The hard and harder problems exist if we take our ontology from science, because it leaves the phenomenal out. Reconciling would mean figuring out a way to include the phenomenal in the scientific, whether that's by reduction, identity, elimination, emergent or expanding the scientific ontology. — Marchesk

We know too little about the workings of the brain to truly reconcile that. At this point, all we can do is entertain metaphysical accounts and consider how these might relate to, or emerge from, the physical. The one thing I reject is the argument from ignorance that dualists use: that if we can't provide a full scientific account for the various aspects of mental life then we should accept dualism.

(whatever THAT is) — Relativist

THAT is the exact thing that is trying to be understood. — schopenhauer1

I expected a response to that! It's a broader topic than qualia. If we can't agree on qualia, we won't get far in a discussion of mental life.

Yep, so why is it THAT experience at all (whatever it is) with the physiological phenomena? — schopenhauer1

It seems to me it's just an accident of evolution (like the rather large size of my nose). The ability to discriminate objects by color has a utility, and this particular means of discriminating color just happens to be what developed as a consequence of genetic drift and environmental factors.

The "concept" of greenness is that mental image that we perceive. The word "green" refers to this quale. The range of wavelengths associated with greenness are those wavelengths that are associated with this quale. — Relativist

Right, and it is these concepts which cannot be reconciled with our scientific concepts. — Marchesk

What do you mean by "reconciled"? The quale "green" is not ontologically identical to the scientific concept of green (e.g. the range of wavelengths), but the two are related to one another: objects that we perceive as matching the green quale of experience are also known (through science) to reflect light in a specific range of wavelengths.

But they still have some experience- even if not the same as a majority of people. What is this experience as compared to the wavelength/neural states that correspond with the experience? This isn't a semantic question, but a metaphysical one. By simply restating that there are qualia like greenness (or whatever subjective experience the person has, like in the case of colorblindness), and that there are wavelengths associated with green, we aren't saying much except what we already know. So how are you dissolving this problem? — schopenhauer1

What I am addressing is the referrent: green is a word that refers to the experience of greenness (the quale). Like all qualia, it is subjective - so your experience of greenness may differ from mine (due to subtle differences in our neural wiring). Knowledge of greenness constitutes non-verbal, non-semantic knowledge; only by actually experiencing greenness can we have this knowledge. The ontology of the quale green is different from other objects of the world because it is subjective: it is a personal mental image (whatever THAT is).

It's true that there is a range of wavelengths that corresponds to green, but this scientific information is not identical to the experience. A person who has never experienced green can learn everything that can be known about the color from the perspective of science and art, but they will still lack the non-semanticknowledge by acquaintance of the color.

Trinity is irrational in terms of the common understandings of persons: 3 persons = 1 person is logically impossible.

Trinity is defended by creating a metaphysical framework in which contradictions are avoided. That metaphysical framework succeeds in its task, but the problem is that it seems nothing more than post hoc rationalization. I look at the history of Christianity, and it appears this Trinity concept arose to rationalize Jesus' divinity within a monotheistic context. Kudos to the great thinkers for their developing this ingenious metaphysical account, but this doesn't make it any more convincing.

Reading of a teleprompter is so difficult. How could we assume the President of the United States to be able to clearly read out from a teleprompter a prepared speech. — ssu

In fairness, Trump is capable of reading a teleprompter. In this case, we're told the teleprompter stopped working, so he had to rely on his personal knowledge of history.

Conceptual problems arise sometimes, when there is legitimately no good explanation how two phenomena that seem different are the same. That is the hard problem. — schopenhauer1

I suggest that there are non-verbal concepts, and this includes qualia like greenness. The "concept" of greenness is that mental image that we perceive. The word "green" refers to this quale. The range of wavelengths associated with greenness are those wavelengths that are associated with this quale. Color-blind humans who lack the ability to distinguish red from green do not know greenness - they only know ABOUT greenness.

Suppose you went back in time and encountered your 2-year old self. Two distinct individuals standing side be side, with clear physical differences cannot be considered the identical person. You do not even share the same set of memories, you only share a 2-year subset (and your memories of that shared subset are fuzzier). Your DNA isn't even identical - our DNA gradually changes a little over time.

Even without time travel, to maintain identity over time, there must be something that endures. What is that?

Some of the more important mental activity that is discussed in theory of mind is that which mediates between stimulus and response. — Relativist

Problem is that consciousness isn’t limited to perception. Memory, dreams, imagination, feelings, thoughts and hallucinations all can have colors, sounds, etc — Marchesk

We perceive (have a subjective experience) of greenness, and having experienced it at least once, we then have a memory of greenness - a memory that is drawn upon when we dream, think, or imagine things that are green. Perceiving color is a functional capacity that we possess, one that confers an ability to tailor our actions based on this quality. The experience of greenness is nonverbal; words cannot convey the experience. What problems are you referring to?

Representation of a physical attribute? That sounds like where you are sneaking in the ghost or the "Cartesian Theater". It usually happens somewhere. — schopenhauer1

I think the "ghost" is an illusion of introspection. Rather, the representation of greenness is present because it influences behavior. Some of the more important mental activity that is discussed in theory of mind is that which mediates between stimulus and response. This is important because it is contrary to the notion that color qualia are epiphenomenal.

I don't think it has much bearing on your argument. I offer it more for context, in case you get interested in Philosophy of Mind - where the distinctions really do matter.

Then what's an example of a solution? Or do we just not debate philosophy of mind and problem solved? I don't see how the problem is not a problem by using different language, or rather, I don't even see how that language would be employed. When I say "green" as a qualitative state and "green" as a wavelength of light hitting the eye and producing all sorts of neurological states and arrangements, they seem different. How would you suppose to not have the difference without adding the ghost? — schopenhauer1

It seems to me the "ghost" may a product of conceptual problems that arise from (possibly misleading) introspection. It seems that my mind IS something, so I conceptually treat it as an entity. IMO this leads to a dualist (or quasi-dualist) view of the mind.

In answer to your question: the quale "green" is an experience - a representation of a physical attribute, that is produced by the visual cortex which then passes into short-term, and then long-term, memory.

The zero energy universe hypothesis (which I don't necessarily buy) has some sort of 'seed' causing a chain reaction that then generates the rest of the matter/energy in the universe in exchange for negative gravitational energy. So I agree something permanent must exist (at least a seed, maybe all matter/energy if the hypothesis does not hold). But permanent existence is only possible outside of time so whatever existed permanently has its origin outside of time. — Devans99

You have some particular (unprovable) ontology in mind, and dismissing other possibilities because they are inconsistent with the (unprovable) assumptions of your ontology. For example, the notion that something with causal efficacy can exist "outside of time" is pure assumption - there's no basis for thinking such a thing can exist. If such a thing can exist, then your scenario is fine. But if it can't exist, then we're stuck with the sort of scenario I've described - along with the assumptions it entails. We've been down this road before, so there's no point in going down it again. Thanks for the discussion.

My understanding of what you call emergentism is not that higher level properties are not the product of lower level ones, only that they are not predictable from them. Those are not the same thing. — T Clark

There are two flavors of emergentism: ontological and epistemological. I think you're referring to epistemological emergence, since you're accepting that higher level properties are the product of lower level properties, but not predictable. Ontological emergence is stronger: it entails the emergence of novel properties that exist exclusively in the higher level that cannot, in principle, be reduced to fundamental physics. Consider mental causation: our minds have causal effects on substances in the world; is this mental activity reducible to particle behavior (reductionism is true), or is the mental activity entail ontological emergence from the material in our brains (reductionism is false)? If you're interested, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has an article on this (here).

Reductionism is a metaphysical approach. It isn't right or wrong, it's more or less useful in specific situations. It's very useful when dealing with subatomic particles. It gets less so very quickly when you leave that size scale. — T Clark

Reductionism could be an approach, but I've only seen it used as an ontological commitment- so from that perspective it is either consistent with reality, or it isn't. Its converse is ontological emergentism, which is the claim that some higher level properties are not a product of lower level properties. Consciousness is cited as the most likely example of ontological emergence.

Things came into existence/time at the point time started - either by creation ex nilhilo (see zero energy universe hypothesis) or because these things existed timelessly already (and they entered time at the start of time). — Devans99

"Ex nihilo" = from nothing, implies a state of "nothingness" existed, a self-contradictory term ("nonexistence exists"). If x exists at all times, and the past is finite, then x did not "come into" existence - that would entail a prior existing state of affairs into which x appears, which is impossible because x exists at all times. Further, the scenario assumes x is fundamental to everything that exists - everything in existence is composed of x.

I do not think an initial uncaused state is impossible - it is possible, but only possible outside of time. — Devans99

What is your justification for believing something causally efficacious can exist outside of time, and can somehow reach into time and interact?

Everything, including fundamental stuff, must be accounted for. IE it must either be created or exist permanently. — Devans99

The fundamental stuff is necessary for all existence, since everything is composed of it. It therefore exists permanently. It can't have been caused, because all possible causal factors (like everything else in existence) are composed of this fundamental stuff. That's what it means to be fundamental. Your only optiob is to deny that there can exist some fubdamental stuff.

As I've pointed out, it is impossible to exist permanently/'forever' in time - you simply cannot have a brute fact within time because causality (which is a feature of time) requires everything to have a both a prior and ultimate cause.

You have provided no justification for believing this.

There have been a lot of discussions around this type of issue. They often come down to a question of the validity of a reductionist approach to science. The behavior of a complex, dynamic physical system will be consistent with so called laws of physics. That does not mean that the behavior of the system is predictable, even in theory, by those laws. It works top down, but it doesn't work bottom up. — T Clark

If reductionism is true, then indeed it must work bottom up. That's not to say that scientific research should be directed toward (say) fully accounting for biology with quantum field theory - that's impractical, but it is in principle possible to do so - or at least would be if our knowledge of fundamental physics were complete. If it is not possible, this implies there are some higher level properties that are ontologically emergent (and thus truly unpredictable), which contradicts reductionism.

Reductionism does imply that the current state of the universe was in principle predictable at the big bang. Quantum indeterminacy means that base prediction would have actually been of a huge number of possible states of the universe, of which the current state is but one of that number.

Au contraire! Philosphers can be kinda funny:

Rene Descartes goes up to the counter at Starbucks. “I’ll have a scone,” he says. “Would you like juice with that?” asks the barista. “I think not,” says Descartes, and he ceases to exist.

Also, It is not intuition; it is logic: things must first come into existence in order to exist - the alternative is just a belief in magic — Devans99

It's bad logic. If the past is finite, then something existed without "coming into existence" because that would entail a state prior to its existence, and this is logically impossible.

The following two quotes appear to reflect the same point:

If the fundamental stuff exists then its composition exists as well. So both basis are covered and I am not committing the fallacy of composition. — Devans99

If you prefer to view it that way, then I would say those fields and the disturbances in them need a temporal start too. One configuration of the field is caused by a previous configuration of the field. If there is no first configuration of the field, there is no second configuration, no third, and by induction, no configurations at all. — Devans99

If there is fundamental stuff, it is metaphysically impossible for it not to exist (i.e. its existence is metaphysically necessary). A finite past implies the fundamental stuff was in an initial state (configuration) and perhaps this state could have been different (i.e. the specific state is contingent), but why think that it impossible for an initial, uncaused, contingent state to be impossible? You need to provide a justification for this that is not based on the subsequent temporal states and the composition fallacy.

The formal argument you gave is inconsistent with a finite past. A finite past implies an initial state, and I see no reason to think an initial state cannot have some contingent properties.

1. Assume a particle does not have a temporal start point (IE its existed ‘forever’)
2. If the particle does not have a start, then it cannot have a ‘next to start’ (because that would qualify as a start and 1 says that it does not have a start)
3. So particle does not have a next to start (by Modus Ponens on 1 and 2).
4. etc… for start+2, start+3…
5. Implies particle does not have middle
6. etc… unto start+∞ (now)
7. Implies particle does not have a (temporal) end
8. Implies particle never existed — Devans99

I don't follow your argument. It appears you're treating particles as fundamental. What do you mean by "next to start"? An eternal particle doesn't start to exist (nor cease to exist) but it exists in contingent relations to other eternal particles that collectively configure into higher level objects. These higher level objects are what come into existence.

And say we find X is actually fundamental (be it a string or whatever). X will have innate properties. That will require a temporal start at which these innate properties are acquired. Else X has no innate properties and X is null and void. — Devans99

Again, you just seem to be asserting (without support) that contingent things cannot exist uncaused. My response is the same: any initial state will necessarily have contingent properties. This is true even if there is a God. A God that exists in an initial state would have had had an uncaused plan for a universe in his mind - i.e., an intent to create THIS contingent universe rather than all other metaphysically possible universes.

Inner dialog is just one more form of conscious experience. And it's not necessary to experience color, sound, pain in perception, memory, imagination, etc. — Marchesk

I agree with this, but would like to clarify that inner dialog is one aspect of HUMAN consciousness. Non-human animals (and non-verbal humans) probably don't have an inner dialog, but they arguably experience qualia.

I argue that we should use a comprehensive definition of consciousness that admits a wide set of mental behavior. If we get too specific, we become overly human-chauvinistic.

The 'fundamental stuff' must of had a start in time. Else how did it come about? — Devans99

Why believe the fundamental stuff required a start in time? Your intuition about the need for a start is based on experience with configurations of the fundamental stuff, and when you extrapolate this to the fundamental itself, you commit the fallacy of composition.

A quanta of energy remains a quanta of energy even if it s form can change.

Quanta are disturbances in a quantum field. Fields are fundamental (or at least, MORE fundamental), so quanta are just configurations of the more fundamental field.

IMO matter/energy has to have a start too — Devans99

Matter and energy (which are interchangeable) are just configurations of fundamental stuff. The intuition (which is not a proof) is rooted in our experiences with configurations of stuff having a "start." This leads to the conclusion there is a past infinite series of configurations (every configuration "started", having been caused by a prior configuration), but even so - this doesn't entail a beginning for the fundamental stuff itself - just a beginning for any particular configuration.

Anything that exists within time must have a start — Devans99

The sort of thing that clearly has had a "start" are merely configurations of fundamental stuff. The fundamental stuff itself has no apparent "start", and I see no justification for believing it necessary had one.

There must be an explanation for everything that is not a brute fact. Brute facts can only exist outside of time. — Devans99

Your first sentence is a definition: a brute fact is something that exists without a reason for existing. But why believe that brute facts can only exist "outside of time"?
I grant that they don't seem to exist WITHIN spacetime, but that doesn't necessarily have bearing on spacetime itself. Spacetime doesn't exist "within" spacetime, so our intra-universe observation/intuition doesn't apply.

I think it does. Several incredibly stupid insights: the Earth is 6000 years old, give or take a thousand years. Man ate from the tree of knowledge so he was condemned to have sex. Man has free will. Bad things are attributed to Satan, who was created by god, but somehow or other it's not god's fault ETC. — god must be atheist

I grant that (in principle) God could have created the universe 6000 years ago (or 6 seconds ago, for that matter) but this historical explanation doesn't provide a physical explanation of the fundamental structure of material reality: are quantum fields fundamental? Is string theory true? Is there are quantum basis for gravity? It's not enough to "know" that God is the cause of it all - we would like to know exactly what he caused.

Your focus on "explanation" seems a red-herring. Explanations are post-hoc semantic descriptions. The leap to a conclusion that explainability is a metaphysical requirement is unjustified. Determinism entails explainabilty. The state of a quantum system (e.g. the quantum system that is the universe/multiverse) is "explainable" by it's prior states because its evolution is describable in a Schrödinger equation. This does not imply the quantum system itself is necessarily explainable by something external.

To summarize, the harder problem is that human phenomenal concepts do not reveal whether our material makeup or the functional role our neurobiology plays is responsible for consciousness. As such, we have no philosophical justification for saying whether a functional isomorph made up of different material such as the android Data from Star Trek is conscious. Even more confusing, we have no way of telling whether a "mere" functional isomorph is conscious, where "mere" means functional in terms of human folk psychology only, and not in the actual neural functions. — Marchesk

IMO, the difficulty is due to the vagueness of the term "consciousness". Broadly speaking, we can consider Data, my cat, and myself to each possess a sort of functional capability that are analogous to one another - and we could label this functional capability as "consciousness." Or we could adopt a narrow view of consciousness that could only possibly apply to humans (and possibly not even all HUMANS!).

Conscious thoughts do not arise in isolation, they arise in a complex context. The context includes sensory perceptions (consider the processing of the visual cortex, which automagically produces a conscious "visual image" by processing reflected light), subconscious "knowledge" (consider reflex reactions that are triggered by past experience), preconscious hard-wiring (consider the physical aspects of sexual stimulation), and bodily functions (feelings of pain, hunger, etc). Also consider pattern recognition - perceiving sameness in a variety of objects, this depends on hard-wiring in the brain, unconscious learning, and conscious learning (think through the mental processes involved with reading and interpreting the words on your computer screen right now).

My cat and Data each comprise very different contexts, and therefore their respective "consciousnesses" (broadly defined) will necessarily be very different from my own. My cat's consciousness will be closer to mine in some ways (those relating to bodily functions, perhaps), while Data's consciousness will be closer to mine with regard to intellectual processing (rational thought). I see or smell desirable food, and my body reacts (my mouth waters, I suddenly become conscious of hunger) - and it appears to me that my cat has some pretty similar reactions. Data does not, because he's not wired that way. On the other hand, I see a reference to Pi (3.14159...) and this triggers my learned concept of circle - and I'll assume Data has a similar thought.

It's clear that neither my cat nor Data can be said to have a human consciousness - the contexts are too different. And yet they each have some functional similarities to human consciousness. On the other hand, I can't accept Block's Chinese brain as having anything analogous - the context is too different.

Your scenario seems possible as an ontology, but I don't see how scientific investigation of fundamental physics could uncover it.

So, what's the difference between the ToE and God? — TheMadFool

If it is ever acheived, a ToE will be a theory that describes the most fundamental structure of material reality and how higher levels of structure (e.g. the standard model of particle physics) emerge from that fundamental level.

The "God hypothesis" simply asserts that God is the most fundamental level, but provides no insight into how physical structures emerge at ANY level.

Premise 4: If a being exists, its explanation must exist.
If this were not true, science would be impossible. If things "just happened," the observations would not be underlying dynamics, and could neither confirm nor falsify hypotheses. Note that “explanation” has two senses: (1) the fact(s) that make some state of affairs be as it is. (We may or may not know these.) This is the sense I am using. (2) Our attempt to articulate our understanding of (1). This is not the sense I am using here. — Dfpolis

I object to your claim that "explanation must exist". First, I'll note that this contradicts your definition of existence (" Existence adds a new note of comprehension: that the thing we are talking about can act in reality"): an "explanation" cannot act, and therefore explanations don't exist. Explanations "exist" (in a broadened sense of "exist") in minds, but only after theory has advanced to do so, and theory depends on the prior existence of minds that are capable of articulating it. The universe operated without existing explanations for quite a long time (and we obviously don't understand every aspect of material reality even now). I expect you're actually referring to the fact that mind-independent laws of nature exist, rather than semantic/mathematical descriptions of these laws. However, this can't suit your argument: laws of nature exist, but this provides no grounds for extrapolating beyond the universe (i.e. the totality of material reality) as you're trying to do. Everything within the universe is causally connected to everything else; it is these causal connections that constitute the laws of nature. But the existence of these intra-universe causal connections does not imply there is a causal connection to something external to the universe - there's no basis for assuming that to be the case.

.

That's a how answer masquerading as a why answer. — Unseen

It is presumptuous to assume there's a reason for consciousness BESIDES the how. Why think that? Are you looking for an excuse to believe it "had to be" a product of design?

I'm not going to insist it CAN'T be design, but you need to make a case for it and not merely ask a leading question.

Whenever we discuss the meaning of words, I do not think we are trying to figure out the objective meaning of those words. After all, words do not seem to have objective meaning. — TheHedoMinimalist

Words refer to concepts, most of which are fuzzy, but still have a core of agreed meaning. You noted the biological definition of life - and I see nothing wrong with that, and no reason to change it. Indeed "living" sets certain things apart (you said, "above" - but that's a subjective judgment, so it seems moot).

You're setting apart a different set of things, overlapping somewhat between the living and unliving. That's a fine analysis, albeit that it's also fuzzy. But I just see no need to redefine words to draw the distinction.

It seems simply biased and short-sighted to assume that only organisms should be associated with the process of life. — TheHedoMinimalist

It's not bias, per se, - it's trying to keep the fuzzy concept "life" from getting any fuzzier. You're right that it's conceivable that there could exist something akin to biological life that is vastly different from what we call "life", and that would challenge the fuzzy boundaries of the concept. If we cross that bridge, we can create new terminology based on whatever draws the least fuzzy boundaries.

Drilling down on the story a bit more the consensus is that Trump didn't have, and couldn't get, anywhere near the trillions of dollars that he had been talking about for infrastructure, that was the purported subject of the meeting. Journalists noted that, affixed to the Rose Garden podium, was a nicely printed No Collusion No Obstruction poster for when Trump stormed out of the meeting and started to kvetch. So the whole walk-out was staged as a smokescreen for the inability to deliver the infrastructure funding, which was itself a smokescreen. — Wayfarer

So, since there was no point in having a meeting, Trump decided to make a show of it. Sounds Trumpian.

And he’s been lying ever since. The Mueller Report showed he was lying, but as soon as it came out, what was the first thing he did? He lied about it. — Wayfarer

But he wasn't under oath, so that's OK....that seems to be the way Trumpists view it. Even if no crime is ever charged, and no impeachment ever proceeds, Mueller unequivocally shows what a liar Trump is, and that he's engendered a culture of duplicity throughout his administration.

it's not determinate anyways because the chain of causation which supports hard-determinism is broken in the quantum substratum of reality and all things come into being from the micro to the macrocosm...similarly, all causal chains act from the mirco to the macro too...so its a mute point. — TheGreatArcanum

It's not moot, because the fundamental components of the world are particles that do not behave as we'd expect from our experience in the macro world. The world is fundamentally quantum mechanical. Your metaphysics doesn't predict this, and it's not even compatible with it. Therefore your metaphysics is moot.

if the universe must end by means of "heat death" and the law of entropy, it necessarily has an end, and if the universe is deterministic, that end was predetermined, so in saying that the universe will die eventually and that it is also deterministic, you are saying that it has a first cause; final causes are deterministic you know...determinism and intentionality are synonyms. — TheGreatArcanum

Determined does not equate to intended.

Although it may be reasonable to assume the past is finite, the future is potentially infinite - so even this heat death is not actually a "final" state. An analysis like this is rooted in obsolete classical physics rather than quantum physics, so what the infinite future may bring is impossible to know.

in order to make the world "real" and "concrete" the physicalist begins his philosophy with the absurd notion that objects are not contained within subjects. In understanding that all objects are contained within the mind, all the answers fall into place. — TheGreatArcanum

You're attacking a poorly constructed strawman. Physicalism does not entail objects being contained in the mind. [

to solve the unsolved questions about the nature of existence, one must first ascertain the essence of the set of all sets which do not contain themselves, that is, the set of all contingent things. to do this, one must relate ontology and set theory, or rather, the notion of precedence and set containment or non-containment — TheGreatArcanum

"Solve the unresolved questions..."? At best, solutions can be proposed - they cannot be verified. Proposing a mereology is reasonable metaphysics, but you're mistaken if you think you can determine metaphysical truth. Nothing more than coherence is attainable.

so physicalism cannot be true. In fact, it’s beyond absurd. — TheGreatArcanum

You"re going to need more than this:

1. If Physicalism then not(teleology)
2. Teleology
3. Therefore not(physicalism)

Physicalism needn't even be true. If the universe evolves deterministically (which seems likely)
there is no "final cause". You're left with accounting for mental activity this way. But mental activity can be accounted for in other ways, so you don't really have a case at all. All you can do is to propose your view as a metaphysical system that is possibly true. Is that all you're after? Anything more is futile.

Will has a final cause and therefore a first cause; when each person is born, their potential to die is contained within themselves as well; and also, one’s potential to live is contained within their potential to die; so life itself involves a first and final cause. — TheGreatArcanum

Two problems with this:
1) You are assuming there exist final causes, and then accounting for "will" with that paradigm. This does not establish it.
2) Physicalism is possibly true. If so, then the matter composing the body is just temporarily in the form of a body - so there is no "final" configuration of this matter.

if you are to say that our coming into being does not involve a first cause; you must say that our existence is a result of a set of material causes that extend backwards into indefinitely into time,
and that that set of causes end with our death and that an infinite number of material causes happened only so that one person could be a live for just a blink of the eye of eternity.

I haven't said that the universe's existence implies no first cause. If the past is finite, it implies there was an initial state. The past existence of an initial state does not entail intentionality. Your assertion, " so that one person could be a live for just a blink of the eye of eternity" assumes intentionality.

Are you just asserting that this Aristotelian 4-cause paradigm is coherent, or are you claiming there's a compelling case to believe its true? I believe it may be coherent, but it's far from compelling.

Have you never considered religions before? A lack of objective support is normal and expected. — Pattern-chaser

LOL! Indeed I have, and I agree completely.