According to the solipsists over in another thread, @apokrisis is a figment of my imagination. In that vein I'll take a shot at responding.
So circles and numbers are the idealised limit of physical reality? — apokrisis
I said no such thing. Circles and numbers are abstractions. Limits have a technical definition and I would never use that word imprecisely in a mathematical discussion. This is not the first time you've quoted me as saying something I never said.
They represent perfect symmetry — apokrisis
I never said that nor do I agree with the statement. Modular forms are said to be the most symmetric mathematical objects but they're beyond me. Circles have lots of symmetries but I don't know what a perfect symmetry would be.
and to "physically exists" means always to be individuated - a "materially" broken symmetry. — apokrisis
Not something I would have said nor do I understand what you mean. If someone asked me if I believe that material objects are broken symmetries I'd first try to figure out if the questioner was a crank; and if not, to ask them what they meant by that. Maybe I'd learn something.
Surely I don't have to explain to you the difference between abstract and physical objects. You're just being disingenuous.
Therefore mathematical forms are not real. — apokrisis
Mathematical forms are real, they're just not physical.
There is only imperfect matter and its approximations of these forms - always inevitably marred by "accidents". — apokrisis
I would not say that matter approximates forms; rather I'd say that mathematical forms are often (but not always) abstracted from familiar physical objects.
I don't know what you mean by the accident bit.
Every physical circle is a bit bent. — apokrisis
In the British usage of the word?
Any collection of things may be given a number, but no two things are actually alike. — apokrisis
This I do believe. Unless you go along with Wheeler's idea that there's only one electron that hurries around a lot. I don't think you can distinguish electrons. But of course electrons are right on the border between the physical and the abstract. I do understand your point that saying that physical things are "really there" is a stretch once we get into the higher realms of physics. Still, one can distinguish between a number and a rock, one being abstract and the other physical. Even you would agree to this distinction, yes?
This is certainly a familiar ontological view. — apokrisis
It should be. It's yours, not mine. But then again the solipsists do seem to have a point.
Surely you can understand that my response was to someone claiming that the number pi proves that numbers are physical or have material existence. I'm not on any soapbox about the ontology of physics. I understand the traps therein.
I really can't comment on the rest of it. If I understand your point (and I so rarely do) it's that if I'm pressed to say what's physical, I'll say a rock. Then you'll ask me about electrons, quarks, strings, and quantum amplitudes, and I'll be forced to admit that I don't really know what a physical thing is. Then you'll say, Aha! Then the number pi is just as real as a rock!
That your point?
Ok. I don't disagree.
But the number pi is a lot different from a rock.
I'm going back into my vat now. It's nice and warm in there.
ps --
A substance ontology is what we experience, and any mathematical notions about form seem so clearly an abstraction produced by the creative human mind. — apokrisis
Wait!! It seems you agree with me after all. I completely agree with this statement.