That I endorse a more sensible way of approaching the matter — S

You don't think it's just more sensible to you though. You think it's more sensible in general. Which is not a subjectivist view. As you've agreed, you think that reason transcends personal opinion, and you think that moral views can be arrived at via reason. Again, this is not a subjectivist view.

I have little idea what you're saying in most of the initial post you made about this. (That's why I responded with a "Say what?"--a lot of your post came across like gobbledygook to me.)

So I said that I could see saying that valuations are a relation between the individual valuing something and what they're valuing. But the valuation is strictly something mental the individual is doing.

What is the

specific claim about interpreting Euthyphro. — Terrapin Station

you are skeptical of, and, in what way are you skeptical of it? — Mww

The claim was "the Euthyphro is considered by virtually all contemporary moral philosophers to be . . . a damning criticism of subjectivist views"

Aside from simply being a naturally skeptical person, I'm skeptical of that claim because for one, I can't recall even one philosopher interpreting Euthyphro as being about a subjectivist account of ethics. Aside from that, usually one of the primary critical focuses is the philosophy of religion issue re whether particular properties of God are the case in a way that could at least potentially be arbitrary, or whether there's something more primary than God that non-arbitrarily determines what those properties (like piety) of God would be.

The question is, why are you focusing on the Islam bit and not on the "secret pedophile ring run by the Clinton's" bit? — Echarmion

What sort of secret is it if A Gnostic Agnostic knows about it?

It seems to me that many commentators do not appreciate the force of Spinoza's statements about the nature of ultimate reality. According to him, only God exists. God is the only substance. Substance is one, infinite and indivisible. All finite and divisible things are a product of the imagination, which means that plurality, finiteness and divisibility are all illusory. "Measure, time and number are nothing but modes of thinking, or rather of imagining" — bobobor

How would I appreciate the "force" of it when it just seems arbitrary and nonsensical to me?

The ‘valuing part’ you refer to is a set of measurable/observable events in the brain that can be related to the experience of valuing. That doesn’t amount to a value relation, — Possibility

Then I wouldn't say that it's a relation. Valuing only occurs in the subject's brain. What is valued is not only in the subject's brain (usually; the exception is if the subject values their thoughts, ideas, etc.). If you don't want to say that the relation is between the subject valuing something and what it is that they value, then it's not a relation, because there's nothing else to be had.

That's why it would be wrong to say "it's my gut feeling that we should arrest anyone whose names begins with M", because a) its so unlikely, given our common experience, that this is a gut feeling, and b) without some seriously convoluted thinking, such a policy is unlikely to yield anything close to the sorts of gut feelings people tend to have. — Isaac

I'd certainly agree that it's unusual. I wouldn't say that someone can't be unusual, however. Especially because I know and have known a lot of really weird people.

In general, I'm the last person who would insist that people must be similar to me in their thinking, the way they reason, etc.

Looks like Bartricks might be right. Seems the majority of philosophers are moral realists and moral cognitivists according to philpapers survey. — bert1

What I was skeptical about wasn't this, but a specific claim about interpreting Euthyphro.

You apparently think that moral stances can be arrived at via reason and that reason somehow transcends people as individuals.

You're not really a subjectivist on this stuff, then. That you have the stance you do isn't the same as saying that your stance is correct and alternates are incorrect in general.

I don't know if you misread my response above. I said that the only thing that I can imagine as a "test" is thinking about whether the principle really matches one's feelings/intuitions.

So, in other words, thinking, "Do I really feel, or are my intuitions really that we should have no crimes that are words starting with the letter 'M'." And then if the answer is "Yes," it has passed the test.

I'm not sure you realize that I really, really do not believe that there are any "correct" stances when it comes to morality.

There are stances that are nothing like my own, and of course I'd prefer that my own were common, were made law, etc., but that doesn't make mine correct or anyone else's incorrect.

Moral values are relations between a subject and their experience of behaviour: theirs and/or others’. It is a property of the subject only in relation to behaviour, and a property of behaviour only in relation to the subject. This means that moral values are contingent upon both subject and behaviour. — Possibility

Say what?

It's okay to say that it's a relation between the subject and what they're valuing, I suppose, but the valuing part of that equation only occurs in the subject's brain.

2 seems clearly false to me — bert1

Yeah, me too. His support of it is a combo of the old "it's self-evident" trope and an appeal to authority/supposed popularity (among authority).

The ancients assumed that reason would lead us all to the same understanding. But their criterion was not ‘objectivity’ in the modern sense - the ideas of objectivity and for that matter subjectivity have changed considerably in the transition to modernity. The Eclipse of Reason discusses this in detail. — Wayfarer

The historical "objectivity" of reason that he's referring to was a symptom of psychological projection. That's been remedied to some extent (though certainly not wholesale) by a greater realization of and improved empathy towards other people in the world, who can be, who can look at things, who can reason, quite different from ourselves.

Still, you say it is a bad argument because moral values are the values of a subject, namely Reason. — Janus

Ah, he was saying that reason is a subject? I'm not sure how that would make sense to him/wouldn't just be equivocating the word "subject," but I don't suppose I'd get an honest, straightforward answer from him.

Fifteen year-olds usually are.

I really hope you're not much older than fifteen.

So good persuasive tactics from you. I'm sure folks are impressed. You'll have lots of followers soon.

I'm not trying to convince you of anything.

So you're not going by my rules, and you think that someone telling you their own views needs a citation. Why?

You tell me — Bartricks

What I told you is that if you're just telling me your view then I wouldn't need a citation for anything.

That's another claim. Citation please. — Bartricks

Why would we need a citation for something someone is saying about their view, how they feel or approach things?

Citation in support of that please. — Bartricks

Were you only making claims about yourself? If so, then we don't need a citation other than you.

Again, it's a claim about me. I'm the source. It's not a claim about all or most philosophers or anything like that.

Your claim that the one making the claim has to do the work. — Bartricks

It's a statement of how I approach people making empirical claims. I'm the source. I'm telling you something about myself.

Back that up. Provide a citation in support of your claim. — Bartricks

What claim are you referring to?

I explained this to you already. You want anyone to accept something, it's up to you to do the work. You're trying to sell me something. I'm not wanting to sell myself something.

And no, it isn't. — Bartricks

No what isn't?

First off, the claim was about interpretations of the Euthyphro.

Aside from that, where is Danahar's citation?

You have the internet. Do some research. — Bartricks

If you're going to make a claim, it's up to you to provide citations. There's no way I'm doing your work for you. I couldn't care less if you do the work. But if you want anyone to accept the claim, it's up to you.

It appears self-evident to the reason of most that moral truths are necessary, not contingent. — Bartricks

It might seem self-evident to you, but it doesn't at all seem to be the case to me or to many other people. So simply claiming that it seems self-evident does no good.

How else do you explain why the Euthyphro is considered by virtually all contemporary moral philosophers to be such a damning criticism of subjectivist views??? — Bartricks

Aside from the fact that that would be both an argument from authority and an argumentum ad populum, what's the source for the claim?

If moral values are the values of a subject, Reason, then they will be contingent, not necessary — Bartricks

The word "reason" makes no sense to me in that sentence by the way.

2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent — Bartricks

They're contingent, not necessary.

Well, the problem is that it appears self-evident to the reason of most that if something is morally valuable it is not just morally valuable here and now, but always and everywhere. That is, moral value does not vary over time and space alone. If it is bad today to be a sadist, then it is morally bad tomorrow to be one, other things being equal. — Bartricks

If your reason or intuition is suggesting this to you, your reason or intuition are mistaken. It's clearly the case that moral values can and do vary from person to person, and even over time for the same persons.

It seems that even the short posts aren't focused quite frequently. — uncanni

That's true, but the situation isn't made any better by making posts longer.

A methodology which doesn't permit all kinds of nonsense. — S

i don't suppose I'm going to be able to get details on that.

I bought it because I didn't know how to read a book, but then I realized that I couldn't read How to Read a Book, either.

Finally someone explained to me that the first step is to open the cover.

So then you do allow for a methodology which permits all kinds of nonsense, like the example I gave? And... you don't see that as problematic? — S

What's the other option?

You just said that "obviously" you think that your subjective experience of Mount Everest is identical to Mount Everest.

You must stay away from the discussions with around 2,000 responses. Just because a discussion gets long doesn't mean it can't keep its focus. — uncanni

I agree with that hypothetically, but in practice, contingently, even single long posts on the board are never focused.