As I said, I can't remember where I encountered that item of information, but a google search yielded this:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Primary/secondary_quality_distinction — Janus

Thank you for the reference. I think the proper formulation is to say that secondary qualities depend on the relation of particular sensory modalities to physical conditions, while primary qualities are independent of particular sensory modalities.

I think that tastes, odors, colors, and so on are no more than mere names

With respect to Galileo, they are more than bare "names." They are modes of sensory interaction.

that we are not aware of their being anything other than various arrangements of the size, figure, and motions of the parts of these objects — Janus

I think Descartes has it wrong as well. We are not aware of the "various arrangements of the size, figure, and motions," any more then we are aware of our brain states when we know the contents they encode. What we are aware of is the action of various kinds of physical states interacting with our senses. These are presented as qualia.

Differences are simply potentiality of values deviation between two observations. — Akanthinos

Differences can be either actual or potential.

The determination of identity is the determination of a set of values. — Akanthinos

Only if the identity in question is quantitative. Two numerically different protons can have identical masses and charges. We know they are numerically different because they stand in different relations to their environment -- including observers.

the FTA CAN be framed abductively (as an IBE), and this is a more comprehensive analysis than what you are arguing. — Relativist

I am discussing the actual form of the argument. You are not. Changing the FTA's form to what it is not gives you an easier target, but doesn't rebut the actual argument. I've shown that the FTA is an argumentum signum quia (depending on our prior experience of works of intellect), not a case of hypothetico-deductive reasoning.

This kind of bait and switch tactic is common with naturalists. Many say, for example, that free will is compatible with determinism, but to make the case, they re-define free will. Others redefine "intent" in a way that excludes our experience of intending. I give numerous other examples in my book.

I am not responding further to this distortion.

if we allow any exception to the principle of causality, we undermine all science.

You're pontificating an absurdity. Science need concern itself with nothing other than identifying laws of nature (how things work) and working toward a basic understanding of what is physically fundamental in the world. — Relativist

You are confused. Any scientist can limit her field of interest, but doing so does not undermine the fundamental principles of science. Specifically, we can rationally confine physics to quantifiable phenomena, but doing so does not posit the existence of uncaused phenomena. As my Becquerel example shows, denying the principle of sufficient reason undermines the structure of science.

Causation refers to something that occurs in the universe, a relation between physical things in the universe. — Relativist

There are many meanings of "causation," but the definition you've given does not describe how the laws of nature cause phenomena. A "thing" is an ostensible unity. The laws of nature aren't "things" that can be pointed to. I'm unsure how you are defining "physical," but if you're referring to objects with localized space-time coordinates, clearly the laws of nature are not "physical things" in that sense.

The laws of nature are real, not because they are "things," but because they are an intelligible aspect of reality. Further, there is no space-time separation between the laws and the events they control. They act concurrently. If the the law of conservation of mass-energy is not operational here and now, mass-energy will not be conserved here and now. Since there is no space-time separation between the law as cause and its effect, there is no physical relation to be discerned.

Still the laws are causes -- we scientists point to their operation when we wish to explain the time development of the universe or the evolution of species.

There's no basis for claiming it to be more than that (such as a metaphysical principle) — Relativist

Thank you for sharing your faith.

Metaphysical principles are no more or less than fundamental lessons of experience that apply to all existence.

So, of course there's an empirical basis for a different, concurrent view of causality. Aristotle's paradigm case of concurrent ("essential") causality is a builder building a house. This is one, unified event with two intelligible aspects linked by identity. The cause is the builder building the house and the effect is the house being built by the builder. These are necessarily linked because the builder building the house is identically the house being built by the builder.

On the other hand, as Hume famously showed, there is no intrinsic necessity to causality considered as the orderly succession of pairs of events. Something can always intervene between separate events.

Either every phenomenon has an adequate explanation, or we have no rational grounds for requiring an explanation for any phenomena.

You're conflating physical causation with explanation. Explanations exist only in minds; causation exists in its physical instantiations. — Relativist

This is pettifogging. "Explanation" has two meanings, one is the aspect(s) of reality that bring about a phenomenon. That is what I am discussing. The other is a representation of how those aspects of reality bring about the phenomenon. You can tell that I'm talking about the reality by my reference to "grounds."

R: " Physicalism entails the non-existence of states that are "logically prior"

Physics problems often specify an initial state that is logically (and temporally) prior to the final state. Any information used as a starting point in reasoning is, by definition, logically prior to the conclusion.

You're conflating explanations (and "problems") with what actually exists. — Relativist

You seem terribly confused. Note that the subject of my first sentence is "Physics problems." Physics problems are mental puzzles that arise out of reflection on the physical world. They are not in the world, but in the mind reflecting on it. Thus, they are part of the logical order. In short, I did not say that "logical priority" is an aspect of the physical world, but of thought about the physical world.

You're merely identifying the agents of causation, ignoring the temporal context - so your account is incomplete. No clear case of causation occurs other than in a temporal context. — Relativist

Of course all thought and writing about reality is incomplete. We think in terms of abstractions that always leave data on the table.

The point is that Humean-Kantian ("accidental") causality is defined as the temporal succession of events according to rule, and so involves time in its very definition. On the other hand, Aristotelian concurrent ("essential") causality involves a single reality considered in different ways so, time does not enter into its definition.

In other words, essential (concurrent) causality does not reflect the emergence over time of a new state. It reflects the fact that in any given state, there are active and potential aspects and the reality of the potential aspect(s) (effects) depends on the operation of the active aspect, aka the "cause."

Of course it's temporal! You weren't thinking of me prior to our initial engagement on this forum. — Relativist

When I say that time does not enter in an essential way, I do not mean that my thinking of you occurs outside of time. Clearly it does not. What i mean is that time is the measure of change according to before and after, and my continuing thinking of you (as opposed to my starting to think of you), involves no essential change. Since it involves no essential change, time does not enter continuing thought in an essential way -- only incidentally.

This again suggests you're considering life an ends. — Relativist

Objectively, life is the end of the process we call "biogenesis," just as the emergence of specific species are the ends of the processes we call the "evolution" of those species. I don't see what objection you can have to me thinking of states that are objectively the end of identifiable processes are ends. What am I missing?

But you haven't provided a reason to think life is an "ends", and you haven't examined the other logical fork (that it is unintended). — Relativist

To say that life is the end of the process if biogenesis is not to assume that it is intended. It is simply an observation. The fact that life is the termination of biogenesis may be evidence that life is in some sense intended, but being evidence for x is not "assuming" x.

Note that Daniel Dennett, a dyed in the wool atheist, makes a lengthy argument that these kinds of processes are intentional in his The Intentional Stance. So, seeing intentionality here does not require one to be a theist.

The claim, "the fundamental constants are a sign of intentionality " simply ignores the possibility that life is just a byproduct of the way the world happens to be, and depends on treating life as an "ends" - which you have not justified. — Relativist

No, it does not. You continue to ignore how heuristic reasoning works. It's not deductive, and certainly not ironclad. Instead, it reflects on analogous cases and concludes that the present case is like them. "Where there's smoke, there's fire," doesn't mean that smoke invariably entails fire -- it just says that fire is a very rational conclusion when we see smoke. It's certainly possible that aliens made the smoke by pouring oil on the exhaust of their hyperdrive, but we've never seen that happen before, while we've often seen fire make smoke.

he fact that multiverse is possible gives it the same epistemic standing as — Relativist

Aliens pouring oil on their hyperdrive exhaust.

You don't seem to understand what I'm referring to. Symmetry breaking is the process by which a physical system in a symmetric state ends up in an asymmetric state. — Relativist

I am sorry, but as a theoretical physicist, I do understand "spontaneous" symmetry breaking. It was investigated by Pierre Curie, who came to the conclusion I gave you: By definition, perfect symmetry can never be broken. As far as I know, no one has ever shown that Curie's analysis is flawed. That does not mean that "negligibly" imperfect symmetry cannot be made manifest by inflation.

Your understanding is decades out of date: the Copenhagen interpretation ... — Relativist

I am not a proponent of the Copenhagen interpretation. I think the best approach is to avoid "interpretations" and look at what physics actually tells us. Still, this is not the forum to discuss interpretations of quantum theory; nevertheless, as long as the equations continue to work, we can be confident that the time-development of unobserved states is deterministic.

So you really have no grounds for dismissing the physical possibility that the observed laws of physics might be a consequence of symmetry breaking ... — Relativist

You are arguing against a position I have not taken.

I am baffled as to how you can justify dismissing one metaphysically possible hypothesis for its ostensible unfalsifiability whilst claiming victory for your preferred hypothesis that is (at best) equally unfalsifiable. — Relativist

You are baffled because you have still not understood what I'm telling you.
1. I am not dismissing one "metaphysical hypothesis." I am dismissing any hypothetico-deductive deductive approach to metaphysics. The proper method of metaphysics is to abstract necessary principles from our experience of reality, then, applying them to concrete experiences, deduce necessary conclusions about the nature of being and our place in it.
2. Independently of the field of application, unfalsifiable hypotheses are unacceptable in the hypothetico-deductive (scientific) method because it can't be applied to them. The method works by feigning hypotheses, deducting consequences of those hypotheses, and testing the deduced consequences against reality. If a hypothesis is unfalsifiable, we can't test it, and so the method is inapplicable. Feigning an unfalsifiable hypothesis is simply stating a faith position.
3. The FTA is an argumentum signum quia. As such, it is not a sound deductive argument, or even a hypothetical argument. It is merely a persuasive case.

I do not think it is worthwhile to continue this discussion, as we are making no progress.

Unfortunately, Aristotle thinks "in some cases the matter .. is such that it can initiate its own motion [italics mine], and in other cases it is not ...".

Until you can explain this statement on your theory, the case is closed. — Dfpolis

I already explained this. In these cases there is a form inherent within the material body, a source of activity called the soul. It's quite well explained in "On the Soul". — Metaphysician Undercover

Sorry, that doesn't explain the text. He does not say that an associated form acts, but "matter .. is such that it can initiate its own motion."

Where he makes the statement you quoted above, he goes on to compare this type of movement with that of a stone. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, stones are natural objects, not artifacts. They fall as a result of their intrinsic nature.

My understanding is consistent with the whole Aristotelian corpus and its historical context. I think we've exhausted this subject.

So the laws cause matter to behave the way that it does, by informing it? I assume that they exist as information then. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, not as abstract information, but as an intelligible aspect of reality.

How could matter interpret the information which the laws provide, in order to act according to the laws, if it is not aware of that information — Metaphysician Undercover

I did not say it interpreted the laws. It simply acts in a uniform, orderly fashion and that uniform mode of action is the foundation in reality for our concept <laws of nature>.

Don't you think that information is useless without something to interpret it? Do you know of any cases where information does anything without something interpreting it? — Metaphysician Undercover

As I said above, we are not dealing with actual information, but with intelligibility. When we become aware of the intelligible order in nature, we form the concept <laws of nature>, which can enter into judgements about reality -- informing us. Until we have a true judgement, there is no reduction of what is logically possible, and so no information.

Well that' a really bad analogy then. — Metaphysician Undercover

All analogies fall short. That's what makes them analogies instead of veridical descriptions.

Why would you even think that matter exhibiting orderly dynamics is a case of matter obeying laws, when this has nothing in common with what we know as "obeying laws"? — Metaphysician Undercover

If there were no note of commonality, there would not be an analogy. The common note is that, both are a source of order in their respective spheres.

As I see it, knowing and willing are objective relations; their intentional objects are not subjective, but objective (and shared, public). — gurugeorge

There is no knowing without a subject knowing, no willing without a subject willing. So, our experiences as subjects are essential data in understanding the reality of knowing and willing.

I'm not denying that there are objective acts we call "knowing" and "willing." Nor am i denying the intersubjective availability of many of their objects. Still, these acts are asymmetrically relational and so cannot be fully understood without examining both terms of the relation.

Broadly I take a view on causality that is Aristotelian and Peircean. — apokrisis

I know Aristotle's views quite well. While I respect Peirce, I don't know as much about him as a should. What should I know of his view of causality?

Which then cashes out in the kind of current physicalism which sees information and entropy as bridging the old mind-matter divide. — apokrisis

It seems to me that the "divide" is between subjectivity considered in isolation and objectivity considered in isolation. If so, the divide can be bridged by considering them holistically. The concepts of subjectivity and objectivity certainly relate to information, but I don't see what role entropy, as a measure of disorder, has to play.

Talk of an "informational realm" is pretty general. — apokrisis

I am not talking about an information realm, but about physical and intentional theaters of operation and their relation.

You can inquire about the location of an event, or the momentum of an event, but not get a complete answer on both in just a single act of measurement. — apokrisis

While this problem is based in reality, it is due to a misconceptualization of reality not to any ontic inconsistency. As Aristotle points out in Metaphysics Delta, real quantities are not actual numbers but specific forms of intelligibility: either countability (for discrete quantity) or measurability (for continuous quantity). Thus, quantum states do not have actual numerical positions or numerical momenta -- rather they are susceptible to location measurements and momentum measurements.

There is no a priori reason to think that different measurement operations will be interference free. The Principle of Quantum Indeterminacy simply tells us that this logical possibility is real. We cannot simultaneously measure canonically conjugate variables (such as position and momentum, time and energy) with arbitrary accuracy. This may be a surprise, but it has no profound metaphysical implications.

your proposal strikes me as having a particular problem. It seems to have to presume a classical Newtonian backdrop notion of time - a spatialised dimension. And modern physics would be working towards an emergent and thermal notion of time as a better model. So any logical propagator would have to unfold in that kind of time, not a Newtonian one. — apokrisis

First, my concept of time is Aristotelian, not Newtonian. "Time is the measure of change according to before and after." I see no conflict between it and any recent development in physics.

Physics does point to a regime, the big bang "before" Planck time, when our <time> concept breaks down -- because the required measurements are impossible in principle. The canonical (Lagrangian and Hamiltonian) formulations of the laws of physics also break down, along with General Relativity and quantum field theory. I have no special insight into how to formulate physics in this regime.

So, I'm quite happy to concede that there are regimes in which our concepts break down. I don't think that'is an argument against them in regimes where they do apply.

But the bare physical world - the world that does not have this kind of anticipatory intentional modelling of its tomorrow - has only its tendencies, not its plans. So it is "intentional" in an importantly different way. — apokrisis

I would agree: Mary has an explicit representation of the "final" state she intends. Nature does not. Still nature has an implicit representation. Except for personal agency, the present state of the universe and the laws of nature fully specify (and therefore represent) the "final" state. Still, the only difference is that one representation (nature's) is merely intelligible, while the other (Mary's) is both intelligible and actually known.

All this is a great advance on the old notion of transcendent laws floating somewhere above everything they regulate in some kind of eternal and perfect fashion. — apokrisis

I do not see that one projection excludes the other. From the initial appearance of laws of nature in Jeremiah until very recently, the laws were seen as both fixed and providential. As James Hannam points out in The Genesis of Science: How the Christian Middle Ages Launched the Scientific Revolution, without this combined perspective we would not have the scientific revolution as we know it.

Yes, the full physical description needs to recognise final and formal cause. — apokrisis

I would say a full philosophical description. Mathematical physics seems to be getting along nicely without these concepts.

So everything can be brought back to the notion of constraints. — apokrisis

I agree that is one conceptual space into which we can project our experience. It has a related set of supporting concepts that can give rise to novel insights. Still, the concept of constraints is not in any way "unique." Constraints restrict possibilities, but information is defined to be the reduction of possibility. So, we can move our representation from the conceptual space of constraints to that of information -- activating a host of new associations and insights. Again, information reflects the Greco-Scholastic concept of <form> with its network of elaborations.

So, I don't see the benefit of prizing one conceptual space above another.


Stepping back, I am reminded of the Scholastic axiom: "whatever is received, is received according to the mode of the recipient." So, I do not expect that your reception of my ideas will mirror my views. Hopefully you will make fruitful new connections.

I would be happy to comment. I follow Aquinas on a number of issues, but depart from him on a few points where he has a Neoplatonic, rather an an Aristotelian, position. Specifically, I reject (1) his notion of prima materia (prime matter) as a completely unintelligible passive potency and (2) his claim that we can have no intellectual knowledge of particulars. This are related positions and it is hard to reject (1) without rejecting (2).

I have published my reasons for rejecting (1) -- "A New Reading of Aristotle's Hyle," Modern Schoolman 68 (3):225-244 (1991) (https://philpapers.org/rec/POLANR)

My main reason for rejecting (2) is that It makes the application of universal knowledge to particulars impossible. To apply any science to reality we need a judgement of the form "This particular is an A" (where A is a universal). On Aquinas's theory this judgement can't be formed by the intellect (which doesn't know any particular), nor can it be formed at the sensory level (because A is a universal).

Now to your text. Brennan gives an accurate and competent presentation of Aquinas's theory. So, let me say where I think it breaks down.

This means that in the case of sense knowledge, the form is still encompassed with the concrete characters which make it particular; and that, in the case of intellectual knowledge, the form is disengaged from all such characters. To understand is to free form completely from matter.

First, this seems to reify the form. Objects are intelligible - they have various aspects the intellect can grasp (notes of intelligibility). A subset of these notes corresponds to each concept the object can evoke in us. One subset evokes the concept <human>, another the concept <tall>, etc. These notes of intelligibility are not separated in the object, which is an ostensible unity (a "substance" = ousia).

Second, while different material objects have different matter (different atoms), we understand that an object is this particular by grasping, intellectually, is place in the world -- its relation to other objects. This individualizing relations are just as intelligible as the notes that define the kind of object we are dealing with. So, yes, the matter of an object does not enter us in cognition, but information that allows us to judge an objects particularity does.

Third, abstraction is not a mystical process that removes the "form" from individuating data. It is simply us attending to some notes of intelligibility to the exclusion of others. So, when he says "To understand is to free form completely from matter," that is simply wrong. (a) An object's matter never enters our senses -- its action does. (b) If it were true, we could never understand anything other than forms (the intelligibility required to evoke species concepts such as <human>). We could not know when and where we were born, how tall we are, or whether we are driving on the right or left side of the road.

Moreover, if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized.

This is simply a dogmatic claim -- and one contradicted by experience. We have universal concepts not only of substantial forms (e.g. humans, cats and planets), but also of accidents (e.g. height, hair color and age).

But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality.

If you read Aristotle's De Anima you will see that concepts arise when the agent intellect actualizes notes of intelligibility latent in the phantasm (bound sensory representation). If we actualize the notes common to a species, we form the concept of a species form, but we can just as well actualize the notes of intelligibility informing us of an object's particular and individualizing traits (its "accidents").

Since the notion of "agent intellect" is very abstract, it is good to ask how this concept relates to experience. What mental act makes neurally encoded information actually known? Clearly, we come to know when we become aware of them. So, the agent intellect is simply our awareness -- and abstraction is focusing our attention, our awareness, on some aspects of experience to the exclusion of others.

Note that the word nous, which Aristotle uses for intellect, is a cognate of noos (vision).

the intellectual stage, wherein agent intellect operates upon the phantasmal datum, divesting the form of every character that marks and indentifies it as a particular something.

I would say that we are in the realm of intellect when ever we are aware. Sensory processing absent awareness is just what Freud called the unconscious mind.

Abstraction, which is the proper task of active intellect, is essentially a liberating function in which the essence of the sensible object, potentially understandable as it lies beneath its accidents, is liberated from the elements that individualize it and is thus made actually understandable.

As you can see, this is not my understanding, nor, I think, that of Aristotle.

The A of "A at T1" and "A at T2" are identical because they are the same A, not because of any other attributes such as composition or spatial location. — Akanthinos

Just to be clear, by A and A' I meant two simultaneous instances of the same type, not one A at successive times. So, I'm not sure that we are considering the same example.

A at different times is numerically one because its successive states are linked by dynamic continuity, not because they are made of the same constituents. It is formally one to the extent that its successive states have the same intelligibility (can evoke the same concepts).

The question was "Can identity give rise to differences?" My claim was that it cannot. So, I pointed out the differences between two formally identical instance of the same type. Differences, being relational, cannot be found by examining one object in isolation. We need to consider their relations.

A is identical to A is identical to A is ... But each instances are different and identifiable. The phenomenal compound of "A on pick 1" and "A on pick 2" are different. — Akanthinos

I do not see how this rebuts my claim. Yes, A is numerically one, but your example is not pointing out a difference in A, but in the picking events. These events are different because they stand in objectively different temporal relations to each other.

Attributes and relations do not constitute objects, they reveal something about them. — Akanthinos

I never said they did. Still, they are our means of knowing objects.

I think it may have started with Galileo — Janus

I would be happy to learn of its roots in Galileo, if any.

Why would we need to be agnostic when intentionality is something neurocognition studies? We have reason to make a definite distinction between brains and universes, purposes and laws. — apokrisis

Three points.
1. I'm anything but agnostic on the existence of God. I am a theist.
2. The points I've discussed in this thread are an insufficient to decide the existence of God. I have not discussed the origin of the laws or what their existence betokens. Even if we say that intentionality betokens an intending mind, that does not tell us that mind is God. So the agnosticism is wrt respect to what has been established, not with respect to the existence of God in general. Elsewhere i have used the continuing operation of the laws to argue the existence of God.
3. The existence of God is a contentious issue that could easily sidetrack the conversation I want to have.

Given that it is probability states that evolve deterministically, then I would say that makes it literally part of the equation. — apokrisis

What evolves deterministically is a wave that can be used to calculate a probability. That does not imply that the wave itself is probabilistic. Observations always involve an interaction between a relatively isolated quantum system and detectors made of bulk matter. We have no way of knowing the detailed initial state of the detectors, and calculating their interaction with a quantum system is beyond our mathematical wherewithal. This twofold ignorance is a sufficient reason to see the relative unpredictability of measurements as epistic rather than ontic.

And classical determinism is an emergent feature of reality at best. — apokrisis

I'm unsure why you think classical determinism is "emergent." "Emergent" means that a feature is logically irreducible to some prior knowledge base. Given that our knowledge of reality is a posteriori, I see no reason to see determinism as "emergent" with respect to some set of prior features. It is just another contingent fact. What am I missing?

Let me say in anticipation, so we aren't talking at cross purposes, that I do not think that human agency is predetermined. The determinism I'm discussing is my best understanding of what physics tells us -- based on years of advanced study and decades of reflection.

So you are taking an approach to the laws of nature that seems really dated. — apokrisis

I am not concerned with whether my views are dated or avant garde. I only want sound analysis consistent with the known facts.

The idea that transcendent laws could some how reach down, God-like, to regulate the motions of particles was always pretty hokey. An immanent view of nature's laws is going to be more useful if we want to make sense of what is really going on. — apokrisis

My view combines Newton's insight that the laws we learn on earth apply to the whole universe (and so are transcendent) with the fact that the laws are inseparable from the matter they act to control (and so immanent).

Sounds good. But I'm not getting much sense of how you mean to proceed from here. — apokrisis

One step is to discard the ill-defined modern concept of "substance" and return to Aristotle's view that ostensible unities are fundamental our understanding of the world. So, we are not a material "substance" interacting with a mental "substance," but single beings who can act physically and intentionally -- which lead us to examine how our intentional acts relate to our physical acts.

Part of the answer rests on the fact that the laws of nature and our committed intentions act in the same theater of operations.

Talk of "laws" is definitely nonsense if we are to understand that as meaning anything like the kind of law-bound behaviour of reasoning social creatures like us. — apokrisis

Clearly, "laws" has different meanings in the natural order and the social order. Still, the meanings are not equivocal, but analogous. They are both sources of order, but the order is effected in different ways. Also, historically, when the notion of fixed laws of nature first appears in Western thought (in Jeremiah), it is taken for granted that they are the acts of a lawgiver.

But the irony, as I say, is that our human concept of law is all about reification. We create these abstract constructs like truth, justice and good, then try to live by them. A lot of hot air is spent on debating their "reality". — apokrisis

While I certainly agree that our abstractions are not "things," we shouldn't assume that they're mere constructs. Abstractions arise from the mind fixing on some notes of intelligibility in reality to the exclusion of others -- so they have an objective basis. Constructs, on the other hand, are invented to fill gaps in our knowledge and have an inadequate basis in reality.

The problem is that they don't work very well - at least to explain "everything". — apokrisis

Exactly.

So first up, science just is modelling and hence abstractions are how it goes about its business. That won't change — apokrisis

I don't expect it to. The Fundamental Abstraction is a useful methodological move. It whittles the complexity of reality down to a scale more proportioned to our limited mental capabilities. The problem is forgetting that it is an abstraction -- committing Whitehead's Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness -- and thinking that physicality exhausts reality (as physicalists do) or, as you suggest, reifying the abstraction into a res extensa (as Cartesian dualists do).

Second, physicalism can now be better understood in terms of information and entropy rather than mind and matter. — apokrisis

I would be happy to see how you develop this line of thought. I am not one, however, to abandon one conceptual space in favor of another. Each gives us a different projection of reality. So employing several can only enrich our understanding.

And that semiotic view even explains why science - as an informational process - should be a business of abstractions ... so as to be able to regulate the world insofar as it is a concrete and entropic realm of being. — apokrisis

The idea that the sciences are defined by their various degrees of abstraction is well developed in Aquinas Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius. Applying the language of information theory to this insight is a recent development.

I am not sure how you see abstractions as "able to regulate the world."

You are welcome.

Why on earth should anybody care about their subjective experiences? They're of interest only to them. — gurugeorge

As philosophers we are not interested in subjective experiences because they a particular to each person, but because they they are tokens of types of experiences such as knowing and willing.

A and A' are not different because they are identical, but because they are made of different atoms and occupy different locations. So, I do not see that you have rebutted my claim that "You can't derive differences (in thought or in the physical world) from identity. If you have differences, it is because there is some real difference giving rise to them."

We care what Ptolemy, Galileo, Newton and Hubble saw, not about their subjective experience in seeing it. — Dfpolis

Eh, we still don't care. — gurugeorge

It's a matter of choice. Some of us do. You seem not to.

This is what I'm trying to get at in this thread: Is it valid to say that an elephant and a rock and the feeling of looking at a sunset are all merely different names/forms of X (consciousness in this case)? Or do these things 'possess' some sort of essence/identity that make them ultimately unique, despite their all being sublated by consciousness? — rachMiel

You can't derive differences (in thought or in the physical world) from identity. If you have differences, it is because there is some real difference giving rise to them. So, yes, it's rational to conclude that our experiences of elephants and rocks can be traced to irreducible differences in their origins.

It's irrational to think that the variety of our experiences is unreal. At the very least our experiences are part of reality.

So I agree that being is not a "prior substrate" and would say that the very notion of a prior substrate, or passive substance, is really incoherent. — Janus

I think we pretty much agree

The Laws of Nature are immaterial, transcendent and immanent, principles which act (operating, controlling). So, they are independent of, and determine, existence. From a theological standpoint, they can be equated (or at least associated) with God. — Galuchat

They do not determine "existence," but the time-development of material systems.

However, the relation to God has deep historical roots. Jeremiah, who introduced the idea of fixed laws of nature into Western literature (Jer. 31:36; 33:25 -- a generation before Thales), conceived of them as divine ordinances, and Aquinas used them as the evidentiary basis of his fifth way. Newton thought God "tweaked" them to give us the observed orbits (the "hypothesis of God" rejected by Laplace). I'm not making the God case here -- I'm looking at the laws in se and in relation to the mind-body problem.

The Laws of Nature are an explanation (cause) of existential change and/or stasis. Then are they efficient cause? — Galuchat

If you define an efficient cause as one that actualizes a potential, then in actualizing potential physical states, they are an efficient cause.

If the observable sign of intentionality is "systematic time development ordered to ends" (efficient cause), what is final cause? — Galuchat

We need to understand that formal, material, efficient and final causality are different ways of conceiving the same event or process. They need not be separate "things" as a logical atomist might think. A final cause is the foundation in reality for the form of a state to be actualized. It is those aspects of present reality that determine the form of what will come to be. In the model of physics, future states are determined by the initial state (present form) and the laws of nature. So, the final cause is the form of the present state together with the laws of nature, jointly conceived as determining the future state.

To make my point about different ways of conceiving the same process, think of the supposed opposition between mechanism and teleology. If a mechanist is a determinist, she is, ipso facto, a supporter of teleology -- for she posits the immanence of the future form Final causes do not act from the future to "pull" the present state into the future state, they are immanent and active throughout the process. My desire to go to the store (final cause) does not pull me to the store, it guides my intermediate actions to effect my arrival at the store. Thus, teleology and mechanism are two projections of the same reality. Instead of being contraries, they are complimentary -- related as ends and means. Mechanism fixes on means, teleology on ends.

I understand data transformation with reference to mathematical function (correspondence) and the process of encoding/decoding, but would appreciate a definition of "logic" in terms of data transformation which works for both the Laws of Nature and human committed intentions. — Galuchat

In talking about the logical order, I'm discussing information. Information is the reduction of (logical) possibility and results from the actualization of intelligibility. Both physical and intentional states have an intelligibility that is prior to our knowledge of them.

While information properly speaking belongs to the logical order, a state's intelligibility, as a source of information, may be called "information" by an analogy of attribution -- just as we say food is "heathy" not because it's alive and well, but because it contributes to health.

So, I'm using "logical" to refer to the information (intelligibility) specifying a state, whether that state be physical or intentional. "Logical Propagators" in nature, then, transform the intelligibility of one state into that of another.

What do you mean when you say that these laws are "operative"? You say that the laws are immaterial yet they operate, acting to control matter. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean that they inform future states. Of all the metaphysically possible future states only a determinate future state is actualized at a given time. As information is the reduction of possibility, the laws inform successive states of the cosmos.

So this "acting from within", is really the individual acting in choice to follow the laws. The laws are actually passive, not acting at all.. Is this the same way that matter is controlled by laws? Does the matter know and understand the laws, choosing to obey the laws, but still maintaining the capacity to disobey? — Metaphysician Undercover

We have no evidence to suggest that matter is aware, let along aware of the laws of nature. Because of the Fundamental Abstraction rational agents are not adequately accounted for by physics. Thus, it is not surprising that we act in ways not described by physics.

If this is not the way that these laws operate, or act, to control matter from within, how else could they act to enforce themselves from within the matter? — Metaphysician Undercover

We know, as a contingent fact, that matter exhibits an orderly dynamics, which by analogy with human ordinances, we call "obeying laws." This does not imply either awareness or choice on the part of matter. Asking how the laws work is like asking what dynamics links the dynamic of a system to the system it is the dynamics of. That kind of question misunderstands what "dynamics" means.

Well, yes and no. The laws don't cause material events in the sense of a willing, planning, intending mind. So they can't be essentially intentional in the usual psychological definition of intentional. It can only be some kind of analogy. — apokrisis

My logical propagator argument shows that the laws of nature are in the same genus as human intentions, not the same species. My comparison with human committed intentions is certainly an analogical argument. Still, since the analysis does not address the issue of an intending mind, we need to be agnostic as to their origin and its character.

Quantum theory shows that probabilistic spontaneity is part of the equation. — apokrisis

This is a common misunderstanding. Quantum theory restricts probability to observations and asserts that states evolve deterministically between observations. (E.g. P. A. M Dirac, Quantum Mechanics 4th ed. p. 108) Since there could be no observations before the advent of intelligent observers, quantum theory sees the evolution of the universe and of life up to recent times as completely deterministic.

not jump all the way over to a mentalistic or idealistic metaphysics. — apokrisis

It is not my intention to do so. Recall that I said that all knowing involves both a known object and a knowing subject.

A system develops a record of its past as some kind of memory. And that history constrains all further free possibility. The physical future is still free - a matter of unconstrained accident - but also a freedom that is shaped into some definite set of likelihoods. — apokrisis

The model physics finds adequate today is that all of the past is summed up in the present physical state (with no detailed "memory" of how that state arose). Future states are completely determined by the laws of nature acting on the present state. There are no "probabilities" involved unless one wishes to predict a measurement (observation).

by being able to predict the propensities of the world, an observing self becomes included in the future outcomes of that world. The self becomes a player who can act to constrain outcomes, even at a future date, so as to serve locally particular goals. — apokrisis

We agree. The question is how to form a coherent understanding of both physics and personal agency.

think you are aiming to conflate the two stories. Physicalism - seeking to make a minimal expansion to its causal metaphysics - would agree that finality has to be part of its fundamental story now. But it can already see how psychological finality is its own semiotic story. It is discontinuous with the physicalist picture in the important regard of introducing a modelling relation with the world. — apokrisis

I am not seeking to conflate anything. Broadly, I'm saying that physicalism (as opposed to physics) is an instance of Whiteheads Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness -- that it confuses an abstraction (resulting from the Fundamental Abstraction of natural science) with the complex concrete reality from which it is abstracted. We have two disjoint abstractions -- the objective world of physics, and the subjective world of Cartesian mind. What we need is to understand is how the concrete world bridges these abstractions. In other words, the mind-body problem is not a problem of the lived world, but of confusing our abstractions with reality.

Do you think a Thomas Aquinas would have made that statement? — Wayfarer

Yes, I think he would.

I think the awareness of ourselves as knowing subjects, separate from the domain of objective facts, is one of the hallmarks of the modern period. — Wayfarer

Consider:

As stated above (Articles 1 and 2) a thing is intelligible according as it is in act. Now the ultimate perfection of the intellect consists in its own operation: for this is not an act tending to something else in which lies the perfection of the work accomplished, as building is the perfection of the thing built; but it remains in the agent as its perfection and act, as is said Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8. Therefore the first thing understood of the intellect is its own act of understanding. This occurs in different ways with different intellects. For there is an intellect, namely, the Divine, which is Its own act of intelligence, ... And there is yet another, namely, the human intellect, which neither is its own act of understanding, nor is its own essence the first object of its act of understanding, for this object is the nature of a material thing. And therefore that which is first known by the human intellect is an object of this kind, and that which is known secondarily is the act by which that object is known; and through the act the intellect itself is known, the perfection of which is this act of understanding. For this reason did the Philosopher assert that objects are known before acts, and acts before powers (De Anima ii, 4).

-- Summa Theologiae Ia, q. 87, art 3.

You're right that, beginning with Descartes, philosophers have posited that we know our mind independently of knowing the other; however, this isn't what Aquinas and I are doing. I'm following Aquinas in saying that in knowing the other we can grasp that we have the power to know. ("that which is first known by the human intellect is an object of this kind, and that which is known secondarily is the act by which that object is known.")

In other words, every act of knowing has two objects. One, (the objective object), is the thing we seek to know, say an apple. The other (the subjective object) is what our act of knowing the objective object reveals about ourselves -- e.g. that we can and are seeing, that we can and are being aware. In the Fundamental Abstraction we fix on the objective object to the exclusion of the subjective object.

Aquinas assumes that the intelligible forms of things are known directly by the intellect — Wayfarer

No, he does not assume "that the intelligible forms of things are known directly." He follows Aristotle's analysis in De Anima, saying that we know material objects via the senses -- by abstracting intelligible features from phantasms (bound sensory representations). He says explicitly that we have no direct knowledge of essences -- knowing them only by sensible accidents.

And that this comes sharply into focus with the foundation of modern science, and its assumption of the distinction of 'primary qualities', which are those qualities that are subject to exact mathematical analysis, and 'secondary qualities', which are associated with the subject. — Wayfarer

The modern mind-body problem begins with Descartes, who antedates Newton and whose mathematical physics is a joke. The distinction of primary and secondary qualities seems to start with Locke -- long after Descartes..

Nagel Has a poor grasp of the history of science -- accepting mythic over documentary history. A good remedy would be reading in the history of medieval science. good starting point. James Hannam, The Genesis of Science: How the Christian Middle Ages Launched the Scientific Revolution is a good starting point, despite missing a few critical points. Medieval physicists developed mathematical concepts (such as inertia and instantaneous velocity) essential to classical physics -- providing the foundation on which Galileo and Newton built.

So, there's nothing about a mathematical approach to the material world that gives rise to either Cartesian duality or the modern mind-body problem. The actual cause is Descartes's profound ignorance of the tradition -- leaving him to work out both physics and philosophy de novo.

It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop. — Thomas Nagel

Nagel sees an important point here, but, I think, mischaracterizes it. Leaving out the subjective is a rational methodological move, but no more "essential" than the willing suspension of disbelief in watching a drama.

Dennett's 'eliminativism' is a direct consequence of the application of this paradigm to 'the subject' — Wayfarer

I agree that Dennett is applying this paradigm; but it is utterly irrational to think, as Dennett does, that the paradigm is adequate to the full range of reality.

I think that "matter" as used and defined by Aristotle signifies something completely passive, and that is potential, or potency. — Metaphysician Undercover

Unfortunately, Aristotle thinks "in some cases the matter .. is such that it can initiate its own motion [italics mine], and in other cases it is not ..."[/quote]. Until you can explain this statement on your theory, the case is closed.

My argument is that in all the cases where he uses "matter" in this way, it is in reference to living things, and he has clearly attributed this activity which appears to inhere within matter, to a form, the soul. — Metaphysician Undercover

He uses living things as his primary source of examples of natural (as opposed to artificial) processes. I've already said that matter passively receives form in the creation of artifacts -- just not in natural substantial changes.

I was writing my post when you asked about point 2. I hope that it provides a satisfactory answer.

With regard to the first point, the Fundamental Abstraction of natural science: Every act of knowing is both objective and subjective. It involves both a known object, and a knowing subject. When we begin natural science we choose to focus on the object to the exclusion of the subject. We care what Ptolemy, Galileo, Newton and Hubble saw, not about their subjective experience in seeing it. So the fundamental abstraction leaves behind any and all data on the subject as such. As a result the natural sciences are bereft of the data required to address human subjectivity, awareness and intentionality.

The second point of discussion deals with the laws operative in nature, as opposed to what we may call "the laws of physics," which are approximate descriptions of the laws operative in nature.

(1) We explain things by immaterial laws of nature. Asking, “What is the law of conservation of mass/energy made of?” betrays a category error. Natural laws are not made of particles or fields, but are immaterial principles operating through­out the cosmos.
(2) These laws are immanent, operating in matter, and transcendent, depending on no single species or instance of matter, but controlling all matter regardless of constitution or properties.
(3) The laws explain things here and now because they act here and now. If laws did not act, we could never experience their effects. For energy to be conserved here and now, the law of conservation of energy must act here and now. The explanation is a concur­rent, co-existing cause, not a Humean prior event. “Explanation” has two meanings. One is a word string describing a causal structure. The other is the cause so described. We are discussing causes in nature.
(4) These laws are aspects of reality, not fictions. Laws of nature are not invented, but discovered. While the laws of physics are human products, the realities they approximately describe antedate humans. If they did not, they could not explain the evolution of either the universe or life.
(5) Since the laws explain why energy, momentum, and elec­­tric charge remain constant, science requires explanations not only for changes, but also for constancy.

A pivotal thesis is that the laws of nature are essentially intentional. One way to see this is to reflect on what I call "Logical Propagators."

Logical Propagators: Logical propagators are propositions or judgments allow­ing in­for­ma­tion about one space-time point to be applied to another. Using conser­vation laws to explain a stone’s existence required our premises be true at the time and place of their application. It is inadequate for a law to be true at another time or place. To be effective, an explanation must be operative when and where applied. Consider an argument whose premises are only true some­times. For a conclusion to follow, the major and minor prem­ises must be true simultaneously. If one premise is true now and the other later, the conclusion is unsound. For example:
All now in the room can hear Mary. (Time specific)
John will be in the room tomorrow. (Time Mismatch)
John can hear Mary. (Invalid)
This is invalid because of the temporal mismatch. There is noth­ing profound here.

Still, we routinely draw conclusions true at one time from data true at another. Scientists and engineers make predictions, and we base our lives on past experience and future expectation. Whenever we do this, we rely on logical propagators. Consider:
All in the room when Mary speaks can hear her. (Timeless)
Mary now intends to speak in the room tomorrow. (Logical Propagator)
John will be in the room tomorrow. (Time matched)
John can hear Mary tomorrow. (Valid)
The second premise uses a fact today to make an assertion about tomorrow. It is because Mary now intends to speak tomorrow that we can validly draw the conclusion. Absent her committed intention, the conclusion would be as unsound as before. Logical propagat­ors link information at two times.

While propagator propositions are in the logical order, they express a reality transcending a single time. In asserting existence (“There is a ball”) or a property (“The ball is rubber”), we are saying something true at one time. A committed inten­tion, however, points to future information. It is a present tendency with a path to fruition. If we are careful, we can call real tendencies “logical propagators.” They control the develop­ment of earlier material states into later ones, but are not material states. They are logical because they transform information. They are propagators because they propagate information from one time to another.

There are two species of logical propagators: commit­ted intentions and natural laws. If Mary commits to speaking tomorrow, she will speak to­mor­row. If billiard balls or quanta are in state S1 at t1, then, by the laws of nature, they will be in state S2 at time t2. Both predictions are true ceteris paribus (other things being equal), be­cause unforeseen factors may intervene. Mary could die. An earthquake could upset the billiard table. A cosmic ray could disrupt a quantum system. Humans are more complex, so more things can intervene, but the principle is the same.

Since com­­mitted intentions and natural laws are two species in the same dynamic genus, this is not a metaphor, but a shared dy­nam­ic. The time-development of human behavior under committed intentionality and that of physical systems under natural laws equally play out immanent dispositions or logical propagators. Both allow us to predict future information from present information. Both express immaterial principles in ob­­servable behavior.

What is the observable sign of intentionality? Is it not a systematic time development ordered to ends? This is how naturalists understand intentionality. Eliminativists’ theory-theory is based on human inten­tions and natural laws having a common dynamic so that intentions become theoretical constructs for behavioral prediction. (Goldman 1993: 351-8). Dennett (1987) argues that phys­­­ical systems be­­have exactly as though expressing inten­tions. Dawkins (1989) writes of the selfish intent of genes. Shared dynamics is a fact relied upon by naturalists.

Another way of seeing the intentional character of the laws of nature is to employ Franz Brentano's analysis of intentionality as characterized by "aboutness." As my intention to go to the store is about effecting my being in the store, so the laws of nature are about effecting the sequence of states predicted by physics.

Reflection:
Given Hume’s critique of causality, our grasp of time-sequenced causality is not adequately based on observing physical events. However, it is warranted by our experience of willing. Being aware of our own committed intentionality and its subse­quent incar­nation, we expect analogues in nature. Contrary to de­terminists who give time-sequenced causality prior­ity over voli­tion, will is the prime analogue and causality deriva­­tive. Associ­ation plays a role, but, as Hume noted, asso­cia­­tion does not warrant necessity. The idea of causal con­nec­tion over time derives from our experience as agents.

I will continue with point 3 in a later post.

Well, we seem to be going in circles again. I see no point in continuing.

I have considered the multiverse hypothesis and found that (1) there is no observational data in support of it (in contrast to the FTA) and (2) it makes no clear, falsifiable predictions.

It entails a special pleading, because you identified criteria to dismiss one hypothesis but ignore these criteria with respect to the God-hypothesis. — Relativist

No, it does not. The form of reasoning in the FTA is heuristic, not hypothetico-deductive. The FTA doesn't make a hypothesis, and then deduce its consequences as hypothetico-deductive reasoning does. Saying it does is a distortion. Instead, it argues that coordinated means directed to a common end signify intelligent direction. We have many examples of coordinated means signifying intelligent direction. Thus, the FTA is an argumentum signum quia -- an accepted form of heuristic reasoning. It is used, for example, by Forest Service look-outs when they call in fires after seeing smoke.

On the other hand, the Multiverse hypothesis, which pretends to be "scientific" violates fundamental canons of the scientific method. There is no experiential basis for taking life as a sign of the existence of a myriad of unobservable physical objects.

Multiverse is BOTH a physical hypothesis and a metaphysical hypothesis — Relativist

Metaphysics requires sound deductive reasoning, not hypothetico-deductive reasoning -- but if it did, it would still require hypotheses to be falsifiable. The falsifiability requirement is methodological, not discipline-specific. Unless hypotheses have testable predictions, there is no epistic point in deducing their consequences -- so instead of hypothetico-deductive reasoning, we have hypothetical reasoning -- the kind of "reasoning" used by conspiracy theorists.

the puddle exists accidentally, not a product of design, but from its perspective the world seems designed for it. — Relativist

As I said, this is not an analogous case.

a brute fact basis for natural law does not violate a principle of science, — Relativist

Of course it does. As Freud points out in the Psychopathology of Everyday Life, if we allow any exception to the principle of causality, we undermine all science. Either every phenomenon has an adequate explanation, or we have no rational grounds for requiring an explanation for any phenomena.
Some As require a B.
This is an A.
Therefore, this requires a B.
Is an obviously invalid line of reasoning.

Physicalism entails the non-existence of states that are "logically prior". — Relativist

Baloney! Physics problems often specify an initial state that is logically (and temporally) prior to the final state. Any information used as a starting point in reasoning is, by definition, logically prior to the conclusion.

Causation in the world (as opposed to its propositional description) is a temporal phenomenon. — Relativist

This is a baseless simplification often assumed in contemporary thought. Here is a counter example. If John is building his house, clearly John is the cause of his house being built. But, the house is not being built if John is not building it. Here cause (John building) and effect (John's house being built) are clearly concurrent, not sequential or time-ordered.

Another example is my thinking of you. My thinking is the cause of you being thought of. Time does not enter into my thinking of you in any essential way,

You didn't provide an analysis, you only made a vague allusion. — Relativist

I think I did, but if you'd like a more detailed argument, look at my discussion of "Logical Propagators" in "Mind or Randomness in Evolution" (https://www.academia.edu/27797943/Mind_or_Randomness_in_Evolution) (pp. 5f in the on-line version).

Claiming they demonstrate intentionality is just a different way of saying they demonstrate design, or they imply God — Relativist

Establishing the truth of premises is not arguing their conclusion.

1. There is no valid reason to reject a physical hypothesis solely on the basis that it is not entailed by accepted science. If that were done, no new science could ever get off the ground. — Relativist

First, I am not rejecting the multiverse hypothesis. I agree a multiverse is possible. Second, the lack of supporting evidence is just one reason for saying it has no epistic value. Another is that it's unfalsifiable and a third is that it is unparsimonious.

multiverse seems to be entailed by the theory of cosmic inflation — Relativist

There is no "seems to be" wrt to entailment. Either something is entailed or it is not. As far as I can tell the multiverse is not entailed by cosmic inflation.

Inflation also entails symmetry breaking, which is the mechanism that produces the classical world that we know. — Relativist

No, it does not. If a symmetry is perfect, inflation will not break it. If a symmetry is imperfect, inflation can make the imperfection manifest.

Symmetry breaking at the level of a quantum system almost certainly entails alternative physics because most processes of a quantum system entail quantum indeterminacy. — Relativist

This is false. All unobserved processes are completely deterministic in quantum theory. Quantum indeterminacy is a feature of measurement processes, and so cannot have occurred before the advent of intelligent observers -- making them "special."

Multiverse is conceptually possible — Relativist

Conceptual possibility is utterly worthless. It does not even entail logical possibility. In the late 19th century it was conceptually possible to reduce arithmetic to logic. Goedel showed it was logically impossible.

Any proposed physical multiverse hypothesis is thus a viable metaphysical hypothesis — Relativist

As I said above, (1) metaphysics does not use the hypothetico-deductive method, and (2) if it did, no unfalsifiable hypothesis can pass methodological muster.

Violating the "norms of the scientific method" is irrelevant to evaluating metaphysical hypotheses — Relativist

False. As I said, methodological norms arise from the nature of the method, not from the nature of the discipline using the method.

it seems to us that human life is special. — Relativist

It is "special" because as humans (which we all are), it has, objectively, a special relevance.to us.

The problem that is often overlooked is that the FTA depends on there being an objective value to human life. — Relativist

As I pointed out in my last post <value> is a concept that arises out of the relation between the thing valued and the subject(s) by whom it is valued. There is no value devoid of a valuing subject. So, not only is there no "objective value," the very concept is an oxymoron.

The FTA does suggest that the result of coordinated, improbable means is of value to the intelligence instantiating those means -- that life is valued by God -- because one does not seek to effect an end one does not value. This is a conclusion, not an assumption.

I am not sure how you're defining "accidental." (referring to the possibility that "life is an accidental byproduct of the nature of this universe").

I simply mean "not designed"; "not intended". — Relativist

OK, then it's begging the question to decide this prior to examining arguments (such as Aquinas's 5th way, Paley's argument from design, the FTA and my discussion of Mind in evolution).

A metaphysics demonstrates its adequacy to reality by its ability to coherently account for everything that we perceive exists. — Relativist

No system of human thought can do this, because humans have both a limited representational capacity and a limited lifetime. So, if metaphysics is to be a real, human science, it must be far less ambitious.

I see metaphysics as the science concerned with nature of existence and how more specialized sciences are grounded in existence. It derives its principles, not from assumption or hypothesis, but from a reflection on our experience of being. It demonstrates the adequacy of its concepts and conclusions by showing how they are grounded in our experience of being.

It's no trivial task to construct a metaphysics that is coherent and complete — Relativist

Since reality cannot instantiate contradictions, grounding metaphysics in the experience of reality guarantees its consistency. The notion of a "complete" science is the result of self-delusion.

The problem of universals requires reflection and analysis, not the assumption of an a priori solution. Any and all a priori assumptions close the mind to reality. (if you're interested in my take on universals, see my video "#46 The Problem of Universals" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7l2SSENSKvA)).

Parsimony does not entail a small number of existing things, it entails no more assumptions than are necessary to explain a set of facts. — Relativist

No, the Principle of Parsimony tells us to favor the explanation with the fewest assumptions. The multiverse hypothesis posits not just one or a few other universes, but a myriad of other universes. If does not posit other universes like ours, but universes with a range of physical constants that we do not know to be self-consistent. Clearly, it is an unparsimonious solution to the fact of fine tuning.

Your claim that multiverse depends on "rejecting the standard framework of physics (which sees the laws and constants of nature)" can only possibly apply to a physical multiverse hypothesis, not the metaphysical one. — Relativist

Right, because the operation of intelligence in the cosmos does not require the rejection of standard physics. If it did, I would say it did.

it simply extrapolates to a hypothesis that established physics is a special case of more fundamental physics. This is exactly the same framework as Newton's gravitational theory is within General Relativity (which is a theory of gravitation): Newton's theory applies more narrowly than GR. — Relativist

The difference is that we have an observational basis for accepting GR and none for the multiverse.

Fine tuning entails a fine-tuner. In the context of our discussion, I am using the term "God" to refer to the fine tuner (or that which is the holder of the intention, if you prefer). — Relativist

We judge the merits of an argument by how well it conforms to the accepted norms of reasoning, not by the nature of its conclusion. I may agree with the conclusion of an argument, but still judge it to be unsound (as I do with Anselem's Ontological Argument) or not a proof, but conforming to accepted heuristics as I do with the FTA. What an argument aims to prove is irrelevant to the formal question of its merit.

We have the objective capacity to create "a perfectly well-defined set of criteria" (as you put it), but these will be arbitrary. — Relativist

1. What is said was that "I can have a perfectly well-defined set of criteria, and not be able to apply them in a particular case because of a lack of data." I did not say that I actually do, or even can, have such a set of criteria.

2. Any criteria we may devise will not be "arbitrary." They will reflect objective commonalities actually observed in our (historically conditioned) experience. They will reflect them in a way that we deem relevant to our situation.

So, how does this widespread agreement show anyone is "assuming" their common position rather than abstracting it from reality?

All metaphysics is based on abstracting from reality, and there is not agreement on all matters. — Relativist

I never said that there was agreement "on all matters." That would be ridiculous. Some issues are quite difficult, but over time, we develop more understanding.

One metaphysical system entails God, and another does not. — Relativist

Sound reasoning entails God. Unsound reasoning does not.

Notice, how matter is defined as outside the sphere of becoming and ceasing to be, such that to speak of it in these terms causes the contradictions indicated. It is an underlying substratum which does not change between before and after. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, hyle is a principle of continuity that helps us understand change. It does not, itself, change. All of this fits my account. How does it support your idea that it is passive and devoid of anything analogous to desire?

Potential is the capacity to act. As such it is not itself active. If it were active it would not be the capacity for action, but action itself. This is why potential and actual are categorically different. And, since it is other than active, we can say that potential is passive. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let me clarify. A potency can be passive -- like clay waiting to have a form impressed on it. Or, it can be active -- like an acorn able to become an oak tree. In neither case does the potency actualize itself. Each kind of potency needs an efficient cause to actualize it (a potter in the first case, moisture and other environmental conditions in the second). One important difference between them is that, while clay receives its new form from an extrinsic source (the potter) and so is an artifact, the form of the oak is immanent in the acorn and so its germination and growth into an oak is a natural process.

Living things have an intrinsic principle of activity, the soul, and it is clearly a form — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, so organisms are natural. Still, we aren't analyzing beings, but substantial change.

Again, what a thing is now is based on its form. Its tendency to cease to be what it is now, to become something else, (e.g. to germinate or to die), is not explained by being what it is now (its form), but by an intrinsic tendency (hyle) to become the new thing (e.g., an oak or decaying matter).

"Of things that come to be, some come to be by nature, some by art, some spontaneously."

Here Aristotle points out that natural substantial changes are not artistic ones -- alerting us to watch for the difference between active tendencies and passive receptiveness. He again contrasts nature and art in 20 and 33.

.

Ch.9, 1034a, 33,
Things which are formed by nature are in the same case as these products of art...

This is in ch. 7, not 9. If you read chapter 7 from the beginning, you'll find Aristotle explicitly rejecting your view that matter is always passive: "in some cases the matter .. is such that it can initiate its own motion [italics mine], and in other cases it is not ..."

Now, let's look at 1034a33 in context.

.

Therefore as essence is the starting-point of everything in syllogisms (because syllogisms start from the "what" of a thing), so too generation proceeds from it.

And it is the same with natural formations as it is with the products of art..

The similarity between substantial changes in nature and in art is not the matter, as you suggest, but that "generation proceeds from [essence]."

So, as described in Bk.7, in the case of art, the form comes from the soul of the artist, and in the case of nature, the form comes from nature. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, and hyle is a kind of nature (physis).

Perhaps your question is left unanswered at that point, until he proceeds to discuss efficient cause and final cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, my question is addressed when he says that "in some cases the matter .. can initiate its own motion."

"The (apparent) variety is merely different names and forms of consciousness."

What I'm trying to get at in this thread is the viability of the above sentence. An elephant, a rock, and a memory of childhood ... can they all be reduced to being merely different names and forms of the same thing, consciousness? Or do objects possess an ultimate (essential) uniqueness that goes beyond this underlying sameness? — rachMiel

I was not addressing consciousness in my post, but the idea that the whole is convertible with tits parts.

As for consciousness, I see no reason to think that any material being we know has subjective awareness other than humans -- and certainly not rocks.

We have different ideas ("forms of consciousness") because objectively different kinds of things act on us in objectively different ways, and their action on our sensory system gives rise to our neural representations of them. We call our awareness of these representations "ideas."

I don't see why neutral monists would need to be self-proclaimed Scottists — Janus

That was not what I was asking. I was asking for a philosopher who calls himself a "neutral monist" and, as you suggested, follows Scotus in ontology. I don't know Deleuze's work, but I intend to read abut him.

My question with regard to Descartes was based on taking res (thing) as possibly convertible with "being" with "thinking" and extended" as modifiers. Personally, I don't see being as a prior substrate that can be modified.

How deep/close is the relationship between an object and its most fundamental building block? — rachMiel

The question conceals an error. We do not know that there is any "fundamental building block(s)." The history of recent physics reveals that each object viewed as fundamental can give rise to new, previously unknown, objects.

This means that the building block paradigm, irrationally accepted from the Greek atomists, is fundamentally flawed. A better way of thinking about nature is to say that there are actual objects, out of which we can create finer objects and out of them finer objects still -- perhaps ad infinitum. Suppose you think string theory is viable. Then, what is to prevent strings from being modeled from, or actually decomposed into, components? And those components from being decomposed again?

None of the finer objects are discrete entities until we destroy the whole. in the original whole, they are potential, not actual individuals.

Further, we don't know that wholes contain no more information than obtainable from each component examined in isolation (if such an examination were even possible). In fact, we know the opposite. No examination of a proton in isolation would show that it will repel other protons at long range (via E-M interactions), bind to other nucleons at close range (via the strong interaction) or possibly transform into a neutron (via the weak interaction)?

So, clearly, behavior in holistic contexts is not reducible to behavior in isolation. Or, as Aristotle noted, the whole is not just the some of its parts.

Viewing objects as reducible to "atomic" building blocks is an example of Whiteheads fallacy of misplaced concreteness. When we're doing physics, we don't care if an electron is in an isolated hydrogen atom or in a human being. So, we abstract away (leave on the table) all of the data that distinguishes a human from a hydrogen atom. Once that data is gone (and it is gone from physics), it's not available to construct biology or describe a human. So, biology and human psychology can't possibly be reduced to physics -- there's no data in physics to do so.

Physics may leave open the possibility of bacteria, frogs and humans, but that is not information about actual bacteria, frogs and humans. As Claude Shannon, the founder of information theory, pointed out, information is the reduction of possibility. Possibility is not information. Biology reduces some of the possibilities left open by physics to actuality. So, it is not reducible to physics. It has its own, independent methods and data.

the two opposing contraries are both of the formula, i.e. formal. This is evident in logic, being and not being, is and is not, has and has not. Matter cannot be opposed to form, so it is categorically different. — Metaphysician Undercover

How does this oppose anything I said about hyle? I did not say hyle was one of the contraries. I said the contraries were the old form and the new form -- as you seem to be saying here.

None of this tells us that Aristotle thought hyle in natural processes was purely passive, gives a reference supporting that claim, or says how a purely passive matter can solve the problem of Physics i, 9

Matter, being categorically different is therefore passive — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a non sequitur. Another way to be different is to be potential, but potential need not mean passive. To make your case, you need to show that potential (dynamis) implies passivity -- a difficult case to make given that the primary meaning of dynamis is "power."

I do not see this difference between "matter" in an artificial thing, and "matter" in a natural thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

One is defined as a kind of physis (nature = "an intrinsic principle of activity") and the other is not. Aristotle distinguishes artifacts by their lack of an intrinsic principle of activity.

Newton is not Aristotle or even Aristotelian -- nor is his physics that of Aristotle.

I don't see how you could argue that Aristotle claims that there's a different concept of "matter" for artificial things from the one for natural things. That would be blatant inconsistency, which Aristotle avoids. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, by distinguishing the natural from the artificial.

Why don't you read some of this stuff? — Metaphysician Undercover

I've read the Metaphysics more than once (some parts many, many times and in Greek), because, as you say, it is difficult. I've also read Plato and some of the pre-Socratics as context and background.

I think where he actually says matter receives form is prior to this — Metaphysician Undercover

I believe that discussion is about artifacts. That is why I want the specific reference.

substance consists of matter and form, and it is the form which changes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Strictly speaking, form does not change. It is replaced by a new form. In Physics i, 9 Aristotle is asking, "where does the new form come from?" Your view does not provide a satisfactory answer.

No, hyle is not all we have left — Metaphysician Undercover

In the discussion of Physics i, 9 there are precisely three principles, and hyle is the only one we have left after eliminating the original and contrary form.

continuing...

It is metaphysics, in examining the foundations of physics, that deduces the existence of God.

That deduction is contingent upon metaphysical assumptions. Obviously, physicalist metaphysics does not entail God. — Relativist

Not everything called "metaphysics" is an adequate to reality. A rational metaphysics is not based on assumption or speculation, but on sound reflection and analysis of our experience of existence.

Your argument is like saying that since Russell and Whitehead assumed that arithmetic could be reduced to logic (which Gödel showed to be false), all metamathematics is based on assumption.

1. I do not use metaphysical possibility to argue the existence of God. I only use actual being.

You have made no such argument in this thread, so this seems moot. — Relativist

Right, I have not. It is irrelevant to the discussion of the merits of the FTA that other, more cogent arguments exist. Still, my statement is relevant to your claim that our knowledge of the existence of God rests on possibility instead of actuality.

Your challenge is to show that the God possibility is a better explanation for each of the not-God possibilities I presented. — Relativist

I have. I showed:
(1) The FTA is evidence based, while the multiverse hypothesis is not.
(2) It is more parsimonious to posit one God than a myriad of other universes which have the additional property, also unsupported by evidence, of diverse physical constants.
(3) That the FTA is a classic argumentum signum quia -- a rational form of heuristic reasoning (e.g. "Where there's smoke, there's fire"). On the other hand, positing a multiverse violates the accepted norms of the scientific method by (a) being unfalsifiable, and (b) rejecting the standard framework of physics (which sees the laws and constants of nature as universal).

3. As I have pointed out a couple of times recently, possibility is not information. Information is the reduction of possibility

I have no idea what you're talking about. — Relativist

What I am talking about is that Claude Shannon, the founder of information theory, defined "information" as the reduction of possibility. For example, in a binary message each bit we receive reduces the possible messages by half. Thus possibility is not information.

Here's the problem: Removing multiverse from consideration because it's not entailed by accepted science — Relativist

I have not done that. I explicitly said a Multiverse is logically possible. I also gave this possibility as one reason the FTA is not a proof. I did say that the FTA is supported by accepted heuristics, while the multiverse hypothesis is not.

We can show God exists?! — Relativist

Yes.

clearly one can't assume God exists if one is to claim the FTA makes a persuasive case for God's existence — Relativist

I disagree. We are not debating the existence of God, but the merits of the FTA. One can examine the merits of an argument whether or not one agrees with its conclusion. Some arguments are sound, some not. Some conform to accepted heuristics, others do not. Some are taken as serious threats by opponents, others aren't.

If we were debating the existence of God, I would rely on sound arguments, not the FTA.

Silicon and oxygen are only produced through fusion in large stars, in novae — Relativist

"Fusion processes create many of the lighter elements up to and including iron and nickel, and these elements are ejected into space (the interstellar medium) when smaller stars shed their outer envelopes and become smaller stars known as white dwarfs. The remains of their ejected mass form the planetary nebulae observable throughout our galaxy." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nucleosynthesis.

Thus, large stars and novae are not needed.

It's "an assumption" that the billions of people on earth have the objective capacity to evoke the concept <human>? I can't agree. For me, it is an experiential fact.

It is a concept that's vague, in the context of evolutionary history - as I pointed out. — Relativist

I don't see any confusion in deciding which present day creatures are human. So, all of those people have the objective capacity to evoke the concept <human>.

As I said before, if I lived in a different time or culture, I might have a different <human> concept. In other words, concepts are neither hardwired nor pre-determined.

If we look at our early ancestors, I agree: some would evoke my concept <human> and others not. I further agree that different individuals might evoke your <human> concept than would evoke mine. Nonetheless, whatever creatures evoked your concept would do so because they have the objective capacity to do so. So, I don't see that these differences undermine my case.

I'm stating an belief that I'm pretty confident of, but I invite you to prove me wrong by agreeing that physicalist metaphysics does not depend on assumption — Relativist

That's like saying that I must show that Trump usually tells the truth to show that there are people who usually tell the truth.

If you can't draw a sharp line between human and non-human in your ancestral line, then your concept of "human" is flawed. — Relativist

This is utter nonsense. I can have a perfectly well-defined set of criteria, and not be able to apply them in a particular case because of a lack of data.

Here's a postulate of Armstrong's ontology: everything that exists consists of a particular with properties. i.e. properties do not exist independent of the particulars that have them. — Relativist

So Armstrong agrees with Aristotle's discussion of substance and accidents -- as do most medieval Scholastics and modern Aristotelians.

So, how does this widespread agreement show anyone is "assuming" their common position rather than abstracting it from reality?

Causation is a spatio-temporal relation between particulars (due to laws of nature). — Relativist

Definitions are not assumptions. They simply tell others how you are using words.

Under this account "pure act" cannot exist, because it does not entail particulars with relations between them. — Relativist

You cannot define yourself into a conclusion about reality. It did not work for St. Anselm, and it does not work here.

Thanks for the comment on the relation of neutral monism to the philosophy of being. I have two questions:
(1) Do you have an example of a self-proclaimed neutral monist who is a Scottist in ontology?
(2) Given than Descartes calls both his substances "res," wouldn't he by classed as a monist by this definition?

The FTA doesn't point to evidence, it fits a hypothesis to a set of facts. — Relativist

In fitting a hypothesis to a set of facts, it points to those facts as evidence. For example, in positing the inverse square law of gravity, Newton fit a hypothesis to facts such as the relative accuracy of Kepler's laws. Those facts were evidence supporting his gravitational hypothesis.

A reasonable abduction requires that other explanations be considered - you have to test how well the facts fit the alternatives. — Relativist

Yes, if there are other, viable hypotheses, it is rational to compare them.

Newton did not do this in the Principia. In point of fact, Newton's theory, while simpler than Ptolemy's, was inferior in predictive power and continued to be less accurate for over 100 years after its publication.

I am not sure what relevance this has. I have considered the multiverse hypothesis and found that (1) there is no observational data in support of it (in contrast to the FTA) and (2) it makes no clear, falsifiable predictions. You mentioned predictions made by a version of the theory, but if these don't pan out, that wouln't falsify the idea of a multiverse. Supporters would say only one version was falsified -- not the basic idea.

If there's a God ..., — Relativist

You seem not to understand how an argumentum signum quia works. It does not begin by hypothesizing its conclusion. Rather, it argues that certain facts (here, the fine tuning of various constants in the manner required to produce life) are signs of the operation of some cause (here, the intelligent direction of nature). The way to a attack this line of reasoning is not to attack the conclusion -- because it is not a premise -- but to attack the significance of the relevant facts. You need to show how the facts might not signify what proponents of the FTA say. You have made some arguments to this effect. This is not one.

Your response to #1 is that multiverse is not entailed by known physics. Obviously, neither is God, so this fact doesn't serve to make God more likely. — Relativist

The FTA is not a physics argument, even though it uses physics as support. Physics concerns itself neither with intelligent vs non-intelligent causality. On the other hand, the existence of a multiverse is a physical hypothesis. So, we have to judge it as we do any physical hypothesis -- and it simply does not pass muster.

Relativist: "For the FTA to have any utility, it needs to have some persuasive power."

Clearly, it does.

Assertion without evidence. — Relativist

We have abundant evidence. Many people, including atheists, find the argument so strong they need to violate the norms of the scientific method to hypothesize an alternative explanation.

life is an accidental byproduct of the nature of this universe, with no objective significance or importance. — Relativist

<Significance> and <importance> are concepts depending on human valuation. If humans use life as a sign, then it has significance. If humans see life as pivotal, it has importance.

I am not sure how you're defining "accidental." Since the physics of unobserved processes is deterministic, if you think that biogenesis and evolution are physical processes (as I do) then they are not random, but determinate. As I have argued in a number of places, including my "Mind or Randomness in Evolution" paper, the laws of nature are a species of intentionality. If life is the determinate result of intentional operations, who can it be "accidental"?

“If you imagine a puddle waking up one morning and thinking, 'This is an interesting world I find myself in — an interesting hole I find myself in — fits me rather neatly, doesn't it? In fact it fits me staggeringly well, must have been made to have me in it!" (Douglas Adams) — Relativist

For this to be analogous to the FTA, other "holes" (other sets of constants) would have to "fit" (work) equally well. They do not.

— Relativist

How do we explain natural law? That's a metaphysical question, who's answer depends on the metaphysical assumptions you make (despite the fact that you deny there are metaphysical assumptions, but more on that later). — Relativist

When you make an actual argument on the baseless nature of metaphysics, I'll give you an actual reply. For now, I merely observe that purely mental constructs (assumptions) can't operate to produce real phenomena -- only causes operative in reality can.

Physicalism with the assumption of a finite past entails an initial, uncaused state, a state that entails the natural law that determines the subsequent states of the universe. That initial state, inclusive of its properties, would be a brute fact. — Relativist

First, I don't think physicalism entails the non-existence of a state logically prior to this universe. Second, just because a fact is fundamental in a particular theory does not mean that it has no cause in reality.

I started with Brentano's analysis of intentionality in Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. showing that it is characterized by "aboutness" and then showed that the laws of nature have the same kind of aboutness

All this does is to show that the God hypothesis fits the facts, as I described in the first portion of this post. You have to show this more likely than the two "not-God" alternatives. — Relativist

No, because it neither mentions nor assumes the existence of God. It deals with the essential character of the laws of nature. if you have a criticism of my actual analysis, please state it.

to be continued

If I make a statement and we are to judge the relation between the reality of what's in my mind, and the representation (the statement) for adequacy, how are we to judge this? — Metaphysician Undercover

I may not be able to judge, because I have no direct access to what you know and/or believe.

Typically, you can judge. Suppose a Nazi asks if you're hiding Jews, you know you are, and yet say "no." You're acting morally, but still, you're being dishonest because you're misrepresenting what you know. Now, let's suppose that the Jews, having seen the Nazis drive up, have left. Then you are (accidentally) telling the truth because you have adequately described the reality about hiding Jews, but you are still being dishonest because you have not adequately represented the reality of what you believe.

Meanwhile, the Nazi doesn't care what's going on in your mind, except incidentally. What he wants to know is reality -- the location of Jews.

Do we judge it as adequate for my purpose, or adequate for your purpose? — Metaphysician Undercover

To continue with my example, your "no" is adequate to your purpose of protecting the Jews, but adequacy to that purpose is not adequacy to the reality of the situation. So, saying "no" is uttering a falsehood -- all be it a moral one. The Nazi has no right to the truth in this matter.

More broadly, you may tell me something that adequately describes reality as far as you are concerned, but creates an inadequate representation of reality in my mind. So, you're telling the truth, but I'm not hearing the truth you're telling. For example, thinking of Jane, I ask "Where is she?" You think I'm asking about Jill and say, "At the store," which is true. I think <Jane is at the store>, which is false. So, your statement is true for you, but inadequate and false for me.

As I said at the beginning of the post, when someone asks me to tell the truth, I think they want me to refer to my experience. You think that they want me to refer to reality. So I think you've reduced reality to experience — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I'm saying that we know reality from experience, not that experience exhausts reality. Experience is my awareness of being acted on by reality and me being acted upon by reality is (identically) reality acting on me. So, in experience, I'm linked to reality by a relation of partial identity.

Thank you for your gracious acceptance of by breaking off the discussion of truth.

Are you panpsychist? — Metaphysician Undercover

I have never met anyone claiming to be a panpsychist, so I have no idea if I may have anything in common with one. I do not call myself one.

I see the cosmos as reflecting intelligent guidance, but not as self aware.

By "subjective awareness" do you intend to posit something radically separate from the physical? What if the objective and subjective accounts of human nature are simply two incommensurable accounts of the one thing? — Janus

By "subjective awareness" I'm not "positing" anything. I'm simply naming an aspect of human experience -- that, by focusing our attention on contents, we transform them from merely intelligible to actually known. When we begin thinking about something, such as "subjective awareness," its nature is an open question -- something to be decided by analysis and perhaps further experience.

I don't think that our awareness, our intentionality, is separate from our physicality. We humans are intrinsic unities -- not two "substances" somehow glued together. Still, being a unity doesn't prevent us from finding different logically distinct aspects when we think about ourselves. Thus, it is perfectly consistent to say that while I'm one being, my physicality is not my intentionality.

There is a lot of underbrush to be cleared here before we can see the trees, let alone the forest. First, is Descartes's aberrant notion of "substance." There is no evidence that we are made either of two things or of two kinds of "stuff."

Aristotle's definition of "substance" (ousia) is much less conjectural. It "posits" nothing. For Aristotle a "substance" is an ostensible unity -- a whole that we can point out -- like you, the planet Mars or the solar system. Once we recognize a whole, we can discern its various aspects -- say height, hair color, age, etc., etc. These are not wholes, but intelligible aspects of wholes. Aristotle calls them "accidents." Again, this "posits" nothing. It merely names an aspect of experience

So, accidents aren't like raisins in a pudding of substance -- they're just different aspects of a unity. If we could name all of a substance's accidents, we'd exhaust it's intelligibility without residue -- there would be no "pudding" (substrate) left after removing the raisins because the raisins, the accidents, are the substance's notes of intelligibility -- collectively they are all we can say about what a substance is.

Another source of confusion is Russell's logical atomism and its spawn. There is no reason to think that all we know can be reduced to a one-to-one correspondence with physical "atoms" (atoma) in the sense of irreducible components.

First, this idea is based on shabby science. Physics has found no irreducible "atoms" composing the cosmos. Rather, it models (very incompletely) the cosmos in terms of continuous quantum fields and their interactions.

Second, logical atomism forgets that knowledge is a subject-object relation. Every act of knowing involves a known object and a knowing subject. This is important because what we know, the instruments of logical representation and manipulation, is our relational to, our interaction with, reality -- not objects in isolation. We always know incompletely. We use abstractions, leaving notes of intelligibility behind. We have a single space-time history, not a universal perspective. Our conceptual space is the result of our uniquely personal history and cultural context.

As a result of this, one object, say a human being, can be thought of in many ways without having to be many things. To think both of our physicality and our intentionality we don't have to be, or combine, both a physical object and an intentional object. We just need to be able to act physically and intentionally.

This is not neutral monism, because real substances -- people like you and I -- are never "neutral." We are wholes that act both intentionally and physically. This does not imply the existence of an underlying neutral "stuff."

I've noticed your YouTube channel, and am interested in becoming somewhat familiar with your views on intentionality and mind as time permits. — Galuchat

My understanding of intentionality comes from the Scholastic tradition via Brentano. A key to my approach is the recognition that, as the laws of nature and human acts of will are both species of intentionality, they are in the same theater of operation. Another key is my discussion of the fundamental abstraction of natural science as leaving science bereft of the data to discuss intentional matters.

When Aristotle mentioned this in Physics Bk.1, ch.9, he is talking about how others, specifically Platonists, described the existence of contraries. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, he is contrasting his views with those of Platonists. The desire comment relates to his own view.

But later Platonism, and Aristotle redefined "matter", such that it is entirely passive. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you have a reference in Aristotle for this? And, how can a completely passive matter solve the problem he discusses in Physics i,9?

Aristotle's Metaphysics you'll see that matter receives form, form being the active part of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

In artifacts matter does receive its form passively from the artificer, In natural processes the role of matter is very different. Aristotle defines nature (physis) as an intrinsic principle of activity and tells us that matter (hyle) is a kind of physis -- and so a principle of activity rather than passivity. If you say matter is passive in natural processes, you confuse natural objects with artifacts, while Aristotle takes great care to distinguish them.

So, where in the Metaphysics do you see the matter of a natural process passively receiving form?

matter is defined as the underlying thing which does not change when change occurs — Metaphysician Undercover

Only substance (ousia) changes -- substantially or accidentally. So, we cannot expect to see Aristotle saying principles change. We can expect to see Aristotle telling us how principles explain substantial change -- and he does that in Physics i, 9. He notes that the original form cannot explain it, because then it would have to work for its own destruction, Nor can the new, contrary, form explain it, because it's not actual (=operational) yet. So, all we have left is hyle, which must act to bring about the new form.

This produces the separation between material cause and final cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

Material and final causes are indeed distinct. Hyle, as the material cause, is potentially what it "desires." The final form is what hyle "desires."

I agree.

Now, the question is, for a physicalist, how can consciousness (as subjective awareness), produce effects that can be selected by evolution?

Thank you for your appreciative comment.

GIven your biological interests, I wonder if you would like to read in my article, "Mind or Randomness in Evolution," Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies (2010) XXII, 1/2, pp. 32-66 (https://www.academia.edu/27797943/Mind_or_Randomness_in_Evolution). As a physicist, I would like a biological perspective.