Feb 16, 2017
Trump: “DACA is a very, very difficult subject for me...You have these incredible kids, in many cases not in all cases. In some of the cases they’re having DACA and they’re gang members and they’re drug dealers too...I have to deal with a lot of politicians—don’t forget—and I have to convince them that what I’m saying is right. And I appreciate your understanding on that. The DACA situation is a very difficult thing for me as I love these kids, I love kids, I have kids and grand kids and I find it very, very hard doing what the law says exactly to do and, you know, the law is rough. It’s rough, very very rough.”

So it appears Trump really wants to help Dreamers. So how can his offering to temporarily help Dreamers constitute a compromise? Compromise entails giving something you don't want, or giving up something you DO want.

Right. He of the Sarah Pailin VP choice. He was not-so-great, only with effort better than Trump. Of course he did have some principles.... — tim wood

McCain regretted picking Palin (see this). Admitting to a mistake is a sign of both intelligence and humility.

Jeff Flake? Mitt Romney?

How about let's not cast baseless smears just because we don't like secure borders? — Inis

It's not baseless, but it's relatively unimportant whether or not Tump is a racist in his heart. What's important is that his rhetoric appeals to racists, and it repels those of us who are not:

"When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. They're not sending you. They're not sending you. They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people."

That's only one factor in the equation.
This Wikipedia article provides a balanced analysis.

Trump is a consequence of the right wing punditocracy. This is no exaggeration; listeners are his base, and Trump frequently takes advice from them.

I'm not so sure about that. You should hear some of the Republican politicians grovel before Rush Limbaugh, for instance. Having right-wing media turn on you can likely damage your popularity among conservative voters. — Arkady

Funny you should mention that, because Mike Pence was a guest on today's Rush Limbaugh show. Pence said: " Thank you, Rush. It’s always an honor. I just left the Oval Office — told the president I was headed to be on your program — and we couldn’t be more grateful for your voice on the airwaves of America every day. Everything we’ve accomplished over the last two years — rebuilding our military, reviving our economy, setting a record for conservatives appointed to our courts, America’s growing at home, we’re standing tall on the world stage — you’ve played a key role in that. And, Rush, we don’t thank you enough. But thank you for all that you’ve meant to this movement and to the progress that we’ve made in this country."
(source)

Do his supporters believe Trump is clairvoyant?

I don't know how else to explain their complete trust in every "solution" he comes up with, despite there being no evidence of careful study and analysis. This is my main beef with his pushing of a wall. I have no a priori commitment against a barrier, at least in some places, if it will help - and it will not cause other problems (e.g. environmental or stealing personal property). But it has NOT been studied in full, with a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis.

Now? That would make Mike Pence President and Nancy Pelosi Vice President. — ArguingWAristotleTiff

Pence becoming President would not result in Pelosi becoming Vice President. She would briefly be the next in the line of succession - while remaining Speaker, but only until Pence appoints a new Vice President and s/he is confirmed.

I don't know that it's an honorable profession, but it does seem to be one sort of profession that a truly honorable person might take. I suspect some people become doctors from an initial noble intent, but based on my personal experience - this nobility often disappears. My personal physician (internal medicine) seems drawn to it by the intellectual challenge of diagnosing. There's nothing wrong with that - in fact, it's similar to my being drawn to software engineering and support, but it's not "noble" per se.

Remember Dr. Kevorkian? Regardless of whether you agree with what he did, it seems to me he was driven (at least partly) by noble intent. Doctors who spend a lot of time on charity cases seem driven by noble intent. But most of the ones we run across are just doing their job.

April 2016, Trump said, ""We're gonna beat ISIS very, very quickly, folks. It's gonna be fast. I have a great plan. It's going to be great. They ask, 'What is it?' Well, I'd rather not say. I'd rather be unpredictable."

He did keep part of this promise: he was unpredictable.

In May 2017, he said that in 2 weeks, he would announce his plan. It never happened.

1. If I read my logic book then I will feel tired and frustrated
2. I feel tired and frustrated
3. Therefore I read my logic book

Question: is this a valid argument? a fallacy?
If you can't get this right, you' d better return to reading it.

What is a concept? I suggest it is an abstraction, described propositionally.

You seem to be suggesting there exist platonic entities that correspond to numbers, but that our propositional description of these things is flawed as a consequence of our intellectual limitations. Without a referrent, there can be no flaw in that description.

Can't we also agree that how a person weighs such factors is not merely backward looking, not merely a matter of past experience and belief, but also forward looking -- a matter of what kind of person the agent wishes to be? And, if that is so, then the past is not fully determinative. We know, as a matter of experience, of cases of metanoia, of changes in past beliefs and life styles. While this does not disprove determination by the past, it makes it very questionable. — Dfpolis

No, it's not just beliefs - it's also due to dispositions and can be influenced by impulsiveness. These are also consistent with determination. Questionable? It's questionable either way.

The coherence of compatibilism shows that a determinist's ontological commitment is not falsified. Still, I agree that the coherence of compatibilism doesn't falsify a libertarian's belief either.

I don't think the arguments given do this. They begin by noting that we feel responsible, and show how this plays a role in our behavior -- none of which is in dispute. The question of why would we have a false belief in responsibility if we are not responsible is simply not addressed. Why couldn't we reprogram the drunk driver with prison or a scarlet "D" because reprogramming works (if it does), and not because of an irrelevant responsibility narrative? — Dfpolis

I suggest that you are defining responsibility from a libertarian's point of view, and observing that my account is inconsistent with it. The account I gave has the explanatory scope needed to show that moral accountability is still a coherent concept under compatibilism, even though it is not the identical concept to that of LFW.

But you have mentally assigned the probabilities based on prior beliefs, and this determines your choice.

As I mentioned in my post, you're controlling the unequal probabilities. — Terrapin Station

What does that mean? Describe the process you have in mind.

I made a case for moral accountability under compatibilism here.

Hence we may say that the alternative possibilities that are genuinely open to the agent, at any given time, are the possibilities that are consistent with her general abilities, and her opportunities, such that it is only the agent's own power of practical reasoning that is responsible for one of them, in preference to another, being pursued. — Pierre-Normand

That is a reasonable clarification of the PAP. But isn't this still consistent with compatibilism? How could the agent have made a counterfactual choice through his own powers of reasoning? What rational factor is indeterminate?

You are basing your hypothetical on some specific interpretation of QM. For example, your view is consistent with the Many Worlds interpretation. This is a different subject. For this thread, I'm stipulating that QM entails ontological interdeterminacy.

That's the problem here: Where shall be the difference? — Heiko

You earlier referred to Schroedinger's cat. A cat is not both alive and dead; it is one or the other - that is the ontological nature of the experiment. Until we open the box to see the cat's state, we're in a state of ignorance - which is epistemological.

Prior to the cat's death, it was indeterminate as to when the cat would be killed. That is ontological indeterminism. It's also epistemologically indeterminate, but that is not due to mere ignorance - it is due to the quantum uncertainty - the time is not predictable in principle.

It is widely recognized that there are two main aspects to free will: alternative possibilities and agent control. Most of those who affirm free will are obliged to account for both of these aspects, and libertarian free will advocates are no exception. — SophistiCat

Refer back to the thought experiment I described in my opening post. If I make a choice based on my prior beliefs and dispositions, isn't that choice under my control? That seems to be the case irrespective of whether our free will is libertarian or compatibilist. The point of divergence is the principle of alternative possibilities, not control.

If you say that the alternative possibility must be under the libertarians control, then what exactly is the libertarian controlling that is not determinative? Why is he choosing Y instead of X? If there's a reason, that reason is determinative. If there's no reason, it's random - and QM indeterminism seems to fit that bill.

By "ontological" - I'm referring to things as the actually ARE (as the exist), not merely what is measured.

All interpretations of QM are consistent with what is measured, but make assumptions about what exists. e.g. many Worlds Interpretation assumes these worlds actually exist, even though it is impossible to access (or measure) them.

Maybe nothing, but I wanted to clarify that quantum indeterminacy is generally regarded as ontologically indeterminate. I gather you do actually accept that. Cool.

How much energy would we need to apply to a human being to actually determine it's indeterminacy at quantum level throughout? — Heiko

Not so much. See this. Of particular relevance is footnote 41, which refers to a 1968 journal article that proposes the energy for neuronal activity is stored at the QM level - which is intrinsically indeterminate.

What I mean by free will is that I can make choices that are like rolling dice (where we assume that the dice outcome really is random), but where I'm also able to bias the roll, so that given four options, I can bias the probabilities to, say, 40%, 30%, 20%, 10%.

In my view this is a completely naturalistic phenomenon. I'm a physicalist. An identity theorist.

And I don't think that the natural mechanism would necessarily have to be quantum. Some macro phenomena could turn out to be random or probabilistic rather than deterministic. — Terrapin Station

Does quantum indeterminacy satisfy your assumption of randomness. It is REALLY random, unlike dice throwing. Do you think this randomness is sufficient to meet the assumptions of Libertarian Free Will?

Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics does seek to explain the indeterminacy. I am aware of only two interpretations that are consistent with strict determinism:
1) Bohmian - which assumes there are non-local variables that determine the discrete state of the system; I don't believe this is well accepted.
2) Many Worlds - which assumes all possible measurements of the system actually exist as a branch of a meta-universe. This has more acceptance (and also vehement rejectors), but even if true - the world we find ourselves in is random (there's a copy of us in each world).

For purposes of the discussion, consider quantum indeterminacy to entail ontological indeterminacy, not just a measurement problem. This is consistent with all interpretations except Bohmian.

OK, but any factor under the agent's control seems determinative, which falsifies LFW. Refer back to the thought experiment: It seems to be the case that there is such a possible world only if there is no reason for the choice.

x

Compatibilism = a concept of free will that is consistent with determinism. I've described choices that are consistent with determinism. Is the choice "free"? It is free, because it is a product of the agent's mental processes. That's why I stressed the agent's causal role.

Could the agent have decided differently? Yes, if there were some difference in the factors contributing to his decision. This is sufficiently free to be classified as "free will," and sufficiently free to be held morally culpable.

Is that not free enough for you? Do you insist that true freedom entails being sufficiently free to make a different choice given exactly the same set of deciding factors? That seems absurd - because it implies a freedom to make choices for no reason at all.

If they are, then effectively, any decision is predetermined and we're not talking about compatibilism. — Terrapin Station

Sure - and they ARE effectively predetermined. I'm drawing the distinction between entailment and causation. Per determinism, the decision is a truth that is entailed by the truths at the big bang. The logic parallels the causation: Big bang truth ->entails a logical chain of truths->entails the truth of the decision. The transitive property applies to the logic, so it's valid to say: big bang truth ->entails truth of the decision. Although this is valid logic, causation unfolds in a temporal sequence and each step in the sequence is necessary to the next (i.e. the transitive property does not apply to the causal sequence). This means we are warranted in considering the necessary role of the immediate cause of the decision.

I take it, hower, that when Relativist speaks of alternatives, s/he is speaking of a range of options that merely appear open to the agent, for all she knows; since a deliberating agent never (or very seldom) is in an epistemic position where she would know in advance what decision she is being predetermined to make. — Pierre-Normand

I mildly object to saying a decision is predetermined. Saying the decision was "predetermined" can be interpreted to mean the same decision would be made irrespective of the cognitive processes the agent engages in. I stress that the agent's specific cognitive processes were necessary to the reaching of the decision, even though no other decision could have been made given the full set of characteristics of the agent. This is relevant to avoiding fatalism. An agent's role is an active one.

"What situation could you envisage that would offer no alternative courses of action? Unless you have unwillingly and unknowingly been 'possessed' or 'taken over' in some way then there are always alternatives. An unattractive alternative is still an alternative"

Alternative courses of action exist, but only one is selected. Under my compatibilist account, the one selected is determined by the chooser's memories, beliefs, dispositions and impulses. Given those specific memories, beliefs, etc - no other decision could have been made.

It seems reasonable to think those factors determine our choices. If these don't determine our choices, then we're making choices for no reason. But hypothetically, we could make a different choice if we had a different belief, memory, disposition, or impulse.

"Doesn’t free will just mean to a Compatibilist that the actor isn’t being coerced by anyone?"
Yes, but some deny there is moral accountability if choices are the product of determinism. I was addresssing that in my Op.

Multiple options are available, and one is chosen. This is the case irrespective of whether or not compatibilism is true. This is indisputable.

I described what is involved in the selection process (i.e. it is a product of a person's memories, beliefs, dispositions, and impulses), and this is also irrespective of whether or not compatibilism is true. Do you disagree? Am I omitting something?

Then it's not actually a choice and not compatibilist. There's no actual (ontological) freedom involved. — TerrapinStation

It is a choice by definition (a choice is a behavior in which a person has multiple options before them, and selects one), and I explained how it is consistent with determinism, so it is compatibilist.

In your initial post, i don't think that you're describing compatibilism in either 1 or 2. — Terrapin Station

Thanks for the comment. It reminded me that I failed to include a preliminary description of a compatibilist choice. I have added that - it's now the second paragraph of the Op, and I'll repeat it here:

By definition, a choice is a behavior in which a person has multiple options before them, and selects one. Choices are plausibly consistent with compatibilism because they are the product of a person's memories, beliefs, dispositions, and impulses. At a point in time, memories, beliefs and dispositions are fixed. Impulses imply a seemingly random element to the choice, but not actually random. The impulse has a basis in one's attitude at the moment (e.g. optimistic, pessimistic, anger, happiness...) or related to an internal or external factor that triggers a transient memory or feeling. These factors plausibly collectively determine the decision - no alternative decision could have been made given the specific set of memories, beliefs dispositions, and impulses that were present at the time of the decision. For purposes of this discussion, we'll assume that there were deterministic causes of the prior memories, beliefs and dispositions as well (in general, a combination of nature and nurture).

The drunk driver chose to drive while drunk, and chose to drive off after hitting the bicyclist. These decisions were plausibly the deterministic result of her beliefs, dispositions, and impulses of the moment. The question I was addressing in #1 and #2 pertained to whether or not a plausible account of moral accountability could be provided.

I still think that argumentum ad populums are fallacies. — Terrapin Station

I'm not making an argumentum ad populum. I'm noting that each of us has a natural reaction to such deeds as I've described, and it is these natural reactions that are the basis for assigning responsibility.

The Op over-generalizes. There are cases in which medication is appropriate and beneficial. Some people are so psychotically impaired that this is their only chance for anything close to a normal life. There are also some who benefit from temporary use of anti-depressants. Many doctors ARE too quick to prescribe and too willing to continue a medication, but I wouldn't demonize the entire profession. Better research, better guidelines, and better training is called for.

"
Well the Guardian is fairly reputable, and two sources is better than one, whereas the Canary is new and 'radical', and that article seemed to be sourced mainly in tweets. Still, the story is un-confirmed elsewhere, and the meetings denied by both parties. "
The important thing is that we ahould not treat the claim of meetings as fact. Even if true, it will only be relevant if there is admissable evidence for it. We have to wait for Mueller's report to know what what facts can be established. In the meantime, we just have these little tidbits, that may or may not pan out.

The Guardian says they were told this by two sources. That is not "fake news". It may be false, but fake news is the spreading of stories that have been thoroughly discredited - like the story about vaccinations causing autism. As far as I can tell, this story hasn't been discredited - it's simply been denied by Assange, which is hardly surprising. Whether it's true or false, no one's going to be convicted on the basis of there being two unnamed source telling a newspaper.

Am I failing to provide the sort of support you think I should give?

For what it's worth, I'm not pulling for Trump to fail. I related this in a post I made awhile back (here).