An objective morality cannot exist that states "Existence should not be" as that is a logical contradiction. — Philosophim

"Should" only applies only to choices made by beings that can make choices. It would make no sense to claim an electron "should" be attracted to a proton. That attraction is a necessary fact.

To suggest that "existence should be" is incoherent because it would imply a being exists who makes the choice for there to be existence. It's self-contradictory.

Everything's existence is contingent. Nothing had to exist. — Philosophim

If there is an uncaused first cause, how could it have NOT existed? What accounts for its contingency? What is it contingent UPON?

Even if you believe the actual uncaused first cause is contingent, how could there be a state of affairs of nothingness- an absence of anything at all? Existence itself (the fact SOMETHING exists) is metaphysically necessary entailed by the fact that we exist and something cannot come from nothing.

if "don't steal" could have randomly come out as "do steal", there is no objective reason to follow it.
— Relativist

No, it could not have. That's the entire point of the OP. — Philosophim

Your op only claims "existence should be". You haven't explained how that entails the moral imperative "don't steal".

Secondly, you had referred to moral imperatives being the product of randomness- and THAT is the basis of my claim that each moral imperative could have come out as its converse. If that is not the case, then explain what you mean by "randomness" in your context. Why couldn't this imperative have come out as "do steal"?

The problem with this statement is that you haven't just declared that an objective morality cannot exist. This statement declares that nothing objective can ever exist. — Philosophim

No it doesn't. I accepted that a moral value can exist. But if it's a product of "random existence", there are 2 implications:

1) it's existence is contingent. It didn't have to exist.
2) it's value is contingent. Its converse could have existed.

The same would be true of anything else with "random existence". But if "don't steal" could have randomly come out as "do steal", there is no objective reason to follow it.

I don’t see anything unreasonable about this argument. You seem to be noting that all the examples we have of beings with knowledge also have parts: that is true. However, this does not entail that a being could not exist which has knowledge and doesn’t have parts. The problem I have is that you are presupposing that a being with knowledge must have parts without giving any sort of argumentation for that. — Bob Ross

There is a problem with the argument I stated: it assumes God exists. To then use the conclusion to support an argument for God's existence entails the circularity I was referring to. It's irrelevant whether or not you agree there's circular reasoning involved; I'm just explaining why I said that.

You brought up the fact that it's possible knowledge can exist without parts or complexity. This points to the fundamental problem with your argument.

Any reasonable person should agree that God's existence (and omniscience) is logically possible, without needing your argument to show that. The question is whether or not the argument in your Op provides good reason to think it's more than merely possible. Consider that it's possible that physicalism is true: would you consider an argument for physicalism compelling if it's premises were based on entailments of physicalism?

Since you're presenting an argument, you have the burden of defending your premises. In particular, you'd need to show that all your premises are sufficiently probable that the conclusion (God exists) gains some warrant (i.e. more justified; gaining some epistemic probability) beyond being merely possible. If your premises only seem possible, then your conclusion is still only possible- you won't move the needle of belief one bit.

That is why God is attributed—or more accurately just is—these properties analogically. I am not claiming that God has, e.g., a will the same as ours. — Bob Ross

You're rationalizing your theistic framework, not making a compelling argument. I described the way knowledge (and willing) exists in the real world - there is a physical basis. You're doing no more than asserting its logically possible that knowledge and will can exist without a physical medium. You need to show it's sufficiently plausible to remove it as a barrier to accepting the soundness of your argument.

That’s still not what circular reasoning is! Even if I ad hoc rationalized my position by saying God’s properties are identical, that would not imply that I am presupposing the truth of the conclusion in a premise — Bob Ross

My key point is that you've given no reason to think multiple properties is equivalent to a single property. It seems like a logical contradiction, like saying "6=1", which would mean your argument is unsound. But even if you could show it's logically possible, but that still just makes your conclusion logically possible - no headway.

I am not sure what you mean by “intrinsic properties”, but assuming you mean something like “properties a thing has independently of what we say it has” then I would say God has no properties: that’s the whole point of being absolutely simple. — Bob Ross

This just shows that your argument depends on a specific ontological model. You have the burden of showing this is better ontological model than the one I'm most familiar with. And if you can't, then you need to accept that your argument is pointless - it does no more than show that God's existence is logically possible, which is exactly where we are without the argument.

how can a being which has no parts exist as a particular? — Bob Ross

Every particular has at least one part. Everything that exists is a particular: a quark, a galaxy, the universe, and even the totality of existence. Anything we can point to, or assign a label to, is a particular. But I'm not debating who's metaphysical theory is better (although I'd be willing to, in another thread). I'm just pointing out that your argument depends on your preferred metaphysical system being true- so for the argument to be compelling, you have the burden of showing your metaphysical system is likely to be true - at least the axioms you depend on in your argument. Again, if your many assumptions are only possible, then your argument is pointless.

Individual up-quarks are distinguishable at a point of time by their spatial location.

That is a property that one has that the other doesn’t; which implies it has parts. — Bob Ross

It's a relational property, not an intrinsic property. Again: we're applying different metaphysical assumptions.

Moreover, yes, I do not see any contradiction with the idea that a composed being which is spatiotemporal must be infinitely divisible and yet ontologically be comprised ultimately by one singular non-spatiotemporal thing. (: — Bob Ross

Irrelevant. I believe there has to be a bottom layer of reality, consisting of indivisible objects. You should at least agree this is logically possible- that's all I've claimed. I'm not the one claiming to prove something.

No, I don't think so. If I'm right in the logic put forth, in at least any universe we can imagine, 'existence should be' is the necessary base answer to any objective morality. — Philosophim

Your logic in the Op was based on the assumption that objective morality exists. I'm showing that morality that is the product of a random existence cannot be objective; it's logically impossible. If you want to assume there are objective moral values then you need to drop the assumption that they are a "random addition".

Everything comes from an undesigned universe that evolves 'debatably' deterministically. I don't want to sidetrack too much, but if an undesigned universe can incept without prior cause, what's to stop other things from also happening later in the timeline? Such things would be completely unpredictable. Again, not a design intent, just random additions. — Philosophim

A moral imperative that is a "random addition" is not an objective moral value, it's a random value whose converse could have instead come to exist. In effect, the universe flipped a coin, and "do not kill" won.

Right, this is the logic. Morality is what should be. — Philosophim

How do you get a relevant* moral imperative from an undesigned universe composed of matter and energy and evolving deterministically? You compared it to a red wavelength of light, but that entails nothing like a moral imperative - it just entails some role in the deterministic evolution of the universe.

*If the moral imperative is random, it's irrelevent - there can't have the sort of meaningful implications that you're looking for. The imperative "don't steal" could just as easily come out "do steal".

Does a red wavelength of light have intent behind it? No. Is a red wavelength an objective entity? Yes. My intent is to find a morality that exists like a wave of light. We may subjectively interpret it in different ways, but its something underlying that we're all observing. — Philosophim

You refer to "shoulds" - which sounds to me like moral imperatives. Correct me if this is not what you mean.

A red wavelength of light exists by brute fact. Its existence has relevance to the deterministic chain of causation, but it entails no "shoulds" outside of this. So if your morality exists like a wave of light, it may have some relevance to the deterministic causal chain, but there are no "shoulds" outside its role in causation.

...morality as existence itself. — Philosophim

I asked you this before, but I don't believe you answered. What do you mean by "existence"? For example: are you referring to the totality of existence? The fact there reality exists rather than not? Or perhaps you're referring to OUR exististence? I have followup questions, depending on your answer.

My point is that noting the natural world is 'arbitrary' doesn't make any point. We both agree that the universe is uncaused, meaning we cannot look outside of the universe for explanation. We can only look within it. The term 'arbitrary', if you are to use it against morality, would apply to everything in the universe at its core. You could just use the word 'random', but arbitrary adds an unneeded emotional element of dismissal to it. — Philosophim

I used the word "arbitrary" to highlight the fact there is no reason for these cosmic morals to be what they are. There can't be a reason unless there is some intent behind them- and intentionality entails a mind. You sidestep this with vagueness- a belief that this vague moral object exists and in some vague way, this is involved in our moral judgements.

This is relevant to your question about the implications of there being objective morals. If objective morality is rooted in a mind, it would have different implications than if there is no mind. But it appears to me that objective morals entaiis a mind because it would have to be the product of intent. Since you deny that, your position seems incoherent.

I feel there is morality that is not relevant to humanity, and would exist even if we were gone. And since you believe morality is subjective based on feelings, I guess I'm right eh?

The paradigm I have presented is the OP and a note that a subjective morality does not serve any rational purpose, but is just a surface level feeling that fails upon close inspection. Feel free to go back to the OP at this point if you're interested. If not, I'm not sure there's anything more that you can add, and I'm not sure I can either. — Philosophim

Your paradigm assumes there are moral values existing external to humans that were caused to exist by undirected natural forces. You have not explained how these moral values are non-arbitrary. In the case of a God, the answer theists give is that God is Goodness. You don't have that.

You haven't even said what you're referring to as existing externally to us. I have used the term "moral values", and you haven't disagreed. If it IS moral values: what are they? For example, does every statement "x is wrong" "y is good" correspond to some object existing out in the ether? Or are there just foundational moral statements existing out there?

You also haven't explained how we know what these moral values (or whatever it is) are- how they influence our moral judgments. You seem to deny feelings are involved, so what is it?

I'll refrain from responding to your criticism of my paradigm until you fully address this.

Read this post: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/962312

If you want more details on the math, read this post: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/962884

And yet, in transfinite math, all the sets you mentioned are the same "size" (the same cardinality).

What caused the energy to exist, which is matter? As you noted, all causality at the end boils down to an uncaused reason for existence. — Philosophim

It boils down to an initial, uncaused state of affairs. What that might be is unknown, but whatever it is, it exists for no reason. This is because to have reason would require there to be something existing ontologically prior to it, which is logically impossible.

But if what is good is feelings, then the only reason we can conclude is whatever we feel is right, and whoever has might gets to assert what they feel is right. — Philosophim

That is categorically false. Self preservation, extended through empathy to the preservation of life in general, is the strongest mutual feeling that we have. It's sufficient to account for the "golden rule" (treat others as you would like to be treated) that has been developed in various cultures- apparently independently. All generally agreed moral values are consistent with it. Indeed we have other feelings/urges that we often act on that are inconsistent with our moral feelings, but we still make moral judgements of those actions - and never claim it's OK because we "felt like it".

Everything exists by chance. "Arbitrary" would apply to everything then and is a pointless criticism to morality in general. Of course its not arbitrary, or you would have hung up on this discussion long ago. — Philosophim

You side-stepped my objection. Moral values that exist due to the blind forces of nature would be completely random. Some value happens to be good because some force of nature randomly with in the direction it did, and it could just as easily gone in another direction.

Further, if a God formed, it too would be an arbitrary formation, and we're stuck with the same pointless argument.

This is the Euthyphro dilemma, but it doesn't apply to my model of intersubjective moral values. In my model, good=directed positively toward life (preserving life and helping it flourish). It's fundamental basis is a properly basic belief- one that is innate and incorrigible. An act is right and good because it is consistent with this properly basic belief. Within the scope of humanity, no moral value is arbitrary because it is necessarily consistent with this this properly basic belief.

In a broader sense, beyond the scope of humanity, the existence of humans is arbitrary. We happen to exist by a chance series of events in evolutionary history, and in cosmological history. So in this cosmic sense, there are no objective moral values. But our scope of interest is humanity: our basic moral value is an intrinsic part of being human. As a properly basic belief, a moral value is right because we all believe it to be right, and it is a belief that has no defeaters. It's reasonable and rational to retain a properly basic belief that has no defeaters.

So my foundation of morality is epistemic. You're inventing an ontological basis for it, so you need to account for why natural forces would just happen to produce the values that it did, and provide some rationale to consider them non-arbitrary. There are, BTW, theistic arguments that deal with the Euthyphro dilemma. You can google them if you like, but you'll find they won't fit your paradigm. You're on your own.

Why is your survival not arbitrary? Why are your feelings not arbitrary? By reason, how is a subjective morality not arbitrary? As you can see the arbitrary argument leads nowhere. — Philosophim

I answered this above. Our survival IS arbitrary in a cosmic sense, but it is NOT arbitrary in the only sense that's relevant to humanity. We judge morals in terms of who and what we are. Now you answer your own question within your paradigm.

I was listening today to a legal podcast, and they brought up an issue I hadn't thought of, regarding the withdrawal of Secret Service protection from people like Fauci,Pompeo, and Bolton. Even if one regards it as appropriate - why not do it quietly? Announcing it publicly served no public interest, and it suggests that he may want it known that they're now vulnerable. I hope nothing happens to any of them.

Its amazing that we have a reality in which there is a law which states, "Matter can neither be created or destroyed." Except that philosophically we know that one part of this is false. — Philosophim

It's anachronistic. Per general relativity, mass and energy are interchangeable. What is conserved is the total amount of mass+energy (see this). Regarding the matter/anti-matter balance issue, it's an open question in theoretical physics.

what we have today is matter, or existence, which has as its core the resiliency to continue to exist in the face even extreme energy concentrations. Everything that exists is built out of this. This resiliency is the core of morality. The logic of the OP is to say, "If an objective morality exists, what must be true?" And what must be true if there is an objective morality is that "Existence should be." — Philosophim

This seems a product of your misunderstanding of the fundamental conservation law. Why did you write "matter, or existence"? How are the two related, particularly under the understanding that matter and energy are just different forms of the same thing?

Just as matter could be incepted without prior cause, — Philosophim

Under the right conditions, energy can be converted to matter and vice versa. Those conditions are the cause.

The reason to believe there is an objective basis is the patterns I've been noting — Philosophim

What you've noted is scientifically inaccurate. But if even if there were some so-called "resliency", it's ad hoc to claim this to be the "core of morality." This seems like a "objective morality of the gaps", although you haven't really identified a gap.

The logic of the OP is to say, "If an objective morality exists, what must be true?" And what must be true if there is an objective morality is that "Existence should be." — Philosophim

I'll set aside the objections raised above, and just consider your sentence, ""If an objective morality exists, what must be true?" The answer depends on what objective morality IS. This was another of my questions. Is it a set of moral values (e.g. murder is wrong; altruism is good), or something else?

The fact that a subjective morality based entirely on emotions breaks down to where even you admit 'reason' gets involved. — Philosophim

Reason gets involved no matter what the basis is:moral questions can be complex, and evaluating them can be complex.

Do I have proof of an objective morality? Absolutely not, that's never been the goal of this paper. My point here is to say, "If one exists, what must be its base?" So the question we are debating is not whether one exists, its whether you think its possible for one to exist, and if so, does the logic I've put forth put forward a reasonable base to start from.

This gets back to what I said in my first post: the existence of objective morality can be used to argue for the existence of God:
P1 – If there is no God, then objective moral values and duties do not exist.
P2 – Objective moral values and duties exist.
C – Therefore, God exists.

You're proposing that morality exists without a God. I agree that is logically possible, but it has a fatal implication: they exist by chance, so they are arbitrary. Arbitrariness is the base, if there is no God who designed them for some greater purpose he has in mind. I expect you wish to assume they are non-arbitrary. How can that be, if they weren't the product of design? It seems to me, the above argument shows that the best explanation for the existence of non-arbitrary morality is that a God exists. (personally, I don't think a God exists - and that's why I inferred the presence of intersubjective moral values. They aren't arbitrary - they are consistent with survival).

Thanks. You've set my mind at ease. :rofl:

Circular reasoning is when a premise presupposes the conclusion as true: I didn’t do that. Also, why would it have to be magical? — Bob Ross

Here's what I inferred to be your reasoning:

1.God is omniscient (possesses all possible knowledge)
2. God is simple;
3. Therefore knowledge doesn't entail parts

But you didn't explicitly make this argument, so I haven't been fair. Perhaps you can show it's very reasonable to assume knowledge does not entail parts. Please do so.

Just think about how you will, and how this willing—even without what we stereotypically refer to as rational deliberation—is correspondence with at least primitive knowledge. Think of a plant growing towards the sunlight. I am just noting that we can see—by analogy—how a being can have knowledge and yet not be computating like a human brain or AI would. — Bob Ross

You've identified no "primitive knowledge" that exists independent of a physical medium. My willing entails physical processes (e.g. neurons firing in a sequence based on action potentials that could be established either by learning, or be "hard wired") in a brain. Deliberation entails access to memories which are stored in the brain (possibly in the form of action potentials of neurons). A plant certainly isn't making a decision - it's growth is entirely a result of its physiological mechanisms, expending energy in the most entropically favorable way.

I claimed there was circular reasoning in your statement,"although you are right that a being with one property is simpler than a being with more than one; my rebuttle is that God’s properties are reducible to each other." And you're correct that you haven't stated a strictly circular argument (I'm making an assumption that you chose to equate multiple properties with a single property to rationalize your claim that God is "simple") You've given no argument at all, and haven't articulated the rationalization I assumed. So I can certainly be wrong.

So make an objective case for the claim that an object with seemingly multiple properties is actually an object with a single property in your ontology, and show that this is more reasonable than considering multiple properties to be distinct. To be clear, I'm referring to intrinsic properties, not just attributes we talk about.

This argument necessitates that an up-quark is not comprised of anything else and is non-spatiotemporal. — Bob Ross

No, it doesn't. It just assumes individual up-quarks exist as particulars, and that (generically) "up-quark" is a universal (it exists in multiple instantiations). Perhaps that's inconsistent with your ontology, but that's my point: your argument depends on some specific assumptions about ontology.

then there would be only one since there’s nothing ontologically distinguishing them. What you are doing is talking about separate quarks and thinking that since they are simple that they are absolutely simple. — Bob Ross

Individual up-quarks are distinguishable at a point of time by their spatial location. It's persisting identity is uniquely identified by it's location in space across each point of time. (Locations in space are relative, but in this case, we can consider it relative to itself).

Regarding "being simple": I'm simply assuming they are not decomposible into other things. If you wish to equate undecomposible with "simple" - I have no objection.

I understand they say quarks have no parts in science — Bob Ross

Then you have an incorrect understanding. They are part of the standard model of particle physics, which is an active field of research. I'm not insisting they are actually the most fundamental level of reality (quantum field theory treats them as disturbances in fields), but all macro objects in the universe have quarks as part of their composition.

I was an atheist before this style of argumentation found its way onto my desk; so, you are grossly making assumptions here — Bob Ross

Ed Feser was also an atheist, and he says he converted because Thomist metaphsyics "made sense" to him. I've read a couple of his books, and these suggest that he just thinks Thomism is coherent and answers the questions he felt important. I haven't seen him make a case for Thomism vs (say) metaphysical naturalism (his polemical attack on "new atheists" is irrelevant).

I've admitted that I've made assumptions. They're based on the assumptions I've seen others (including Feser) make when arguing for deism. In all my years debating arguments for deism with theists, I've found that 100% of the time, they depend on questionable metaphysical assumptions - so when I see a debatable metaphysical assumption, I shine a light on it. But I'll try to avoid jumping to conclusions with you, and give you the opportunity to make an objective case for each of the metaphysical assumptions I've identified so far.

Please let's discuss this. I think its an important issue and as a female OBSESSED with philosophy, seeing women fall short on it saddens me deeply. I also see many errors in my own self regarding my focus etc. Is it just me or is it all women? There are many things to talk about here. — EcceHomo

I found this study, with data through 2016 (unfortunately).

There seems to be an increasing trend for women to study philosophy- most apparent in the graphs for women choosing it as a major when entering college, and women getting a bachelor's degree. The graph for awarded-PhDs doesn't show a clear trend, but it would make sense for there to be a lag vs the 1st two categories.

This isn't your issue, but the demographics show a worse state of affairs for racial/ethnic minorities than for women.

As a right-wing conservative having millions of illegals in your country is translated to something like "lawlessness". As a left-wing liberal having millions of illegals is translated to something like modern slavery, extreme inequality and less democracy. — Eros1982

Not really. The undocumented workers are making more in the US than they could in their home country. The fact we'd take advantage of that seems similar to choosing to purchase products manufactured in countries with low wages, because they're cheaper.

Irrespective of the morality and legality, their presence is baked into the economy:

"More than two-thirds of U.S. crop workers are foreign born, according to the USDA. Many of them came to the country through the H-2A visas, but officials estimate that 42% of the workers are undocumented migrants." -- https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-deportation-plan-effects-undocumented-farmers/

So the cost of harvesting will increase, and some may not get harvested at all.

I have no statistics, but I understand home construction utilizes a lot of undocumented workers. Prices will rise.

The Social Security trust fund will be negatively impacted:
"In 2022, unauthorized immigrants contributed $25.7 billion in Social Security taxes, typically by working under borrowed or fraudulent Social Security numbers. Unauthorized immigrants, however, are ineligible to claim Social Security benefits."
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/explainer/immigration-social-security-solvency/

Undocumented workers are consumers: they spend the money they make, so they contribute to GDP.

I'm not suggesting we should have open borders, but rather that the full impact of proposed actions should be taken into account and plans adjusted accordingly.

Feelings are simply subjective experiences of reality. My point is that we may have different subjective feelings as to what is good, but there is an objective reality to good underneath it. Just like the experience of a red wavelength is not the same as the dry analysis of what is objectively red, the experience of an objective morality is not the same as our subjective experience of it. — Philosophim

So it appears you have some sort of hypothesis that goodness is some sort of existing entity that we perceive, or perhaps that its a physical property of...something (what?) Clarify exactly what you're proposing exists, and what facts this hypothesis is supposed to explain.

Offhand, this just seems like an assumption you make because you want to believe there is some objective basis for morality. So please clear this up for me.

If I have a son or daughter that cannot feel empathy, I can teach them how to behave in social situations regardless. But I have to give them more than, "You have to behave this way because I feel its good, or others feel its good." Why should I listen otherwise? Most other people's feelings are irrelevant to me, and in many situations, should be. If moralities base is on feelings only, then the only reason to shape or follow any moral code is feelings. That's not how societies work. That's not how people work. — Philosophim

If you were to have a child who lacks empathy, I would suggest consulting psychologists with expertise with trying to teach morals to sociopaths, since that is the defining feature of sociopaths. My understanding is that it would be very challenging (which is partly why I believe morality is rooted in the feelings of empathy). My non-expert opinion is that you should teach them there's a God who will punish them for their sins (appealing to their personal self-interest). Even if you don't believe it, it's a very common belief - so it's socially acceptable and has the potential for getting support from the members of the church you would join.

That is because you are still only thinking in terms of subjective experience instead of looking for an objective foundation. — Philosophim

I see no reason to believe there is an objective foundation. You haven't provided one. I await your clarifying your hypothesis, and its factual basis.

"Should there be any evolution at all?"
— Philosophim
Do you agree that a "should" question entails a judgement?
— Relativist

No. Should entails what is optimum for a system. In this case the system is "existence".

Clarify what you mean by "existence". For example, are you referring to the fact that something exists? Or that everything that happens to exist does exist? Or perhaps that humans exist, or maybe that you (yourself) exists?

Also: on what basis is this system optimized? E.g. prolonging the system's existence? Enlarging its scope (like having more children)?

Either we're really not on the same page anymore, or you're purposefully avoiding the point. Emotions are not the same as reasons. Having an emotion, "I feel good, so its moral," is not the same as, "We should do this because this outcome is better than that outcome no matter how I feel." — Philosophim

I agree, and I tried to address this when I clarified that the fundamental basis could be as simple as: the true meanings of good/bad entailing the feelings they invoke with respect to some very simple situations: the vicarious feeling we get when considering someone suffering in some way (i.e. empathy).

This doesn't mean we must trust our feelings as moral judgements in all cases - it just means the meanings of good/bad the words have a non-verbal/emotive aspect to them. A computer couldn't understand it as we do, because they lack emotions.

I also discussed the fact that we also apply learnings (what we teach your children and what our society teaches us) and reasoning when making moral judgements - so it's certainly much more than feelings.

It seems that I didn't get my point across before, but I hope I've succeeded now. If not, then ask.

I am not including a God in this discussion, I have told you a God is not part of this discussion, — Philosophim

You asked me to explain why I suggested it ("This in no way suggests deism or theism, and I would need to see some reasoning why you think that is"). I did just that: I showed that your unsupported assertion (that reason or whim must be involved) entails a God. I provided my analysis so you can identify a flaw in it. Instead, you're just complaining that I said it.

Except I've told you I'm looking for something apart from mind. Something core to existence itself. I don't mind if you introduce a mind or think it cannot exist without a mind, but I myself am not implying an objective morality necessitates a mind. — Philosophim

How can that be? How can objective morality exist without minds? Before humans existed, was bank fraud wrong? Was altruism good, when there were no humans?

As I've tried to explain, it appears to me that human morality is entirely a human thing: it relates to human actions, and it entails human judgement. If you think it's more than that, then explain how that can be. Explain how bank fraud or murder is wrong even if there are no humans.

"Should there be any evolution at all?" — Philosophim

Do you agree that a "should" question entails a judgement? If so, who's judgement are you interested in? Are you just asking because you want input to help you form a judgement?

If you think "should" questions are something other than human judgements, explain how this can be.

Thanks for the article. I read it, as well as the study it linked to. The study results make a good case for some things not to do in DEI trainings. For example, it measured reactions to reading:

“White people raised in Western society are conditioned into a white supremacist worldview. Racism is the norm; it is not unusual. As a result, interaction with White people is at times so overwhelming, draining, and incomprehensible that it causes serious anguish for People of Color.”

This resulted in a backlash. This seems hardly surprising. Essentially telling people they are evil, but didn't know it, would piss people off and make them defensive.

I was surprised to read that, according to the study, this sort of inflammatory language is common in diversity training. It makes me glad the study was done. I can absolutely agree that this is a terrible approach. But it doesn't mean diversity, equity, and inclusion aren't positive objectives, nor that effective training is impossible. In fact, it wouldn't be hard to purge this sort of thing from the training and focus on positive messages. I have in mind the sort of DEI training I received at Exxon-Mobil, which I described in another post.

Both "reasons" and "whims" are products of minds, so this suggests deism or theism.
— Relativist

A feeling and a reason are two different products of the mind. A feeling is an impetus or summary that compels a person to action. A reason is the result of an analyzed situation that one can decide to act on.
This in no way suggests deism or theism, and I would need to see some reasoning why you think that is. — Philosophim

You had said: "Because if there is no logic reason, there is nothing besides whim."

A whim is also a product of a mind - we would not describe the random result of a quantum collapse as a "whim". So both your options entail a mind. You seemed to imply that whatever happens has been caused or influenced by reasons/whims, and this would entail one or more supernatural actors. For brevity, assume one mind.

Although you haven't suggested that this mind created the world (which would make it a god), you nevertheless seem to think everything that exists is due to reason or whim. This would apply to this mind as well. Once again, a vicious infinite regress of minds to provide a whim or reason. The best solution to this is a single mind - a god, which exists necessarily - and not for a reason or due to whim.

No, then you should agree with my conclusion that "There should be existence" is the logically necessary base of an objective morality. You'll need to give greater detail why this isn't the case. — Philosophim

Non-sequitur. "Should" implies there being a reason, something other than a physical account of causation. So again, you're implying a mind. But independently of this. if something exists necessarily, no reason is needed to explain it other than the necessity of its existence, it can't NOT exist. This is the traditional reasoning behind the deistic argument from contingency, but applies equally to any uncaused first cause, even a materialistic one.

Right, the underlying value for having that feeling is the species survival. But should the species survive? .... isn't the underlying objective purpose to ensure the species continues? Why should any species continue? — Philosophim

No, not really- there's no purpose behind evolution that is directing it (intelligent design notwithstanding - unless you believe in a god); it only seems that way, because we often focus on the organisms that comprise a species. Here's biological view of it:

Evolution is defined as the change in the frequency of alleles* (including the development of new alleles through mutation), within a gene pool** over time.

*An allele is a gene variant, such as the variant that results in red hair or blue eyes.
**gene pool: all the alleles in a population of organisms that interbreed.

When an organism survives to maturity and reproduces, it is inserting genes into the gene pool. The longer it lives, the more opportunity to reproduce and thus to propagate is genes. If certain alleles (individually or in combination with others) produces a survival advantage, then over time - these alleles can come to dominate. The average impact to a gene pool that one organism can have is proportional to the size of the population - this is simple probability (1 out of 1000 organisms vs 1 out of 1000000).

Over time, a subpopulation may become isolated from the mother population, and if this persists - that subpopulation's gene pool will evolve independently from the mother gene pool, and over time, this can result in a new species- the gene pool is quite a bit different from the original pool (a pool that may have also evolved away from what it was at the split).

This doesn't entail an objective, it just entails genetic mutations that occur in a gene pool that may or may not provide an advantage to organisms that effects how much they reproduce.

that's what I'm trying to pin down in the OP. The beginnings of any rational discussion of morality must conclude that given the options of existence vs complete non-existence, existence is better, and therefore the base of any good reason. — Philosophim

We all want to live, and most of us would like humanity to live on after our own deaths. I see no reason to think that this common desire exists independently of humans, and that's much of what I've been arguing. But I can agree that human (intersubjective*) morality is consistent with our drive/desire for humanity to continue and for it to flourish.

*In philosophy, psychology, sociology, and anthropology, intersubjectivity is the relation or intersection between people's cognitive perspectives.

Because if there is no logic reason, there is nothing besides whim. — Philosophim

Both "reasons" and "whims" are products of minds, so this suggests deism or theism. Naturalism would imply that what occurs is a product of blind, undirected nature - neither reasons nor whims.

... Therefore existence is metaphysically necessary.
— Relativist

That is, (minus the infinite regress) essentially what the OP proves. Therefore we may be in agreement conceptually, just not semantically. — Philosophim

Then you should agree your question, "Should there be existence?" is inapplicable, and certainly has nothing to do with morality.

There are reports of mother cats entering burning buildings to rescue their kittens, getting themselves hurt in the process. I suggest it "feels right" to them to do so.
— Relativist

Of course, but that doesn't mean there is an objective underlying reason why that feeling exists. — Philosophim

The behavior (having the feeling that induces the actions) has a survival value for the species, so that could account for its presence - demonstrating it being consistent with naturalism. In this case, there isn't a reason this particular trait evolved. Other species evolve differently; example: some produce so many offspring that there's high probability some will survive to reproduce.

The idea that feelings alone are all we have to go on in morals and there can be no objective details does not pan out in any other feelings we have, why in your mind are moral feelings an exception?

I'm not suggesting that feelings fully account for all morality, just that they are at the core. A feeling can account for the concepts of "good" and "bad": hurting me invokes a "bad" feeling; helping me invokes a "good" feeling. Through empathy, these feelings get evoked vicariously. Neither concept can be understood solely by their dictionary definitions - the link to the feelings must be present. Sociopaths lack the link. They could be forced to memorize a moral code, but they'll lack the connection to their feelings.

This innate capacity for perceiving good and evil is a sine qua non for morality, but it's only the beginning of the story. From there, we then think abstractly, apply reasoning, and we learn things (including the morality further developed by others).

What feels right instinctually IS right and good.
— Relativist

No one objectively agrees to that.... — Philosophim

I was only referring only to the fundamental basis of right(good) and wrong (bad). We still learn things - such as what you've taught your children. And we have other feelings that lead us in other directions, and different people will apply different reasoning and differrent sets of beliefs.

Those are reasons why something exists. They are not reasons that it should exist. — Philosophim

Why must there be reasons?

At the end, even that boils down to the prime question, "Should there be existence at all?" Its irrelevant why there is existence. Should there be existence? And if there is an objective morality the OP notes that the only rational conclusion to be made is, "Yes". — Philosophim

Your question can only be meaningful if existence itself is contingent. I don't think it can be contingent, because contingency entails a source of contingency. That source of contingency would have to exist. If that is contingent, it needs a source...ad infinitum - a vicious infinite regress. Therefore existence is metaphysically necessary. So a "should" (a reason) doesn't apply.

It seems odd that morality just 'suddenly' appears when life comes about. — Philosophim

As you noted, empathy didn't appear suddenly when humans developed. In addition, parents of most species feel some sort of affection for their offspring. There are reports of mother cats entering burning buildings to rescue their kittens, getting themselves hurt in the process. I suggest it "feels right" to them to do so. They may not contemplate the risks in advance, nor do they engage in a mental deliberation weighing the pros and cons before acting. They lack the capacity to do this. Be we have the capacity, and that's what we add to our instinctual inclinations- we intellectualize them, and think abstractly about them. What feels right instinctually IS right and good.

So if we begin to say, "Its good that the species survive," we can ask, "Why?" "Because I feel like it." Then why do we bother saving people who want to commit suicide? The species will continue. Why not murder anyone who gets in our way? The species will continue, and I'll have more resources for me. Its a bit more than, "I want, gimme, I feel, gimme, I'm happy to do all sorts of atrocities for my feelings, gimme." — Philosophim

You minimize the "feeling like it". It's a strong feeling. We don't want others to commit suicide because we fear death for ourselves, and we empathetically extend this to others. By analogy, each dog in a pack will fight for other members of the pack. I imagine that if they could speak, they would say it's the right thing to do

I get the strong feeling that you want there to be meaning to existence - perhaps you actually need it to be the case. Do you think this could be the case? If so, I think I can give you something more helpful than my expressing disagreement with you.

I'm going to follow that up with, "Why do you need a God to exist for there to be an objective morality?" I see an objective morality as a rule of existence. — Philosophim

Objective morals are consistent with theism, and inconsistent with physicalism. They may not entail theism, but objective morals just existing untethered to anything seems ad hoc - logically possible, but lacking any good reason to think they exist. Of course, this is just as far as I can tell. I'm open to hearing why one might be more open to their existence.

"Nonsense" is not an argument. Explain to me where I'm wrong in demonstrating that all moral questions boil down to this fundamental question. Have you also proven that an objective morality cannot be separated from humans? Not yet. Feel free to provide examples. — Philosophim

I should have said "seemingly incoherent", because I can't see how to make sense of them. But no, I can't prove objective morals can't exist independently of humans, any more than I can prove the nonexistence of gods, but "not provably false" is not a justification for believing something. So I don't believe such things exist. You seem to think they do, so tell me the justification for that belief.

We have our moral intuitions because they provided an evolutionary advantage, and these intuitions manifest as instinct and emotion.
— Relativist

But this is not a subjective advantage. You have a subjective experience of this advantage, but what is the objective underlying moral rule?.. — Philosophim

This question assumes an objective rule exists. Sure, the advantage is an objective one: empathy for others helps motivate behavior that has a positive impact toward survival of the species. Moral values, as we know them, arise from verbalizing our inherent instincts. Consider that the golden rule (treat others as you would like to be treated) is consistent with empathy- vicariously experiencing the suffering of others. That alone could serve as the basis for developing a moral system.

Why should humans even exist? Why should life exist? Why should anything exist?

Life exists because the environment was suitable for abiogenesis to occur. Humans exist because of the series of accidents associated with our evolutionary history. As I said I presume our empathy had a survival advantage. I don't know that I'm right, but I think it entails fewer metaphysical assumptions than you would need. But you're welcome to provide a simple basis.

Without 1, 2 could not exist, though the reverse doesn’t hold. Since it is because of the existence of 1, or one thing, that there can be 2, or two things, then the former can be said to be the cause of the latter.

Does this hold? Surely this argument has been made plenty times before, no? — Pretty

Numbers do not exist. They are abstractions. One-ness and two-ness (etc) exist, as properties of groups of objects. There is a logical relation between one-ness and two-ness, but a logical relation is not a "cause".

Others disagree. Here's a poll: https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2023/05/17/diversity-equity-and-inclusion-in-the-workplace/

To be clear, this isn't focused on the military, but the military is still a workplace.

"More than half of workers (54%) say their company or organization pays about the right amount of attention to increasing DEI. Smaller shares say their company or organization pays too much (14%) or too little attention (15%), and 17% say they’re not sure. Black workers are more likely than those in other racial and ethnic groups to say their employer pays too little attention to increasing DEI. They’re also among the most likely to say focusing on DEI at work is a good thing (78% of Black workers say this), while White workers are the least likely to express this view (47%)."

Suppose we were to put it to a vote. The majority of voters are white- the group least likely to be victims of prejudice. Would it really make sense to eliminate it based on a majority vote? I don't think so.

Prejudice has not disappeared from our society, and was institutionalized in the military in the past. Acknowledging the racial and ethnic discrimination that occurred in the past demonstrates the current inclusiveness and distinguishes it from the prejudices that persist outside the military. This is not antithetical to unity.

Mississippi bill would pay bounty hunters to catch undocumented immigrants

President Trump’s administration has made it clear that deporting illegal immigrants is a priority, and we are proud to do our part here in Mississippi to help support his agenda and protect our citizens.”

Keen and Barton suggested offering a $1,000 reward to registered bounty hunters for each successful deportation they help facilitate, which would be funded by the general assembly and administered by the state treasurer, according to a press release from his office.

If this passes, non-Whites should steer clear of Mississipi.

I can grasp some reasons why conservatives oppose DEI and affirmative action: they infer that it entails discrimination against their kind (white, heterosexual, etc). Irrespective of whether they are correct (which I'm skeptical of), I'd like to understand why this is deemed appropriate:

US Air Force removes lessons on black WWII pilots from training

Donald Trump's move to block diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) initiatives has led to the US Air Force removing material on the role of black and female pilots during World War Two from its training programmes.

A military official said "immediate steps" were taken to remove material to "ensure compliance" with the US president's order, the BBC's US news partner CBS reported.

Trainee troops were previously shown footage of pioneering servicemen and women as part of DEI courses during basic military training.

Trump signed an executive order banning such programmes in the federal government soon after returning to office, fulfilling a pledge he repeatedly made during the campaign.

The OP does not argue for, nor need a God to argue for an objective morality. — Philosophim

Without a God, how can there exist objective morality? That's why I brought it up, and also brought up intersubjectivity.

Yes, this is a more common approach to the issue. But have you read the OP? I'm trying to establish what at minimum, must exist in any objective morality. — Philosophim

Yes, and I disagree with most of it. For example:

"All moral questions boil down to one fundamental question that must be answered first, "Should there be existence?""
This is nonsense if, as I explained, morality is not objective in a transcendent sense of existing independently of humans. That's why I brought up "obective moral values" and the basis of morals being empathy.

If morality is entirely intersubjective among humans, moral judgements apply to things that relate to humans and are contingent upon the human perspective. It means morality is a consequence of our existence, and this is problematic for your claims.

No, I'm not. What I'm trying to find is a base for an objective morality that builds up to something which better explains why we have the moral intuitions that we do, and a guide to understand beyond instinct and emotion. — Philosophim

We have our moral intuitions because they provided an evolutionary advantage, and these intuitions manifest as instinct and emotion. IMO, empathy IS the base because it broadens our self-survival instinct beyond ourselves. The only further "beyond" to this is the reasoning we apply to develop morality more broadly.

A non-controversial example is law enforcement. Also: minimizing air and water pollution.

There is no such thing as a “Public Weal” — NOS4A2

There is at least the potential of a public interest.

Ah! I see your point.

IMO, you underestimate the fealty of Trump's supporters. For example: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jan/22/trump-pardons-republicans

It's theoretically illegal, but since Presidents are above the law, that may not matter.

That Nazi slogan “The Public Weal Transcends the Interest of the Individual” is the crux of fascism, found not only in Fascist iconography, but in Mussolini’s writings. — NOS4A2

That seems overly simplistic, but tell me if you think the proposition ("The Public Weal Transcends the Interest of the Individual”) is intrinsically false - meaning that it's necessarily wrong in all respects and in all contexts.

He said on the Cross: "My God, My God, Why Have You Forsaken Me?". How could He be abandoned if He and God are one? — MoK

Christians rationalize this as the product of his human nature. That human nature could experience real human suffering, without which there could be no atonement.

A more objective view would treat this as evidence the author of Mark didn't view Jesus as being truly one with God. Luke chose to put different last words in Jesus' mouth: "Into your hands, I commend my spirit".

A couple of recent events that add to the concerns about Trump: his firing of 12 Inspectors General, and his pardoning of the Proud Boys & Oath Keepers convicted of seditious conspiracy for planning the 1/6 Capitol break-in.

“Success is going to be retribution...We gotta do everything in our power to make sure that the next four years sets us up for the next 100 years.” -Enrique Tarrio, Proud Boys leader, convicted of seditious conspiracy for conspring to break into the Capitol on 1/6.

I have heard very few rational notions that morality is subjective. — Philosophim

If you assume morality is either objective or subjective, then one can consider the metaphysical implications. This is the basis for the argument for God's based on the assumed existence of objective moral values (OMVs).
At minimum, objective morals entails physicalism being false.

Regardless, what's the basis for the premise that OMVs exist? It's typically based on our moral intuitions. But in your op, you said:

A subjective morality is based on our own feelings and intuitions. An objective morality would be something that could be evaluated apart from our feelings and intuitions using logic and objectively measurable identities. — Philosophim

I may misunderstand, but you seem to be dismissing the role of our moral intuitions- because these manifest as feelings.

The existence of intersubjective moral values makes the most sense to me: nearly all of us have a common set of moral intuitions (exception: sociopaths, who may have a genetic defect). This shared set of values seems a reasonable basis for morality, one that is independent of metaphysical implications. It's consistent with the possibility that OMVs exist but doesn't entail their existence, and doesn't require simply assuming they exist (as you proposed).