So it would be a contradiction to then say that God is beautiful and complex but it doesn't need a designer. — Harry Hindu

The standard theist claim is that God is ultimately simple -- not that He is complex

The pont of the "who designed the designer argument" is not to ask who designed the designer but to simplify Occam's Razor. It is simpler to say the universe IS than to state the universe was created, — Grey Vs Gray

This is to misunderstand Ockham. His principle is that we are not to multiply causes without necessity. It is not, as you suggest, that we have no need for causes.

1. The woman claimed she feared traveling by air and the Senate had to postpone the hearings. But at the hearings it turned out she had traveled a lot by plane to remote places such as French Polynesia. — Proto

So, now Dr. Ford is being blamed for overcoming her fears? Whether of not she is afraid of flying is totally irrelevant to her testimony.

2. Ford named 3 witnesses all of whom failed to recollect the party. — Proto

Would you recall a gathering 35 years ago in which nothing special happened to you? Remember, this was not even "a party" -- as Dr. Ford testified. It was a gathering before a party to take place later.

3. She was convincing answering Democrat's questions but whe asked by the prosecutor she couldn't remember how she got home located 8 miles from the assult place. — Proto

I suggest you read up on the memory of traumatic events -- after all, this is supposed to be a philosophy forum.

Research shows that physical and emotional trauma can directly affect your memory. Some of this memory loss may be a temporary way to help you cope with the trauma, and some of this memory loss may be permanent due to a severe brain injury or severe psychological trauma. — Casa Palmera Staff

These results suggest that some information (the essence, the theme) of a traumatic event might be relatively well retained in memory, while memory is impaired for many of the specific, and especially peripheral, details. — Sven‐åke Christianson & Elizabeth F. Loftus,

when subjects are negatively aroused by a scene, they process more elaborately those critical details that were the source of the emotional arousal, and they maintain or restrict the scene's boundaries. ‘Tunnel memory’ results from this greater elaboration of critical details and more focused boundaries. Tunnel memory may explain the superior recognition and recall of central, emotion‐arousing details in a traumatic event — Martin A. Safer, Sven‐Åke Christianson, Marguerite W. Autry, Karin Österlund,

4. When asked who paid for the poligraph test she failed to give an answer. Her attorneys explained they paid for it. What else was she paid for? — Proto

What relevance does this have to her credibility? I see none. Obviously her lawyers, before taking on a pro bono case, wanted to know if their prospective client was telling the truth. What is relevant is not who paid for the test, but that she passed it.

5. Ford is an experienced psychologist, she has command of special methodologies that help her to stand public pressure, questionings and interrogations . — Proto

You must not have watched her testimony. If sh had access to such methods, she needed them. I heard a notable increase in the tension of her voice as she recalled the attempted rape itself, compared to the rest of the testimony.

5. Ford benefited from the K-case. — Proto

So, you see it as a net positive to have death threats to you and your family and have to move twice -- something you would gladly do.

I must say that this is one of the most biased and unreflective analyses I have read on this forum. I suppose it comforts you, but it does little to convince anyone approaching the case with an open mind.

I wonder why the democrats didn't think to hire their own female prosecutor, then? I suppose they thought they were competent to do the job themselves, and didn't need the fig-leaf of gender equality... — unenlightened

The Democrats have two women Senators on the Committee and so have no need for a fig leaf. One of the women and several of the men are former prosecutors and pinned Kavenaugh on at least four lies, and made it clear that he did not want an FBI investigation. I should note since the advent of Supreme Court confirmation hearings in 1937, no outside counsel has been called in to question a witness before. The last time outside counsel was used to question witnessesin a committee hearing was Watergate.

Anyway, it comes to this; a credible complaint of sexual assault has been made, and is being ignored or dismissed in favour of party politics to the detriment of the justice system, by a committee whose only job is to preserve and enhance justice. — unenlightened

Yes. The reason the Dems serve is to have access to the evidence and a voice in the proceedings. Also, it was Senator Coons' (Dem., Delaware) closing statement (along with a face-to-face with two sexual assault victims) that caused Senator Flake (Rep. Arizona) to demand the FBI hearing we finally got. So, while it is dirty business, giving up is not the answer.

it is too convenient that her "virtue" lines up with waiting until the last second. Your argument could be right but I'm doubtful. — yatagarasu

We need to rely on evidence, not conspiracy theories The facts, which I have enumerated previously, do not support your view. There is no evidence that Dr. Ford's name was leaked by the Democrats. It is clear that her letter was never leaked.

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This also depends on if they could get the nomination through in those 2 months. — yatagarasu

The schedule is completely in the control of the Republican administration and Senate. They have about 90 days at this point. The average time for confirmation is 67 days.

Let us hope that the truth becomes clear.

Are US prosecutors routinely partisan in their case management, or is she a notorious exception? — unenlightened

No, though many have political ambitions, they are usually not political in their prosecutions. There is a systematic bias against poor defendants, as they have over-worked defense counsels assigned by the government at no cost to them. These public defenders typically press poor defendants to avoid a trial by pleading guilty in return for a lower sentence. Defendants who can afford their own layers do better. This is not political, just one of the many hardships of being poor or advantages of being wealthy.

You need to remember that though Rachel Mitchell is prosecutor for a county in the State of Arizona, she was not working in that capacity at the Senate hearing, but was being paid by the Senate Republicans. So, she did not need to conform to the ethics required of her as a prosecutor. She was just a lawyer hired to ask questions for the Republicans.

hat she was brought in and not used in this even handed way, seems to indicate that either she was partisan, or she was assumed to be partisan. — unenlightened

Yes, she was a partisan hired by the Republicans on the committee to avoid the appearance of a panel composed only of male Senators trying to undercut the credibility a female victim. By denying her request for an investigation before her testimony and by refusing to subpoena, or even to allow, any other witnesses, the Republicans hoped to pit an inexperienced housewife against a trained lawyer -- effectively having a show trial. That plan was ruined when she turned out to be very credible, and Kavanaugh very evasive.

Alas, the whole notion of justice is so far betrayed by both sides, that they might as well dissolve the committee and the supreme court both. Justice counts for nothing, and nobody believes in it. — unenlightened

I am sorry, but I see no case for equal blame here. I see one side asking for a full and impartial investigation and a release of all relevant documents, and the other hiding documents and (before Senator Flake's courage) refusing to allow an impartial investigation by the agency most experienced in these matters. So, if you have a case for equal blame, lay it out. If not, do not make such claims.

The question comes down to credibility. As Senator Blumenthal pointed out, there is a Common Law principle:Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (False in one thing, false in everything). Not only has Judge Kavanaugh lied in previous confirmation hearings, he did so again in his most recent testimony. A recent article, "The Four Big Contradictions in Brett Kavanaugh’s Senate Testimony" (https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/09/the-four-big-contradictions-in-brett-kavanaughs-senate-testimony/) documents four of his most recent falsehoods.

Independently of judicial philosophy, man who lies with such frequency and facility, even when given opportunities to correct himself, has no place as a judge on any court, let alone the highest court in the land.

the accusation could have, and should have been investigated confidentiality. it is completely possible to have investigated this allegation and keep dr fords name out of the press. — Rank Amateur

Yes, if Senator Feinstein put partisan advantage above honor, she could have violated Doctor Ford's request that her name not be used. Remember, the request was not that her name be kept "out of the press," it was that it not be used at all. While many may have violated Doctor Ford's confidence, Senator Feinstein chose not to. I find both their actions commendable.

There is nothing I know of that would have prevented sen feinstein from informing the committee and immediately using the existing investigating ability of the committee to conduct a confidential investigation of these charges 45 plus days ago when she received the letter. — Rank Amateur

Nothing except Senator Feinstein's honor and virtue in following the request of Doc. Ford that her name not be disclosed. In order to have an investigation, the investigators would have to know who was leveling the charges.

Do you have some means of magically investigating the matter without knowing the name of the accuser?

It is simple. We are aware of the action of objects on us in experience. This awareness guarantees that the object can act to inform us as it is acting to inform us.

1. You have not said what you mean by "permanent" in this context.
2. In claiming that time is not a measure, you show an inadequate grasp of the relevant physics. Your view was falsified when special relativity was confirmed.
3. As you make vague and inadequately argued claims, I think I will not respond to you further.

In the same way the democrats would not have held onto the information until the last second had they actually wanted the truth. — yatagarasu

It is amazing how the virtue of Senator Feinstein is being used against her cause. Let us review the facts:
1. After consulting with her friends, Dr. Ford herself anonymously tipped the Washington Post and sent her letter before Kavanaugh was selected -- showing it was not a general attack on any nominee, but an attempt to avoid the selection of such a flawed candidate.
2.Senator Feinstein was asked to hold Dr. Ford's Letter in confidence. Despite the fact that it would have been to her party's political advantage, she did so. There is no evidence that Doc Ford's letter was ever leaked. Thus, Sentator Feinstein acted with virtue.
3. Reporters got wind of the story late (possibly from a friend of Dr. Ford) and it was only as a result of the news accounts and the press showing up in her classroom, that Dr. Ford finally agreed to make her name known and allow her letter to be released.
Thus, there is no factual basis for the late hit conspiracy theory.

If it passes midterms there is a 100% chance he isn't confirmed because the republicans will not have enough votes to get him there. — yatagarasu

You seem not to understand the American electoral system.
1. The last time I looked, the Republicans had a 70% chance of retaining control of the Senate.
2. Even if they lost control of the Senate, the new Senate would not begin until January of 2019.
3. After the elections, there would be a lame duck session of congress giving the Republicans also two months to work their will.

What other reason would you hold it? — yatagarasu

1. As i explained above, there is no evidence that the Democrats leaked Ford's letter. So your premise is questionable at best.
2. As I also explained above, the motivation you offer makes no sense as the Republicans will maintain the majority in the senate until the end of 2018.
3. Could it not be that some Senators take their constitutional duty to advise and consent seriously and want to have the best available information?

There are still members of congress willing to work across the aisles. Sadly, Senator Flake was forced to retire by his party because he has broken discipline in the past.

If he is willing to sacrifice a determination of the truth to the expedient end of being on the court a few days earlier, he does not have the temperament to be a judge. The FBI investigation in the Anita Hill case took only 4 days. Suppose his took 10 days. Is that too much to ask?

Why risk the reputation of the court by putting him on it now as opposed to delaying 10 days? Also, there is no process of "reversing confirmation." The remedy would be impeachment. The only reason to rush is to prevent the truth from coming our before he is confirmed.

6. So time must be real, permanent and finite — Devans99

I do not see how this follows from the premises. First, what does "permanent" mean in this context? Second, time is a measure. For it to actually exist requires a measuring operation, which requires a measuring agent. So, you seem to be proving too much. Third, you have made no argument that precludes change from going on forever. Thermodynamic equilibrium does not imply changeableness. In fact there is a theorem in statistical mechanics that says if we if we wait long enough, any closed system will return arbitrarily close to any previous state.

Presentism implies that things have been around for ever: IE only now exists and now has always existed IE now has existed for an eternity. — Devans99

I think you misunderstand presentism. It simply denies actual existence to the future and possibly the past. So, what you say is not implied by presentism. Also, you continue to confuse eternity with infinite time.

Wikipedia says:

Eternalism is a philosophical approach to the ontological nature of time, which takes the view that all existence in time is equally real, as opposed to presentism or the growing block universe theory of time, in which at least the future is not the same as any other time. Some forms of eternalism give time a similar ontology to that of space, as a dimension, with different times being as real as different places, and future events are "already there" in the same sense other places are already there, and that there is no objective flow of time.

I think you are confusing these views.

1. Something can’t come from nothing
2. So base reality must have always existed — Devans99

Yes, but that does not mean that the cause must exist in time. For example, the laws of nature operate to bring about various physical changes, but there is no evidence they change. As time is a measure of change, it cannot be predicated of what is intrinsically unchanging. So, what is unchanging and timeless can effect what is changing and temporal. Thus, "always" (which quantifies time) is unjustified.

Presentism implies that things have been around for ever — Devans99

Would you care to elaborate on why you think this? (Starting from the SEP defintion.)

Eternalism by contrast usually posits a definite start of time. — Devans99

What do you mean by "eternalism"?

Using terms without saying what you mean by them can only lead to confusion.

Ford invites a detailed FBI investigation of her claim. Kavanaugh refuses to do so. That makes it clear who seeks the truth and who is willing to use any evasion to avoid his past coming to light. Add to that the many lies in which Kavanaugh has been caught, and the case is clear as day.

Because eternal is impossible — Devans99

Question begging.

Say you meet an Eternal being in your Eternal universe and you notice he is counting. — Devans99

This shows a total lack of understanding of what it is to be eternal. Eternity is not unending time. It is being at once. Hence anything eternal is unchanging and timeless. So, the idea of an eternal being being engaging in a time-sequenced operation is a contradiction in terms.

Take any physical system with a clock/timer. Make the system Eternal. What does the clock read? — Devans99

This displays the same confusion between time and eternity.

Assume time is eternal. — Devans99

A continuation of the same error.

Relativity suggests the existence of multiple presents, whereas Presentism demands one present — Devans99

Relativity is a theory about the space-time continuum. Eternity is timeless.

Time clearly passes — Devans99

Yes, but this observation is irrelevant to notion of a timeless present.

Negative infinity does not exist mathematically — Devans99

This shows confusion about the mathematical nature of infinity. Positive and negative infinity are not numbers but process limits.

If the universe has been around for ever — Devans99

As far as I know, there is no generally accepted view that the universe has been around forever. So, who are you arguing against?

Presentism is just so depressing — Devans99

It is hard to respond to this, as you have not defined what you mean by "presentism." According to the SEP:

Presentism is the view that only present things exist (Hinchliff 1996: 123; Crisp 2004: 15; Markosian 2004: 47–48). So understood, presentism is an ontological doctrine; it’s a view about what exists (what there is), absolutely and unrestrictedly. — David Ingram & Jonathan Tallant

Your arguments do not seem to address this view. The seem to be aimed against the idea of infinite time, which few if any hold in the era of big bang cosmology. You also seem to be confusing infinite time with eternity, which makes me wonder if you see your arguments as aimed at the notion of an eternal God.

Is the relation a form of projected value from the valuer onto the valued object? — InfiniteZero

No, valuing is the recognition of the worth of the object to the subject -- just as knowing is the recognition of object's notes of intelligibility. Before valuing an object, it was valuable, but its value was unacknowledged. In valuing an object, we form a new, intentional relation to it, but we do not change its intrinsic nature. We don't project anything into it.

the object itself - having the intrinsic disposition to be potentially valued by affecting our senses and perception causally - is what makes itself be valued by the subject it affects? — InfiniteZero

This isn't it either. The object's capacity to help us toward self-realization (the endpoint of Maslow's hierarchy) is intrinsic to the object and why it's valuable. Still, unless we recognize it as valuable and integrate it into our life plan, it will not be valued. So, the object can present itself as valuable, but it can't force the subject to value it. Just as we have to turn awareness to intelligibility to make it actually known, so we have to integrate the object into our life plan to value it. In both cases, personal agency is required for to actualize the presented potential.

if it is Type 2 valuing you may be after, then value in objects is necessarily dependent on there being subjects that can value them, value them insofar as these objects causally affect them. But, given value is yet again being based from an anthropocentric starting point, without the anthropocene, no object has any value. It will be merely left with the dispositional power to be valued insofar as it can affect a subject valuer, without them, this dispotional power is mute, and again we are devoid of any value in the universe — InfiniteZero

As I said, type 2 isn't quite it. Still, while being valuable is intrinsic, being actually valued depends on a valuing subject. I can be argued that the Creator values all His creation by the very act of creating it. Still, on a more mundane level, to be actually valued requires a valuing subject, even if it is not human.

o, both types of valuing here give a relativist type of notion — InfiniteZero

Exactly. Value is a relation between a valued object and a valuing subject, just as knowing is a relation between a known object and a knowing subject. That is my main point. My second point is that in these relations have an objective basis in both the subject and object. The subject is able to know and value. The object is intelligible and valuable.

If that is the case, then an ethical system based on this framework of instrumental value clearly makes us hold humans as mere means to an end. — InfiniteZero

No, it does not. One aspect of human potential that a fully realized human being actualizes is the capacity to love unselfishly. We have the the power to make our beloved's good our good. While we can't do this without a beloved (the object of our love), and while to be valued in this way one must have valuable attributes, we cannot make the good of the beloved our good while simultaneously demoting the beloved to the instrument of our satisfaction. So, the instrumental model does not fit.

What is worse is that if we go further and consider God as a subject and a valuer, then clearly God itself becomes object to our instrumental valuing, and so God itself may be a means to some end. — InfiniteZero

And so God is presented in some religions, viz., those that make personal salvation the ultimate end. In orthodox Christianity, our ultimate end is not salvation, but love -- love of self, neighbor and God. Salvation is an incidental side effect of being loving. Indeed, if the ultimate goal is personal salvation, all other acts are necessarily selfish.

Thank you for the reference.

why must one assume there is a necessity in having to pick any one of these religions? — InfiniteZero

I am not assuming necessity. I'm asking about relevance.

If science tells us the physical world has no intrinsic value, there is no evidence for God and meaning is merely projected by moral agents, does that seem so unpalatable if it were true? — InfiniteZero

As science tells us none of these things, this is a hypothesis contrary to fact. As one trained in physics, I know what science is and is not capable of telling us, and the degree of certitude one should have with respect to what science does tell us.

While every act of knowing has both a knowing subject and a known object, we begin natural science with a Fundamental Abstraction in which we fix our attention on known physical objects to the exclusion of the knowing subject. We care about what Ptolemy, Galileo, Newton and Hubble saw, not their subjective experience (their experience as knowing subjects) in seeing it. This is a rational methodology if our interest is physical objects, but it separates in thought what is inseparable in reality (the known object and the knowing subject). It also leaves the natural sciences bereft of the data and concepts required to address the knowing subject and correlative issues. Lacking these data and concepts, natural science can make no connections between what it knows of the physical world and concepts revolving around the subject (such as subjective awareness, intentionality and meaning).

So, the physical world is not convertible with reality and nor does "intrinsic" mean "objective." Many properties are relational., and are only realized when the object is actually related to a subject. The physical world is intelligible because it is capable of informing an observer -- it can stand as a actually known object to a knowing subject. In the same way, physical objects are valuable because they can stand as actually valued objects to a valuing subject. So, objects have an intrinsic potential to be valued (are intrinsically valuable), for nothing can be actual unless it is possible. In other words, an object is valuable if it is capable of being valued.

As for the supposed nonexistence of evidence for God, there is only one way of substantiating such a claim, and that is to know that there is no God. Why? Because evidence is not self-evident. We have no a priori way of knowing what is and is not evidence. In 1800 an investigator encountering bloody fingerprints would not know that he had evidence of identity. In 1950 a detective examining a crime scene would be unable to recognize DNA evidence, no matter how abundant, and a cosmologist would not know that a rock she found on the beach provided evidence of nucleogenesis in the early universe. Evidence is only intelligible until it is actually understood. So, it is utterly irrational to say we have no evidence of p unless one already knows p is false.

"Meaning" is intelligibility, and so is prior to being understood. Thus it is not necessarily "projected" by human agents. The "meaning" of a fossil in this stratum is that a certain species lived in the Cretaceous period, and the fossil had that meaning long before humans evolved to understand it. If you are thinking of "meaning" as value, I have discussed above how nothing can be valued unless it is first valuable.

The question regarding the age of the earth, the universe and the origin of our species and others in general is not for a man-made logical system to determine — InfiniteZero

Of course it is! The relevant man-made logical system is called "science."

It is just as logically possible for the earth to be flat or have a geo-centric view on the solar system. — InfiniteZero

You are confused about the epistemological status of your examples. It is not logically possible for the earth to be flat because were have definitive evidence to the contrary and have had since the time of the Greeks. What is the center of the universe is a matter of representational convention. There is no observable consequence to placing the origin of our coordinate system anywhere we choose as long as we make the appropriate transformations to our dynamic equations. The only difference is the complexity of the equations.

only physics gives us credible knowledge regarding the physical universe, not dogmas from holy scriptures providing "a priori" knowledge. — InfiniteZero

I'm not questioning the competence of physics to deal with the physical, but its competence to deal with aspects of reality it has excluded from consideration a priori. Further, there is no general reason to assume that ancient authors (of whatever tradition) were trying to explain the nature of the physical world as opposed to using contemporaneous cultural assumptions to convey their spiritual insights.

However, arbitrarily choosing between pre-existing dogmas is surely epistemically incredible. — InfiniteZero

It would be, if that were what I suggested. I made no mention of anything "arbitrary." Subjective considerations are just as real as objective considerations -- especially when the question is how one will relate as a subject.

How would science deal with the claim of God? — InfiniteZero

It should not, as it is utterly incompetent to do so.

If the claim is that God is part of the physical world, then it would demand evidence for such a being to exist in the physical world. — InfiniteZero

You're positing straw men. There are very few pantheists. Certainly no mainline Western religion makes such a claim.

Any claim of transcendence after death would require the same from science — InfiniteZero

Why? On what evidentiary basis could science form any conclusion (pro or con) about an afterlife? You seem to be suffering from the misapprehension that science is competent to deal with all reality. I showed above, in my discussion of the Fundamental Abstraction, that science begins by denying itself such competence.

If there are no evidence supporting the claim or "hypothesis" of the Judeo-Christain God, then the conclusion follows that there is no reason to be holding that claim. — InfiniteZero

I'm ceaselessly amazed at how epistemologically challenged physicalists are. You seem to think that the only rational approach to reality is the hypothetico-deductive method. Anyone who has studied mathematics knows that it can proceed quite well without every positing or testing a hypothesis. Instead, it abstracts concepts from our experience of nature, forms judgements relating these concepts (axioms or postulates), and deduces conclusions. Natural theology proceeds in the same fashion to attain equal certainty.

The abritrariness of value judgment in the decision regarding which religion one resonates to becomes to an extent random. — InfiniteZero

Random? So, you are not a determinist with respect to will? How can you not be,and be a physicalist?

Value judgements can certainly be made with insufficient thought. That does not imply that they are necessarily made with insufficient thought. In making important decisions people weigh many factors and give each what they consider to be an appropriate weight. The weights are given for considered reasons (with a view to what needs are met and left unmet), and not "arbitrarily" or "randomly."

If we ignore the teachings of the religion as the basis for determining its "value of worthiness" — InfiniteZero

I have no suggested that. Just the opposite.

If it is solely the spiritual dimension one seeks, then that's clearly going to be an arbitrary choice as that's solely dependent on subjective needs and aspects. — InfiniteZero

This is an utterly ridiculous claim! Subjective needs are as real as electrons. Being the need of a subject does not make anything less actual or intelligible. It does not make it less a cause of observable acts. So, on what rational basis do you dismiss "subjective needs and aspects"?

However, religion is institutional, and has more than a spiritual dimension to it to be classified and regarded as a religion in the first place, so if one seeks only a spiritual connection, religion is no necessary choice, much less a good choice if that was one's sole criteria and reason to choose a religion. — InfiniteZero

As social beings, we often use institutions (with all their faults) as necessary means to ends. It is hard for a lone spiritual practitioner to found a school or hospital. It is considerably easier for a practitioners acting together in an institutional framework.

But what is there to back up the truth in the claims that Jesus walked on water, or Moses split the sea in half to lead his people through, or that Hanuman threw boulders from the tip of India to create a bridge across to Sri Lanka? — InfiniteZero

Nothing. That is exactly my point. Western religions, at least, do not claim that their doctrines are known by reason, as is your example of the earth is round. They are quite explicit that they require a leap of faith. So, criticizing them because of inadequate evidence controverts no actual claim.

So, we have to take it as an agreed upon given that matters of faith are inadequately supported by evidence. Therefore, whatever reason there is for having faith, it is not epistemic. Demanding that it be epistemic is beating a dead horse. Still, it is an on controverted fact that people do believe in religious dogmas inadequately supported by evidence. The empirical approach to this, which I am suggesting, is that one accept the fact and then investigate the reasons for it. As these reasons are not epistemic, they must be non-epistemic. I do not see how you can argue otherwise.

You are not investigating the reality of faith commitments, but imposing your notion of what "ought" to be in the face of the facts. My approach is the opposite. I accept the reality, as any good scientist should, and then seek to explain it. I am suggesting that what people actually do is judge on the basis of perceived worthiness. Then I'm asking what can justify this perception.

I still fail to see why one necessarily needs to pick a religion to resonate with some presupposed notions one already has about certain aspects of life in general? when all these questions can be answered through philosophy and science alone? — InfiniteZero

Really? Surely you jest! Science is going to tell me if I should be a Moron, a Jew, a Moselim, a Catholic or a Buddhist? Philosophy is?? Science does not even consider most matters of faith. Sure, science tells us that the Fundamentalist take on the age of the earth and the origin of species is, shall we say, "peculiar," but it is logically possible, and more so than as the equally peculiar belief, popular with some philosophers, that we are simulants.

So, how would science and/or philosophy deal with the claim that God, though one being, is a trinity of persons? Or the claim that after death we merge into the Transcendent as a drop into the sea?

my critique is on the dogmatic scriptural dimension i.e. its teachings from some holy text. — InfiniteZero

When you look at what religions actually teach, it is not usually the literal word of some text. More often, it is an interpretative tradition (and usually one in competition with other interpretative traditions). These traditions usually reflect a history of controverted interpretation, resolution and perhaps division. Some of these traditions are open to the findings of science, others not. Further, within any one tradition there is often a range of opinion (from conservative to liberal, and along other axes), open to an adherent of the tradition.

So, your characterization of religious traditions as "dogmatic" at least distorts the reality of living and responsive traditions.

Regarding connatural knowledge, I do not think knowledge by connaturality would provide any better reason to decide which religion one can justifiably pick over another. — InfiniteZero

I do not see why not. If God has created our nature (by whatever means), then it would not surprising that our being would "resonate" with authentic spiritual teaching, and that, if we are attentive, we would be aware of such resonance. By "resonance" here, as in physics, I mean a response that is much stronger than typical.

Given that the epistemic problem one has here lies directly in the truth of the teachings of the various religions themselves. — InfiniteZero

I'm suggesting that the choice of religion or spiritual path is not an epistemic problem, but results from a judgement of which is most worthy of our commitment, which is a judgement of value, not of truth. In other words, it is an act of will, which can only be distorted by casting it as an act of intellect.

How can I justifiably follow the teachings of religion A over religion B, and claim to have knowledge — InfiniteZero

I don't know the position of non-Western religions on faith, but most Western religions explicitly teach that matters of faith are not subject to rational proof -- that they are not "known" in any sense generally accepted in philosophy. So, I think you're once again mischaracterizing the nature of religious commitment.

How can I justify my choice and pick one and follow its teaching as if it granted me knowledge about something — InfiniteZero

But, it is not being sold as "knowledge." Perhaps you are misreading this because you have accepted the peculiar doctrine that knowledge is a species of belief. It is not. Knowledge is awareness of present intelligibility and so an act of intellect. Belief is commitment to the truth of some proposition and so an act of will. Thus, Descartes tells us he was in his chamber (showing he knew he was) while he was methodically doubting that fact. His doubt was not an act of intellect. (It did not make him unaware that he was in his room.) It was an act of will: the willing suspension of belief. If knowledge were a species of belief, one could not know something without believing it -- yet that is exactly what Descartes did with his methodological doubt.

But why make a commitment when something is inconclusive? — InfiniteZero

There is no need to make a commitment when the data are conclusive. Then the only need is for honest acceptance.

The commitment is made because framework for living provided is judged to be worthy. To be worthy, it can't be contradicted by what we know for a fact, It's teachings must resonates with one's nature (what Maritain calls knowledge by connaturality), and it must lead to a way of life that is fully human. Hopefully the commitment will result in both self-realization and the realization of others' unique natures.

Obviously all decisions are complex and involve a number of factors that cannot be treated algorithmically. Still, one may reject candidates that make us look down on others ("infidels," "the unsaved," "the unenlightened," etc.), that denigrate one's self as intrinsically evil or one's nature as corrupt, that reduce moral action to following a set of invariant rules or "being saved" to holding certain dogmas, that elevate selfishness over love, etc.

It seems to me that you are making an error in assuming that acts of will, such as the choice of religion, are based solely on the perception of truth. The very idea of faith is that of making a commitment when the data are inconclusive. Let me suggest that the criterion of faith commitments is not knowledge, but worthiness. I believe what I believe, not because I know it is true, but because I have decided that it is worthy of my commitment.

Dennis, if you really believe that philosophical theories are uniquely derived from experience with unassailable reasoning, and that this can be done for Aristotelian philosophy in just a couple of paragraphs, then you are very naive. Anyway, I do not wish to detail this discussion any further. — SophistiCat

I think neither that philosophical theories are unique, nor that they can be derived in a few paragraphs.

I do think that all sound philosophical theories, as reflections of reality, are necessarily mutually consistent. I also think that the insights necessary to support specific conclusions can be provided in a few paragraphs. If they could not, this, and similar, forums would be futile.

You are, of course, free to direct your time and attention where you will.

Well, when it comes to philosophy, at the end of the day it does come down to "taste;" there's no getting around it, unless you believe that you can derive an entire philosophy completely a priori, without any extrarational commitments (which would be an exceptionally crankish thing to believe). — SophistiCat

No, I think you can derive any sound philosophical conclusion a posteriori by reflecting on judgements adequately based on human experience. I see no need for any a priori claims, although I think that some conclusions, once they are come to a posteriori, may be applied a priori thereafter. So, while we cannot prove all premises, those admissible to philosophy can either be proven, or derived from experience. "Taste" is a cover term for intellectual prejudice.

When making an argument one must start from some common ground, and Aristotelian or Scholastic metaphysics isn't such a common ground between us. — SophistiCat

And that is why I do not appeal to authority, but to the data of experience in making my case. So, while my mode of analysis is, as you say, Aristotelian or Scholastic, the common ground I appealed to was experiential data and the acceptance of salve veritate logical moves. If you thought my argument unsound, you could rationally have pointed out a failure on either point.

If you absolutely have to use that framework, then you would have to start by justifying that entire framework to me, or at least its relevant parts. — SophistiCat

And that is what I have been doing. I showed how the concept of potency is required to reject Parmenides argument that change is an illusion. I showed how concurrent causality is required by the fact that to operate, something must be operational, etc.

I received no objections to my justifications, only a rejection of the line of argument based on "taste."

It is amazing how taste can trump analysis.

Nothing can act that is not operational

I am not familiar with that proposition. What does it mean? — andrewk

It means every actuality entails the correlative potentiality. So, unless something is operational (proximately able to act), it cannot act/operate.

And why do you feel the absence of an unrestricted PSR is inconsistent with it? — andrewk

I have already explained this. Since no merely potential reality is operational (or it would not still be potential), no potential can operate to make itself actual. So, the actualization of every potential requires the operation of a being which is already actual (its cause). Further, it is an oxymoron to say that something insufficient to being about an effect brings about that effect. So, the cause must be sufficient.

Creating the universe is not the critical point. The critical point is being the end of the line of explanation. Since everything has an adequate explanation, so must the end so must the end of the line; however, because it is the end of the line, its explanation cannot be something else. If it were, we would not be at the end of the line. So, the end of the line must be self explaining. Since beings explain/cause other things in light of what they are, what a self-explaining being is, must entail that it is.

Based on a statement of Plato in the Sophist, let me suggest that if something can act in any way, it exists. In other words, existence is the unspecified capacity to act. Correlatively, what something is (its essence) is convertible with what it can do. If a being can do everything a duck can do, and nothing a duck cannot do, then it is a duck. So, we may think of the essence of a being as the specification of its possible acts.

So, if a being is to entail its own existence, the specification of its possible acts must entail the unspecified ability to act. Clearly, this is impossible if its specification limits the being's ability to act in any way. Thus, to be self-explaining, a being must have an unlimited capacity to act.

Do you agree that every line (regress) of concurrent causality must terminate in a self-explaining cause? If you do, then God has an unlimited capacity to perform any possible act.

I don't disagree, but I still can't see any support for the idea that a view of the world that does not incorporate an unrestricted PSR would be logically inconsistent — andrewk

It is not inconsistent in se or with principles of logic. It is inconsistent with the metaphysically certain proposition "Nothing can act that is not operational" taken together with the meaning of terms like "potential" and "sufficient."

I favor sound logic over naturalist belief.

It depends on what kind of infinity you are thinking of. Actual numbers are the result of counting operations, which take time and so are necessarily actually finite, but potentially infinite.

On the other hand lines of concurrent explanations necessarily terminate in an self-explaining, and so actually infinite, being. However this infinity is not numerical, but the denial of limitations on the power to act.

Reflections on the world are open to new experiences. Formal systems, which I take to be systems with fixed axioms, are not. The PSR is a insight for reflecting on open systems -- ones which are experience-driven, not a priori.

To me the attraction of Aristotelian metaphysics is its conformability to the data of experience -- whether that be sensory, subjective or mystical..

Intelligible state of affairs (ISA): is this just a fact by another name? And we have ISAs and "known" ISAs? Is there a difference between them beyond the implication that mere ISAs are, apparently, not known? Just what is an unknown ISA (or fact)? — tim wood

I do not see these questions as doing more than rephrasing what I said in interrogatory form. I suggested definitions and do not intend to engage in anargumentum in circulo. It is reasonable to object to definitions by giving counter-examples or by saying why you find this or that defining term to be problematic. These questions do neither.

"Intelligible" itself is a problem, here: what does it mean? — tim wood

"Intelligible" means capable of informing an intellect. An intellect is informed when what is logically possible to it is reduced.

It appears to beg-the-question as to what a fact is. — tim wood

I see no such appearance. If you would care to argue you claim, I will consider your objection.

Nor did I mean "text" in the narrow sense you seem to have taken it to mean. Broadly, what I mean is you've either got the thing itself, or a representation of the thing. — tim wood

To my mind, "texts," broadly speaking, are conventional instrumental signs. The do not include concepts, unexpressed judgement and other instruments of thought which are neither conventional nor instrumental signs, but formal signs. If you wish to include unexpressed judgements, how would you distinguish them from known states of affairs?

In this sense I'm calling perception a text. — tim wood

You may use terms as you wish. Most people would not call perceptions "texts," so this choice of terms is bound to lead to confusion -- as you can see from my post.

I'm calling the representation a text, i.e., that it is not the thing itself, but represents it. — tim wood

I would say that perceptions are not re-presentations, but presentations. The make the object dynamically present to us -- not the whole object, but the object as acting on us. My sensory "representation" of an object is identically the object's modification of my sensory system. It belongs jointly to the object (as its radiance of action) and to me as my sensory representation. It is the object dynamically penetrating my being. So, in a sensory presentation I have the object itself -- not in its entirety, but in an informative projection of itself. The object informing me is identically me being informed by the object.

That is, it matters how "fact" is defined. I offered above that a fact is a description, and that influences how the arguments wrt to the OP might proceed. — tim wood

This leaves out one of the most common uses of "facts" -- that in which we seek to find the (currently unknown) "facts." If facts do not exist without an actual description, no unknown "facts" are possible and seeking them is an exercise in futility. On the other hand, by my definition, intelligible states of affairs count as facts that can be discovered.

I'll ask you to demonstrate exactly how you get from, "The red book is on the table," to, the red book is on the table, and vice versa. Or, same question, how you know the red book is on the table. — tim wood

One could write a whole book on this, but the outline is simple enough. The environment acts on me via my senses -- informing them in specific ways. Various objects have specific acts that they are capable of and others that they are incapable of. When I turn my attention to my sensory contents, I can focus on specific aspects -- becoming aware of them. If some subset of sensory contents (an object presentation) evokes the concept <book>, I can class the object as a book. If the same object presentation evokes the concept <red>, I can judge <The book is red>. I can do the same with tables, positional concepts and so on. I can keep all of this information to myself, or I can express it in a conventional way, saying or writing "There is a red book on the table."

Going the other way, after making out the letters and reading the text, the sentence evokes certain concepts and relations between them, so that I can, if I wish, imagine a red book on a table.

Rather it is how the fact-as-text can become the fact itself — tim wood

The fact as text never becomes the state of affairs the text describes unless I am an artisan. All it can do is evoke evoke an intellectual or imagined representation of the state of affairs described. If I am an artisan, I might be able to make an object with the specified features. Still, even if I am an artisan and make a specified object, the object I make was not a fact when I received the specification.

The point of this is that in talking about facts, one has to distinguish between the thing described and the text wherein the description is homed. Confusing the two makes for confusion and bad philosophy. — tim wood

Of course. That is why I started my post by saying "It seems to me that 'fact' has two senses."

It's an illusion in the sense that we tend to confuse it with the whole. — Jake

Yes, but it is an error we can come to avoid.

It seems to me that the role of philosophy is to develop a consistent framework for understanding all human experience: physical and intentional, effable and mystical. If this is so, our starting point must be experience. Language that cannot be cashed out in terms of some actual or possible experience is meaningless. That does not mean that language has to capture or limit experience. It can also point to what is ineffable.

we have these a priori/innately existing perceptual categories of: causality (eg Hume) & (multiplicity & form & change). — Nasir Shuja

Do we? I see no reason to think that our categories are developed my reflecting on experience. We see that these perceived events are similar to those in this way, but not in that way. This certainly seems to be how children learn. I think that in the above posit, you have already committed yourself to some form of Kantianism -- and unnecessarily so.

What is the reality we perceive constituted of, does it exist in any meaningful sense if it is an illusion created by perceptual categories, etc.? — Nasir Shuja

This question is not based on experience but upon an unargued theoretical commitment. If you think about it, what we generally mean by "reality" is the world we normally perceive. If this is so, what can it possibly mean to think of a world "more real" than reality? Isn't the very idea an oxymoron?

I am not denying that mystical experience, for example, might penetrate to the foundations of reality, but that the foundations are those of the reality we perceive.

Perhaps it would be better to say that we see only a tiny fragment of reality, and so the image we have of reality does not accurately represent reality, and is thus a form of illusion. — Jake

To see a part is not to suffer an illusion, it is just to see a part of reality and not the whole. All human knowledge is a projection (a dimensionally diminished map) of reality. It is an error to make divine omniscience the paradigm of human knowledge. "Knowing" names an activity humans actually do. When your theory concludes that humans never "know," you are no longer talking about what the rest of us mean by "knowing."

It seems to me that "fact" has two senses. One is an intelligible state of affairs. The other is a known intelligible state of affairs. That a known fact can often be expressed in text is incidental. A person who cannot speak or write can know a fact. Alternately, a fact might be so novel that there are as yet no words to express it. (Still, one might be able to indicate it in some non-verbal way, such as pointing.)

To the argument that the facts are the things themselves, there arises the problem of just how, exactly, one comes to understand what the fact is. — tim wood

I don't think this is an argument so much as a definition. If we define a "fact" as an intelligible state of affairs, that does not imply that we have access to the fact. When we do have access, we come to know the state of affairs because it acts on us, typically via our senses.