I agree that free will is a good start (though not more than that) that there can be compensating goods for evils. I'm still not sure that's the best defense of evils brought about free will. I take free will as a given. By definition, God is not responsible for evil caused by free will (though he could be expected to sometimes intervene to soften its evil results--that's what a lot of petitionary prayer is about). It seems unnecessary to show that there are compensating goods for free will. Are you saying that, because of the evil it allowed, God would not have given us free will if it did not contribute to greater good that non-free will? Then you're faced with the same computational problem as with natural evil. I'm more inclined to just give God a pass on free will evil and not do any computations. I'm not entirely sure we'd even be having a discussion like this if we didn't have free will--or at least the mental capacity that results in free will. We're having this discussion at least in part because we have free will about whether to believe that God exists. Hence we're morally culpable if God exists and we don't believe s/he exists.

I'm inclined to proceed like this. The starting point is that an all-powerful and perfectly good God would not permit evil. However, we then realize evil results in part from human free will--which we consider good. We also see the good that comes from at least some of the natural challenges that we face. They can help us develop and grow.

But then I have two serious problems: (1) even if all evils are outweighed by the good they create, aren't the means God uses often immoral? I don't think many of us would say that we should murder an innocent person so that several other innocent people can harvest her organs and continue to live. We can't defend the use of immoral means in order to create a greater good. Yet the argument, even if it doesn't necessitate the use of immoral means, clearly permits God to use immoral means. The only consideration is whether the means create greater good. Natural evil results in all kinds of death and suffering that is neither deserved nor fairly distributed. It sounds like God is thought of as an act utilitarian--though maybe not just in reference to humans. Through natural evil, God does countless things that we would put people in jail for.

(2) While some degree of natural suffering might be good for an individual, it seems implausible that hideous amounts of pain are good for that individual. It's "pointless" at least so far as that individual goes. Either the good result could have been achieved with much less pain, or the treatment destroys the patient, or the pain is an immoral means of obtaining the good result.

Anyway, I'm inclined to say that, for natural evil, any non-trivial amount of evil that meets the criteria in (1) or (2) above falsifies the proposition that God is perfectly good unless and until the theist can show (or at least make a plausible case) both that the natural evil is not immoral and that it is not pointless. The burden of proof shifts to the theist. That's how science works. It's an empirical argument. The skeptic has not "proven" deductively that God is not perfectly good, but s/he's overcome whatever evidence the theist has for saying that God is perfectly good. The logical possibility that God is perfectly good is not evidence that God is perfectly good.

How would you argue against the claim that God is a completely malevolent being who uses good to increase the amount of evil? The atheist could say that it's logically possible and therefore s/he does not need to show that there are compensating evils for the good that exists.

I wonder if the main point of saying it's logically possible that God is perfectly good is to allow room for faith, ie, simply believing that God is perfectly good without any reasons--except perhaps revelation in the Bible. Many theists don't want to be irrational in the sense of believing things that are formal contradictions, like God creating a round square. Using a noseeum argument to show it's logically possible that God is perfectly good, despite widespread evil, keeps theists from having to believe a formal contradiction. Then faith/belief enters the scene.

Firstly, as clarity, against an argument that God does not exist with the argument from evil, the
theist need not prove that compensating goods do exist, the theist just needs to show that it is a
possible explanation.
Rank Amateur

I think I would agree with you that the logical possibility that there are compensating goods for evil prevents a deductive proof that an all-powerful and perfectly good God doesn't exist. However, not all arguments are aimed at deductive proof. If an atheist presents a large number of examples of natural evil, shouldn't it be incumbent on the theist to at least make a prima facie case that it's plausible to think there are compensating goods for a substantial portion of those evils? Otherwise, what reasons do we have for thinking there actually are some. That it's possible there are? But you claim that it's a "reasonable" possibility. I don't see any reasons. Anything is possible except a logical contradiction.

That's the point of my example about good causing evil. It's possible that "God" is a completely malevolent being who causes some good because the overall balance of evil is thereby greater. We have just as much reason to believe that God is malevolent as we have that God is benevolent. Would you agree with that? it seems to me that both arguments are the same.

With regard to free will, I'm less concerned about whether there are compensating goods. It seems to me that the key point is that, arguably, God is not responsible for evil that's the result of free will. Humans are. But I want to raise a couple issues in this regard: (1) Although I think that ultimately humans have a significant degree of free will, it's a lot more limited--by genetics and environment--than is apparent on the surface. Thus the free will defense defends God against being the cause of evil to a much lesser degree than many would think. (2) I think many theists, at least Christians, expect that God could, should, and does sometimes intervene against some free will-caused evil, e.g., in response to prayer. So wouldn't the noseeum defense also have to be brought into play for many free will-caused evils, e.g., the Jewish holocaust?

Thank you for taking the time to respond. I think it's a good discussion.

With regard to compensating goods, what reasons or evidence are there to think that there are compensating goods for natural disasters that kill hundreds of thousands. Of course it's not impossible there are compensating goods but then nothing is impossible except formal contradictions.

I also want to ask something along the lines of how do we know that the good in this world doesn't simply make evil worse, e.g., by raising our expectations and hopes and then dashing them?

I agree with Kamikaze that desire for God is a major source of religion. However, even though desire is not evidence of truth it's not evidence of falsehood either--except that if one has only desire then one does not have reasons for belief.

In my mind though it makes sense to search for things we desire. That could include God.

But wouldn't we have to have at least some minimal reason for thinking God existed for it to make sense to search for God?

What would be a good analogy? A cure for cancer? Another planet with humanlike beings? Medical technology that prevented death? A non-material soul for every human being?

As many have said, it's critical to define what is meant by "God." I could define "God" as the laptop I'm using right now and prove to myself that "God" exists.

I agree that most philosophers of religion are conversing about the Abrahamic God. But I think the Judaeo-Christian tradition has also developed a conception of God that is often referred to as the "Philosopher's God," i.e., all-powerful, all good, omniscient, personal, etc. This is contrasted with Yahweh in the Old Testament who is portrayed as a very human sort of being with loves. jealousies, passions, intimate involvement with his chosen people, etc.

The Judaeo-Christian "Phiosopher's God" is similar to the Deistic God except that the latter is usually thought of as simply the creator who set everything in motion and then is not involved with human beings or their world.

I've thought a lot about a generic definition of a "god." The one I find most satisfying is that a god is a superhuman agent, an intentional, personal being but much more powerful than human beings and also superior in other ways. I'm thinking that even "animal" or "plant" gods could fit that definition in that they are usually conceived as having humanlike self-awareness and communication abilities. That seems to cover most of the ideas of beings that humans have referred to using the word.

I appreciate the discussion about the origin of the word "God." That shows how a god functions in our lives. But merely invoking a god does not mean that a "god" exists, simply that someone has the idea that the god exists. On the other hand, if one was able to show a a strongly-evidenced causal connection between invoking a god and successful results from those invocations, that would be evidence that the god exists.

Nevertheless, the existence of the Judaeo-Christian Philosopher's God seems to be what most westerners are concerned about. I can make a certain amount of sense out of the idea of a being who has humanlike qualities to perfection--though it's a separate question whether such a being exists. But I'm not able to imagine a purely spiritual being, one without a material existence. And even if I could, I don't know that I'd want to describe such a being as perfect. That being would seem to be lacking something needed for perfection.

So I have trouble even getting off the starting block regarding the existence of God. God simply seems to be an idea of non-material, humanlike perfection.

Or maybe God is an idea that has existence independent of the existence of that idea in anyone's mind?