Comments

  • Is the mind divisible?
    Small and darkunenlightened

    I went to an Alternative Health Fair with a friend who spent £20 (at that time about half his weekly welfare benefits) on a 'kirlean' aura photograph together with character analysis. It said he was a very warm purple and rather too trusting and gullible. Typical Aquarius, of course.
  • Doing away with absolute indiscerniblity and identity
    Maybe I'm wrong about that. The Statue of Liberty could have been made of different stuff and it would still have been the Statue of Liberty.
  • Doing away with absolute indiscerniblity and identity
    you end up with violations of Liebnitz' LawCount Timothy von Icarus

    I think it's partly because Leibniz-style 'laws' don't deal well with counterfactuals and necessity. The same lump of clay might have made a different statue or none at all. But this particular statue could only have been made from this lump of clay - for any statue made from a different lump of clay would have been a different statue. The OP claims 3. and 4. are not surgical enough to help us analyse how we identify objects and how we use 'might have been' and 'must have' and 'couldn't have been' to discern coherently between them.
  • Currently Reading
    I sympathise. I think the rot set in with Tristram Shandy or perhaps even earlier with Don Quixote. But at least we can trust Tolkien.
  • Doing away with absolute indiscerniblity and identity
    But if the statues have an identity, and the clay has its own identity, then you have two objects occupying the same area of space at the same time.Count Timothy von Icarus

    That's interesting but it doesn't seem to me to be a problem. Let it be that there can be two objects that occupy the same area of space at the same time. Since they are both composed of the same stuff it's not surprising they are in the same place and at the same time.

    If things are eternally indiscernible, but someone still claims that they can be ontologically different, then it seems to me like their ontologically commited to the possibility of infinities of indiscernible differences throughout their ontology. But these unobservable differences, aside from not being parsimonious, are also explaining absolutely nothing about the world, which is a notable difference from unobservable parallel dimensions.Count Timothy von Icarus

    We have no right to require parsimony from the universe. Or explanations. We assume that it's somewhat consistent in its behaviour but that's an assumption for our own convenience because we need to plan our diaries and get our hair cut once in a while. It's not something we can demand. I can imagine there are lots of unobservable things that will remain unknown; and an indefinitely large number of things that, even if known, could not be known apart from other things, from which they are nevertheless different. That is because we are relatively small and ignorant in relation to the world as a whole. So I plead guilty to being ontologically committed to infinities of indiscernible differences throughout my ontology. In plainer language, I am committed to believing that in vast areas of enquiry we may stand no chance of understanding what things differ from or are the same as what other things. Whilst we acquire much knowledge, our ignorance continues to be predominant.

    It may sound like a wildly wasteful ontology but it can be comfortably tucked into a drawer and forgotten about because it's only a way of talking about everything we do not and cannot know. We have enough to do dealing with the stuff we might and could know.

    a very unsatisfactory ontologyCount Timothy von Icarus

    I would say it's unfashionable more than unsatisfactory. It's unfashionable because it seems to contain a claim to a God's-eye view of the universe. But the 'God's-eye view' is only a manner of speaking. What it's a manner of speaking about is all the stuff that there is about which we know absolutely nothing but which we sometimes wish to mention in our philosophising.
  • Currently Reading
    I just finished 'David Copperfield' for the second time and found it no more convincing than the first. The narrator claims to be the author of several well-known books but I have never found any other works by him. Enquiries at the library or bookshop produce only the autobiography I already have. It is highly amusing and very well written but I don't trust its truthfulness one bit.
  • Is a hotdog a sandwich?
    When I was a kid in London I asked at a bakery for a 'sausage roll' and the baker took a bread roll, sliced it, inserted a cooked sausage and handed it to me. It was very pleasant but it was not a sausage roll. A few years later I asked (at a different bakery) for a cheese bun and the baker explained that buns are sweet and do not come with cheese. Misunderstandings in bakeries are a social menace. I blame the decline of platonic essentialism and the malign influence of Quine and Foucault.
  • Is a hotdog a sandwich?
    Not only do they insist on dressing for dinner, they have to have the dinner dress toounenlightened

    It's the drizzling I find so odd. Drizzle is what we used to get when it wasn't quite raining. Now it goes on food.
  • Is a hotdog a sandwich?
    prosecco saladBenkei

    It's any salad with a dressing of disdain from the chips 'n' pies 'n' beans 'n' potato crisp sandwich brigade, of whom I am a member.
  • Is a hotdog a sandwich?
    My father insists that Darts isn't a sport.sime

    In my experience of fathers that means he's forgotten about the loan. Otherwise he would be insisting on repayment.
  • Is a hotdog a sandwich?
    usage is the only source which informs you what a sandwich is. There is no trans-linguistic realityhypericin

    Another source is our own prescription. "It's called a sandwich but it does not deserve the name." As if the so-called sandwich is descriptively or even morally defective. There is a trans-linguistic reality exactly when there is a prescriptive reality: the world of what ought and ought not to be, distinct from the world of what is. For example, democracy is not just whatever anyone chooses to call democracy. Otherwise any old tyranny will qualify. Usage is something, but not everything. Don't know why I've decided to stick up for Platonism in this thread, a position that is neither fashionable nor sustainable. But heck, someone's got to do it. If they don't explicitly, it'll only come sneaking in by the back door.
  • Is a hotdog a sandwich?
    platonic essencehypericin

    parody of bad philosophyPie

    He may have got the answer wrong but I give him credit for raising a question that is still intriguing us in almost its original form two millenia later. Austin's 'first-water, ground floor' mistakes, which it's no disgrace to have made.
  • Negative numbers are more elusive than we think
    Take the ubiquitous example of a count of apples. It's obvious and natural to us what it means for me to have a positive number of apples, it's something we can count.Jerry

    That skates over the philosophical problems of counting with natural numbers.

    "But," you might say, "none of this shakes my belief that 2 and 2 are 4." You are quite right, except in marginal cases -- and it is only in marginal cases that you are doubtful whether a certain animal is a dog or a certain length is less than a meter. Two must be two of something, and the proposition "2 and 2 are 4" is useless unless it can be applied. Two dogs and two dogs are certainly four dogs, but cases arise in which you are doubtful whether two of them are dogs. "Well, at any rate there are four animals," you may say. But there are microorganisms concerning which it is doubtful whether they are animals or plants. "Well, then living organisms," you say. But there are things of which it is doubtful whether they are living organisms or not. You will be driven into saying: "Two entities and two entities are four entities." When you have told me what you mean by "entity," we will resume the argument. — Russell

    However many rules you give me—I give a rule which justifies my employment of your rules — Wittgenstein
    (Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics [RFM] I-113).

    We might end up saying - "This is just how we count - and anything else doesn't qualify as 'counting' as we do it". If we can get no further with justifying counting with natural numbers then we can take the same dogmatic 'Just How We Do It' approach to negative numbers.
  • Is the mind divisible?
    Is the mind a single thing, or does it have parts? If it has parts, what are they? Are its parts tied to parts of the brain?TiredThinker

    I read the question and started thinking about 'the mind'.

    But perhaps I need also to think about 'thing', 'single thing', 'or' and 'have parts'. A sphere is (plausibly) a single thing. And it has whatever parts I decide to split it into, e.g. two hemispheres. Does the sphere 'have' those parts or did I just impose parts on the sphere which had no parts at all until I intervened? So, the word 'or' in the question may be misleading - being a single thing and having parts may not be exclusive categories.

    I congratulated my friend on getting a new job. Was that congratulation a thing? Is it still a thing? The congratulation was not a nothing. If it is a thing, I wonder whether it makes sense to wonder whether it has parts. If it is not a thing, then I wonder what criteria to apply to - lets say, things - to decide whether or not they are things. Are numbers things? Rankings in sport? Political offices?

    "Is the office of President of the USA a single thing, or does it have parts? If it has parts, what are they? Are its parts tied to the person of the President?" It may be that the OP questions make as much or as little sense as that.

    We might find out that the mind is not a thing at all and not a nothing either.
  • Does solidness exist?
    It does seem to imply the notion of infinity, does it not? How far can something that is solid in the absolute sense, be infinitely divided?Watchmaker

    I'll chuck in the pre-Socratics. Thales thought everything was made of water. He also thought that everything was 'full of gods', by which he might have meant something parallel to 'will' or 'mind'. Heraclitus said 'Everything is in flux'. Parmenides and Zeno raised the question of matter being infinitely divisible or not. I think you might be a Thalesian. Nobody promotes Thales much these days. He's seen as a pioneer who stuck a flag in the philosophical territory but didn't survive to cultivate the land or build cities.
  • Is refusing to vote a viable political position?
    Not a small but insignificant difference (such as with reducing one's carbon footprint), absolutely no difference at allIsaac

    Doesn't that lead to a paradox? If your vote carries no weight and your vote carries the same weight as everyone else's, then nobody's vote carries any weight. The sum of a finite number of zero weights is zero. And yet the number of votes determines who gets elected.

    We seem to have reached a point in this discussion where one side is arguing that voting is utterly pointless and the other side is arguing that it's not utterly pointless, only almost utterly.

    If I came here hoping to take up a career in promoting democratic engagement then I certainly won't quote this thread on my CV.
  • Is refusing to vote a viable political position?
    Voting (or not) does not decide my future. It's not a belief, it's a fact.Isaac

    I think this a problem for any sphere in which individual actions count for little or nothing but group actions determine the result. Reducing your carbon footprint by 90% or increasing it by 200% will do practically nothing to save or to harm the planet. Having just one cigarette in a pub is not going to give anyone emphysema. Etc.
  • Is refusing to vote a viable political position?
    It is also impossible to tell the difference between enthusiastic support and reluctant consent just from a vote.Isaac

    That's right. If someone describes themselves as an 'enthusiastic supporter' on the strength of voting, they are over-stating the case. If someone describes themselves as a 'protester' on the strength of not voting, it's another overstatement.
  • Is refusing to vote a viable political position?
    Some people don't vote as a protest and some are merely indifferent. When it is not possible to distinguish protest from apathy then 'protest' is no longer an applicable description. To qualify as a protester I must at least explain my reasons to the people with power. I must at least write a letter, stand on a street corner with a placard, join a club. Sitting at home does not in itself entitle me to the label.
  • Is refusing to vote a viable political position?
    By not voting - and also not standing for election - and also not doing anything to protest against or to change the constitutional system - then I am consenting to any result. It is the democratic equivalent of a shrug. It means 'whatever', 'I don't care'. Let whoever wins, win. But the shrug does not quite shrug off all responsibility. The point remains that I could have done something to sway the result and I chose not to. So abstaining is, after all, equivalent to a vote. Whoever wins, I voted for them by failing to have added my vote to the numbers voting against them. It's a moral risk.
  • Is this even a good use of the term logic?
    I'm not sure whether studying logic will improve four-in-a-row play. I can say confidently that the person who proved that four-in-a-row is a 'solvable' game - i.e. first player can always win on optimal play - was an impressive logician. Even if the proof was done by crunching cases, the programme needed to crunch the cases took a lot of skill in logic to devise.
  • Is this even a good use of the term logic?
    Decision trees are extended syllogisms, like the example I gave above used in four in a row. You might not be using them consciously or at all. When you are playing, how do you decide your next move?
  • Is refusing to vote a viable political position?
    But that brand of anarchism may be either identical with - or easily mistaken for - or too liable to degenerate into - the kind of unaccountable individualism that we see in the global above-all-states economy. 'Anarchy' in the sense of wild-west lawlessness. We get crypto-currency outside the exploitative state-controlled banking systems. And behold, it is a gift to international crime and exploitation of other kinds.
  • Is this even a good use of the term logic?
    The OP is asking: (i) if you're good at four-in-a-row, does it follow that you're good at logic? (ii) If so, what kind of logic?

    Answers so far suggest - (i) possibly, but not necessarily; and (ii) decision trees, which are one aspect of logic, but not the whole of it.

    I would only add that asking the question does in itself evince some logical skill. Many people would receive the comment "You're good at four-in-a-row, so you must be logical" as a deserved compliment and give the matter no further thought.
  • Is refusing to vote a viable political position?
    Then perhaps individualist anarchism is what you want. Stirner, Proudhon.

    The Ego and Its Own had a destructive impact on Stirner’s left-Hegelian contemporaries, and played a related and significant role in the evolution of the thought of Karl Marx. Concerning its longer term historical influence, Stirner’s best-known work has become a founding text in the political tradition of individualist anarchism. — Stanford on Max Stirner

    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/max-stirner/

    I will hazard a guess why collectivist anarchism prevails, which is that people see what some individuals get up to outside state control and wonder how the interests of the weaker can be protected. But collectivism, if prescribed, re-invents the state. It's a problem, for which rejection of anarchy itself may be the only solution.
  • Is refusing to vote a viable political position?
    Maybe I've remembered wrong but didn't you post somewhere about the Council of Aragon? You know this stuff?

    https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/690369
  • Is refusing to vote a viable political position?
    ........refusing to vote seems a viable position in this regard. But there is little philosophy on the subject and very little writing I can find comfort in.NOS4A2

    But haven't you overlooked the philosophy of Anarchism? States are - in themselves and regardless of form - unjust and oppressive. Voting colludes with injustice.

    If there is a State, there must be domination of one class by another and, as a result, slavery; the State without slavery is unthinkable—and this is why we are the enemies of the State. — Bakunin

    The slogan of the 1970's - 1980's was 'If voting changed anything, it would be illegal.' For all I know, it's still current but I don't tend to meet anarchists now so I can't say.

    The Anarchist Library has plenty of papers with titles such as 'Anarchists Do Not Vote, They Fight' and 'The Case Against Voting', 'Angry, Not Apathetic' etc. https://theanarchistlibrary.org/category/topic/anti-voting.

    The Stanford entry on Anarchism is sound but unsympathetic.
  • Is this even a good use of the term logic?
    You might use a kind of decision tree to work out a strategy. If I play A, his next best moves are B or C. If he plays B I could play D or E. If he plays C I could play F or G. Etc. That is an application of logic. On the other hand, you might be like one kind of chess player, looking at the board and instinctively sensing opportunities and weaknesses, without explicitly thinking about sequences of moves. So you might be great at four in a row and use very little explicit or conscious logic at all.
  • Understanding the Christian Trinity
    Foster: I'm still a bit hazy about the Trinity, sir.
    Schoolmaster: Three in one, one in three, perfectly straightforward. Any doubts about that see your maths master.
    — Alan Bennett, 40 Years On
  • The unexplainable
    “When a man stops believing in God,” said GK Chesterton, “he doesn't then believe in nothing, he believes anything.”

    Neat. Not true, I would say. But sometimes I prefer neatness to truth. (That's a confession, not a boast.)
  • Venerate the Grunt
    Yeah - sorry, not good etiquette - I wanted to include the punch-line. Kipling gets a reputation for being a jingoist and imperialist but I think he's seen at work exposing the hypocrisies and injustices of empire. "The White Man's Burden" is easily misjudged by its title.

    Take up the White Man’s burden–
    And reap his old reward:
    The blame of those ye better,
    The hate of those ye guard–

    No illusions about grateful civilised peoples there. Again the punch-line is heavy. Go and make your empire - it will be a failure and everyone will hate you for it. But his irony was twisted by imperialists. Of course, there's an anti-Kipling interpretation too.
  • Venerate the Grunt
    Kipling wrote about the disdain for the common soldier and the reliance on him in time of need:

    I went into a public 'ouse to get a pint o' beer,
    The publican 'e up an' sez, " We serve no red-coats here."
    The girls be'ind the bar they laughed an' giggled fit to die,
    I outs into the street again an' to myself sez I:
    O it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' " Tommy, go away " ;
    But it's " Thank you, Mister Atkins," when the band begins to play
    The band begins to play, my boys, the band begins to play,
    O it's " Thank you, Mister Atkins," when the band begins to play.
    .....................

    For it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an` Chuck him out, the brute! "
    But it's " Saviour of 'is country " when the guns begin to shoot;
    An' it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' anything you please;
    An 'Tommy ain't a bloomin' fool - you bet that Tommy sees!

    https://www.kiplingsociety.co.uk/poem/poems_tommy.htm
  • Foundational Metaphysics
    I would say not quite. “existence” is indexical: is it awkward that I can refer to different people with the same word ‘he’? I personally don’t think so. I can posit, without contradiction, that the cup in my hand “exists” (by constituting, for example, its existence as phenomenal) while denying it as existing in an ontic sense. I gave a couple examples, such as Spinoza to illustrate this clear distinction: do you disagree with that distinction as demonstrated in the examples?Bob Ross

    Indexical means 'relative to context of utterance' - like 'he' or 'here', as you say. The term 'existence' does not seem relative to context in that way. You go on to say that it has different senses, which is different from indexicality. You may well be right. Hamlet exists as a character in a play and does not exist as a flesh and blood human being. So sure, there are different kinds of existence in that way. But to say for example that Hamlet exists but does not [open italics]actually[close italics] exist is confused and confusing. To choose Hamlet as an example of some entity which uncontroversially exists is equally confusing. You chose the cup in your hand as a straightforward example of something which exists, distinguishing it perhaps from the tiger in your hallway which (ex hypothesi) does not. That's a much better example. But it does not allow for the kind of apparent equivocation that Hamlet does. It's a useful example specifically because it won't let us wriggle away from its existence.

    If I were to posit, for example, that the cup in my hand exists (contextually to phenomena), but really exists as one infinite substance, then, regardless to its truth, there is a distinction being made there within the concept of “existence”. Another example is that a cup may exist in the sense that I can interact with it, yet not exist sans my consciousness.Bob Ross

    The problem is that your cup doesn't exist sans your consciousness and the cup in your dreams also does not exist sans your consciousness. We are left with the problem of distinguishing a cup in the hand from a dreamed cup. That is, a real cup from an imagined cup. Or, in other words, a cup that exists from one which does not. Similarly, the cup in your dreams also exists contextually to phenomena and for all I know it may exist as one infinite substance as well. But at some time, possibly outside the philosophy laboratory, we are going to have to distinguish the cup of our dreams from the cup in our hands, the car that hit ours from the car that did not, the positive bank balance from the negative. I mean, while we enjoy this delicious atmosphere of confusion we must still keep a concept of 'existence' tucked in our back pockets for use when we actually need it and not just for when we are playing at metaphysics. And that, I submit - the concepts tucked away for use when we are serious - is our metaphysics.

    The only valid, thus far, determined sine qua non is that the subordinate rules cannot be affirmed and denied in accordance to the superordinate rules within the given operation of derivation; the derivation of derivation, and its recursive utilization, is this principle—which shall be termed the principle of regulation.

    If the terms mean something like the interpretation I gave them, then I can get little sense out of this - except perhaps that if we fail to follow rules of logical inference, then we will fail to make logical inferences.
  • Foundational Metaphysics
    My point here is that, to my comprehension, there’s a meaningful distinction between objects put forth in front of me and what lies at the bottom of existence (or what actually is existence); that is essentially what I am trying to convey.Bob Ross

    True. The dark side of the moon exists and it is not an object put forth in front of you.

    It is most certainly possible to assert that what “actually exists” is the same as what “exists” (which would be essentially claiming that whatever is deemed “existent” must be also in an ontic sense), but my point here is that that is not necessitous at all (personally I would find it problematic)

    On this view, from the proposition that X exists we may not infer that X actually exists - it is not 'necessitous.' That's awkward. If you have a theory that your cup may not actually exist (having proposed it yourself as a straighforward example of something that uncontroversially does exist) then you've made a muddle. To ask "What does it mean for something to exist?" is sensible enough. To give an answer that denies actual existence to the very thing you have chosen as an example of something that exists is confused. The theory is invoked to elucidate a given fact - if it turns out that the fact is inconsistent with the theory then I think it's the theory that has to give way.

    It may be that your cup exists but that your cup is not the thing that I think it is. Just as, for example, stars exist but stars are not the things that the ancients thought they were. They may not even be the things that we think they are.

    The only valid, thus far, determined sine qua non is that the subordinate rules cannot be affirmed and denied in accordance to the superordinate rules within the given operation of derivation; the derivation of derivation, and its recursive utilization, is this principle—which shall be termed the principle of regulation.

    The essay is most certainly meant to prove that the principle of regulation is true.Bob Ross

    You think it's clear but I say needs an example or two. E.g. a 'subordinate rule' is 'Don't walk on the grass' and a 'superordinate rule' is 'Notices in this park are posted with authority of the Town Council'. 'Derivation' is 'If p, then q. p. Therefore q.' 'Derivation of derivation' is 'If 'if p, then q. p. Therefore q', then 'If p, then q. Not-q. Therefore not p'. 'Recursive' means, well, I don't have an example. A 'sine qua non' is for example. Examples are the baby-walkers of the mind.

    You do give an example of a superordinate rule:

    “1” and “1” are identical but not indiscernible.

    What makes this a rule? What makes it superordinate?

    It looks like a proposition. I have say it also looks false. I take 'indiscernible' to mean 'impossible to tell the difference between'. I have never been able to tell the difference between "1" and "1" or between 1 and 1. I can tell the difference between several instances of mentioning the number 1. I would happily buy the proposition that 1 is identical with 1 and that to mention "1" at the start of a sentence is different from mentioning it at the end. Is that what you mean? If so, that seems OK, but it does not look like a rule. It looks like an observation helping to distinguish an entity from the mention of an entity.
  • Foundational Metaphysics
    @MAYAEL thank you, very thoughtful post, and when we talk about patience I think you are making a better show than I can often manage! best wishes
  • Does Consequentialism give us any Practical Guidance?
    My whole point is - we can't know. I don't think we can even make an educated guess.RolandTyme

    True - about some things. But not true about others. Some consequences we can reasonably predict. We can't predict the consequences of all-out nuclear war. We can predict the consequence of putting a hand in boiling water. So far we can say that consequentialism is limited to the extent that we can make good predictions. We can't yet say that -

    consequentialism has no practical importantRolandTyme

    Consequentialism may well not be true. But the OP does not do enough to establish that.
  • The elephant in the room.
    Only the very ignorant use wiki.Jackson

    That's true. People who already possess knowledge do not need to seek it out. My local library houses an awful lot of untrustworthy rubbish. But that's not a reason to distrust every book in it.
  • The elephant in the room.
    I believe Aristotle originated that phrase (don't remember where).Jackson

    In Ivan Andreyvich Krilov's 1814 epigrammatic story "The Inquisitive Man" a man visits a museum and notices all the creatures except the elephant. He told the story to make fun of people who miss the obvious.

    Full text of Aristotle in translation can be found on Project Gutenberg. Lots about elephants.
  • Foundational Metaphysics
    Ontology is about what “really exists” as opposed to a looser, colloquial use of the term (which usually is deployed to merely depict something resides outside of imagination or what have you).Bob Ross

    So your cup exists but it does not really exist. It exists in a colloquial sense but not in an ontic sense.

    The ontic sense is clarified by adding italicised 'really' to 'exists'. But this does not seem to add anything to the sense. I'm writing this post. Am I really writing this post? If I'm writing it, then I'm really writing it. If I'm really writing it, then I'm writing it. 'Really' is an intensifier, adding to emphasis, but not to sense.

    In terms of your contention, if you could please review my response here, then that would be much appreciated. Perhaps you did respond and I simply missed it?

    Please feel free to refer me to your response if that is the case; otherwise, I would love to continue our conversation if you could provide a response to mine.
    Bob Ross

    Thank you, I did see your response to my questions. At the risk of summarising inadequately, you seem to be saying 'wait and see how I use these concepts to make an argument in a future essay.' Fair enough. You have laid out the tools. Are they useful tools? What did you create them in order to achieve? Are they valid - do they exist? What questions or problems are you trying to address - what task did you create the tools for? You seem to be looking for validation that they are good, useful tools. I am sorry that I can get little sense out of the one you emphasise most. The principle of regulation as formulated seems not to have a clear meaning.

    The only valid, thus far, determined sine qua non is that the subordinate rules cannot be affirmed and denied in accordance to the superordinate rules within the given operation of derivation; the derivation of derivation, and its recursive utilization, is this principle—which shall be termed the principle of regulation.

    I asked whether this principle can be denied or asserted with equal consequence. Suppose I say - hang on, the opposite is the case - what difficulties would that create for me, what absurdities or contradictions would it land me in? In short, what problem does the principle of regulation solve?