common view of philosophers.

Obviously, the "crossing out" rule only works for certain premises and notations. My claim is that there are other "rules" with the same consequence for all logical system, which use always a linguistic notation (they are formal languages). For example, for (p=>q) = ~(p^~q) someone could interpret than "=>" means that we must cross out two "~" signs and one "^" sign, so pq=pq.
The point is that all notation system do not prevent the existence of heuristic rules that led both to formal and necessary conclusions. I try to show cases of logical luck.

The point is that the crossing out is other logic than "classic" modus ponens, but it is a formal way that leds to a valid conclusion (necessarily true if premises are true). But is seems not to be a logical consequence of premises.

In my view, Kant's examples of synthetic a priori are not theorems, as I said wrongly in the first commentary. The synthetic a priori fits for example to mathematical conjectures and physics predictions.

The Goldbach conjecture, for example, is true a priori, and synthetic. If someone proves it, the conjecture will become into a theorem, and so it will be true a posteriori. A priori and a posteriori in my opinion are able to capture the distinction between predictive and retrospective knowledge.

There is no way for a premise to be determined true or false except relative to another premise — khaled

When a the truth-value of a premise is relative to other premises, it is not called "premise" but "conclusion".

The assertion (1) "There are no a priori synthetic truths" can be tested by showing a example of a priori and synthetic truth, as Kant showed. Mathematics theorems are a good example. Thus, (1) is a posteriori and synthetic, due to it refers to something that either exist or not.

Logic is an instrument of justification. The logical systems have or not consistency, completeness, etc. They are some of properties of some logical systems. "Justified" is not a property of logical systems, insofar I understand, so the response is that logic is not "justified". "Knowledge", but not "logic", can be or not "justified", regarding logic and empirical evidence. The apparent paradox emerges when you assume that "logic" have epistemic properties such as "justification".

Metaphysics assertions led to contradictions, as Kant showed. We can prove that the world is created and not-created, and so. The metaphysics is not an object of experience or understanding, but of desires. We know that the concept of God, World and Soul are contradictory, but we make how if they would exist (in a regulative way) because often we want that they were real.

Saying we are living in a simulation run by super intelligent beings is logically the same as saying we live in a universe created by God — T Clark

I am agree. My view is that Goodness and Simulation arguments are very close, so by definition God would be able to occult us.

I want to say that mental states fit brain functions, and mental states also have functions (to predict movement, differentiate objects, etc.), but these are at individual level. The individual level is often neglected in the accounts to mind-brain problem. We can account this problem in a basic way by stating 3 levels and pragmatism: there is actors, actions, instruments, mechanisms, etc. The Hard Problem is lack if you consider that it is not possible that an instrument working into a mechanism (brain producing consciousness) does not realize the corresponding function or action (It is not possible to think Chalmers's zombies, C-fibers without felling pain, etc. as it is not possible to think a knife cutting without something being cut).

Since I do not endorse that mental states have not a function, but they are a function, of brain states, this argument about the identity does not work for me. In my view, the relation between mind and individual is ontological: that is, subject X makes the action Y, and then we say for example that X makes Y due to think T. Then, T is something that X also makes. However, between brain and individual does not happen the same. Brain is the instrument by X thinks T, so between T and brain state B there is a action/instrument relation like cutting and knife (but not actor/action like for X and T).

I try to show that your 1) premise is not true, so your argument is lack (or it is a vacuous tautology).

I think, as I posted at beginning, that there are 1) individuals (sociological level), which 2) use its brain (biological level) 3) to think (psychological level).
Basically, we explain 1) by 3), and 3) by 2).

1) Mental states and occurences are defined by their functional roles.
2) The functional roles so defined are filled by states of and occurences in the brain (well, let's be honest, you'll need more than just a brain to fill some of these functional roles, the rest of the body will probably have to get a look-in).
3)Therefore, mental states and occurences are brain (bodily) states and occurences. — MetaphysicsNow

I think that mental states are not defined by their functional roles, but brain states. That is, in 1) you must change "mental" for "brain". Then 1) and 2) state the same, so 3) is actually "mental states are brain functions".

The terms "instrumentalism", "functionalism", "pragmatism" mean different things in different contexts and in some contexts are not even compatible with each other. — MetaphysicsNow

And they can also mean the same, such as the context of my previous answer.
I am explained my view in previous post, so I will not repeat it. Basically I can be considered a some kind of zombie-arguments hunter.

But it's curious how so many people can believe that transistor-switchings somewhere can create a world, but that a world couldn't consist of the system of abstract facts itself — Michael Ossipoff

I do not understand what do you mean by "system of abstract facts itself".

Sorry for my expression, I try to be the clearest as I can. My claim is that Singularity is by definition unknown, such as God in religions, the player in video games, etc. A super IA is by definition, able to occult its existence.

then not only is the simulation more probable in the future, is it not inevitable? — Arne

It is possible that in the future there is not a Singularity, so I can not see the inevitability. Option 1) prevents it.

he was saying that our physical world could be a computer program that doesn't need a computer — Michael Ossipoff

I can not understand this claim. Software without hardware is for me a nonsense like mind without brain or a "substantiation" of functions.

Or perhaps I could think with someone else's brain, and not my own? — MetaphysicsNow

I am an instrumentalist, functionalist, pragmatist, etc.: brain is the evolutionary solution to the advantage that think has. Individual is which thinks, and brain is the instrument, such as knife and cutting onions.

Sorry, I am editing the post.

Does your concept of consciousness, in the context of philosophy of mind, admit of degrees of consciousness? — bert1

I think it is a very interesting question. Consciousness can be the "vividness" (number of pixels), but also the "integrity" (i.e., not superposition between them, how when two channels of TV match, so they are "superposed"). Both of them admit of degrees.

What distinugishes a human from a computer? — TheMadFool

Computer is a mathematical concept. Alan Turing defined it (the Turing machine) and also its limits (the halting problem). Human is the biological specie of Alan Turing.

Very well, here is an example, the precision of an iq test has the 95% reliability interval at measured iq + or - 15 iq points. 15 iq points is also the standard deviation in measured iq in a population. — Tomseltje

It is another abstract example. I do not understand what want you say with this. In my view, a rational skepticism would question the validity of the Raven Test, or any other IQ test (Mensa, etc).

wich claim I made are you referring to? — Tomseltje

You said that rejecting IQ tests shows low IQ, and to question its validity shows high IQ.

Why do you want me to cite an iq test as evidence? — Tomseltje

Because you are questioning them, but you do not cite anyone. It is such as to question that thermometers are not reliable, but without to give an example of it. Your criticisms is not critic.

Wich theory would that be, and why don't you consider it to be plausible? — Tomseltje

Scientific theories are supported by empirical data. You have not data (I suppose) of your claim.

My point is that we still have much to improve on iq tests to increase their accuracy — Tomseltje

It is possible, but again you do not show any evidence. You should cite any actual IQ tests, how the are designed, etc. For me the your is not the scientific way of questioning validity (which in addition can be either "internal" -reliability- or "external" -generality-).

Your theory about IQ (predictable by people's belief about IQ tests) is not plausible. I said that dismissed IQ tests shows low IQ ironically. IQ is predicted by IQ tests, but of course not exclusively. Science always tends to go beyond the present knowledge, so we do not have reason to assume that present tests are the best.

If you think that IQ tests are bad designed, so they are not scientifically valid, you should show some kind of evidence. If your argument is that empirical science is inherently "invalid" in some grade, it is a selection fallacy or a kind of general skepticism equally fallacious.

Social, linguistic and musical features of intelligence are also measured in the IQ test. People only show the limitations of empirical science for psychology of intelligence. It is a clear case of selection bias.

Since the term "intelligent" is not universally well defined, their measurement is obviously not easy. IQ tests are one of these attempts to define "intelligent" so that measurement can be done. — FLUX23

In my opinion, this rules for all psychological (and scientific in general) concepts. Only logical and math concepts are "universally well defined".

By God you are right! — MetaphysicsNow

You can be sure. I work in a very related domain. People often do not know what is an IQ test.

And the only thing that IQ tests have ever been able to tell about anyone is how good or bad they are at taking IQ tests. — MetaphysicsNow

This the wrong point. Why IQ tests are different to other psychological ones? The questioning of IQ validity is an evidence of low IQ.

Consciousness could be the temporal synchronization of several different and specialized brain areas (brain channels or "senses"). When this happen, the subject has a conscious experience. While more different areas are involved more vivid will be the mental state, and while more frequent are the synchronized fired more "slow" you will perceived the time (there will be more "frames" per physical time unity). And as all physical process, it must have associated some kind of energy cost or flow, as you comment, but the account ought be beyond.

In previous responses I said that you can see objective and subjective red objects. You seem to want misunderstanding me.
Anyway, even when you imagine a red tomato, you need to see it with "imagined" light. Are you able to imagine a red thing in a dark scenario? You are only questioning "What is red?", "What is Red"? like a colorblind. Sorry, but it is not interesting for me.

Red is how individuals see certain objects when they are lighted. This is a psychological fact. You are which must prove that the scientific view of colors is wrong. The Chalmers' argument in my view only proves that fantasy is very persuasive.

I summarize as I understand the relations between brain, mind a conscience. We start with brain, which is an object of nature (the phenomena to explain, like “specie” for example in the theory of evolution). You can open a head and you will find a brain, which is not questionable. How is that brain exists? Now is when the concept of mind appears. Brain appeared as a biological response to the advantage that thinking has. You can elude predators, moving to food, light, etc. So from an evolutionary (biological) account, mind explains why some organisms have a brain. Moreover, in our model of mind, we differentiate conscious and unconscious mind states. I think, following to Llinás (I of the vortex) that brain could solve the problem of mind by the space (some areas are specialized in certain mental functions, such as emotions, memory, reasoning, etc.) and the consciousness problem by time. That is, when different areas are firing we have mind, but if also they are firing simultaneously, we have a conscious mind state. A higher frequency fits more "vivid" mind states, such as some drugs cause. Also if many areas are synchronized, the experience is more "detailed" o "complex". This is in my view the picture of a scientific philosophy of mind.

Another way of accounting conscience is the following: conscience is the vividness or "resolution" of mental states. It would be a property of mental states, different to redness, which is of objects. When I finish a summary of hard problem I will post here. Thank you for your responses.

Physical Red light has the Property of Wavelength. Conscious Red Light has the Property of Redness. — SteveKlinko

The property of redness is said to all that we call "red", both if it is real or fictional light. I follow the semantic rule of predicating a property of the thing that has it.

So, you can say "What is that I am viewing?" "A red tomato"; "How are you viewed it?" "Very vividly". "With that are you viewing it?" "With my visual system (eyes->visual cortex)", and so.

We experience the Red and recognize it as a Category of Experience that we call Color — SteveKlinko

There are several problems with Hard Problem. Another more is that we do not experience the Red as red (the Redness) but something as red. An object (real or fictional) can have the property of being viewed as red; in the same way that it has the property of being eaten by a black hole. The difference between another properties is that these kind of them needs another object to be corroborated empirically (an observer and a black hole respectively).
We call color to a property of objects, but not mental states. The properties of mental states could be "conscious", "vivid", etc., which would be a kind of "categories of experience".