Can chance be a cause? — TheMadFool

No I don't think so, chance pertains to how it was caused, not to what the cause was.

So, an infinite regress of causes notwithstanding, evidence seems to point in the direction of the universe being caused by something. What's interesting here is the proof that the universe had a cause is a posteriori (all observed phenomena have causes) but the objection to it is a priori (infinite regress). Rationalism or Empiricism? — TheMadFool

I think Hume showed that the assumption of Causality with a big C, as a metaphysical principle, is unwarranted. We expect things to be caused out of habit, but have no actual proof that everything is caused, all the time, as an unbroken causal chain back to God.... so it's a psychological truth rather than a metaphysical one. There is no need to stop infinite regress (with something like God), if you don't assume an unbroken chain of causation.... which was ultimately Humes intention, he was a sneaky atheist.

As to the rest of your post, I definitely fall on the empiricist side, so I think I can only repeat what I already said, we just don't know because of lack of any data... anything is possible.

Yes, not literally but figuratively. Note that 'by chance' is not the subject of the sentence in 'he scored that goal by chance'. It's not chance that score the goal, he did.... by chance
— ChatteringMonkey

By the way,

Google definition of "chance": the occurrence of events in the absence of any obvious intention or cause — TheMadFool

Yes, the definition and use is ambiguous like I said, intention and cause are two different things. But that is often the case with common language which isn't intended for these kinds of discussions. For science and philosophy you often have to clarify terms.

So, there has to be someone who causes the goal whether by chance or not. Similarly, there has to be something that causes the universe whether by chance or not. A valid competing explanation for a person who scores a goal by chance isn't chance itself, it''s something else. Similarly a valid alternative to god having created the universe isn't chance but something else. :chin:??? — TheMadFool

Well no, we can't just assume goal-scoring is analogous with universe-creating because you can formulate similar sentences about them. For one, we don't know if cause and effect even applies outside of the universe. And if causality would apply we don't know if there is intention behind the cause. To 'know' you would need some data to test your theory to. Since we lack data about the origin of the universe we are left with a range of possible origins that are possible in theory. Chances that any one guess will happen to be the right one seem rather low... in short we just don't know.

What do you mean it's a "figure of speech"? Do you mean that when I say "the universe was created by chance" I mean something other than the literal meaning of that sentence and the words contained therein? — TheMadFool

Yes, not literally but figuratively. Note that 'by chance' is not the subject of the sentence in 'he scored that goal by chance'. It's not chance that score the goal, he did.... by chance.

I'm afraid that's not true. People actually mean that chance created the universe and chance here is being offered as a good enough alternative to a creator-god. — TheMadFool

I don't agree because as you said, that would be incoherent. And I think one shouldn't use the word 'created' either, because that already implies intention.

However, chance is simply a description of the relationship between possibilities and actuality. Chance isn't a cause and it, therefore, can't bring the universe into existence. — TheMadFool

Exactly my point. A goal can't be scored by chance. Similarly, a universe can't be created by chance. — TheMadFool

I don't know why you are so hung up on this particular point, it's just a figure of speech, not literally a probability. People do say that a goal was score by chance, by which they mean that it wasn't intended...

Teleology isn't necessarily an attribute of a god-created universe. God is seen as the cause that made what is a possible universe (ours) a reality whether it be by design (teleology) or not. Aristotle's first cause argument for the existence of a god doesn't even imply that god, as the first cause, has to be a conscious, self-aware, being so we can forget about purpose (teleology). Since,a non-teleological universe is compatible with god, it doesn't make sense to differentiate chance and a creator-deity on that basis. — TheMadFool

It's hard to have a teleological universe without God is the important part you are leaving out. Sure, you can have a non-teleological universe with God, but then that is usually not the kind of God we invent.

A word can have a different meaning in a different context.
— ChatteringMonkey

Which meaning of "chance" makes sense in the sentence "the universe came into existence by chance"?
— TheMadFool

The non-teleological one. He scored that goal by chance, means he didn't intent to score the goal... not that the goal was score by some probability. — ChatteringMonkey

Although, I'll grant you that it can also mean that that he did intent to score it, but that there was a very low probability to score. It's a bit ambiguous and so maybe not the best word here, I agree.

A word can have a different meaning in a different context.
— ChatteringMonkey

Which meaning of "chance" makes sense in the sentence "the universe came into existence by chance"? — TheMadFool

The non-teleological one. He scored that goal by chance, means he didn't intent to score the goal... not that the goal was scored by some probability.

Well, "chance" is the wrong word if you want to talk about the absence of teleology because chance is an aspect of the teleological too. — TheMadFool

A word can have a different meaning in a different context.

But we end up with global self-devouring humanism and runaway technological disruption. The tech promises and threatens. It could/should liberate us from drudgery, but it also threatens unprecedented domination. — five G

There are lots of ways it can go horribly wrong, sure, but what I would want to question is if the upside is really there to begin with? Nietzsche, again, says that it's not really suffering itself that is the problem, but suffering without meaning. If that claim is true, then the idea of a humanism that values progress as a way to alleviate suffering is a flawed idea to begin with. Because it doesn't address the root of the issue. This is presumably only going to get worse as AI and automation can take over more and more roles in society, which was still a way people could feel part of that bigger whole and derive some meaning (although that certainly has it's problems too, I won't deny).

So yeah, this to me seems like the biggest challenge. And if we don't find a solution for that, it will cause a lot of problems, which will only be exacerbated by those technological advances. Technology is essentially neutral, it all depends on how you use it. And how we will use it, will depend on the state our civil societies will be in... which, you know, doesn't look to good at this particular moment :-).

Ok, I think I agree with most of your points.

Just to clarify though, you say

I consider morality the principle according to which we individually choose our actions in accordance with reason. — Echarmion

I take it that you mean that, even though we choose individually, the principle according to which we choose is the same for everybody, universal?

Anyway, these discussion are all a bit besides the point I think. I don't think religions and Gods should be viewed literally or as accurate descriptions. They are myths or stories created to serve a certain purpose in societies. If you are looking to prove them or find evidence in the descriptive, you are already on the wrong track it seems to me.

Yes chance and probability are an expression of our epistemic uncertainty. In poker you put a probability or chance on you winning a hand because you lack information. If you had all the information, there would be no need for probabilities.

I think Wayfearer was originally using the term in another way though. By chance, as a fluke or an accident, means something like lack of design or intention... non-teleological. We never know for sure, but it seems like we came about by the process of evolution, which is a non-teleological process, i.e. "by chance".

Concerning the universe itself, yes, we just don't know. We don't even know if it sensible to talk about it being caused, since it's hard to see how causation even would apply outside of space and time.

I do still find it hard to make sense of an evil god, except as an enemy of the good god which is actually worshiped. What I can make sense of is a conception of the big bad world in its entirety as a metaphorical god, but then the relationship becomes ambivalent. Or there is the strange vision of God as presented in the book of Job, a glorious and powerful God who is beyond human notions of good and evil. — five G

I agree with you about participation in the cosmic plan. The only hitch is that maybe humans could resent and rebel against the plan of a god they considered evil. Or perhaps they obey out of fear of Hell or some other punishment. That makes the world a kind of prison, and casts God as the worst tyrant ever.

It's possible that I'm thinking from humanist prime directives that I just can't see around. For 'us,' a god must make sense, be rational, and seem virtuous by human standards in order to 'truly' be god and not just some powerful alien tyrant or inscrutable, cold machine.

Thoughts? — five G

Yes I think you, and I am too for that matter, are viewing it from a humanist perspective, which has grown out of the western judeo-christian tradition. Following Nietzsche, the concept of evil itself is an invention of this tradition. And the formula that fuses the good, reason and virtue together an invention of Socrates and Plato, and later coöpted by Christianity. Pre-socrates, Greek culture was Homeric, and the gods had little to do with reason, virtue or being morally good... the whole idea of equating the good with reason and virtue would probably have been completely alien to them. And so would the idea of good and evil as a dichotomy.

I think the meaning people generally seek, is feeling part of some greater (cosmic) plan. If God created the universe, then you have such a plan because presumably he created it with a purpose.

Since a simulation is in fact created by purposeful beings, you wouldn't have that problem.
— ChatteringMonkey

Let's imagine that our world is a simulation created by humans who are more technologically advanced. If they are ethically no better than us but only have more power, would that really satisfy our need for meaning?

How has the idea of God comforted people, given them a sense of meaning? It seems to me that God 'has' to be adorable in order to function. Think of a son wanting to grow up and be like his good father, who seems not only full of love but also full of power and knowledge. Anything confusing or questionable in the world can be explained in terms of the son's incomplete education.

If all we have for a god is a confused older brother, on the other hand,... — five G

This is an angle I hadn't exactly in mind, but sure. I think all that is needed that people believe in him, so he needs to be believable for it to work. There have been all kinds of different gods historically people believed in, good, evil, neutral etc... The problem, in relation to believing in a god anyway, in our current age is our commitment to empirical truth and scientific advancement. So I think it has more to do with the general cultural climate, than what a particular God looks like... but being all powerful, all knowing and infinitely good probably helps, yes. Though the pantheon of Greek gods weren't exactly all that perfect or impeccable, and that seemed to work alright.

Yep.

Now Trump is saying that the election was stolen... but now go home.

The guy simply doesn't understand just how seriously his followers take him. And likely that will be the end of Trump once those hardcore supporters understand how full of bullshit their idol is. Because, in the end Trump cannot be anything else but the inept leader that he is.

(It would be like saying to us Finns that Russia just invaded your country, but go home now, no need to mobilize the army.) — ssu

Does he really don't understand though, or is it exactly his intention, I can't decide. His video almost seemed like as explicit an invitation to carry on you could get away with as an acting president.

In certain cases we do think intent to harm isn't necessary for something to be immoral, like say in case of doing harm because of drunk driving or negligence.
— ChatteringMonkey

I'd consider drunk driving a case of negligence. And what makes negligence what it is is your failure to act according to your duties before the outcome is unavoidable.

Using the drunk driving example: if there is a chance you'll end up drunk driving, don't drink in the first place. — Echarmion

This was an example to illustrate that intention doesn't always matter. Maybe you intent to drive while drunk, but you don't intent to harm somebody. The harm done is an accident, made more probable because you are drunk but still an accident. Unless you are going to say that it is driving drunk itself that is immoral, regardless of whether you hit someone or not. But I don't think that's how we typically look at it, it does seem to matter that you hit someone or not.

So here we have basically the same actions that are judged completely differently because context matters.
— ChatteringMonkey

But is this a sign of different moral approaches or merely of different factual information? We always have to infer the intentions of others from outcomes.

Football players also agree to a specific game with specific written and unwritten rules. Which is why things that would otherwise be considered assault aren't if they can still be considered part of the game. — Echarmion

Yes I agree, maybe it wasn't a good example for the point being discussed. I though it interesting because it illustrates the complexity of judging a certain situation in todays world. You have the rules of the game, you have the law,... and then you also have morality? Makes you wonder where morality actually comes into play.

I was referring to American football, but either one illustrates the point, I think. The context being that all parties involved in the game have consented to play it with the full knowledge that certain physical contact is allowed and could cause injury (I’m referring to legal tackles here, which could still lead to injury).

However, I wonder if there have been any cases, in any sport, where legal charges were filed due to excessive or malicious use of force (think fights in hockey where actual weapons (hockey sticks) have been used)? I know in American football, some illegal hits carry the additional burden of being judged as immoral as well. These are hits that are obviously done to intentionally injure a player. — Pinprick

There definitely have been in soccer, and in other sports like cycling too I think. Consent typically doesn't overrule criminal law if lack of consent isn't part of what constitutes the crime (whereas it does overrule civil law) because it isn't deemed a matter between the parties only, but also a matter of the state... which is why you have a public prosecutor.

I thought he meant that we judge something on what the intended or desired outcome was, not on the actual outcome. And while that seems to be the case for the most part, it isn't that cut and dry. In certain cases we do think intent to harm isn't necessary for something to be immoral, like say in case of doing harm because of drunk driving or negligence.
— ChatteringMonkey

I agree that both have to be considered, but neither are good/bad on their own. You can’t solely look at outcomes or intentions and derive a moral judgment based only on that. For example, is it wrong for me to shove pins in a Trump voodoo doll because I’m intending to do him harm? I don’t think it is since no harm is actually caused. It’s the same thing with outcomes. Is it wrong if a football player tackles another player and unintentionally injures him? Again, I would answer no. — Pinprick

Yes, I think it also depends on the circumstances what will be considered and what not, which is not saying much, I know... but it is complex and probably not reducible to simple uniform principles.

Shooting at someone with a gun but missing, would be considered morally wrong, but shoving pins in a voodoo doll is not... both have the same intention and and the same outcome, but they are judged differently. So aside from outcomes and intentions, what kind of action also seems to matter.

The football example is actually an interesting one, because in football (and I'm talking about soccer here) they have very clear rules about what kind of tackles are allowed and which are not. Intentions usually are not considered in determining whether the player has made a fault. Either way such a tackle usually isn't considered morally wrong, even if it was a fault. But if you were to tackle someone outside of a football-field then it would be considered morally wrong. Intention to harm is assumed because why would you be tackling someone otherwise. So here we have basically the same actions that are judged completely differently because context matters.

Sure, if we evaluate it in our moral frame it would be inconsistent.
— ChatteringMonkey

I mean it's logically inconsistent in itself. — Kenosha Kid

I kinda figured you wouldn't let it go that easily :-).

I think I disagree, but i'm not entirely sure which is why I tried to avoid it. Logic pertains to language. The world cannot be logically inconsistent in itself, only statements we make about that world can.

So I think, concerning this specific point, if you have a totally different moral vocabulary, that doesn't include individuality, agency, free will, personal blame and the like, because they just don't exist yet, you presumably cannot really say it is logically inconsistent. It's logically inconsistent in those terms, but I wouldn't know if it was in their terms.

An example giving in the podcast was bloodfeuds of old, and how if one member of a clan did something wrong to a member of another clan, you could take compensation from any member of that clan, not just from the one that did wrong. And yes, if individuality isn't a thing yet, but their whole way of looking revolves around tribes and clans or any social unit, it isn't clear how intentions would play a role there.

This is why I find it illogical to construct an ethics of outcomes. One does not act according to outcomes; one acts according to intentions.
— Kenosha Kid

I find this interesting...

One reason why could be that intentions themselves have no effect on others. I can intend to do harm all day, but no one will actually be harmed until I act, and even then only if I am successful. If no one is harmed, then what is there to justify any moral judgments made on intentions? Also, our intentions are, at least sometimes, caused by whatever outcomes we desire, or don’t desire. So I’m not sure it’s entirely accurate to say we don’t act on outcomes. If I had no desired outcome, I don’t think I would act at all. Why would I? — Pinprick

I thought he meant that we judge something on what the intended or desired outcome was, not on the actual outcome. And while that seems to be the case for the most part, it isn't that cut and dry. In certain cases we do think intent to harm isn't necessary for something to be immoral, like say in case of doing harm because of drunk driving or negligence.

Oh absolutely. The Iliad is chock full of people talking about evil arrows and evil spears and evil chariots. But then they don't mean what we mean by evil now.

What I meant was that any culture that holds a person to be evil for an accidental outcome of their benign actions but does not hold the tree to be evil for falling on granddad seems objectively inconsistent. — Kenosha Kid

Sure, if we evaluate it in our moral frame it would be inconsistent.

I am European myself. If for an action to be good it would need to have been made in good intentions, then there would result some strange outcomes.
For example, let's take a hypothetical scenario.
A man is swimming in the water. His enemy is trying to shoot him. He misses and shoots a shark that was swimming under the water ready to eat the swimming man, and so saves the man swimming.
The intentions of the enemy were evil, but his actions saved a human being, therefore naming them evil too would be against common sense, but, by what you have said, they would, indeed, be evil. — Matei

I think people, in Europe, generally would think that that action was evil... if they knew his intentions at least, which often isn't the case. But to be clear, intentions are not the only thing that matters. My point was just that they do, to some extend at least.

If the good is accidental, there is no need to consider a moral agent at all. A tree is a good tree if it shelters me or bears fruit. But this is not 'good' in ethical terms. It would be illogical to instruct the surrounding trees to follow the example of the first.

This is why I find it illogical to construct an ethics of outcomes. One does not act according to outcomes; one acts according to intentions. — Kenosha Kid

I agree, but nonetheless some cultures apparently don't see agency as a central concept in morality. It's a descriptive claim, not necessarily rational or normative. Just picked that up from Sean Carroll's last podcast on W.E.I.R.D.- biases. The rough outline is that we westerners, and our conceptions, are in some respects not representative at all for whole of humanity. Individuality and notions of free will and agency are more typical for cultures that grew out of Christianity.

Generally, or in western culture at least, we would say that intentions matter for determining what is a good action or not. So by that logic it would be impossible to desire evil and do good by accident.

In some other cultures intentions seem to matter less, and there it is perfectly possible to desire evil and do good by accident... because good or bad are evaluated purely based on actions.

You just build in meaning from the get go, by fusing purpose into what the simulation 'is'. There is only a problem of creating meaning because we killed God, and so the universe isn't inherently meaningful as a purposeful creation. Since a simulation is in fact created by purposeful beings, you wouldn't have that problem.

Some people would argue we should be just like nature (survival of the fittest?) and not try to transcend it. Are our attempts to control or thwart nature sustainable or psychologically healthy? I think our current era of prosperity (which is not available to many people) is ahistoric and we have to have faith that it is sustainable. — Andrew4Handel

It certainly is unprecedented and unique, but then again it's not like there's a script history has to follow. Is it psychologically healthy and sustainable? Maybe not, but that is a bit moot point if we don't really have all that much choice in the matter. We are here now with a couple of billion people on earth. The more interesting question to me is where do we go from here?

I'd say at this point there is no way back, and we will have to make it work somehow precisely because there are no guarantees that it will. And hearkening back to stories of old, like nature, nationalism or religions won't do the trick I think, because those were geared to a world that doesn't exist anymore. The world has changed fundamentally and we can take responsibility to make it work or not... a little bit of lucidity, creativity and trust in ourselves and we could be off.

I can agree more or less with the moral sceptic part, when it comes to truth value of moral claims at least. I do think however that evaluating morality on the truth-axis is to some extend missing the point.... as I think we create values and morality. Values meaning here more or less the same thing as preferring state 'A' over 'B', but more abstracted and synthesized already.

But then we have the problem of teleology. The human body and its organs seem to have goals such as the heart pumping blood around the body. You could hypothetical have a healthy human body regardless of the preferences of the individual but social norms do not appear to have any kind of teleology like this to follow. — Andrew4Handel

If you mean that we can't find a teleology for them in nature and biology, then yes, I agree. I think we create them because we value some things over others, and so we want people to behave to attain those values. And personally I think this is only a problem if you expect to find objective morality in the first place.

Another problem I have with morality and utopian or utilitarian attempts to improve society is that I think they are bound to fail. So I think it is impossible to not be morally contradictory/hypocritical and impossible to create a non exploitative society. If humans are just a another part of nature then we see that nature appears inherently flawed and not something we can transcend. — Andrew4Handel

That would depend on how high you set the bar, right? If you expect a society of saints, then yes that won't work. But on smaller scales and for less utopian goals there does seem to be some utility. For instance, I think moms can be successful in teaching Johnny not to hit his little sister.

However I am interested in what society would look like if we looked at claims outside of the natural science as weak, contestable and pragmatic. — Andrew4Handel

Yes by and large, although I'd probably say that they are no claims to truths at all, so neither weak or strong. And if we realise that we create them, it is already implied that they are up for revision if they don't serve our ends (anymore).

Let's take homosexuality as in example. It seems to be a minority occurrence but that doesn't seem to entail it has less validity or value than the majority sexuality. It seems to be hardwired as well.

I don't think you can derive values from possibly hardwired behaviours and preferences and pit them against each other. Desirable and undesirable traits are probably somewhat hardwired. — Andrew4Handel

Yes I didn't mean to imply that you can derive them from biology. There would just be agreement, convention as a basis for some values and consequent morality.

I think the problem is not with identifying aspects of life we can improve but having the the justification of compelling other people to follow our values. — Andrew4Handel

Aren't you having your cake and eating it too here? The idea that you need a justification to compel other people is a fictional ought too if you apply fictionalism consistently. So this seems like a problem to me, because if you believe that 1) no objective morality exists and 2) justification in objective morality is necessary to compel people to behave in a certain way, you are 3) effectively ruling out the possibly of morality from the start.

But still I believe that people including those that claim to be relativists treat values and social ideologies as more compelling than they are and use them to justify their own beliefs and actions.. — Andrew4Handel

Yes I agree, I don't think anybody is really a relativist (or nihilist) when it comes down to it... when you look at their actions. And it is often used as a rhetorical tool yes.

That is a good point. Possibly both. But value statements have law like or "ought" like qualities.

People say things like "You ought to lose some weight". You can get the impression that there is an ideal weight that we ought to be aiming for.
If you believe this is true than you may treat it as lawful.
So I suppose people may have to treat a claim as true before treating it as a law or an "Ought".

But I think the person delivering the claims is acting like they are factual and that they should be obeyed.

I like the term "reifying" or "reification" that treat something conceptual or controversial as concrete. — Andrew4Handel

Yes I agree people view morality that way, the question is if this is necessarily so, like I said in my comment above?

Also since some things rely on implicit values that almost everybody agrees to, these oughts might be very much equivalent to a factual claim. For instance, the claim you ought to lose weight might follow from the value 'health'.... if we agree on the value of health, then you ought to lose some weight. This just as an example to be clear, not that I think that losing weight is always good for your health.

It depends on why you are agreeing on something. Obviously consensus doesn't equal right. Would people agree to agree to rules that they accepted were completely made up and not metaphysically binding but only pragmatic and a tool for some kind of social cohesion? — Andrew4Handel

That is the question indeed. Historically it didn't seem enough, which is one of the reasons they felt the need to invent God I think, to infuse morality with objectivity. Ultimately this is a question of psychology it seems. I hope we can get to a place where we can just agree on things and have that pull enough weight, but I wouldn't know if we can.

For example I don't think an atheist would follow religious rules regardless of their pragmatic or utilitarian value.
I believe people think there is a deeper validity to concepts like human rights and prohibitions against stealing and killing than just being pragmatic tools. — Andrew4Handel

And is this something that is learned, i.e. because we were taught to think about them as objective, and so could possibly be changed? Or is it something that is more or less psychologically hard-wired?

So I think that things like legal laws, human rights claims, moral claims and general value claims, traditions and so on are just things we say and use to alter peoples behaviour under the guise that they are lawful. — Andrew4Handel

Under the guise that they are lawful, or truthful?

Fictionalism is the view in philosophy according to which statements that appear to be descriptions of the world should not be construed as such, but should instead be understood as cases of "make believe", of pretending to treat something as literally true (a "useful fiction"). — Wiki

While I agree that morality is constructed and historically has been sold as something that is objective and true, I wouldn't call myself a fictionalist, but rather a moral constructivist. The difference is that I don't think we should necessarily lie about their origin, or at least that's what I hope. Laws and morals need not be true and objective to be 'lawfull', their force can be derived from that fact that we agree on them.

I think fictionalism seems to lead to nihilism where society seems absurd because peoples behaviour seems to be not being governed by reason or rationality but by an unwarranted faith or unthinking allegiance to unjustified ideologies. — Andrew4Handel

I think it leads to nihilism because people stop believing in the fiction (and it works if they believe in it). And then society becomes absurd because people feel like they have to continue to act like they believe in the fiction because they think other people do, while in reality nobody really does... or at least very few.

Anyway my question to you would be, do you think we should get rid of morality all together then, since it is a fiction? And rely on what then? On people just getting along and acting rationally out of their own volition?

I would say that inner space is an important arena for questioning. It can be a frightening world to explore and perhaps we need to touch base with others, as a way for avoiding the wastelands of subjectivity and difficulties we might find in searching for answers. — Jack Cummins

Following 180proof, I'd want to say that maybe we should question the assumption that looking inside, inner space, introspection etc... is even a way to get answers to questions about meaning, identity and the like.

I am not wishing that we should rely simply on the territory of our own introspection. If anything, I spend a lot of time going into the worlds created by other minds in the books which I read. But probably what I find, is that there is so much theorising, and ,somehow, I feel that we can get lost in the mazes, and lose touch with intuition as a source of wisdom. — Jack Cummins

I agree with this, you and I are located in a specific place with a specific context for which other peoples thoughts won't necessarily be all that relevant or applicable. For navigating your world your own thoughts and intuitions would typically be more suited, and there is indeed a danger in drowning them in other peoples thoughts when you spent a lot of time with those. But I wouldn't conflate relying more on your own intuitions and instincts with introspection or 'looking inside'. They come to you as you interact with the world, and are geared towards you interacting with that 'external' world... you don't need to go looking for them inside. In fact I think deliberately looking for them via introspection will mostly only fracture them in a self-reflective hall of mirrors.

If that's true then how could moral rules follow from values at all, something you are a proponent of? — ToothyMaw

Well they will follow from values, but there will be contradictions and they will overlap to some extend is the perhaps unsatisfactory answer. How you could try to solve this is weighing values against each other and determining what should take precedence, or what concessions could be made to accommodate other values.

If I may take the example of Covid again, and simplify the case as a conflict between two values, quality of life on the one hand and quantity (or duration) of life on the other. You could argue that from the value of quantity of life, rules of total social isolation and total lock-down would follow in times of a pandemic... if people follow those rules (which is not a given either) then this will save lives, thus attaining that value.

But then those extreme rules of social isolation seem to be contrary to attaining the other value of quality of live. What you need to decide in that case (usually after some societal debate) is how much weight you want to give them respectively, and what accommodation can be made to other conflicting values without harming the primary value to much. So in practice, you will for instance make wearing a mask mandatory because it doesn't harm quality of live that much, or you will close down shops but let people sport outside etc...

Maybe some basic, distinct, non contradictory rules that support people's values could be formed and reasoned with/measured and experimented with to create more rules as needed that are distinct, non contradictory, and support people's values? Perhaps a science of morality (I have heard of such a thing but don't know where the idea originated from) would help determine if the outcomes of rules support people's values. However, I don't know how to guarantee that they would be distinct, except insofar as they don't produce the same outcomes. — ToothyMaw

From what I've written above, you can probably figure that I don't think I would be easy to turn this into a science. I do think philosophers, ethicists and other scholars can and do play an important role in this process, by elucidating the process and feeding the public dialogue with expertise of various kind. But I think these interventions will be necessarily more topical, than systematic if that makes sense.

The interesting question to me is how and why states developed, given all of these disadvantages. I think at least part of the answer is to see the agricultural society as a population machine, which aims at producing domesticated humans; humans that cannot survive on their own and depend on the state to survive and so therefore maintain it. — darthbarracuda

I've always presumed, maybe incorrectly, that states were a consequence of increase of population size and density, and the need for specialisation that creates. If you're are relatively small group of people, you don't need and can't really afford someone who occupies himself solely with ruling.

I don't have any major addictions but sometimes I notice that I feel the need to get something I don't even really want. If you've been on a losing streak in a videogame you'd know what I mean. — khaled

I know what you mean, but I not sure if that's a qualitative difference, or just two conflicting desires with differing intensities... i.e. a shortterm desire to really want to win, and a more general desire to just stop playing the game and do something else constructive.

It's also a common trait of mediocre athletes to be OVERconfident, not lacking confidence. — khaled

I think they are two sides of the same coin. When you are overconfident, a little thing can tilt you to loose all your confidence precisely because it was inflated and it's hard to maintain the illusion in the face of evidence to the contrary.

But yes I think I sort of get what you're trying to get at with linking it to attachment. The downward spiral then is presumably the result of an attachment to an overinflated idea of yourself.

Rules are generally thought to be swapped based on circumstance, but what if a rule has the circumstances in which it applies built into it, along with a stipulation that the actor doesn't matter? Would the application of these rules require a meta-rule selecting from a set of such rules? — ToothyMaw

If you're asking necessarily in principle, I'd say no. Why would you think so?

But off course in practice it's actually very hard, if not practically impossible, to make a set of sufficiently specific rules that are distinct and non-contradictory.

You might say this new, integrated rule may need to be swapped out for even more specific rules according to circumstance. I don’t think that this is necessarily the case. I would argue that if we have a set of sufficiently specific rules, and they are distinct and non-contradictory, we can just view them all as applying at once; no one claims that we must select rules from legal texts via a meta-rule to apply them - except insofar as it relates to whether or not a rule has been broken. — ToothyMaw

And so I think, as a matter of practicality at least, it makes perfect sense to have meta-rules. In the legal system of my country for instance we have the following meta-rules to avoid these problems :
- laws passed by higher authorities trump those passed by lower authorities.
- for laws passed at the same level of authority the specific law trumps the more general.

I thought about it; legal texts are often times open to interpretation. A better reference would a set of very specific legislated laws. — ToothyMaw

Yes usually they are not to specific and open to interpretation on purpose, because it's not really feasible to be so specific as to regulate all the minutia of all possible circumstances. That's where judges come in.

Also I find there is a world of difference between getting the thing I'm attached to vs the thing I want. When I get something I want I'm happy, when I get something I am attached to I don't feel anything. And sometimes I'm attached to things I don't even want (bad habits). — khaled

If you are talking about addictions I would agree, but do you think that is what is meant with attachments here? Maybe, I'd need to think about it some more.

If desiring to win and failing to do so is disappointing, then those who desire to win the most should be devastated the most. We can agree that top athletes probably do desire to win the most. However they are not devastated the most (ideally, they are not affected by a bad performance at all). Suggesting that maybe there is something extra that is the actual cause of disappointment, something other than desire to win. — khaled

Yes but my first guess wouldn't be that that something extra is attachments. It's sort of a psychological downward spiral that compounds the mistakes that other non-top players get stuck in. How do you see the relation to attachments here? I'd say this is more a question of a lack of confidence.

I don't think those two things are the same at all. Attachment is different from desire. — khaled

Meh, I don't think they are things at all... just two symbols pointing at different degrees of what is essential one psychological process. It seems a matter of degree rather than discrete things. If I don't get what I want, I'm disappointed. If I don't get what I'm attached to, I'm very disappointed…

This would mean that you would be put down by a bad performance. But athletes are pushed to to not care even about that. Take volleyball for example, it often happens that a player single handedly loses a game or a set for his team because of the nature of the game making it very clear who messed up (fast paced, highly structured and a single mistake by a player puts down the whole team). But top players shrug off mistakes, worse players are put down by bad performances leading to even worse performances. Does that mean that top players have a weaker desire to win? I think they want it just as badly, but they're not attached. — khaled

No I don't think this is correct, almost every top player cares very much about their performance ... Maybe they can shrug it off more easily, I could buy that. Also note that giving a bad pass for instance, isn't necessarily 'a mistake' from the perspective of the process of trying to play as good as you can. It's the intention and training that counts, not necessarily a particular execution.

However, I would argue that it is supremely difficult, for better or worse, to live without attachments and desires. I am not sure that, as living human beings, we are able to achieve it. If we simply stayed in bed most of the time rather than pursue grander desires, it would still involve an attachment to the comfort of being in bed. — Jack Cummins

No I think that is quite right, because what separates living for non-living things, is that living things have purposes. Purpose meaning here to desire or want certain things to happen, which is another way of saying that living things have (emotion) attachments to certain things or outcomes. So in a very literal sense, the only way to entirely overcome attachments is to become a non-living thing... to die.

So I think the interesting question here is not whether we can overcome all attachments, but rather what should we be attached to and what not, and to what degree etc?

In the world of poker, or other sports too for that matter, you will often hear something like, results-oriented thinking should be avoided at all cost, or you shouldn't care about any particular outcome of a game because that makes you preform worse. The reasoning behind this is that, as it is in part a game of chance, you only have limited control over the results... and so you will be disappointed a lot if you care about the results, and that hampers your ability to make good decisions.

Of course this poses a bit of a conundrum in that what motivates you to play in the first place is probably winning games. And if you do away with that motivation, why bother at all right? The way around this particular motivation-conundrum is being invested in the process instead of the results. You focus on playing every game as good as you can, and try to care only insofar you played well or not.

I think Buddhism and a lot of other wisdom or virtue-traditions point in this same general direction of trying to shift your attachment from concrete results or things to caring about certain processes, i.e. right speech, right action... the eightfold path. And yes I think psychologically this kind of mindset would give you a more even, persistent and resilient motivation throughout your life, because you have more agency and control over it and also because these are goals that don't expire.

Regarding (2), this is most likely the result of enslavement. Once you have an agricultural society, it becomes rational (?) for those with power to capture, enslave and coerce those weaker than them to do the work at the 'bottom' of the division of labour (which did not exist much before, except along gender lines). This is because there is simply a lot more work to be done (simple hunter-gatherer societies could get by on around 15 hours a week), and now there is surplus to be collected.

This suggests a further question, however. Why is it rational for those at the top to coerce those at the bottom? I think it is because this aforementioned surplus is something people now wish to acquire in greater and greater amounts. So it seems like the possibility of acquiring surplus triggered something like human greed... as though greed were a latent psychological inclination among humans that was waiting for the right conditions. I would suggest that such greed is closely related to risk aversion and anxiety. The background conditions of scarcity which compound such anxiety are then also the background conditions of greed - the perception of scarcity, whether or not it remains real, might then lie behind persisting greed and the coercion it inspires. — Welkin Rogue

I don't disagree with this, but I also think a lot of it was the consequence of the structural changes in agriculture societies. Agriculture relies on building up larger stocks of food after harvesting seasons to get through the non productive months. This makes it more interesting and viable for groups to live of stealing those stocks, which in turn makes defence more of a necessity for these communities. And when you need to keep a more permanent defence around, you get specialists who gain an edge on others when it comes to violence and coercion. Why was it rational to coerce others? Because they could without much trouble... whereas previously they couldn't because there was less need for division of labour and specialists.

So were agriculturalists generally more anxious and greedy? Or was it technology and consequent structural changes that enabled anxiety and greed in agricultural societies? Maybe a bit of both? It's hard to tell, but my guess would be that it's often more a case of changing circumstances enabling changes in behaviour, than the other way around.