Again, animals have awareness — Wayfarer

We know that animals have what we might call "medical consciousness," which can be defined in terms of physiological responsiveness. We do not know that animals are aware in the sense of being knowing (as opposed to sensing) subjects. On the principle of parsimony we have no reason to suppose that they do.

That ability is partially pre-conscious, i.e. it operates partially below the threshold of discursive consciousness — Wayfarer

All that we know animals to do can be explained without assuming that they are conscious of what they are doing. We can explain it at an entirely physical level. We cannot do that with human intentional operations such as knowing and willing.

Don’t you see a link between this faculty - intellect - and what enables humans to think, reason, calculate and speak? — Wayfarer

Of course I do. It is the same faculty.

So I don't find 'awareness' a sufficient explanatory principle. — Wayfarer

But it is. All we need to judge <This apple is crisp> is to be aware that the same object that evokes the concept <this apple> is the object that evokes <crisp>. What more do we need? You can easily extend this analysis to the syllogism in Barbara -- following the identity through the premises to the conclusion. So, awareness explains ideogenesis, judgement and deduction. We do not need more.

Hence in the Ockham essay I referred to above — Wayfarer

I'm reading it. I note that it misconstrues Aquinas by leaving out the role of intelligibility in the instances of a universal.

I think you've failed to answer my question: How can we judge that a particular is a universal if particulars and universals are never found in the same theater of operation?

Thank you.

I still do not see the connection between Wittgenstein and therapy.

For a while, I was involved in the philosophical counseling movement, and have an article published in a collection on the subject. I was able to help a few people with severe problems by directing their attention to things that gave them self worth. Without going into detail, the result was transformative. Clearly, this did not depend on my knowledge of Wittgenstein, which is minimal at best.

Thank you for your response.

Well, if you adopt a therapeutic stance towards speech and philosophical problems, then yes it is pertinent to the philosophy of language. — Posty McPostface

I did not mean to challenge your insight, I just do not appreciate the connection.

Surely, we use language to direct attention in ways that will result in desirable emotional states. But does one have to be steeped in the philosophy of language to do that?

Depression, anxiety, OCD, self-identity, death.

All of these influence what conclusions we arrive at. Reason itself is limited by what the emotive aspect of our beings tells us about a situation or issue. — Posty McPostface

While I agree that our emotional state can affect what we look at our admit is real, I don't see that this has much to do with the philosophy of language.

And yes -- self realization is hard.

Could you provide an example?

When I hear some of the interpretations of Wittgenstein, they seem to be of those who have only read some of Wittgenstein, but have not really studied Wittgenstein in depth. — Sam26

I am one of those who have read some Wittgenstein and was not unduly impressed. I take responsibility for that. As a student of Aristotle, who is also a genius and often difficult to grasp, I appreciate the need to study a philosopher in depth to fully appreciate his/her genius. So, as I see it, it is a matter of resource allocation. We have limited time, and so we have to judge, after minimal exposure, where to spend it.

One way to overcome this barrier is to have someone show you an instance of the philosopher's genius.

This sounds like universal as phenomenon rather than thing — tim wood

It it is neither a thing, nor a phenomenon (an experiential appearance). Universality is a attribute of a concept, and, by extension, of words expressing that concept.

By phenomenon I have in mind that my instantiated idea of a strong arm and yours, while both entirely different — tim wood

I would say, not entirely different (equivocal), but analogical.

may, by a third person both be adjudged to correspond in the sense of referring to strong arms. If that, then of what, exactly, is the universal comprised — tim wood

may, by a third person both be adjudged to correspond in the sense of referring to strong arms. If that, then of what, exactly, is the universal comprised — tim wood

Universality is not about communication. What a third person does or does not understand is irrelevant to the intrinsic nature of our concepts. All that is required is that multiple instances have the objective capacity to evoke my concept and (possibly other) multiple instances have the objective capacity to evoke your concept. Of course this can lead to difficulties in communication, because when I say "strong arms" the idea the words evoke in you may differ from the idea I have. Such is life. It is important, we can work out the differences and communicate more effectively.

In any culture, it is likely that our concepts will be very similar, having prety much the same set of instances. Differences will have to do with marginal cases.

I agree with much of what you're saying, but they're are many definitions (I would say uses) of the word time, that cause confusion. — Sam26

Yes, but is it really necessary to study Wittgenstein to spot an equivocal use of terms? Clearly not, for Aristotle discusses different types of equivocation (multiple uses = pollakhos legetai or dikhos legetai). (See, e.g. G. E. L. Owen, "Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology" in R. Bambrough, New Essays on Plato and Aristotle (London, 1965), pp. 69-95; Jaakko Hintikka, ""Aristotle and the Ambiguity of Ambiguity," Inquiry 2 (1959). pp 137-151 and "Different Kinds of Equivocation in Aristotle.," J. Hist. Phil. 9:3, (July 1971) pp. 368-372.)

Don't you think that depending on how you define the word creates many philosophical and maybe even scientific confusion? — Sam26

No. I think failing to adequately reflect on its meaning (the reality it indicates, which I take to be a measure of change), is the source of problems involving time. Once you have a clear meaning, applying it consistently resolves any confusion. Then all that is left is different beliefs about the facts.

You've just replaced 'decision' with 'commitment', how do the two terms differ in this context? — Pseudonym

The question, lest we lose track of it, is how linguistic analysis will resolve my difference with a determinist? It is not whether linguistic definitions are ultimately circular. I can easily prove that in any finite language, definitions must be ultimately circular. The point of definitions is not to provide replacement words, but to cause the reader to recreate in his or her own mind the concept the word expresses.

Where does one event end and the next one start. This is important because if you can define a single event then you can't say that existence is not one single event which undermines the argument against determinism somewhat. — Pseudonym

I don't agree. The fact that I can define a point without reference to a line does not mean that a line is not a continuous sequence of points. The concept of <continuity> changes the context both of points and events. So if I were to define an event in a way that made no reference to other events, that would not mean that actual events were not part of a continuous flow of events. Thinking otherwise would be an instance of Whitehead's fallacy of misplaced concreteness.

As I said, in any closed language, any series of definitions will ultimately close on itself. So, I make no apology for defining "possible" in terns of "necessary." In fact, it is precisely because language in isolation is closed that we must transcend language and turn our intellectual gaze to being. It is only in relation to being that language has any ultimate meaning.

You have yet to indicate how linguistic analysis will resolve the issue between me and a determinist. The determinist thinks there is one possibility. I think there is more than one. That is a difference as to the nature of reality, not a verbal misunderstanding.

Talking about that goes even further away from poor Sam26's thread topic — fdrake

I suppose it may.

All tending, once filtered, to the same idea and the same expression of that idea in language, "strong arms." This is how the world works. But is there any such thing as a strong arm? — tim wood

Note that I did not say we all have the same idea <strong arms>. What qualifies as strong for me may not qualify as strong for you. That is why I talk about the fact that different people have different conceptual spaces. So, the universality is in the relation of one person's concept to its instances, not in the equivalence of concepts among different people. Of course some concepts, say <triangle>, are simple and well-defined enough to fairly universal in the population, but that is not a requirement for any one person to have a universal concept. It may be his or hers alone.

Aristotle was quite aware of people reifying concepts (he had Plato as a teacher). That's why he discusses the difference between things (ousia = substance) and features or accidents.

Philosophy is the study of how stuff hangs together. — fdrake

Well, that is close to what I said about building a consistent framework for understanding our experience of reality -- however, I see "our experience of reality" as an essential note.

If you could provide an example of some philosophical terms whose meaning you think is widely agreed on (with a rough idea of what that agreed meaning is), that might help. — Pseudonym

This is not a central issue. Of course, equivocation has been a recognized problem since the ancient Greeks. However, most open minded people are not wed to specific definitions and are willing to use those of a dialog partner to facilitate communication. The real problem is that even when we agree to use terms in the same way, we may still have very different visions of the nature of reality. Thus, linguistic differences are a side issue, like clearing weeds before starting a building project.

It seems to me that the analysis of most problems don't turn on the analysis of language. — fdrake

Agreed.

All philosophical problems are linguistic in nature — StreetlightX

This is precisely the point I am disputing with Pseudonym

Define 'decision' without begging the question — Pseudonym

A decision is a commitment to a course of action based on a consideration of alternate courses of action. A determinist would say that before this process begins, the commitment is predetermined. I would deny that. There is no question begging on either side.

Define a 'line of action' without assuming cause and effect. — Pseudonym

There is no need for me to avoid assuming that effects follow from adequate causes to maintain my position, nor is the determinist required to do so. However, I am happy to comply with your request: A "line of action" is a continuous sequence of events.

Define what it means for something to be 'possible' without presuming either determinism, or some arbitrary constraints. — Pseudonym

To be possible means that the contrary is not necessary.

I don't think we even agree what it is to 'understand' a thing. — Pseudonym

I will be happy to consider your definition and tell you whether I find it acceptable or not.

There's no such resort with philosophy, hence it is entirely wrapped up in the understanding of language. — Pseudonym

OK, let's take an old saw as an example: Free Will. Of course compatibilists will say that we simply do not understand what it is to be free, but really, that's not the issue. To see this we can avoid the word "free" altogether. The position I take is that at a decision point many, mutually incompatible, lines of action are equally possible. A determinist will say that only one line of action is actually possible. We each understand our terms in the same way. So, language is not the issue.

I seems to me that the role of philosophy is provide a consistent framework for understanding our experience of reality. Occasionally, we misstate what we experience or what we think about our experience, so understanding language can be useful, but it does not get at the central issue of forming a conceptual, and not a linguistic, framework.

Perhaps the fixation on language is an outcome of the 14th c turn away from moderate realism to nominalism.

Where does science fit in this? ... Event experimental setup requires a good deal of creativity and reason. — Marchesk

Of course, science must use intellect, because science is a human activity and humans understand the world by the use of intellect. Still, that does not mean that scientists (as a whole) are all that self-reflective in their use of intellect.

I have written a number of times recently about the fundamental abstraction of natural science. While every act of knowing involves both a knowing subject and a known object, at the beginning of natural science a conscious methodological decision is made to focus on the known object to the exclusion of the knowing subject. As natural scientists, we care about what Galileo saw through his telescope, not about his experience as a knowing subject in seeing it. As a result, the natural sciences leave data on the knowing subject on the table -- excluded from their area of concern. Being bereft of data on the knowing subject, it cannot link what it does know about the objective world of physics to what it does not know about the knowing subject. Thus, the natural sciences are methodologically unequipped to devise theories of consciousness or to discuss intentional realities such as the operations of intellect and will.

Thank you for the reference.

I reject the Thomistic thesis that the intellect can only know universals, which I see, not as Aristotelian, but as Neoplatonic. Aristotle's thesis is that science deals with universals, not particulars. The confusion arises because scientia means both science and knowledge. So the Latin text of Aristotle can be read to mean that intellectual knowledge is only of universals (as stated by Brennan in your quotation).

The problem is that unless both individuals and universals can be recognized by the same faculty, we can't form judgements linking them. We cannot think (an intellectual operation) <This is (universal)>, because (in the Thomistic view) "this" is not an idea, and therefore not something the intellect can grasp, while the universal predicated of "this" can't be represented at the sensory level.

The difficulty can be resolve simply, by identifying the agent intellect with awareness (as I do) and noting that we can be aware of both an object as a unified whole (ousia, substance) and as having various universalizable features or notes of intelligibility. So, in my view, first we become aware of objects as wholes, and then, by abstraction, we dissect them into universal concepts. So, wen we think <this is (universal)> we mean that the "this" we are aware of is the identical object that evokes the universal concept. Both subject and predicate are grasped by the same faculty, but in different modes -- fixing our attentions either on the whole or on a specific note of intelligibility.

Whereas, in consequence of nominalism, which was in many respects the precursor to empiricism, this distinguishing characteristic of the ‘faculty of reason’ is generally no longer recognised, with considerable consequences for modern philosophy of mind and especially theory of meaning. — Wayfarer

Which is why modern defenders of the irreducibly of consciousness fix on qualia and not on the actualization of intelligibility by the intellect.

Do you reject that there are neural mechanisms behind word formation in the brain that have something to do with understanding word meaning? — Marchesk

Of course not. I see the mind as composed of two subsystems: (1) a neural processing subsystem (the brain), and (2) an intentional subsystem that provides awareness and direction (intellect and will).

Does anyone disagree that many words are conceptual? — Marchesk

There are people who believe there is a "language of thought." I reject the notion because it leads to an infinite regress.

Right, but I'm unclear as to the difference between names and concepts in this debate. — Marchesk

It reflects what is thought primary, words or ideas. If you think that ideas are merely words we speak internally, then you are more likely to be a nominalist. If you think ideas are more fundamental, and words merely express them, then you're more likely to be a conceptualist.

clearly there are differences between dogs and cats, while there are similarities among dogs unique to dogs. — Marchesk

Yes, that is why I'm a moderate realist. Perhaps there is a nominalist on the forum that would like to provide a stronger defense of his/her position.

Nominalism says universals are only names, with no foundation in reality. Conceptualism says they are only concepts, with no foundation in reality.

If the only universal things are names, then they exist, but only as conventional signs -- as human inventions.

Unless there is something real to connect universal ideas/concepts to their instances, there is no reason not to call anything by any universal name. For example, I can decide to call my dog a cat, while I call yours a turtle.

Rather, Aristotle's universals are multiple-realizable entities that exist only insofar as they are instantiated in a substance. — darthbarracuda

How is this different from what I said? I suppose that you could think that the universals actually exist in individuals, but Aristotle is quite clear that this is not the case. If you read De Anima iii he is quite clear that objects are merely intelligible until the agent intellect (which I see as awareness) makes them actually known. Thus, while the potential to be universally understood is found in individual substances, actual universals are found only in the mind.

Perception is the mind's impressions of substances, akin to how pressing your thumb into a piece of clay creates an impression of your thumb in the clay. Aristotle's mind is thus a model of substances. — darthbarracuda

The idea of a model misses a critical point in Aristotle's analysis of both sensing and knowing. That point is the dynamic inseparability of sensed and sensor, and of known object and knowing subject. Aristotle points out that the single act of sensing actualizes two separate potentials: the sensibility of the object and the capacity of the sense to be informed. Stated in a different way, the object being sensed by the sensor is (identically) the sensor sensing the object. In a more contemporary projection, the sensible object's modification of our nervous system is (identically) our neural representation of the sensible object.

The same is true of knowing: the single act of awareness actualizes both the object's intelligibility and the intellect's capacity to be informed. Thus, in both the sensory and intellectual aspects of perception, there is an inescapable identity that "modelling" misses entirely. Our knowledge of the object is not a model of the object, but the object itself informing us. Thus, Aristotle avoids the cognitive gap found in modern philosophy.

If universals in the mind reflect reality, then doesn't that mean reality does, in fact, have real universals? — darthbarracuda

No, it means that it has potential universals. The distinction of potency and act is a powerful weapon in Aristotle's intellectual arsenal, and be wields it against innumerable problems.

I hope this helps.

Nominalism theories deny universals and they say particulars can have predicates or group under some category. This is tough for me to understand. — Vipin

Nominalism is tough to understand because it is inadequate. We don't assign the term "strong arms" to Alfred and Tom, by fiat as nominalists seem to think. We assign the term because Alfred and Tom in fact have strong arms.

Moderate Realism, the theory of Aristotle and Aquinas among others, rejects both Platonic Ideals, and the view that universals are merely names or concepts. It takes the middle ground by saying (against Plato) that there are no actual universals outside of thinking minds, but (against nominalists and conceptualists) there is a foundation in reality for our universal concepts.

When we see Alfred, we can mentally separate many features ("notes of intelligibility") he has. Say he's male, lanky, blond, and has strong arms. Each of these features becomes an idea when we become aware of them. <Male>, <lanky>, <blond> and <strong arms> are all ideas evoked by Afred's reality. When we see Tom, the idea <strong arms> is also evoked, showing that it applies to more than one individual, and hence is universal. In each case, the idea is invoked because the individual in question actually has the corresponding feature or note of intelligibility.

Thus, universals are not just names or concepts, they reflect reality. That reality is not a Platonic Idea or Divine Exemplar, but features or notes intelligibility in individuals that have the objective capacity to evoke the same, universal idea. Thus, universals do not depend on arbitrary naming conventions or set assignments. Universal names express our experience that many individuals elicit the same idea, and they apply not only to individuals we have encountered, but to any and all individuals with the objective capacity to evoke the same idea (with the same notes of intelligibility).

So to get your conceptual bearings, the opposite of 'nomialism' is usually said to be 'realism'. — StreetlightX

Yes, but realism need not be the extreme realism of Plato. it can be the Aristotelian or Thomistic moderate realism explained above.

I used to hold the private belief that I was neither my body nor my brain, but an immutable attachment to my mind, which I called "consciousness." — HuggetZukker

But, in fact, you are a unity. You are neither a body/brain alone, nor consciousness alone, but a person who can act both physically and intentionally. You have a metabolism, can move and act in the world, can know and can will. The fact that we abstract different concepts from the one person does not make that person any less a unity than conceiving of a ball as rubber and as spherical makes means it has a rubber part and a spherical part.

"Why am I me instead of someone else? — HuggetZukker

This has no specific answer. It is merely a singular, contingent fact of reality that you are you and not me. If you ask, "Why do I exist?" the question can mean two things. One is why am I me? The rational answer is that "I am me" i simply a tautology, and so not reducible to anything more fundamental than the principle of identity ("Whatever is, is.") They other interpretation of the question is: "What maintains me in being?" The rational answer to that question looks at contingency and necessity, or potency and actualization, and leads to the existence of a necessary being or pure act.

Science and philosophy deal with universals, not with singular facts. So, when you ask "Why is this not that?" the only answer is that that is what our contingent experience of reality tells us. But, when you ask a question which is not about singularity, but has a universal aspect, it is rational to expect science and/or philosophy to have something to say in response.

it disturbed me that I could never know whether anyone else had a spectator inside them: Anyone other than me, I thought, might be a philosophical zombie. — HuggetZukker

Of course we can know that other people ate not zombies, but we can only know it with human knowledge and not with God-like certitude. Almost every bit of knowledge we base our daily lives on is knowledge by analogy. Even in applying scientific principles, we use analogical thinking. The new situation to which we apply our science is never exactly the same as any previous situation, and so we have to rely, not on exact replication, but on the fact that the new situation is analogous to those we have dealt with before.

So it is with other minds. Unless you are mentally ill, you recognize that other people are analogous to yourself, and as your deliberate acts reflect your intellect and will, so do theirs.

It had never before occured to me that my unshakable belief could be construed as belonging to the realm of superstition. — HuggetZukker

I would point out that there were two parts to your belief, One is the experience of being a knowing subject in the subject-object relation we call "knowing." That is no superstition, but a datum to be preserved in our reflections about mind, consciousness and personhood. The other part is a construct you added, unsupported by experience, that you are somehow separate from your body. As with my earlier example of the rubber ball, the fact that we can form distinct ideas does not mean that we are thinking of separate "things." "Body" and "mind" are the names we give to different aspects of the same person.

It was known, before Descartes, that if your brain was damaged (say by a mace blow) that your mind won't work right. So, Descartes's dichotomy between body and mind was ill conceived, even at the time. That does not mean that the mind is simply a matter of neural data processing, for it is not. Still, the contents/information we are aware of depend on neural data processing.

I am only made of my physical self, which is undergoing constant change, meaning I'm basically a new me every day. — HuggetZukker

Materialists are inclined to base identity and being made of the same "stuff." Of course, that is not the basis of personal identity. Identity is more about the continuation of the same, identifiable process. even if every atom in my body were replaced over the course of my life, I am still the same person I was when I was born, because a single life process links the present me to my infant, even zygote, self. So, while I am evolving and maturing, I am not "new" everyday. I am the continuation of my same self.

There's no eternal self, and probably no sharp line to draw between conscious and unconscious. — HuggetZukker

That there is no "eternal" you is as much a faith position as your previous construct. Your account offers no rationale for this belief.

And, there is a very sharp line between being conscious and not. It was drawn by Aristotle inDe Anima iii. What awareness does, that noting else does is make what was merely intelligible, what was only knowable, actually known. There is a huge difference between having and processing information and knowing information, and that difference is bridge when we become aware of (conscious of) intelligibility.

Now you may say that consciousness is "emergent," or that it is "breathed into us by God." There is no operational difference between these views. What is clear is that awareness, by making the merely intelligible actually known, transforms information from being latent in the physical world to being active in the logical order -- and that transformation is not within the competence of physics to explain, because physics has nothing to say about logical entities,

If that is not your position, then can you explain to me the principles whereby you class an act as either physical or intentional. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have repeatedly. You refuse to accept what I tell you or offer a sound reason to reject it.

your position is to assume a dichotomy between physical acts and intentional acts — Metaphysician Undercover

I have already told you many times that this is not my position. Time spent in trying to make you understand my position is time wasted. I'm not wasting any more of my time.

The physicalist claims that if an action can be described without reference to intention, it is not an intentional act (P1) — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not my position.

Intention is not observable, so when any act is described it is not necessary to include intention. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is false on two points. (1) We observe purely intentional acts such as knowing and willing by introspection, so they are observable. They are not intersubjectively observable, it is true, but that is of no epistemological consequence. (2) As acts such as knowing, willing, believing, and hoping can be defined without reference to matter, they are not intrinsically physical. Thus, they are intrinsically intentional.

any act can be described without reference to intention. — Metaphysician Undercover

False.

I certainly agree that, since the laws of nature are intentional, all physical acts, which are guided by those laws, are intentional wrt to God. They are not all intentional with respect to finite minds.

So, just to be clear, I do not see physical acts as lacking intentionality. That they have intentionality was my whole point in beginning this thread. Still, pure intentional acts are not physical acts.

I'm not physicalist, so I would not describe you "knowing that God exists" in a physicalist way. The point is, that a physicalist would describe it in that way. — Metaphysician Undercover

I presume you are not a physicalist because you, like me, see the errors of physicalism. Therefore, it is absurd to rest your case on a position we both agree is defective.

The physicalists produce this description on the this forum quite commonly. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not a physicalist. Are you? The rest of your paragraph wanders aimlessly, not responding to my question. "How would you describe my knowing that God exists physically?"

I believe that all the activities of living beings have an intentional aspect, because intention is inherent within the "soul", which all living things have in common, as the source of all their activities. — Metaphysician Undercover

As Aristotle notes, the soul is the actuality of a potentially living being. While some of our acts are intentional, the mere fact that an act is our does not make it intentional. Your "logic" is rather like saying that since a paint factory can produce black paint, all its paint must be black.

So I believe that any description of the activity of a living being requires reference to intention in order to be a complete description of that activity. — Metaphysician Undercover

All human thought, and all of the language that expresses it, fails to be exhaustive. That does not prevent us from making valid distinctions based on our power to abstract.

What I think, is that in general, all the activities of living things display this "aboutness" which you refer to. — Metaphysician Undercover

Fine. Most of the rest of us do not see that.

I think I have spent enough time with you on this.

We can describe any intentional act as a physical act, simply by excluding the aboutness from the description. — Metaphysician Undercover

Really? How would you describe my knowing that God exists physically? Note that if you remove what my knowledge is about, you fail to specify what knowledge you are discussing. If I say moving my leg is local motion of a lower extremity, I have lost no content.

Also, I have no idea what you think a leg spasm is "about"?

This is what physicalists, materialist, and determinists do, they exclude intention from the description of the act, and from that description without intention, they claim intention is irrelevant to the act. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I said, some acts are intentionally done, others not. Or are you thinking that all acts reflect Divine Intent?

Without any hard principles whereby one could distinguish a physical act from an intentional act in the first place, and then describe the act accordingly, the distinction is meaningless. — Metaphysician Undercover

But I have specified the defining characteristics. Intentional acts are characterized by being about something. Physical acts are characterized by change.

I don't see how you can make this claim. To go from not thinking "pi" to thinking "pi", involves a change. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have addressed this already. Not thinking of pi is not an aspect of thinking of pi.

his crystalline text calved off the larger movement of your thinking. — tim wood

I take no credit for it. It is a standard Scholastic/Thomist position.

It endures (a function performed without matter?). So you call the rock spiritual? — tim wood

No, the rock could not endure absent its matter. If you destroyed its matter, the rock would no longer endure.

The rock is real. But it doesn't seem right to reckon the rock an "aspect" of reality. — tim wood

I would call it "a substance" or "a thing" because it is an ostensible unity. I generally say "aspect" when I'm talking about realities that are not things.

I think endurance is an aspect of reality. Is endurance independent of matter? — tim wood

The concept <endurance> abstracts away matter, but instances of endurance depend on matter, because it is the contrary of inconstancy -- which implies the possibility of change and change entails matter.

Is (the) endurance spiritual? — tim wood

One can have spiritual endurance. Still, that is because of trials found in the material world. It is maintaining one's spiritual commitments in the face of trial.

Well argued.

Could you give me an example of a human physical act which is not about something else? — Metaphysician Undercover

Moving my leg is a physical act. It may or may not serve a purpose It may doe example be the result of a spasm. Bit, even if it did serve a purpose, that would not make it an intentional act in the sense Im using the term. Why? Because there is no need to include the purpose served in defining the act. It is the local motion of a lower extremity -- perhaps specified by the time and place of occurrence. On the other hand, you cannot define a belief or a hope without saying what is believed or hoped for..

If there is an "act" which does not involve change in any essential way, how can this be said to be an "act" without contradiction? To act is to do something, and this implies change. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, in general act does not imply change. My thinking <pi is the ratio of the circumference of a circle to is diameter> involves no intrinsic change. Neither does my acting like a statute. Indeed, to the extent that I am moving, I'm not acting like a statue.

Take your example, "I know pi is an irrational number". Unless there is a change between the state of not knowing that pi is an irrational number, and knowing that pi is an irrational number, which is essential to the difference between these two, we cannot say that knowing pi as an irrational number, is an act. — Metaphysician Undercover

Note that you had to add something the was not only outside of the act of knowing, but its contrary to knowing in trying to make your point. Nothing intrinsically includes its contrary. So, your argument fails. Being aware is an act that involves no intrinsic change.

Isn't it the case that many physical acts are intentional? — Metaphysician Undercover

The motivation for a physical act is not the act. Some physical acts are intentionally motivated, others are not. The difference is that intentional acts is characterized by "aboutness." They are about something beyond themselves -- a goal to be attained or hoped for, something we know or believe and so on. Physical acts are characterized by motion and change: parts moving and transforming into other parts.

And, aren't all intentional acts physical because we cannot conceive of non-physical activity? — Metaphysician Undercover

We cannotimagine not physical activity. We have no trouble conceiving it. I know pi is an irrational number. There is no change involved in my knowing it per se. Any change is only accidentally associated with it.

How could an act be non-physical? — Metaphysician Undercover

By not involving change in any essential way.

Don't you find this distinction to be very impractical? — Metaphysician Undercover

No.

But what does orthogonality itself mean? They are two non-overlapping directions branching from some common origin. — apokrisis

When I say that two concepts are orthogonal, I mean that they do not share notes of intelligibility. So, they are not species of a single genus. If there is a common origin it is the null concept -- i.e. ignorance.

So that is the secret here. If we track back from both directions - the informational and the material - we arrive at their fundamental hinge point. — apokrisis

Not in terms of intelligibility which has to do with essence (specification). What thye have in common is existence, and we can trace it to God as its Source.

This is what physics is doing in its fundamental Planck-scale way. It is showing the hinge point at which informational constraint and material uncertainty begin their division. — apokrisis

There is no reason to think that things are ontologically indeterminate at Plank scales, only that our concepts break down -- which is an epistemological, not an ontological, problem.

We can measure information and entropy as two sides of the one coin — apokrisis

Actually we can't measure anything -- that is the epistemological problem.

biophysics is now doing the same thing for life and mind. — apokrisis

No, it's not. There is no naturalistic model of consciousness and no hint of one.

Finding the scale at which information and entropy are freely inter-convertible — apokrisis

You are confusing information as a logical concept with entropy which is a property of physical states. Entropy does not need to be known to play its role. information does. The fact that they share a common mathematical framework does not make them any more identical than apples and oranges. They also share a common math -- we can count them both.

That lack of a physicalist explanation has been the source of the mind/body dilemma. — apokrisis

No. Thinking that there is a physicalist explanation is the fundamental error -- as I showed in my discussion of the fundamental abstraction.

What is constraint except the actualising of some concrete possibility via the suppression of all other alternatives? — apokrisis

Constraint is not actualization. It is the reduction of (physical - not logical) possibility.

So intellect and will are just names that you give to the basic principle of informational or semiotic constraint — apokrisis

No, they are not. They do different things. So the difference here is ontological, not semantic.

fully articulated thoughts take time to form. — apokrisis

If thoughts took a nanosecond or an eon to form the problem would be the same. We can have determinate ideas for which there are no words. That is why language grows. New concepts require new words.

Then - like all motor acts — apokrisis

Ideogenesis is not a "motor act." It is the actualization of intelligibility. No movement can explain it. I suggest you read Dennett's misnamed Consciousness Explained. In it he shows why naturalistic assumptions are incompatible with the data of consciousness -- effectively falsifying naturalism wrt mind.

when thinking in the privacy of our own heads, we don't actually need to speak out loud. — apokrisis

Nor do we need to "speak" to ourselves. That is why we can have thoughts we lack the words to express.

The inner voice may mumble — apokrisis

Mumbling is having the words, but not enunciating them clearly. It does not explain lacking the words.

So you want to make this a case of either/or. Either thought leads to speech or speech leads to thought. — apokrisis

No. I'm pointing out which is more fundamental. Sure there are cases where words spark thought -- but they are derivative, not fundamental.

Homo sapiens is all about the evolution of a new grammatical semiotic habit. — apokrisis

Thank you for the faith claim.

Making up new rules or rule extensions can be part of that game. — apokrisis

Read what you wrote. If the rules constrain thought, we are constrained from making up new rules. So your theory is incoherent.

In your dreams you have — apokrisis

I do not need to convince you. I only need to make a sound case.

Get it right. Generalisation is the induction from the particular to the general. For an associative network to achieve that, it has to develop a hierarchical structure. — apokrisis

So how does that make it the same as abstraction -- which requires awareness?