"..I guessed that this meant that some of our beliefs are provably true, and are not IBEs. If that guess is correct, then apparently you must hold that some foundations are certain. If that guess is wrong, then it would seem that you hold that all beliefs are (unprovable) IBEs. Do you disagree with any of that?"
I don't think ALL beliefs are IBEs:
-We have some basic, intrinsic beliefs, that aren't inferred. Example: the instinctual belief in a world external to ourselves.
We also accept some things uncritically (no one's perf ect).

Re: certainty- that's an attitude, and it may or may not be justified. Justification doesn't require deductive proof. Consider your example "this entity before me is either a tree or it is not a tree." Solipsism is logically possible, so that there actually isn't something before you. We can justifiably feel certain despite the logical possibility we're wrong.

Arguments for a more widespread skepticism or relativism I am familiar with tend to instead rely on a more global underdetermination of things like all rules/rule-following, all causal/inductive reasoning, or the underdetermination of any sort of solid concept/meaning that would constitute the possession of knowledge, which is a step up (or down) from simple scientific underdetermination. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think we should keep the underlying logical limitations in the background of our minds, but we shouldn't let this undermine practical critical thinking for making judgements and arguments. As one example: a lot of people embrace some conspiracy theory because it explains some facts, and defend their judgement on the basis that it's not provably false. It's a distortion of inference to best explanation. This is a tangent from the theme of your thread, but it's an issue I consider extremely important.

So would you say that some of our beliefs are provably true? — Leontiskos

Good question. We have beliefs that follow necessarily from other beliefs/facts, so they're provable in that sense. It seems inescapable that we depend on some foundational beliefs. So nothing can be proven without some sort of epistemological foundation. What are your thoughts?

God can be known through the application of reason to empirically demonstrable aspects of the ordinary and natural world, — Bob Ross

Is this a premise?

Your OP seems focused on morality. Are you defining God as nothing more than the foundation of objective moral values? That may be all you need, and it lightens your burden of proof.

I would basically argue that some theory which is believed to be underdetermined is not believed. So if I think there are only two theories to account for a body of evidence and that both are exactly 50% likely to be true, then I psychologically cannot believe one over the other.

So I think we would need to get more precise on what we mean by "underdetermined. — Leontiskos

Agreed that we need to establish what "undetermined" means, when were talking about beliefs. I've been treating "underdetermined" as any belief that is not provably true (i.e. determined=necessarily true). Under this extreme definition, nearly every belief we have is underdetermined. I also agree that we ought not to believe something that has a 50% chance of being false.

Most of our beliefs are not provably true, so I have labelled them IBEs. I don't see how else one could claim to have a warrant to believe it. So if you say your belief in X is "more than an IBE" - is it really, if it's not provably true? Or is it still an IBE, but with strong support?

.

This is a really interesting objection. Is an IBE underdetermined? Remember that the conclusion is not, "X is the explanation," but rather, "X is the best explanation." I actually don't see why underdetermination would need to attend IBEs. — Leontiskos

I see your point, that by labelling X and IBE, underdetermination may not apply. Labeling it the explanation would be underdetermined.

But I suggest that in the real world, we operate on beliefs, which are often formed by inferring to the best explanation from the facts at hand (background beliefs will unavoidably affect the analysis). We make errors, of course, but a proper objective is to minimize these errors (more on this, below).

I think it depends on how far underdetermination is allowed to roll. If you pair these arguments, their reach is far greater than scientific theories. The term is most associated with the underdetermination of scientific theories, but as noted in the OP is has been used for substantially broader effect.

If some of these arguments go through, then the "best" explanation is not "the most likely to be true (as in, corresponding to reality)," but rather "the explanation I most prefer," or "the explanation society most prefers, given its customs." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Forgive me if I misunderstand, but this sounds a bit fatalistic, to me - in that it seems to imply the quest for truth is irrelevant or hopeless. I suggest that we have a deontological duty to minimize false beliefs and maximize true beliefs. To do otherwise is irrational, and this includes embracing an explanation simply because he prefers it (there are exceptional cases where this might be appropriate, but I'll leave that aside).

Even if we were perfect at this, the resulting beliefs would still be "underdetermined", but ideally they will be our best explanation for the set of information we have. There will necessarily be subjectivity to it (we each make a judgement, and it will be based on our background beliefs - many formed the same way, others the product of learning). This is a proper objective for critical thinking.

If we accept abductive reasoning (inference to best explanation on available evidence - IBE) as leading to rational beliefs, is there really a problem? Such beliefs will, of course, be undertermined but that just means they don't comprise knowledge (in the strict sense).

Epistemology should be of practical use in the world, and in the real world we are nearly always deriving conclusions from limited information. IBEs are the practical ideal.

most people intuit some form of soul, which is totally unsupportable and is probably the only way to maintain identity obtains for a 'self'. — AmadeusD

I agree with you, although the religious connotations of "soul" leads philosophers to shy away from using that word. There's a good article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy that discusses various approaches to defining "transworld identities", which seems to cover all the relevant ground. Terms that are used (instead of soul): "bare identity", "thisness", "haeccity". The section on haeccity seems the most relevant.

There has idealism and materialism, as well.ad theism.and idealism. What if all such ideas and models are inadequate? Panpsychism may not be complete but it may further ongoing partiality in models of understanding..Just as consciousness itself is evolving, the human models and descriptions of it, are evolving too. — Jack Cummins

What do you mean by "adequate"? Logically possible? Absence of explanatory gaps? Having rational justification to accept?

I just finished reading Michael Tye's book, "Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness".

Tye labels himself a physicalist/representalist, but proposes there to be some aspect of consciousness present in all things (he labels this "consciousness*").
Full consciousness (without the "*") requires a physical structure - like the brain. Consciousness* is unmeasurable/undetectable, but it's presence is sine qua non for consciousness in humans and some other animals.

I'm pretty skeptical, but for those inclined toward panpsychism, it's at least a relatively minimal form of it. I could rationalize it based on the fact that we're all composed of quanta of the same quantum fields- so there is a direct relation between any 2 objects that exist.

if a one particle difference is all it takes to remove identity, then identity is lost every moment anyway — flannel jesus

Strict identity IS lost with every breath. So this approach uses perdurance to account for individual identity over time.

and we'll never know for sure. Theres no experiment to perform to ever know if it's a numerically identical person or just qualitatively (nearly) identical. — Mijin

There is no objectively correct answer. Any answer depends on metaphysical assumptions about the nature of individual identity. I gave you an answer in terms of strict identity - consistent with identity of indiscernibles. Perdurance theory needs to be added to make sense of individual identity across time.

The other extreme is haeccity- which treats identity as a primitive - thus allowing for 100% of your parts to differ while retaining that identity.

Between the extremes are essentialists. One version entails identity being associated with set of necessary and sufficient properties. I've never encountered anyone who could define what these are.

Why? Do the particles contain some essence of you? — Mijin

I don't believe in essence. Either both of them are the identity of the pre-transportee, or neither is. The former implies both copies will perpetually share the same identity - which seems absurd. So IMO, both copies are new identities - each containing memories of the same past life.

This must be a correspondence theory of truth, in that a true statement in language corresponds to a fact in the world. — RussellA

What's a "fact"? It's apparently not something existing in the world, so what is the correspondence? It seems to be a correspondence between two "things" that are both within your mind, and therefore circular.

it seems impossible, in principle, to ever know where that line is, as that line makes no measurable difference to objective reality — Mijin

Any analysis would depend on one's attitude toward essentialism: is there an individual essence? If not, then (it seems to me) that individual identity = strict identity, which means that even a 1 particle difference would render the transported object something non-identical (having a different identity) on each end.

The nature of the transport also seems important. Are the actual particles being moved from place to place, or are a different set of particles being assembled into the same form at the receiving end? If the latter, then arguably - the receiving end is a duplicate, not the "same" individual.

If there's an essence, is it material or immaterial (like a soul)? If it's a soul, it's questionable whether or not the soul is transported.

As an Indirect Realist, for me, objects such as tables and chairs don't exist in the world, but only exist in the mind as concepts. — RussellA

How do you account for truth? Is truth entirely subjective?

Your choice of tense suggests that at said earlier time, 'the universe' (and not just the subset of the universe events where the time coordinate is some low value) 'was' devoid of life, that the universe changes over time — noAxioms

The universe does change over time, from the perspective of any intra-universe reference frame. If anything exists outside the universe, it would "see" our universe as a static entity.

I said I give little weight to intuitions since the purpose of intuition isn't truth, but rather pragmatism. Hence I question all intuitions and don't necessarily reject all of them (most though). — noAxioms

That doesn't answer my question. You had a belief about the external world, and now you don't. I can understand questioning it, given that it is possibly false, but most of our beliefs are possibly false and (I assume) you nevertheless continue to believe most of them.

Regarding this particular intuition: IF there is an external world, and this world produced living organisms, those living organisms would necessarily need to successfully interact with that external world. This would necessarily lead to the organisms distinguishing between what is external and what is internal. The evolutionary development of consciousness would maintain the distinction, through natural, innate intuitions. This doesn't prove there is an external world, but it provides an explanation for why we believe it to be the case. Contrast this with the alternative: there's no reason to believe there is NOT an external world - it's merely a logical possibility.

The universe, not being contained by time, includes all times, so there is no 'this universe before life emerged'. This universe has life in it, period. A subsection of it before a certain time is a subset of the universe, not the universe itself.
Now if you deny this and have the universe contained by time, then it isn't really a universe, just an object that at some moment was created in a larger 'universe'. — noAxioms

No, I don't think the universe is contained by time, but I believe time is real within the universe - and therefore there was a time before life emerged. My dual-view of time is consistent with the Page & Wooters mechanism.

To emphasize what little weight I give to said basic intuitions, I rationally do not agree. Denial of existence of any kind of external reality isn't necessarily solipsism. At best, it's just refusal to accept the usual definition of 'exists', more in favor of a definition more aligned with the origin of the word, which is 'to stand out' to something (a relativist definition). — noAxioms

I don't understand why you deny our basic intuitions about there being an external world. Surely you intuitively accepted this during your childhood, so what led you to believe you were mistaken?

It seems to me that everything that exists is an object, so I don't see an issue.

Yes, but he does not say that science answers all questions. Scientific knowledge is a superior authority, because it's the only methodology that reaches "an intellectual consensus about controversial matters... [Armstrong] concludes that it is the scientific image of man, and not the philosophical or religious or artistic or moral vision of man, that is the best clue we have to the nature of man".

His scope is limited to outlining the "nature of man". He's not denying some use for the philosophical/religious/artistic/moral aspects of man- his only (indirect) criticism is the accurate observation that the resulting controversies will remain perpetually unsettled. So, indeed, one cannot claim to achieve knowledge in that way.

So you interpret, "we can give a complete account of man in purely physico-chemical terms" to mean "all questions should be deferred to science".

That's not the way I read it. In the next paragraph, he writes:

"For me, then, and for many philosophers who think like me, the moral is clear. We must try to work out an account of the nature of mind which is compatible with the view that man is nothing but a physico-chemical mechanism.

"And... I shall be concerned to do just this: to sketch (in barest outline) what may be called a Materialist or Physical account of the mind."

So he's not deferring to science to answer the question of what the "nature" of mind is- he's drawing the conclusion as a philosopher. And his account merely aims to show that mental activity is consistent with physicalism (a philosophical hypothesis).

By my reading, the "complete account of man" is strictly a defense of the hypothesis that everything about men is reducible to "physico-chemical mechanism". In his book, "A Materialist Theory on Mind" he even hedges on reductionism.

Sorry, if my word-choice seemed to put you in an irrational category. Since you used the term "belief", I simply substituted another term, "faith"*1, with the same basic meaning — Gnomon

Fair enough. I'm inclined to avoid using the term when discussing epistemology, because it means different things to different people. I prefer to use the general term, "belief", along with additional description. But I'm not in charge of the dictionary.

I appreciate that your hypothesis is modest, and doesn't thoroughly undermine a general naturalistic world-view. You seem to specifically address physicalism's explanatory gap.

Strictly speaking the physical world could have evolved higher order mammals without this unit, which are not conscious(we don’t know the precise role played by consciousness in the life of higher order mammals and if it is a necessary condition). They could all be entirely unconscious and the world would be identical to the world we live in. — Punshhh

You allude to the question of Zombies - beings who behave as we do (by outward appearances) but do not have the mental experiences we have. I want to explore this further by starting a new thread on the topic. By analyzing how we differ from Zombies, it focuses attention on the most problematic feature of physicalism.

Qualia, intuition, consciousness—they are all real phenomena, but I see no reason to believe they’re anything but products of material data processing. The brain, though vastly complex, is just a physical machine. If that machine can experience qualia, why not a future machine of equal or greater complexity? — Jacques

It makes sense to think that IF the complex machinery of the brain produces qualia, THEN it is physically possible to develop a machine that reproduces this. However, we can't envision a way to implement this in a machine. That's why this is labeled "the hard problem of consciousness". I don't think it's reasonable to think qualia would just HAPPEN with sufficient computational capacity. Rather, we'd first need to have some theory about how qualia manifest in ourselves. Still, you have a good point that we may not be able to figure this out due to our finite limitations.

So, you are aware that your "premise" is a Faith instead of a Fact? Most people, including Scientists, intuitively take for granted that their senses render an accurate model of the external world. But ask them to explain how that material reality-to-mind-model process works, and the story gets murky. Yet, philosophers tend to over-think it, and ask how we could verify (justify) that commonsense Belief as a Positive Fact*1. — Gnomon

No, it's not faith by my definition. It's a properly basic belief*. It's basic, because it's innate- not derived, and not taught. It's properly basic if the world that produced us would tend to produce this belief, which is the case if we are the product of evolutionary forces. It is rational to maintain belief that has not been epistemologically defeated. The bare possibility that the belief is false does not defeat the belief.

This is why I question the rationality of belirving idealism to be true- it seems to depend on denying innate belief solely on the basis that it is possibly false.

Contrast this with faith: it entails a learned belief, not an innate belief, and the tendency is to maintain the belief even if rationality defeaters are presented.
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* A "properly basic belief" is a belief that is rational to hold without needing to be inferred from other beliefs or supported by arguments or evidence. It is a foundational concept in epistemology. They serve as a bedrock for other beliefs. They are justified by the circumstances that cause them. Examples: basic perceptual beliefs ("I see a tree in front of me" Memory beliefs ("I ate corn flakes for breakfast this morning")

...your Real World certainty (faith)... — Gnomon

You have misunderstood if you think I feel certain about physicalism, or about anything else. I have discussed degrees of "certainty" - this could alternatively be labelled "degree of confidence" or "epistemic probability".

Quantum Physics undermined the sub-atomic foundation of Newton's Physics, Uncertainty has become the watch-word for scientists. — Gnomon

Watchword? Not sure what you mean by that. There's simply a degree of uncertainty in the outcome of any quantum collapse, but it still entails probabilistic determinism. I don't assume the current so-called laws of physics (Newtonian, or otherwise) are necessarily actual, ontological laws of nature - they are current best guess.

Classical physics assumed an objective reality independent of observation, whereas quantum mechanics suggests that observation and measurement can influence the properties of a system. Some interpretations propose that properties may not exist until measured. — Gnomon

That's a pretty extreme interpretation of QM, based on the Copenhagen interpretation - treating observation as some special interaction. The modern view is that a measurement is just an entaglement between a classical system (or object) and a quantum system. Personally, Idon't see much reason to think minds have some magical impact on quantum systems.

Until you brought it up, I was not familiar with the term "Negative Fact"*1. But the definition below sounds absurd to me. And I don't know anybody who bases a philosophical conclusion on nothing but the Absence*2 of that thing. — Gnomon

Let me clarify. Let's define fact as: a true proposition. The issue I was alluding to was: what's the truthmaker for the fact? I'm assuming truthmaker theory of truth: a truthmaker is some component of the world that corresponds to the proposition. So I misled by saying there are no negative facts (it depends on whether one has an ontology of facts, or an ontology of things). There are negative facts (propositions), but not negative THINGS.

If one accepts truthmaker theory (as I do), then one is committed to truthmakers that actually exist in the world - something ontological. What things exist in the world that constitute a truthmaker for "unicorns don't exist."? Answer: the set of things that DO exist, a set that lacks unicorns.

To say that "possibility is cheap" disparages the basic assumption of this forum — Gnomon

It shouldn't. It's a phrase that I borrowed from Christian Apologist William Lane Craig, although others also use the phrase (google "possibility is cheap"). It's just a succinct way of saying that bare possibilities (as I previously defined) are too numerous to give any credence to - so something more is needed, as I described.

OK. But do you have a Positive Fact that "_____ does fully account for the nature of consciousness". A Materialist worldview might fill-in the blank with something like "Atomic Theory", or Aristotle's "hyle", instead of "morph", as Positive Facts. Yet, in what sense are these theories or views Factual? Are they proven or verified, or are the only open-ended Possibilities? — Gnomon

Fully account? Certainly not, but I have an account that (AFAIK) accounts for more than the alternatives. I'll describe why I accept this as the closest available approximation of the matter.

I take it as a premise that the external world exists and that we have a functionally accurate perception of it (I justify this as being a a properly basic belief: it's innate, and plausibly a consequence of the evolutionary processes that produced us.This is my epistemic foundation).

Science has developed a large body of knowledge about the external world, through quality epistemic process (hypothesis-testing-falsification-revision). The success of physics, in particular, provides good reason to believe that the observable universe is natural and operates in strict accordance with laws of nature. The question remains: does it account for the mind? At the onset of the investigation, I expect that it should - because we're part of the universe, and there's no evidence of anything else existing that is nonphysical or exempt from laws of nature. Exploring further, we know that mental behavior is dependent on the physical: a healthy brain is needed to operate optimally; trauma, disease, hormones, and drugs affect mental activity. Measureable brain activity has been documented to be associated with a variety of mental activities. These facts establish (at minimum) a strong role for the physical brain in mental processes, and this increases my confidence that my going-in assumption is correct.

Guided by introspection, we investigate further - consider aspects of our minds that (at first glance) seem incompatible with matter/laws of nature. Physicalist theory proposes models that account for the functional and behavioral aspects of mind (beliefs,learning, dispositions, the will, perceptions, "mental" causation...). These models don't prove physicalism, but they show that physicalism is logically possible; by failing to falsify physicalism - my going-in assumption that "the mind" is another part of the physical world, albeit with a special complexity.

And yet, there is an explanatory gap: the "hard problem of consciousness" - the nature of the inner, subjective experience. I'm not sure that this falsifies physicalist theory of mind, but it does cast suspicion. And therefore I'm exploring alternatives - but the alternatives still need to account for the very obvious dependencies on the physical I mentioned. It seems to be that this could most simply be accomplished by supplementing a physicalist account with something more (e.g. some sort of ontological emergence). But no one seems to be going in that direction. Rather, they're suggesting starting from scratch - treating the mind (or thoughts) as something fundamental and (it seems) unexplained.

Note --- I am aware that I experience the world from a personal perspective. But I can only infer, rationally, that you have a similar awareness of the non-self world. — Gnomon

Physicalism provides a very good reason to think we have similar "inner-lives": we have a similar physical construction.

philosophy part is to explain "why" consciousness might emerge from a evolutionary process that coasted along for 99% of Time with no signs of Consciousness until the last .001%. — Gnomon

Life itself seems to be low probability - if it were easy, then those biologists engaged in abiogenesis research would have succeeded long ago. But the universe is old, and vast (there's no upper bound on how big the universe actually is). Can life exist without some degree of consciousness? Maybe not. An amoeba becomes "aware" (in a sense) of the presence of nearby nutrients that it proceeds to approach and consume. This process is explainable in terms of receptors on the surface of an amoeba cell. Multicellular organisms would need to replace the unicellular process in order to survive and I would guess this is the evolutionary track that leads to animal consciousness.

Understood. I'm not familiar with his work. I was just responding to what I inferred from Wayfarer's quote - which (I assume) he provided to make HIS point.

Bertrand Russell "argued that negative facts are necessary to explain why true negative propositions are true"*2. But you seem to be wary of exploring unverified "possibilities" and hypotheses. — Gnomon

Yes he did, but I agree with David Armstrong, that they are superfluous and unparsimonious. The world consists of the things that exist. The truthmaker for a negative proposition is the set of all actual existents. The absence of unicorns from that set is the truthmaker of "unicorns don't exist".

you seem to be wary of exploring unverified "possibilities" and hypotheses. Is that because you can't put a statistical Probability under a microscope, to study its structure? Are you fearful of Uncertainty? — Gnomon

I'm not at all wary of exploring possibilities, and I don't require they be verified (proven). Justification doesn't imply proof. Most of our body of beliefs consist of uncertain facts, and we may have varying levels of certainty. I'm primarily distinguishing propositions that are bare possibilities.

Philosophers often distinguish between different degrees of possibility. A bare possibility sits at the bottom of this hierarchy - it's possible in the most minimal sense, without being plausible, probable, or well-supported. If we applied a numerical probability, it would be infinitesimal.

Example: It's possible the sun will go nova overnight, but I don't take that possibility seriously- so, for all intents and purposes, I'm certain the sun will be there tomorrow, although I acknowledge it's possible in a minimalist sense.

So when, there's a large space of mutually exclusive possibilities, none of which has an iota of support, they are all just bare possibilities. That's what seems to be the case with the negative fact* I'm discussing.

With regard to science: scientists don't explore bare possibilities. They have some reason for exploring some particular possibility - and that means it's more than a bare possibility.

Do you assume, just because my worldview is different from yours, that I am "just making sh*t up". Obviously, you haven't looked at the scientific "justification" --- primarily Quantum Physics & Information Theory --- that I present "for giving it some credibility". — Gnomon

I haven't made that assumption. Rather, I've asked for the justification so I can consider it. The whole point of my discussion with you and @Wayfarer is to hear some justification for treating some specific possibilities (entailed by physicalism's explanatory gap*) as more than a bare possibility. I've been given nothing - and that may be because I haven't been clear on what I'm asking for. I hope I've cleared that up.

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*

You didn't say which "negative fact" I was using as a quicksand ground from which to "jump to a {unwarranted??} conclusion". — Gnomon

The negative fact that is the topic is: physicalism does not fully account for the nature of consciousness.

Embracing physicalism as an ontological ground* does not entail deferring all questions to science.
— Relativist

That is exactly what David Armstrong and Daniel Dennett do. Where do you differ from them on that score? — Wayfarer

Where did Armstrong say that all questions should be deferred to science? He was a reductionist, and believed that all substance and function was reducible to physics (physical substance and laws), but I don't think he ever suggested the human condition is best analyzed from the bottom up.

Irrespective of what Armstrong or Dennett believed, I believe bottom-up analysis is a practical (if not actual) impossibility- even if reductive physicalism is true. Rather, functional-level analysis is appropriate. Most of the science of Chemistry is practiced at a functional level of chemical bonds between atoms - rather than at the (exceedingly complex) level of quantum mechanics. Biology is best analyzed at the level of functioning organisms. In general, functional truths can be established without needing to consider how, or if, it reduces to quarks.

Similarly, everything about the human condition is best analyzed and contemplated at the "functional" level (an unfortunately cold term for beauty, love, hate, good, evil, wishes, hopes, dreams, fears...). So while we could debate whether or not these things are reducible to quantum field theory, it rarely matters - because we all agree these aspects of humanity are real and worthy of in-depth analysis.

Another point I’ve noticed: that you label a very wide range of philosophies ‘speculative’. You’re inclined to say that, even if physicalism is incomplete, anything other than physicalism is ‘speculative’, simply 'an excuse' to engage in 'wishful thinking'. But isn't it possible that this might be because you’re not willing to entertain any philosophy other than physicalism? That it's a convenient way not to have to engage with anything other than physicalism - label it ‘speculative'? And how is that not also 'wishful thinking'? — Wayfarer

Philosophy necessarily begins with speculation, but a speculation presented to another person is only a bare possibility if there's no additional reason (a justification) to accept it (*edit: I discuss "bare possibility" in my reply to Gnomon, which is below this one). This is a point I've brought up repeatedly: why accept one possibility over another? Re: wishful thinking- it's is a form of bias- not a good reason to accept a possibility, so I'm inclined to dismiss this as a justification to raise a possibility above the status of being "bare".

I try to be consistent with my epistemology. So I consider what's wrong with conspiracy theories: they start with a biased speculation (one that is possible), and then interpret facts on that basis, and treat those interpretations as supporting evidence. Contrary evidence is ignored or rationalized. It is a corrupted version of inference to the best explanation. This is bad epistemology in any context.

In this light, I have argued tha physicalism is a proper inference to the best explanation. 1) it's consistent with all uncontroversial facts of the world; 2) it is parsimonious- it depends on the fewest assumptions. I've brought this up several times- and (contrary to your charge) expressed a willingness to entertain other possibilities. You haven't identified one. You've merely pointed to the negative fact (the explanatory gap in physicalist theory of mind), which does no more than entail a wide space of possibilities. I've said this repeatedly, but you haven't appreciated the significance, which is that possibility alone is useless.

As for the 'unknown immaterial ground' - what if that 'unknown immaterial ground' is simply thought itself? — Wayfarer

Why should I believe that? Why do you believe this to be more than a bare possibility? Thinking is a process - a process that humans engage in. Referring to a "thought" as an object seems like treating a "run" (the process of running) as an object. There's no run unless there's a runner, and there's no thought unless there's a thinker. This is what seems to be the case, so explain how your alternative makes sense.

(Notice also the claim to authority inherent in it becoming 'established scientific doctrine'. The triumphal flourish: 'It's true, because science says it is!') — Wayfarer

Facts established by science have strong epistemological support. It BEGINS as a speculation- an inference to best explanation (in the opinion of the formulator) of empirical evidence. But then It has been subjected to verification testing, sometimes falsified and revised. So why shouldn't more credence be given to established science than (say) the untestable speculation that thoughts are objects? I don't see any reason for your negativity on his (conditional) comment. It might make more sense to be skeptical of his optimistic forecast that this will occur.

This is not speculative but analytic: naturalism and physicalism ignore the foundational, disclosive role of consciousness at the basis of scientific theorising. — Wayfarer

Physicalism doesn't START with the role of consciousness, but it doesn't ignore it. It accounts for consciousness, even if imperfectly.

In contrast to the outlook of naturalism, Husserl believed all knowledge, all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all
...

Nothing in the quote constitutes an explanation of what conscious acts are. Asserting consciousness is foundational explains nothing. Rather, it's an assertion that its existence is brute fact

Consciousness should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place.

I'll rephrase this to: consciousness is precisely the reason why we would perceive a world, and why we perceive it as we do. If that's what he meant, it's tautologically true - because our perceptions, our rationality and our capacity to understand are aspects of our consciousness.

"the world is opened up, made meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness...." The world itself is unaffected by our knowledge of it. Knowledge entails meaning; the capacity for knowledge is an aspect of our consciousness.

The world is inconceivable apart from consciousness...because conceiving is something that conscious minds DO, and that's all it is.

consciousness’s foundational, disclosive role... foundational to knowledge not to reality itself.

Since consciousness is presupposed in all science and knowledge, then the proper approach to the study of consciousness itself must be a transcendental one
The case has been made that consciousness is foundational to knowledge, but that doesn't seem paticularly inciteful for the reasons I described.

It seems that Husserl's theory takes consciousness for granted, just as physicalism does. He suggests that consciousness is unanalyzable - a brute fact. That's not explaining anything. Physicalism (in conjunction with neuroscience) attempts to analyze consciousness and explain it. You focus on the gap in that explanation, while implying Husserl's theory is a worthy competitor (or perhaps you think it superior) in spite of it explaining nothing. Rather, it raises even more questions that it can't answer.

If Consciousness was entirely physical*1, there would be no need for Philosophy — Gnomon

That would only be true if we had perfect and complete knowledge of how to reduce everything to fundamental physics, and the capacity to compute human behavior on this basis.

Science has encountered aspects of reality that are "not entirely physical", and can only be analyzed mathematically (mentally ; rationally ; theoretically ; philosophically). — Gnomon

Modern physicalism has no problen dealing with the things you refer to as "not entirely physical". For example, energy is a property that things have. Properties are not objects, per say, but they are aspects of the way physical things are.

Therefore, the need to treat Consciousness, not as a "negative fact", but as more like an invisible Force, or causal Energy, or space-time Field, should come as no surprise. I won't go further in this post. But my thesis & blog treat Consciousness and Life as philosophical subjects, not scientific objects of study. — Gnomon

The negative fact I referred to is "not (entirely) physical." I simply disagree with jumping to any conclusion based solely on this negative fact. Negative facts only entail possibilities - a wealth of them. If you wish to create some hypothetical framework, that's your business, but I won't find it compelling without some justification for giving it some credibility.

I have repeatedly pointed out that that this negative fact explains nothing. It opens up possibilities, but possibility is cheap.
— Relativist

And I have repeatedly pointed out that in this ‘explanatory gap’ dwells the very self that is seeking to understand. — Wayfarer

But "the self" is a mystery before we consider its grounding and a mystery even after we acknowledge there's something immaterial.

deferring every question to science only perpetuates the ignoring of that. — Wayfarer

Embracing physicalism as an ontological ground* does not entail deferring all questions to science. Your objection would be apt for Stephen Hawking, not for me.

* even if that ground includes some unknown immaterial aspect.

To label philosophical spirituality as “wishful thinking” is to close off inquiry too quickly. These aren’t arbitrary insertions into an explanatory gap—they’re attempts to interpret the nature of that gap itself. — Wayfarer

I did not suggest closing off inquiry. Rather, I value truth-seeking, and truth-seeking requires objectivity. Wishful thinking about an afterlife is seductive, not an objective path to truth.

If you agree that methodological naturalism is the appropriate paradigm for the advance of science, where should the negative fact enter into my metaphysical musings?
— Relativist

Methodological naturalism isn’t metaphysical naturalism, which is the attempt to apply the methods of science to the questions of philosophy. That is basically all that Chalmer’s ‘facing up to the problem of consciousness’ is saying: that the physical sciences must by design exclude a fundamental dimension of existence - the nature of being. — Wayfarer

I chose my words carefully, and am highlighting the fact that the "problem of consciousness" only entails the negative fact: consciousness is not entirely physical. I have repeatedly pointed out that that this negative fact explains nothing. It opens up possibilities, but possibility is cheap.

You're quite right that dualism has its own explanatory gaps—especially regarding mind-body interaction. But physicalism's own explanatory impasse around consciousness, intentionality, and meaning suggests that we shouldn't treat it as the default view merely because it's scientifically adjacent. — Wayfarer

Why ISN'T it the appropriate default view for me? Physicalism is consistent with much of mental activity and it explains a lot. You repeatedly point out (and I have accepted) that it can't be the whole truth, but you haven't proposed what more complete truth I ought to embrace. Pointing to the wide space of possibilities, that is entailed by the negative fact, is neither informative nor useful to me. You said "remain open". I am open to differences of opinion. I won't argue "you're wrong because it's contrary to physicalist dogma". I'm not trying to convince anyone to change their view, I'm just trying to decide whether or not I should change mine. Highlighting the negative fact, and the space of possibilities it opens, doesn't give me a reason to change my view of treating a physicalist account (of anything) as the appropriate default for a reductive account. I remind you, this is not some act of faith - it is just the framework I base my philosophical analyses on, and I don't apply it to human behavior or aesthetics.

...So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained. Further, since the mental arises through the development of animal organisms, the nature of those organisms cannot be fully understood through the physical sciences alone...

I have never denied that. Hurricanes.

I think any philosophy that declares a fortiori that the world is irrational unintelligible effectively undermines itself. If reality is, at bottom, unintelligible, — Wayfarer

I disagree, and that's because it is not the WORLD that is rational (or not), it is people.

As for quantum theory, it may well be telling us something not just about particles, but about the limits of a purely material ontology. — Wayfarer

It's not telling us anything other than that there's a set of possibilities, none of which would be inconsistent with materialism (by definition).

the inability of physicalism to account for subjective consciousness—suggests that a purely physical description of the human is incomplete. — Wayfarer

Sure, but that doesn't give epistemic license to fill the gap arbitrarily or with wishful thinking.

if that assumption is undermined, then other domains of explanation become conceptually possible. That doesn’t prove dualism, or an afterlife, or any religious doctrine—but it opens space for something beyond the materialist frame. — Wayfarer

Yes, but it's a wide space of possibility. As I previously said, we've only (at best) established a negative fact.

We cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door." Whether or not one believes in a deity, that phrase betrays the anxiety that if materialism is not all-encompassing, then the coherence of the whole system is threatened. — Wayfarer

I can only give my personal reaction. We've only "established" (too strong, but it will do) that there is some immaterial aspect of mind. I see no relevant entailments - propositions that I should accept because of it. Perhaps it would be relevant to a nihilist.

Remember my hurricane analogy? We don't examine and predict their activities based on quantum field theory. Similarly, we shouldn't examine human behavior or aesthetics in terms of reductive physicalism - even if reductive physicalism is true. So if it's false, with respect to "the mind" - it has no bearing on how I view things. It's just a metaphysical technicality.

The attribution of the anthropic principle to a selection effect ("We find the universe fine-tuned because only in a fine-tuned universe could we find ourselves") is logically valid but explanatorily inert - it says nothing but only reaffirms the taken-for-granted nature of existence. — Wayfarer

It's a falsification of invalid reasoning. The question ostensibly answered by this invalid reasoning reflects a contrivance, not a conundrum requiring explanation.

the anxiety that if materialism is not all-encompassing, then the coherence of the whole system is threatened.

So we’re not dealing with a dispassionate assessment of evidence, but with a boundary-defining metaphysical commitment. — Wayfarer

Even religious scientists employ methodological naturalism in their investigations. There is no alternative that bears practical fruit. Consider the work of "creation science" ' which makes virtually no contribution to our understanding of the world. It's mission is to rationalize empirical data to dogma. If you agree that methodological naturalism is the appropriate paradigm for the advance of science, where should the negative fact enter into my metaphysical musings?

How should I revise my personal views on the (meta)nature of mind? Alternatives to physicalism also have explanatory gaps (e.g. the mind-body interaction problem of dualism).

basic assumption of both science and philosophy: that the world is in some sense rational, — Wayfarer

IMO, that's an unwarranted assumption. We can makes sense of the portions of reality we perceive and infer. That is not necessarily the whole of reality. I also argue that quantum mechanics isn't wholly intelligible. Rather, we grasp at it. Consider interpretations: every one of them is possible- what are we to do with that fact? I'm not a proponent of the Many-Worlds interpretation, but it's possibly true- and if so, it has significant metaphysical implications- more specific implications than the negative fact we're discussing.

whether, as Monod would have it, we are the products of blind chance and cosmic indifference. — Wayfarer

There's a fundamental problem with the thesis that our minds should be considered the product of design: it depends on the premise that there exists an uncaused mind that can do designs. That's a considerably more drastic assumption than the gradual, chance development of rational beings over billions of years in a vast universe.

we find ourselves in a position where naturalism must accept that the universe is, at bottom, irrational—that reason is something we impose or invent for pragmatic survival, but that it has no intrinsic connection to the order of things. On this view, reason isn’t a window into the real, but a useful illusion—evolution’s trick to keep the organism alive. And yet, it’s this very reason we’re asked to trust when making that judgment. — Wayfarer

I disagree. "Rational" applies to minds, not to the world at large. We apply our rationality in attempting to understand the world. Intelligibility may be what you're alluding to. There may be uinintelligibility underneath the layers we can understand, but that possibility needn't deter us from striving to understand what we can. We can never know the stuff that's beyond our ability to measure and theorize; we can't even know anything IS beyond these abilities. Here's where I apply parsimony and pragmatism: there's no epistemic basis to assume such things exist, so it's more parsimonious to assume it does not, and the (mere) possibility has no pragmatic significance.

You seem to have smuggled in the word assumption there.
How can it be deemed unjustified if we don’t know if there are ways to go around, or unlock the veils, or not. Or what, or where the veils are? Surely there is justification to enquire, whilst under the realisation that we have reached the limit of empirical enquiry. — Punshhh

Rational belief is justified belief- i.e.having reasons to believe some proposition is true. "X is possible" is not a justification to believe X rather than ~X. Possibilities are endless.

Warrant=justification.

I'm fine with using intuition to develop and justify belief, but it IS subjective. I don't have any problem with anyone following their own intuitions. I also follow mine. I also ask myself: why do I believe this? Intuition plays a role, but IMO we should also be self-critical.

I apologize if I sound like I'm criticizing you or anyone else. I'm actually just exercising some self-criticism to understand if there is something that I should be taking into account that I have been overlooking? Hearing different point of views is interesting.

Do these pragmatic examples of Causal Conceptual Power (practical magic?) have any "impact" on your overall worldview? — Gnomon

No. I acknowledge everything you said about the impact of mind on the world, but it's independent of the (meta)physical nature of mind. The world we interact with (through human action and interaction) is best understood through things like social sciences, and not through quantum field theory. This is true even if reductive physicalism is 100% correct. The possibility of mind having some immaterial aspects also doesn't seem to have any bearing - it's still just a different sort of reduction.

If there's a
possibility that oneself is something other than physical, then there is also a possibility that it is not subject to the same fate as everything physical - which is change and decay. — Wayfarer

I'm conceding there may be some non-physical aspect of mind, because of the explanatory gap that materialism has regarding consciousness. For purposes of this discussion, I'll treat that as a fact. My question continues to be: what does this fact plausibly entail, or at least strongly suggest? It's true that an afterlife entails some sort of immaterial existence, but it's fallaciously affirming the consequent to conclude that the presence of immateriality implies or suggests an afterlife.

The anthropic principle identifies the trivial fact that rational beings would necessarily find themselves in a world that is conducive to their existence. The "structural coherence" in the universe is most simply explained by the existence of laws of nature. The alleged "fine-tuning" is nothing more than an acknowledgement that our existence would have been improbable (a priori).

"Fine tuning arguments" depend on the unstated (egocentric) assumption that life is a design objective, rather than an improbable consequence of the way the world happens to be.

The hope is that we are more than our bodies. The fear is that, if we are, that doesn’t necessarily guarantee a comforting outcome. The eschatological traditions warn us that post-mortem destiny might be varied and not always (n fact, mostly not) pleasant. — Wayfarer

Wishful thinking is a poor guide to truth. It also seems to me this overlooks what we DO know from science: the "mind's" dependency on the physical. Memories are lost due to disease, aging, and trauma. Personality can even be altered from trauma and disease- such that one's preferences, tastes, and even addictions can change. This constitutes stronger evidence of a physical dependency than the indirect inference of immateriality inferred from an explanatory gap around the nature of consciousness. Memories and personality are essential to who we are (IMO). So what, if some immaterial kernal of me lives on, if it lacks my memories, and my passions.

I put zero stock in religious traditions. The promise of an afterlife is emotionally compelling, but it's fundamentally wishful thinking.

Whether or not one believes, I think it's at least worth recognizing that this line of thought is logically valid and not reducible to mere “God of the gaps” reasoning — Wayfarer

It's not "God of the Gaps", per se, but it seems much like conspiracy theory reasoning. These develop through a corrupted "Inference to Best Explanation" (IBE). IBE is a rational basis for justifying beliefs, but only if it's applied correctly: considering all relevant evidence (conspiracy theorists only consider the evidence consistent with their "inference") and entertaining alternatives. The evidence that mind has a strong physical dependency is strong, and this flies in the face of a relevant afterlife. The explanatory gap in a materialist account of mind can be filled with something considerably simpler than intelligent design and heaven.

Mysticism got there a while back. They realised that mental enquiry alone is blind, there are natural veils in our and the world’s make up, which prevent progress in that direction. That if progress is to be made it requires other avenues of inquiry, to bypass, or see around those veils. — Punshhh

This depends on the unjustified assumption that we actually have the capacity to see around those veils, and it places unwarranted trust in one's intuitions.

we really don’t know anything, this is not to say we are unable know it. It might be veiled from us. — Punshhh

I agree 100%. All we can do is to try and peek back layers of the onion, but sooner or later we'll get to a point beyond which there can be empirical verification, and this would limit our ability to explore even deeper. We may already be there, in some areas.

Thank you for your thoughtful reply, but my question is a bit different. My question, "why take a hypothetical possibility seriously?" was intended to ascertain how you justify believing it as more than a mere possibility. In particular: do you actually believe this to be the case? If so, there must be some justification for the belief. Even if you don't actually believe it, you do seem to give it a level of credibility sufficiently high that you'd bring it up - so you must see something that makes it stand out from the rest.

Related to this: you seem to be treating the current state of scientific knowledge regarding the origin of the big bang as a jumping off point to your hypothesis about causally efficacious mind. How is this not an argument from ignorance? As mentioned, there are various cosmological hypotheses - these are among the possibilities that you are setting aside in favor of you mind-hypothesis.

Regarding the sentiments you shared in your thoughtful post, I share some semblance of this "feeling at one" with the universe, but in my case, I get it by honing my overall world-view. I've embraced physicalism for 10-15 years, because it's consistent with everything we know, with one possible exception: the nature of mind. The question I'm trying to sort out is: what impact does this alleged immateriality of mind have on my overall world view? It doesn't seem to undermine anything, except for the simple (possible) fact that there exists something immaterial. This is why I'm peppering you with questions - I'm not trying to argue you're wrong, I'm just look for things that I ought to take into account.

But there might not be an absolute answer to why it exists. I argue that any attempt to account for the existence of something rather than nothing must ultimately bottom out in a set of brute facts; the universe simply is, without ultimate cause or explanation."
This is just speculation, all we know is that we don’t know and any speculation we do indulge in will be tainted by anthropomorphism. Where the anthropomorphism refers to the the human mind and its contents. Also that the answers we seek may be inconceivable to the human mind, or unintelligible. — Punshhh

This is not speculation, it's inference that there is an ontological foundation to reality. The alternative is an unexplainable infinite series of causes and an infinite series of composition.

It's not much different from the Leibniz cosmological argument - which concludes the ontological foundation is something that exists necessarily. Carroll doesn't accept anything as existing necessarily (although I do).

Of course, metaphysical foundationalism is not necessarily true. But it seems to me that there's more reason to believe this than not.

Regarding intelligibility: I agree the actual ontological foundation may be unintelligible - but that has no bearing on the logic that concludes simply that there IS a foundation. (If we deny logic, this undercuts reason - making it self-defeating.)