That is fine. They are the components of a tensor of rank 2 in special relativity. That means that they can transform into each when we change reference frames.The separation of electromagnetism into distinct electric and magnetic fields is something I've never really been able to understand. — Metaphysician Undercover
Probably the easiest thing to grasp is the concept of fields' energy density. Since mass and energy are interchangeable, fields increase the mass of systems. Imagine positively and negatively charged parallel plates. Because they are attracted to each other, pulling them apart takes energy. That energy is stored in the electric field between the plates -- in space. When the plates are released, that energy becomes kinetic energy. The same is true of magnetic fields.Ok, thanks for the references Dfpolis. You know my principal interest, as I've developed it in this thread, the concept of mass in physics. Can you direct me toward anything specifically related to the ideas I've expressed here. — Metaphysician Undercover
It took 10 years of college and post graduate education to lay the foundation for my understanding, and many years of reflection after that to integrate the pieces into a consistent whole. I do not have that kind of time to spend here. You can look at my (dfpolis) youtube physics videos if you wish. There I have corrected a number of common misunderstandings. You might also look up my paper "Does God Gamble with Creation?"You claim you have been trying to teach me, but you really don't seem to be making much effort. I know that I am of the very skeptical sort, and as such I am a very difficult and trying student, but you often don't seem to be trying very hard yourself. — Metaphysician Undercover
Then you need to study nuclear physics and the behavior of the quarks in high energy physics.I believe it is simply not the case that wave mechanics can explain the massive nucleus of an atom — Metaphysician Undercover
It was not before the advent of Newtonian physics and has not been since the advent of modern quantum physics. Mass is proportional to the frequency of a quantum in its rest frame. This applies to all known quanta and is consistent with special relativity.And "mass" is what is most properly related to "matter". — Metaphysician Undercover
No physical theory has explained the existence of mass. We can explain our observations of the quantity of mass, but existence is a metaphysical problem. It was solved by Aquinas, who concluded that it is contingent on the continuing creative act of God.The fact that wave mechanics cannot explain the existence of mass — Metaphysician Undercover
Which has been falsified. Why would anyone want to do that?The particle is understood to behave under the principles of Newtonian mechanics. — Metaphysician Undercover
And, why would we want to discard this, or any other, fact? The mass of the electron is known with great precision. It is not zero.If we rob the electron of its mass, take it away, and deny that it has any mass, then that discrepancy in total mass, and violation to conservation laws needs to be accounted for. — Metaphysician Undercover
All known waves, even ocean waves, have momentum. The momentum of sound waves moves your ear drum. It can be and has been measured in quanta.See, the fault here is to assign momentum to a wave. — Metaphysician Undercover
Then, you need to study differential equations.I think that this is incorrect. — Metaphysician Undercover
You may believe what you wish. I constrain my beliefs by what has been observed. We can and do have energy, which is equivalent to mass, in space free of all "particles." This is known as a field's "energy density" and is proportional to the field strength (e.g. the electromagnetic field) squared.I strongly believe that wave structures cannot account for the mass of a body, — Metaphysician Undercover
No. It does not. I am responding to questions about it as a courtesy.So, why are we discussing "matter waves" on a philosophy forum. Does the distinction between Particles and Waves have a philosophical significance regarding Dualism & Interactionism? — Gnomon
The medium is not a key term. Physics is not philosophy. It does not aim to tell us what is, but what we can expect to observe in the physical world. Then, philosophers try to place those observations in a larger context -- one that provides a consistent framework of all human experience.But you leave the key term undefined. Is that an accurate assessment? — Gnomon
In the late 19th century, electrons were discovered. We came to understand that they are part of every atom of matter. At first, for historical reasons, it was thought that they were particles. Because of that assumption, it was decided that there must be light particles (photons) as well. In 1923, it was shown that electrons interfere with each other and with themselves -- something only waves can do. So, electrons, an essential constituent of every atom, are waves. Every property previously explained using the particle assumption can be explained by their wave nature. On the other hand, no wave property is explained by the particle assumption. That means the particle hypothesis is falsified.Can you explain how you conceive of a "matter wave"? — Metaphysician Undercover
But, if there is no body, why would we expect it to have a well-defined (point) location or arrival time? Wave packets are spread out in space and time. Because of Fourier's theorem, which applies to all waves, to have a single wave length, a wave must be infinitely long, and to be at a single point, it must have all wave lengths. When you insist that we are not dealing with waves, but particles, this translates into indeterminacy. Since a quantum's energy is proportional to its frequency and its momentum is inversely proportional to its wave length, finite wave packets have neither well-defined energy nor momentum.The momentum of the body could be provided by an energy equivalence with the energy of the wave, but the uncertainty principle would render the position of such a body, with a determined momentum, as having no determinable location. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is no objective randomness. Randomness is a measure of our ignorance. The more we know, the less random processes are. In the quantum case, we know neither the exact initial state of the wave we are trying to measure, nor the exact initial state of the detector that will interact with it. So, all we can predict is a probability -- just as with a dice roll.Hence the "matter" wave is better known as a "probability" wave. — Metaphysician Undercover
That is exactly what the wave equations do represent. The problem is that you cannot pick the one actual solution out of an infinity of possible solutions without knowing the initial conditions.the particular wave in the particular set of circumstances is not ever actually represented — Metaphysician Undercover
Again, there is no "body."it represents possible locations of the body with mass — Metaphysician Undercover
I am sorry, but you don't know what you are talking about.The problem being that these equations do not describe waves, and you know this. — Metaphysician Undercover
What are light waves made of? We do not know. That does not stop us from knowing that light is a wave. The same is true of matter waves. I should add that there are no mathematical substances, only mathematical concepts, based on abstraction form physical reality. We know some properties of the medium, namely, that it obeys, to a good approximation, the equations currently in use.What kind of substance (e.g. matter ; math ; other) are "wave structures" made of? — Gnomon
Since I made the reference, I know what I am referring to, and I am not saying that bodies that are made of mathematical structures. They are made of waves that may be described by the Schoedinger equation, and more accurately by the Dirac equation. The fact that waves may be described mathematically does not mean that they are mathematical abstractions. Things are not their descriptions, and refusing to admit that is irrational."Wave structures" refers to conceptual structures composed of mathematical ideals. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, there is. Matter is what composes bodies. They are composed of wave structures.The problem is that there is no conventional definition of "matter" which allows this "wave-like" feature of reality to be called "matter waves". — Metaphysician Undercover
Schroedinger's cat was designed to show the absurdity of the probabilistic interpretation, not support it. It is not a fact. It is the consequence of a hypothetical interpretation, based on thinking of detectors as classical devices. If you think of detectors properly, as composed of atoms behaving quantum mechanically, there is no need for randomness. Indeed, assuming it is contradictory.The inescapable indeterminacy of quantum non-particles was famously illustrated in his Cat in the Box paradox. — Gnomon
Only if you assume that electrons are particles. If you drop that assumption, there is no need for them to have either well-defined momentum or well-defined positions. All you have is a complex, extended wave structure.the observable properties of the system appears to be non-deterministic. — Gnomon
This is a non sequitur. Being unable to predict the exact result of a measurement does not mean that it is not determined. We cannot predict turbulent flow and everyone agrees that it is deterministic.The outcomes are not determined, so quantum mechanics is indeterministic. — Gnomon
Some of what electrons do can be interpreted as particle behavior. All of what electrons do can be interpreted as wave behavior. That means that the particle hypothesis is falsified, while the wave hypothesis is not. What makes the waves appear to be localized is that they interact with atoms in which the electron waves are localized.however that analogy has weaknesses, because electrons really can appear as particles. — Wayfarer
Our concept of reality is based on what can be experienced, aka what can be observed.You see, the particular instances of observation utilized by the empirical sciences, do not provide any sort of "reality" to us. Nor do they provide us a window into reality. All they do is give us the information required to make judgements, against or for, the preexisting reality (the prejudices), which form our reality, the world of abstractions. — Metaphysician Undercover
While it is absurd to call matter waves "immaterial," physics is not the science of being, but of changes in space and time. So, you are right, metaphysics has different concerns.You may insist that the idea of immaterial waves, waves without substance, is good enough for physics, but it's not good enough for metaphysics. — Metaphysician Undercover
No one is denying this. Physics merely abstracts the aspects of reality it can deal with.Wave" is defined in physics as a disturbance moving in a medium. — Metaphysician Undercover
Uncertainty arises from thinking of waves as particles. The wave structure is perfectly well-defined, but it you insist it is a particle, which it is not, you will be unable to assign particle properties with precision. Similarly, if you insist that a pig can fly, you will have difficulty explaining how.It’s probably more that I fail to see the point of the question. But if you mean, is uncertainty a consequence of the lack of knowledge of the initial conditions, I think Brian Greene answers that in the negative. If you don’t think so, maybe you might re-phrase it. — Wayfarer
No, it is not. Not being able to determine the exact value of classical variables does not mean that the system is intrinsically random. It only means that classical variables are not the best means of defining its state.In quantum mechanics, this determinism is replaced by inherent probabilistic behavior. — Wayfarer
If you insist that quanta are particles, you will suffer the logical consequences of the error you have made. There are no "particles," only wave structures. Wave structures are not point-like and insisting that they are will cause you to think that your non-existent particles are in random places.It gives the probability distribution of where a particle is likely to be found at a given time. — Wayfarer
If you are ignorant of the exact initial state, you will be ignorant of the exact final state, no matter how deterministic the dynamics are. Further, quantum measurement is a nonlinear process, which is mathematically chaotic, subject to the Lorenz Butterfly effect.you can only predict the probability of obtaining a particular measurement result, not the specific outcome for a single measurement (per Quantum (Manjit Kumar) and Uncertainty (David Lindley)). — Wayfarer
It is not a variable in describing the final pattern, but it is a factor in describing the dynamics that bring the pattern about. It takes time for the electron wave to arrive, and time for it to interact with the electron waves in the detector's atoms.This means that if time ( where time = rate of firing) is not a factor in the formation of the distribution pattern, which implies that time is not a variable in the generation of the interference pattern. — Wayfarer
Yes, that is what people say. Yet, it is not the case. It is an accepted fact that all unobserved processes are deterministic. So, put the whole experiment in a box and do not observe it. (You could even include an observer in the box.) Then you can only conclude that the interaction with the detector is deterministic. (If you included an observer, that would also include her observations.) Looking at it after the fact will not change this. So, the hypothesis that observations are random is inconsistent.The outcome of the experiment, the interference pattern, is a result of the quantum probabilistic nature — Wayfarer
There is an experiment in which a beam of neutral kaons interferes with itself, because the neutral kaon has two different states that have different masses and so different frequencies. This can be observed because different combinations of these states decay in different ways. As you move the detection apparatus along the the length of the beam different decay modes are detected, showing that the different mass states interfere with each other in real time.In that sense, the wave function is not a function of time, in a way that is very different from physical waves, which are obviously time-dependent. — Wayfarer
Quantum waves constitute matter. Wave functions are the mathematical functions describing these matter waves and their interactions. The concept is an ideal, but it is based on the observation of real wave properties, specifically, interference of the type demonstrated in Young's experiment.Quantum waves, or more properly called "wave functions" are ideals, mathematical constructs. They have no physical existence. We ought to start with this clearly stated. — Metaphysician Undercover
We do not represent the structures (they are not bodies in the classical sense) with mass. Rather, mass is a quantity associated with them.The problem is that physicists tend to represent these as bodies with mass. — Metaphysician Undercover
No. There are no bodies -- only waves and waves mischaracterized as "particles" because people apply Newtonian concepts without adequate justification.So, there is an interaction problem between the bodies with mass representation, and the ideal (immaterial) waves representation. — Metaphysician Undercover
We have learned a lot since Planck proposed his Black Body Radiation law 1900 and Einstein his explanation of the photoelectric effect in 1905.Nice try Df, but Planck's law is based in the emission of electromagnetic radiation from bodies (black-body radiation). — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, we use material instruments. That does not make the instruments classical bodies instead of quantum wave structures.The simple fact of the matter is that physicists do not have the required theories, or principles, to measure the energy of wave activity directly, without converting this energy to the activity of a physical body. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is no such interaction. The interactions observed are between the waves being measured and the wave structures (instruments) used to measure them. These interactions are purely physical. The representations are how we conceive of these physical structures and do not involved in the measurement interactions -- only in how we come to know the results.So, there is an interaction problem between the bodies with mass representation, and the ideal (immaterial) waves representation. — Metaphysician Undercover
You need to read the history of modern physics if you want to think about these things. It was assumed that we could measure different speeds of light as the earth passed through the either. In 1887 Albert A. Michelson and Edward Morley attempted to do so, and failed. They measure the same speed in each direction and at different orbital positions of the earth. So, we were forced, experimentally, to conclude that the measured speed of light is invariant. Contrary to popular belief, their experiment did not show that there is no aether, but that one aether theory was false.Instead, it dogmatically imposes unsubstantiated ideals, like the constant speed of light. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, it is not. Fourier transforms enter into the derivation of the uncertainty principle.I understand this, it is derived from the Fourier transform. — Metaphysician Undercover
Whether or not the energy is "high" is irrelevant.our inability to make measurements of high energy in a very short period of time is the reason for the uncertainty of the uncertainty principle, in general. — Metaphysician Undercover
It does. It is a definition in terms of more fundamental concepts.However, stating that energy is understood as "the dynamic variable conjugate to time", does not in any way state what energy is. — Metaphysician Undercover
By observation I mean fixing on or attending to experience, whether internal or external. I am not a physicalist. Read my January paper.This is the physicalist perspective — Metaphysician Undercover
Let me be more precise. I mean we have been unable to detect violations of conservation of energy.OK, you may call it "nearly perfect", but "nearly" is a subjective judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover
But, we can. That is what physics, chemistry, biology, etc. do.The material world which we represent with forms, formal models etc., is not actually as we represent it because we cannot represent the material aspect. — Metaphysician Undercover
That is not what anyone else means by "matter."All we have as representation is forms, and "matter" refers to those accidents which always escape the formal representation. — Metaphysician Undercover
We cannot say that. We can only say that in some cases, we are unable to observe possible imperfections, so, we have no reason to believe that the symmetries are imperfect.What they point to, is the fact that the real features of nature are not perfect symmetries, as modeled. — Metaphysician Undercover
You do not understand the meaning of "symmetry" in physics. It is not the kind of thing that can interact. Rather it is a property of the way things interact.Symmetries are perfectly ideal balances, just like the eternal circular motion described by Aristotle. If that perfect ideal has any interaction with anything else, then by that very interaction, it loses its status as a perfectly ideal balance. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is confused. We make observations and then deduce the consequences. As long as the logic is sound, the conclusions are justified by the observations. If the observations were objective, so are the conclusions.Yes. Symmetries are not observed, but deduced. Like constellations in the sky, the inferred patterns are mental, not material ; subjective, not objective. — Gnomon
I do not say "by," but "in" space and time.that waves cannot be described simply by space and time. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, but not the ontology of quantum waves.Furthermore, the subject of the thread is an ontological topic — Metaphysician Undercover
No, I know that material things are wave structures. I did not say what the units of energy are. They are not volts.This misconceives measurement. The instruments are also wave structures. — Dfpolis
Again, this is blatantly wrong, and I'm sure you know it. Energy is not measured by waves structures, it is measured by electrical voltage. — Metaphysician Undercover
Some are. Some are not.And calculations are done in terms of inertial frames and "rest mass" which is essential. — Metaphysician Undercover
Both electromagnetic and matter waves have energy and momentum.These are concepts of classical mechanics of bodies, not waves. — Metaphysician Undercover
Objectively, all physical instruments are wave structures. Subjectively, many people fail to understand this.What kind of instruments are understood to be wave structures? — Metaphysician Undercover
It makes perfect since once you realize that the electrons and nucleons composing atoms are waves.it doesn't make sense to claim that they are — Metaphysician Undercover
Once you realize that electrons are waves, you need to rethink your understanding of massive bodies.So the certainty of this understanding of light waves is dependent on the certainty of the theories which relate it to the foundation, the movement of massive bodies, and ultimately the foundation itself, our understanding of the movement of massive bodies. — Metaphysician Undercover
They underlie the classical understanding, not our quantum understanding. Now we understand that energy depends on the frequency at which elementary structures vibrate. E = h where h is Planck's constant and is the frequency.it's simple fact that these are the concepts which underly our understanding of energy. — Metaphysician Undercover
That is only a non-relativistic approximation. It was how the concept was first glimpsed, but it is not how it is understood now. Now we understand energy as the dynamic variable conjugate to time. To explain that, I would have to explain the conceptual framework of theoretical physics, and that is why I ask that you trust my opinion based on my education. If you wish to pursue this, look up Hamiltonian and Lagrangian formalism, and Emmy Noether's theoremThis is because "energy" as a concept is fundamentally a property of the momentum of mass (kinetic energy being 1/2mv2). — Metaphysician Undercover
All observations are imperfect. In observing you, I do not gain perfect knowledge of you. Nonetheless observation is the basis of all human knowledge. It may well be that energy is not perfectly conserved. Still, that is very approximately conserved is a real feature of nature and points to nearly perfect time-translation symmetry.Symmetries are not observed in nature. Each thing that we observe as a near-symmetry is not actually a symmetry, which is an ideal balance. — Metaphysician Undercover
No. They point to real features of nature. Omniscience is not a rational standard for human knowledge. We know as humans know -- incompletely and approximately in matters involving measurement.Laws are artificial, and created as universals so your examples are irrelevant. — Metaphysician Undercover
There are no universal beings to partake in. Aristotle rebutted Platonic Ideas in Metaphysics I, 9 and universal exemplars ideas are incompatible with the simplicity, omniscience and omnipotence of God.there is an interaction problem involved with trying to demonstrate how the particular partakes of the universal. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, the times are much longer than the Planck time. Different spectral lines have different frequency widths. The transition time is proportional to the inverse of the associated frequency width. See http://www-star.st-and.ac.uk/~kw25/teaching/nebulae/lecture08_linewidths.pdfDid you notice that I qualified "instantaneous" with "almost". We're talking about Planck Time here. — Gnomon
Yes, because the transition times can be calculated using the wave model.Do you have a good reason for picking nits about metaphors? — Gnomon
No, that is not the reason you are wrong. It is a reason to trust my views more. The reasons you are wrong are outside the scope of this thread.Instead of addressing the valid points I brought up, points which are very relevant to the subject, "interactionism", you retort with an implied 'you're wrong because I'm more highly educated than you'. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, I can, but I choose not to here.If you really have the education which you claim, you could very easily show me why you think I'm wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover
Philosophically, I agree that waves are modifications of something; however, saying that contributes nothing to the goal of physics, which is to describe the behavior, and not the ontology, of physical systems. For physics, it is enough that the waves can be described in space and time. If a hypothesis about what they modified, say that it was made of particles or strings, led to a better description, then it would be relevant to physics.The problem here is that without a medium (aether or whatever), a substance to support this so-called "wave phenomena", it is fundamentally immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover
This misconceives measurement. The instruments are also wave structures.Clearly, what we have here is an interaction problem between the immaterial waves (with no material substance), and the material bodies (instruments of measurement). — Metaphysician Undercover
Quantum field theories, like all scientific theories, are hypotheses to explain observed facts. To the extent that they do so, they are adequate to reality and so true. Their truth is not absolute, but limited to how they actually reflect reality. So, it is open to refinement and revision.Quantum field theory and the standard model of particles are composed of immaterial ideals which have no direct correspondence in the physical world. If you have the education you claim, you know this. The truth of this is evidenced by the reality assigned to symmetry in the models, when such symmetries are simply not discovered in nature. Symmetries are ideals which may be artificially synthesized to an extent, in a lab, but have no true occurrence in the natural world. — Metaphysician Undercover
It does not because physical symmetries are not interacting things, but properties of interactions of things.And this manifests as the problem of how the ideal world of symmetries described by the standard model could interact with the world of material bodies which we live in. — Metaphysician Undercover
I see liberals as supporting the value of each individual, not their "sovereignty." And, I do not see materialism as a consensus view, although I do see it as a powerful intellectual and social thread.It's simply the emphasis on the sovereignty of self or ego, on the one hand, and the consensus view of philosophical or scientific materialism, that is associated with political liberalism on the other. — Wayfarer
I have no problem with this, but it does not support determinism, because it does not point to a source of value beyond your own agency.Being with someone I am sufficiently attracted to may indeed be more valuable to me that any number of views of Yosemite Falls. If am more motivated by one than the other then, absent addiction, the more motivating one is more valuable to me. — Janus
The way at this problem is to see what it is to be intentional, and then ask does being intentional require being physical.You seem to simply beg the question that intentionality can exist without physicality. The problem is that you can't provide any evidence of intentionality without physicality, so it seems you take the possibility of intentionality sans physicality on faith. — wonderer1
A "a physical interpretive context" begs the question. The interpretive context depends on the minds of human interpreters. Meaning is not physical. No application of physics will show that X means Y. So, the interpretive context is essentially intentional, not physical except incidentally.Meaning depends on a physical interpretive context. The fact that aababbab doesn't have any clear meaning outside a physical interpretive context isn't relevant to anything. — wonderer1
If you mean by "a physical interpretive context" that people with brains interpret, I agree. That does not mean that what they know is material.As far as I can tell there is no intelligibility outside a physically interpretive context so I think that you need to provide some reason to believe that there can be intelligibility outside a physically interpretive context. — wonderer1
My brain state also supervenes on the orbital motion of Halley's comment. Supervenience has absolutely no explanatory power. Tell me something that matters. Like what causes what.You seem to be getting inputs and outputs confused. Your retinal state supervenes on the physical effect of an apple reflecting light from a light source into your eye. Your brain state supervenes on your retinal state. — wonderer1
When you are thinking about the apple you see, you will have a different neural state than when contemplating light striking your retina. — wonderer1
Not alone. A human mind that understands the language is also required -- both for endoding and decoding. Without that intentional capability (the ability to transform marks into meaning and vice versa), there is no encoding. There are only weird ink stains.Physical ink arranged on physical paper serves just fine for encoding Godel's theorems. — wonderer1
How does it get decoded into a concept when required? We do not perceive the pulse rates or neurotransmitter concentrations. So, how do we know what is encoded?Neural states can encode the concept. — wonderer1
This is not the place to argue this. Let's just say that my education puts me in a better position to judge.I don't agree with this. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, they do not. They generate the light pulses we call photons, which have a finite duration in order to have a well-defined frequency (because of the uncertainty principle). So, we can tell how long the transitions take. Further, the transitions are much better described as wave phenomena than as particle phenomena. The electrons in each level have a well-defined energy and so a well-defined frequency.But the actual jumps seem to occur almost instantaneously. — Gnomon
This is an Augustinian insight I touch upon in my current paper.'m not mentioning that as an exhortation to a specifically Catholic philosophy, but as preserving what I think of as a kind of universalist insight. Firstly the idea that there's a kind of understanding which also requires a transformation in order for it to be meaningful. Secondly that this is not easy or painless. I don't see an equivalent of that in much of secular philosophy. — Wayfarer
No. There are no Ideal Beings. There are only real and imaginary beings. We have different ideas about things because they can act in different ways. Red apples can cause us to experience red qualia. Sweet apples can cause us to experience sweet qualia.So, how do thought and matter interact? They don't -- because the question is ill-formed. What we have is being, with different beings having different capabilities. — Dfpolis
Is that negation based on a distinction between Real Things and Ideal Beings? — Gnomon
Things are defined in terms of their operational capabilities. Acorns can sprout into oaks, non-acorns cannot. When a thing acts on us in a certain way, we learn that it can act in that way. When I was a child, I learned that the thing that caused the image of a bee in me could also sting. Thus, my knowledge of the operational capabilities (the essence) of bees increased, even though it remains imperfect to this day.Yet, you say that "thought and matter" have different (dual?) "capabilities". If "capability" is taken to mean the ability to affect other "beings", how would you characterize that innate power? — Gnomon
Bodies also also exchange momentum and angular momentum in interacting. Also, how much energy a body has depends on the frame of reference in which it is measured.Extended Matter interacts with other things via exchanges of Energy. Do you think that Thinking Beings interact via Intention? — Gnomon
Well, if you mean do think there is an ultimate cause, yes, I do. I am not a neutral monist, because I do not think in terms of substance as a "stuff" which is formed into experienced objects. That, view, even in Cartesian dualism, is fundamentally materialistic. It conceives of everything as "made of" one or more kinds of "stuff." Maybe that stuff is matter, or energy, or res cogitans, or a Spinozan substance than can become material or spiritual things.Apparently, your objection to the Dualistic (proximate appearance) aspect is based on a Monistic (ultimate Ideality) worldview, in which Mind & Matter can be traced back to some primordial Origin, with the potential for both Material things and Mental beings. Is that summary anywhere close to your understanding? — Gnomon
It cannot be. Things that are purely potential are not actual, and things that are not actual cannot act. Evolving is an action, and so requires something actual to effect it.In my thesis, the Ultimate Origin (First Cause) is neither Mind nor Matter, but the Potential for evolving a plethora of material Things & living Creatures & Thinking Beings in the Real world — Gnomon
Aristotle showed, in many ways, that Plato's concept of Ideas lead to many inconsistencies, and could play no role in becoming. So, these two pieces of the puzzle don't match.And I use physical Energy as a metaphor for the "interactions" between those offspring of Plato's hypothetical ideal FORM*2 (configuration ; manifestation ; design), and Aristotle's original Prime Mover (causation ; creation). — Gnomon
I am fine with this, except to say that the theory of evolution must be mute on consciousness because it explains adaptation physically, and physics has no intentional effects. No one has reduced intentional realities to a physical basis.From those different aspects of Monistic Potential, I can trace Cosmology from an initial Bang of omnidirectional Causation, which transformed into the dual aspects of Energy & Matter, and thence into the manifold Darwinian "forms most beautiful". Some of those sub-forms have material Properties and some have immaterial Qualities, such as Life & Mind. Does any of that conjecture make sense from your non-dual perspective? — Gnomon
The problem is that there is can be no more and less in comparing commensurates. That was the point of my question and is the fundamental flaw with utility theories. You cannot value a liter of oxygen against a liter of water. You need both, and no amount of one will meet your need for the other.I have to say I don't really know. I will choose that which motivates me more, and what motivates me more is a characteristic of my nature (my nature at the specified time, since it might change). So, for example, presuming that you were referring to someone of sexual interest, the choice I make might depend on the strength of my libido at the time. — Janus
Modernism is not modernity. It is a modern worldview, or some aspects of that view, that some find offensive. I do not understand exactly what they are offended by. Neither do I understand what you object to about liberal democracy.I have never understood what "modernism" means — Dfpolis
I understand modernity as the period between the publication of Newton's Principia and Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity (or more precisely, the legendary 1927 Solvay Conference where quantum theory was introduced). — Wayfarer
We have to be careful here. Saying that body and mind are different things (res) is more that making a conceptual distinction. The distinction pre-dates Descartes. Aristotle and Aquinas distinguished intellect from sense as "a bodily process." That does not divide[ them. It is just saying that one being can act in different ways. They also knew that we needed physical representations (phantasms) to think and Aquinas knew that brain trauma interfered with thinking.Descartes categorically "divided" Soul from Body ; which in more modern terms might translate to a conceptual distinction between Mind and Brain. — Gnomon
That would involve equivocating on "matter." In dialoging with such a person, I would ask for a clear definition. We can give words technical definitions to articulate our thought, but it is a sign of confusion to use common word with uncommon intent, and not define what we mean.A Monistic Materialist might assume that ultimately Mind is just a different kind of Matter, so the distinction is artificial, not natural. — Gnomon
I have explained why we cannot divide res cogitans from res extensa. The current use of substance is not one to which I subscribe. Instead I follow Aristotle in taking the primary realities (ousia = "substance"), to be ostensible unities (his tode ti = this something), like electrons, viruses, bacteria, cows and people. Different systems can have different sorts of unity so people, the earth, the solar system, our galaxy and so on are all unities, and so substances, in their own way.Apparently, you have either a different meaning of "divide", or a different Prime Substance, in mind. — Gnomon
Thus, materialists need to rethink their fundamental beliefs. For example, Daniel Dennett starts Consciousness Explained by saying he is a metaphysical naturalist. He then proves, to his own satisfaction, that there can be no physical reduction of consciousness. When I studied science, that was called the falsification of a hypothesis. For Dennett, it is a reason to discard data, for he concludes that there is no consciousness.Aristotle's "Self-Thinker" sounds like a dis-embodied Mind, and for a Materialist, would fall into the same nonsense category with Ghosts and Circular Logic. — Gnomon
As do I.I accept that all of the Minds in my sensory experience have been associated with meat Brains — Gnomon
It sounds like a kind of hylomorphism, which is conceiving of bodies in terms of matter (hyle) and form (morphos). Aristotle sees form, not as shape, but as a thing's actuality (energeia). Similarly he thinks of matter, not as extension, but as the potential to assume form.So, the question arises : what is the relationship between Math and Mind? My answer is that both are subvenient (dependent) forms of the universal Power-to-Enform (Energy + Information = EnFormAction). That unconventional notion is not a derivative of pure Idealism, but a conjugation of Idealism & Physicalism. Or, as I like to call it Enformationism. — Gnomon
This seems a reasonable hypothesis, although I suspect that there are other factors as well.For me the answer lies in secularization. The older Judeo-Christian culture had an anchor for equality, namely the imago dei and a "balancing" afterlife, which was thought to reestablish justice. The religion and the anchor were lost, and at that point equality became an all-or-nothing affair. E.g. A Rawls-or-Nietzsche affair. — Leontiskos
I have never understood what "modernism" means, because I have never seen it precisely defined. As I read it, it seems to mean whatever recent changes the author does not like. Instead of discussing them pro and con, they are labeled and dismissed.It's incompatible with //some aspects of// democratic liberalism. That's why most of the exponents of the various forms of the perennial philosophy are hostile to modernism. — Wayfarer
Quantum observations are completely explainable without invoking the "particle" concept. Modelling the physics using the concept of particles works in many, but not all cases. Modelling it in terms of waves works for all the observations.how the particle gets from A to B, etc., and this is represented as a wave function. — Metaphysician Undercover
Thank you for the kind words.Anyway, despite my criticism I do like your work. As a novel variety of science based metaphysics, it's like a breath of fresh air. That's why I'm quick to engage you when you post a thread, I like you. — Metaphysician Undercover
We agree.I agree with what you say, but I see imagiation as involved in both interpreting or undertsnding something as something and in imagining something that does not actually exist. Note that this latter function of imagination relies on the combining of preformed images of objects that do exist. — Janus
My point was that I chose what to read and, implicitly, what to think about, even though I was not yet neurally informed by the printed word. So, my later neural state was, to a degree, a result of my prior intentional state.Of course, if I read other authors I will be moved to agree or disagree depending on how what they say accords with that experience or not. — Janus
Suppose that your experience leads you to a fork in the road. On one fork is said to be a place of great natural beauty, on the other a person you have texted with and are interested in, but not met or made any commitment to. I am saying that your choice of which fork to take is based on how you choose to value these incommensurate goods. On your theory, how is this valuation made?I don't experience myself as being able to freely decide what to value or agree with; I experience that as being determined by what I have, through my own experience, been led to think. — Janus
As I said, the the wave function collapses because the detection process (used in measuring) is nonlinear and cannot sustain superposition.But it definitely has something to do with the act of measurement, does it not? “No phenomena is a phenomena until it is observed”, said Bohr. — Wayfarer