Mathematics do not know time. For example the law of the excluded middle states that any sentence must be either wrong or true. It doesn't matter if one or the other or none was shown. It does not know change. To conclude from this that is presupposes "persistence" is not directly correct as there simply is no difference that would allow to say such a thing.Formal systems do indeed presume persistence -- the persistence of symbols, as mathematics presumes a persistence of number. — Xtrix
Closer to the nature of being it seemsTwo persons blu a baloon, this is his, and this ballon is from another person, you pup the ballons, where air goes??? — Nothing
To me this seems like a mere thought experiment. The totally of sensations always provides for a reference of duration. The body itself generates difference all the time - think of circulating blood or breath. It is not only external objects one would focus on that generates change. It is not even sensations that come clearly to mind as such if you think of the feelings of rest or unrest.for example.If that is the case, then any object that changes is missing here; and since "something" runs its course in every process, no process is in question. There is nothing here that changes, and for that reason it also makes no sense to speak of something that endures. It is nonsensical to want to find something here that remains unchanged for even an instant during the course of its duration. — Joshs
Because formal logic depends on the notion of the self-identical object. — Joshs
And the stars? — Heiko
Not for Heidegger. He has a very particular understanding of ‘world’ that is neither planned nor just ‘revealed’ , and not a product of reflective reasoning. World for Heidegger is projected out from a pragmatic background — Joshs
Yes, he makes the distinction between the ready to hand and the present to hand ( objectively present ). But he derives the present to hand from the ready to hand as an extreme modification of it. His discussion of the statement and subject-predicate logic shows how a thing which just ‘is’ is derived from the hermeneutic structure of concernful dealings, rather than use and value being attributes just added onto an objectively present thing. — Joshs
Emphasis mine - sorry for bad copy&paste.The Greeks had an appropriate term for 'Things': 1rpayp.a-ra-that is
to say, that which one has to do with in one's concernful dealings
But ontologically, the specifically 'pragmatic' character of the 1rpayJLa-ra is just what the Greeks left in obscurity ; they thought of these 'proximally' as 'mere Things'. We shall call those entities which we encounter in concern "equipment". In our dealings we come across
equipment fo r writing, sewing, working, transportation, measurement.
The kind of Being which equipment possesses must be exhibited. The
clue for doing this lies in our first defining what makes an item of equipment - namely, its equipmentality.
Taken strictly, there 'is' no such thing as an equipment. To the Being
of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment, in which
it can be this equipment that it is. Equipment is essentially 'something
in-order-to . . . A totality of equipment is constituted by various ways of the 'in-order-to', such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability. In the 'in-order-to' as a structure there lies an assignment or referernce of something to something.
Equipment, taken strictly, never "is".Ein Zeug »ist« strenggenommen nie.
Here’s a phenomenological way of putting it:
“ “Equipment is “in order to.” This proposition has an ontological and not merely an ontical meaning; a being is not what and how it is, for example, a hammer, and then in addition something “with which to hammer.” Rather, what and how it is as this entity, its whatness and howness, is constituted by this in-order-to as such, by its functionality. A being of the nature of equipment is thus encountered as the being that it is in itself if and when we understand beforehand the following: functionality, functionality relations, functionality totality. In dealing with equipment we can use it as equipment only if we have already beforehand projected this entity upon functionality relation.”(Basic Problems of phenomenology 1927) — Joshs
I'm good with that, but I'm not sure it provides a 'way in' for someone starting from a 'categorical' understanding. If you think categorically, then you can still say, a real apple is an apple and an imaginary apple isn't; a real apple can be sweet or tart, crisp or mushy, but an imaginary apple can't be. And then you're just puzzled, because imagination is puzzling, and now you're thinking about that instead of being. The whole approach of taking a 'complete' description of an object, as a collection of properties, and just adding or subtracting instantiation, checking the 'exists' box or not -- it's not that that doesn't lead anywhere, but it leads you in the wrong direction. — Srap Tasmaner
That’s fine, but it’s not that we can’t atomize it— we can and do. It’s that we don’t wanted to mistake this for “lived” or “felt” time. — Xtrix
The mass of detail may obstruct the view of the essential. Taking maths as an example it seems you can get through quite a few (even university-)courses by just manipulating formulae - which could be done by a computer. You get formal definitions of spaces, homomorphisms, have to prove x->y is such and go on. May be my fault, but putting such stuff together to be even able to ask some kind of "essential" question is something modern education does not seem to have the time for. Looking at some youtube video (e.g. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nVF4N1Ix5WI ) you can get a feeling of what masses of formalism you'd have to chew down to work on open, fundamental questions.Sure, we know more stuff now than they did back then, but we aren't smarter or wiser. Today we use science. Those guys invented it. — T Clark
How could that be a difference?Is the mind in what is understood, or in the way in which it understands? — Pantagruel
A triangle can be little, large, flat or pointy. To me, it is not clear at all which same- or alike-ness would make up for the essential properties of an arbitrary determination.And maybe abstraction is always like this — we’ll say ‘ignoring’ all except the features you’ve chosen, but maybe ‘ignoring’ means ‘pretending not to notice’. — Srap Tasmaner
On the other hand, coming back to the use-character, Heidegger points out that such stuff really "isn't" in some sense. I guess this has to do with the intention the things were created with. Again, going back to Hegel it is totally unclear what was meant with "Dasein", which cannot be said of a hammer or some other "human" invention.My impression, though, is that Heidegger thinks logical relations are themselves in need of grounding, rather than grounding what we might have to say about the being of things. I suppose that passes over your point about identity, but here identity seems to be a sort of raw demonstrative ‘that’. — Srap Tasmaner
I think it does. You do not need to know what is flying towards you to react. You do not need to know if it is a telephone-pole or a streetlight that you nearly walked into.Does it make sense for me to be oriented toward something as something that ‘just is’? — Srap Tasmaner
But in this sense it is not about use, it is about what gains identity and so just "is" without spending any further thought. It is purely phenomenological. With further determinations we get into socially mediated concepts. I do not know many kinds of trees, so which "level of abstraction" would be low enough? And which woods are suitable for telephone poles? That would require some inquiry. And is that tree even a tree or is there some biological distinction, for example, is it a small tree or a giant mushroom? While thinking about those questions and considering what remains the same is "the thing there". In fact this seems to be the quickest, most immediate notion that one can possibly have. Maybe the "thing" is exaggerated and in fact it is just a "there"We can give no meaning to ‘that thing’ and have no use for it, so it’s unlikely to be our first choice if we can guess ‘tree’ instead and change it ‘telephone pole’ later if we have to. — Srap Tasmaner
I'd indeed say the "interpretation" or recognition as a tree comes after the "that thing there". It happens all the time that one can not exactly identify what he is seeing. It's an undetermined "Dasein"(being-there) which becomes "Etwas"(a determined something) - lending from Hegel.But on what do I impose it? Is there not a primary phenomenon there of a fallen tree? ...
Will you say that I have imposed ‘tree’ on a selection of my visual field? — Srap Tasmaner
The first sentence took me some time. I don't think that "alteration" is the right word there - "defines" would be more appropiate, I think. When using the existential quantor the "x" typically appears in the predicate as well. It does not seem to make sense to say "There is an x, so that 3=3" (atough the grammar indeed seems to allow this - but I would have to look that up).Existence would be the way that the particulars ( a thing that is f) alters the sense of the subject that they are particulars of. Formal logic supposes that the subject and predicate sit still as self-identical contents , while we cobble them together in an external relation. — Joshs
Anyone for the idea, expressed to the OP I think, that existence is in the relation between subject and predicate rather than inhering in one or
the other? — Joshs
So being literally has no properties?Rather, in predicating to something one assumes that the something is there for discussion. — Banno
Roughly, to be is to be the subject of a predicate. — Banno
No it isn’t. — Xtrix
A mental picture of an apple, for example. Could be a painted image as well.What do you mean by imagination? — john27
Wouldn't this mean Harry Potter exists? It is just that he is no real person but a fictive figure."Ronald McDonald does not eat spinach" is not like ""Ronald McDonald does not exist". — Banno
If you imagine an apple then there surely is an imagination of an apple. I do not see inaccuracies of spoken language to be a problem. If you buy a painting of a dragon there must be an idea of what a dragon looks like.Do thoughts generate existence? — john27
Exactly - the _negative_ account is the corrective.It was Popper’s way of showing that he was stuck in a Kantian time warp. — Joshs
I am really not concerned with Kuhn. I am more or less talking to you. But if you take his words to mean that assuming a flat earth is scientifically justified, you must have read him wrong or he is an idiot.not according to KUHN. — Joshs
What about the relationship between me as a scientist and an empirical realm? — Joshs
I can construe something as a vase but there are many, many different ways of doing this. — Joshs
I’m nit sure I understand why a construct is ‘missing something’ or doesn’t ‘tell the truth’. Missing what? What truth? — Joshs
To experience anything is to construe it. And he defines a construct as a referential differential. Specifically, a construct is a dimension along which to perceive an event along dimensions of likeness and difference with respect with a prior meaning in our construct system. Furthermore, every new moment in time must be construed, so our construct system is changing from
moment to moment. — Joshs
What if the object doesn’t crumble into pieces? Does it have an identity up till the time it crumbles? If the identity doesn’t lie in the thing , where does it lie? — Joshs
Built into your model of reality is an ‘in-itself. You wouldn’t call it reality otherwise. How else does what happens negate or correct if not by the effect of something that persists or endures as what it ‘is’, independent of the context of your expectations and background of undersranding , and independent of social context of use? — Joshs
You are missing the point. The "in-itself" is a speculation. The "thing" will negate any phantasm you might have about it by itself. This is what is called reality. For example, if you mistake a table decoration for a real apple you will recognize it when it really matters.If we try to point to what it supposedly ‘is’ in itself , it vanishes, because it isn’t anything ‘in itself’. — Joshs
There is no construct, that is the real thing. If there is no reality preventing you from upholding a belief about it then the description, in fact, matches the subject. Propagating a general doubt "just because" is not backed by any reality, irrational, destructive and dishonest.It is only what it is as a comparison, and we need both sides of the comparison in order to have the event, the construct. — Joshs
Yes, "in itself" - you got it.I would argue it isn’t ‘being’ that is the abstraction , it is the idea of a thing in itself as static state, — Joshs
There is a more fundamental thinking that penetrates beneath the idea of a world as a container with ‘parts’(existing beings) of which we are just one more. Rather than the world being just object beings that are presented before a subject being ( who is also an object within that world), the world ( including the subject) is enacted , produced , synthesized rather than just mirrored and represented. From this vantage , ‘being’ isn’t the existing parts, it’s the synthesizing, enacting , producing activity that creates and recreates the subject and object poles. The being of this world is in its becoming, and our own indissociable becoming. ( Is that obscure enough for ya?) — Joshs
The reason that this is not logical is that it presumes 'we know how things are' — Wayfarer
Being-there comes from being in the world. The central focus for Heidegger has always been Being. That is, a questioning of the word ‘is’ that we stick between subject and predicate as some sort of neutral glue. — Joshs
Dasein has to be what it is. Whenever you determine something, it is and can only be an "object".My point remains that you are treating ‘self’ here as an object in the world. — Joshs
A huge difference , when you add what else he says about Dasein. — Joshs