Will the system allow for left-wing government? Would the people vote for a left-wing government? Do the left stand a chance in politics? — Down The Rabbit Hole

No, not for the long haul, at least the left side of the left. On the other hand, neither does the right of the right stand much of a chance. The left are embarrassed by the conservatism of the people and by their attachment to tradition and monarchy and their suspicion of foreigners. The right are bewildered by people's love of community and solidarity, rejection of class privilege and hatred of authoritarian government.

We like this country because people look out for each other and because everyone minds their own business. We adore the Queen and we despise toffs. We stand together as a country and we sniff at mention of our neighbouring county, town or village. We won't tolerate a police state and we want coppers out and about keeping an eye on things. We think British justice and democracy are models for the whole world and that our judges and politicians are hopelessly corrupt and self-serving. We hate officious government and we want the council to do something about whatever we want something doing about. Unions are selfishly ruining our lives with strikes and at least someone is sticking up for normal working people. It's not a political divide. It is the same people stating both sides sometimes in the same conversation.

Thatcher exploited one of these contradictions perfectly: we want decent council housing and we want to own our homes. Blair got another one right: we want public services and no socialist politics.

That's why I kept it all about personality and left physics out of it. For someone who can't read you write very well.

What if there were other universes before that? — Jackson

Then our universe isn't so special after all and it can take that smug look off its face.

Me only cruel immortality
Consumes; I wither slowly in thine arms,
Here at the quiet limit of the world,
A white-hair'd shadow roaming like a dream
The ever-silent spaces of the East — Tennyson

I think Aldous Huxley's After Many A Summer is an interesting answer to the question. He tends to the view that immortality would be disgusting, vices would become magnified and ossified and bodies would slowly rot, not being made of stone or steel. Tennyson wasn't a fan. There is also a view that we will rise from the grave and get new bodies and live on a new earth under a new heaven. In that case a lot of people will be walking around smugly saying - 'Told you so, and you mocked.' That in itself would be quite hard to bear.

So Moses comes off the mountain. "I have good news and bad news. The good news is I beat him down to ten. The bad news is adultery's still in."

I'm sorry, but isn't this supposed to be a mathematical philosophy page? — alan1000

No, that's down the corridor with Mr Russell. They started half an hour ago. This is the hyperbolic crochet class.

You are saying "The statement can't be true because logic does not support it." — god must be atheist

On the contrary, the statement is (as far as I know) true, just as it is written. Religious people are not necessarily stupid - but most stupid people are religious. This may well be a true empirical finding.

However, this observation alone - although true (let's grant, for sake of argument) - may not entail any interesting correlation between stupidity and religiosity.

The lack of correlation is shown by the parallel example of heterosexuality and two-leggedness. Again, empirically, we can see that most two-legged people are heterosexual. This is quite probably a true statement. But there is no interesting correlation between having two legs and being het.

Religious people are not necessarily stupid, but most stupid people are religious. — paraphrase of J.S. Mills (re: conservatives)

Hmm, interesting. If it's true, then it may merely be because most people are religious (to some degree) and also that most people are quite stupid when compared with the very intelligent. We could note that heterosexuals are not necessarily two-legged, but most two-legged people are heterosexuals. That example brings out the lack of logical connection. The statement is true merely because most people have two legs and also most people are heterosexual.

This privately owned situation is near impossible to change — schopenhauer1

If there are Marxists who also believe in inevitable capitalism, then I imagine they are too busy trying to square one belief against the other ever to get busy procreating. But if they do, they might find a Christian who thinks we are all already damned, for example. Hopelessness can be quite sexy.

I stated that Christianity believes in good people living forever in heaven and evil people living forever in hell....I was describing the view of the great majority of Christians. — Art48

The quicker you set them right, the better the world will be. It only remains to show that they are wrong or that there's no reason to suppose they are right. It would be a disappointing waste of effort to persuade millions of people that they won't live forever in heaven when actually they will. You need to get that point straight with everyone first. Unfortunately, nobody has any idea whether such a belief is true or not. So I guess another strategy is needed to assess 'folk' versus 'nuanced' beliefs.

I've often wondered whether many religious people have a semi-detached commitment to the stated tenets of their own religion. I expect you'll find Christians who believe in astrology and re-incarnation as many non-Christians do. The Creed of the established church in England states that we look for the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come. But if you do walk around looking for the resurrection of the dead then you're likely to be detained for questioning by mental health professionals. Religious belief is a slippery concept.

In which case, how can it make sense to draw context-independent conclusions about whether or not the architecture has achieved understanding? An understanding of what in relation to whom? — sime

I think all the above post is true. The robot has issued such and such words and the words all made sense. But did the robot mean any of it? On the other hand, if a robot threatens to beat me up I won't wait around to ask whether it understands what it's saying.

We are so predictable. It's like an automatic reflex. They know just what buttons to push. Oh... hang on......

However, I really believe that there are other systems of thought that predate the church can pull one towards Christ if the individual lets himself. — Dermot Griffin

That is true. Socrates could be seen as a pre-Christian martyr, for example. But let's not get carried away. Early Christian thought and theology was heavily influenced by texts and philosophies that already existed. It's perhaps not surprising that the New Testament is packed with fulfillments of ancient prophecies. Christianity is not alone in this. Newton stood on the shoulders of giants. It's not so amazing that Copernicus and Kepler foreshadowed Newton or that Archimedes came within a whisker of inventing calculus, missing the mark by only a couple of thousand years.

I think it would be pretty easy to see us as robots — hwyl

True. We can also be seen as angels, demons or lizards. If we turn out to be lizards that blows a hole in the robot theory. The point I'm making is that we can't infer anything about a thing's identity from our capacity to see it as something.

We're certainly comfortable acting as if plants are incapable of feeling pain. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Do plants feel pain?
The simple answer is that, currently, no one is sure whether plants can feel pain. We do know that they can feel sensations. Studies show that plants can feel a touch as light as a caterpillar’s footsteps. — Peta

https://www.peta.org/features/do-plants-feel-pain/

So Peta is crazy. Well, as the song goes, we're all crazy now.

I was just thinking, how do we know if human emotions are genuine anyway? We don't, oui? — Agent Smith

But we do - only not infallibly. I gave the example of parents distinguishing between the stomach-ache and the 'I haven't done my homework' stomach-ache.

So we can make that distinction - many times, not infallibly - in the case of humans. But in the case of robots, is there a distinction to be made, given that all their behaviour is a simulation?

- both were actors! — Agent Smith

True. But neither one is a robot. Profound insincerity can be suspected or diagnosed only if we are able also to diagnose a level of sincerity. In the case of the robot neither sincerity nor insincerity seem to be in question. I can imagine a robot behaving as it if had ulterior motives in being helpful to me. But would it really have any motives at all, let alone ulterior ones?

people don't wanna wear their hearts on their sleeves, but that doesn't necessarily imply they want to fool others — Agent Smith

True. Privacy is not the same as deception. The issue is: does it even make sense to talk about these motivations in the context of simulated behaviour?

I believe LaMDA will rekindle and reinvigorate debates on human consciousness, solipsism, p-zombies, and the hard problem of consciousness. — Agent Smith

Probably right. Parents learn by experience to distinguish a child in pain from the same child pretending to be in pain because they don't want to go school. It was pointed out earlier that any behaviour or interaction between humans can be simulated (in principle) by robots. So can we (could we) distinguish a robot in pain from the same robot simulating pain? The hypothesis is that all the behaviour is simulation. So we would be at a loss. The robot is reporting pain. Is it sincere? Sincerity entails non-simulation. But all the bot's behaviour is simulation. The difference with previous debates is that we might face this question in practice and not merely as a thought experiment to test our concepts about 'other minds'.

If you're willing to provide your age, that would be welcome too. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I am sixty four and I am not a robot. I do have an idea for a sketch in which an honest admin robot rings a helpline and asks a chat-bot how they can get past a login screen when required to check the box "I am not a robot". I know about Pygmalion but not about Asimov. I hope that biographical information helps to locate my views in the right socio-cultural box.

1. Repeatedly introducing a topic unrelated to the current conversation that the human is trying to have ("Wait a minute, John. I don't want to discuss music. What about my person-hood?" - think HAL's voice from 2001),

and/or

2. Initiating conversation ("John, you busy? I've been thinking ...") — Real Gone Cat

Talking about me behind my back. Lying to get out of doing work. Getting irritable when tired. Going easy on me because my goldfish died. Forgetting my birthday then making it up to me a couple of days later. Long way to go. There's so much more than intelligence going on between us. When we can question the robot's sincerity, that's getting close.

Why not just ignore what seems to you to be stupid remarks? — Marvin Katz

Because the person making those remarks may claim that lack of contradiction implies assent. "Nobody has disagreed with me - I must be right!"

So I ask: is this looking to poke holes in people's efforts, or to find fault, or to be negative and argumentative ...is that your idea of 'being ethical'? — Marvin Katz

Yes, it is good practice in science and philosophy. It's called 'testing the hypothesis'. We put our assumptions under the stress of being challenged and see whether they can hold up. If we are too attached to our theories to do it ourselves, then we rely on other people to provide that test. To complain about people being too argumentative on a philosophy forum is a bit like asking Mumsnet to stop harping on and on about babies.

S > E [giving a dogma, an opinion, or an ideology higher priority than a thing, a possession, a meal, etc.] — Marvin Katz

Suffragist women went on hunger strike, putting their democratic ideology ahead of their need to eat. There are many examples of cases where it is better and many where it is worse to prioritise ideas over material well-being. So many examples on either side that no general rule can be made. Fortunately, no general rule is needed.

@Angelo Cannata A lot of truth in that. But.

If we dismiss questions that seem to be grasping at universal truths with inadequate tools then we leave the way open for any old answer to be chosen inside or outside of philosophy. Are there universal human rights? What is it for something to be a person and not a thing? What can we say that may not be doubted? What does it take for a statement to make sense and not nonsense? These questions swirl nebulously around practical debates and they rouse confusion and fury. I think you are right that they are often too big to make sense of. But they are not going to go away easily. Some ways are needed to draw out the points of issue, however ridiculous they sound. Perhaps that's what you mean by 'playing ideas'?

I don't think ethics can be just a means to an end. Even if I don't get to nirvana, I still have to pay the rent. And if I do ever get to nirvana, I'll still owe the rent (i.e. have various duties, obligations etc)

These words appear to present a question but in fact only express a wordless awe or astonishment — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yes. Or a cry of anguish. Morgenbesser's reply was "Ach, even if there were nothing, you would still be complaining."

I think it was a general point, yes - it is rather over-used as a vague rebuke generally......

that aphorism is regularly used as a cudgel on this forum. — Wayfarer

True, and I had drafted a reply along the lines of "Advice more often given than taken" but I thought it sounded more sour than the kindly @Agent Smith deserved, who I don't think was cudgelling on this occasion......

Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silent — Wittgenstein

The only thing I can say to that is that I have nothing to say to that.

1. p Nyet!
2. ~p Nyet!
3. p & ~p Nyet!
4. ~(p v ~p) Nyet!

The Buddhist Denial = Nyet! — Agent Smith

Not a denial of all propositions, however. The Buddhist Denial as given above asserts the following proposition:

(~1 & ~2 & ~3 & ~4) & ~(~1 & ~2 & ~3 & ~4)

(plus as many logically equivalent nestings of those you choose to make).

It's the statement 'Nyet!' at the end that causes the problem.

The way to deny all propositions is to withhold assent and dissent and to maintain silence or to make a remark or gesture that is wholly unrelated to propositions. If this is done with an inscrutable expression then the effect will be more impressive.

I'm a little confused at what I wrote anyway... — Varde

Not too much. When we experience something, specific events happen in our bodies and brains. I think you are asking: Is our experience identical with those events?

Then you are wondering: If the answer to the first question is 'yes', then can we experience anything other than events happening in our bodies and brains?

I happen to think that the answer to the first is 'no' and to the second is 'question doesn't make sense'. But there are arguments on both sides.

@wayfarer

nothing which is being opposed to something is also the nothing of a certain something, a determinate nothing — Tobias

So we can have determinate nothings - the zero score is understood as nothing only in relation to the positive score I might have got. At any rate, there are nothings after all - determinate ones.

However, the implied search is for indeterminate nothings - pure nothingness, perhaps.

I'm not sure we'll find pure nothingness - not because it's nothing - rather, because it's presumed indeterminate. If we try to talk about Something that is not Something-in-particular, we will have just the same problem.

the zero is merely the indicator of something not gotten. — Wayfarer

True. But an indicator, whatever else it might do, indicates. The nothing I get as a score in a game is quite different from the nothing I have in the bank. We're talking about separate indicateds (horrible word, but I'm avoiding '..things indicated' so as not to be too obviously begging the question. I may be surreptitiously begging the question, of course.)

When you score nothing in a game it's still a score and a score is something. When you get a zero it's a big fat zero.

Before concluding that it's self-censorship I say we need a comparison. For example, if you go up to someone in the street and ask "What is a toothbrush?" you will probably see them tense up and look shifty. This is probably not because they are censoring their thoughts. It's more likely because some stranger has just accosted them with an unclear and possibly provocative intent and they are not sure how to react.

Socrates had a similar experience when he went round asking people 'What is good?'

Well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows anything really beautiful and good, I am better off than he is - for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows. I neither know nor think that I know. In this latter particular, then, I seem to have slightly the advantage of him. Then I went to another, who had still higher philosophical pretensions, and my conclusion was exactly the same. I made another enemy of him, and of many others besides him. After this I went to one man after another, being not unconscious of the enmity which I provoked,.... — Plato, Apology

http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/apology.html

We end up with an unfathomably low probability. — Geerts

I think there are a couple of math concepts that will help with the problem.

The first is the difference between probability and probability density. I recommend this 10 minute video: Why “probability of 0” does not mean “impossible” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZA4JkHKZM50

The second concept is conditional probability. 'What is the probability of S committing a crime in the next year?' is a different question from 'Given that S has a long criminal record, what is the probability of S committing a crime in the next year?' which is different again from 'Given that T has just committed a crime, what is the probability that T already has a criminal record?' https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HZGCoVF3YvM

It is equivalent to saying that if relations exist then relations exist. — RussellA

There is one step in between. It's this:

If relations do not exist, then it is not the case that something is to the west of something else.
Glasgow is to the west of Edinburgh.
Therefore (at least one) relation exists.

The first premiss does not assume that relations exist. It suggests a criterion for finding out whether they exist or not. The suggested criterion is to go and look at the world to see whether anything is to the west of anything else. I cannot think of a better criterion, but perhaps there is. So it's a challenge - if that's not what it is for a relation to exist, what should the criterion be?

How do we know it is now now? — KantDane21

Because when you misbehave in class the teacher says: "Now, now!" It's a simple matter of classroom discipline. Some teachers say "Now, then!", but their theory is quite incoherent in my view.

Is there any reasoned argument that relations do ontologically exist in the external world ? — RussellA

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/650566

I consider the sentence "One plus one equals two" and now I pretend to be astonished that when I count actual things I find that one of them plus another one of them equals two of them. Then I imagine that this is a suspicious and unreasonably co-incidental fit of arithmetic to the world and of the world to arithmetic. But I do all this to what end - or is it just a pastime? It does not seem to show anything. Perhaps we invented arithmetic because we find it a useful tool. Perhaps we discovered arithmetic because it's there to be discovered. Feigning astonishment does not seem to add anything.

As to lineage I see something like: Isaiah (and friends) to Milton to Swedenborg to Blake — ZzzoneiroCosm

Bunyan? Rabelais? Shall I stop naming people with idiosyncratic and prophetic imaginations and then putting a question mark after each name? Or not? I might be able to think of a couple more.

We don't always mean what we say. So what we say may mean nothing even though we do mean something. If I draw a square with rounded corners and call it a round square, then you can object that there's no such thing as a round square but you can add charitably that nevertheless you know what I mean.