1) What does contradiction inhere in? — tim wood

I am not claiming that the contradictions can inhere in things as accidents, i.e.,as what Aristotle calls secondary beings. I am claiming that they cannot exist, and so do not exist. As they do not exist, they do not inhere, and as they do not inhere, they have no need of something to inhere in.

If you're asking how we can form/justify this judgement given that what we are talking about does not exist, I respond that the judgement is not based on any experience of non-existence (which is impossible), but on our experience of being. Everything we encounter exists, and this allows us to abstract a notion of existence. (I say "notion" because it is not a concept like other concepts.)

When we do so, we see that existing utterly excludes not existing, and so we grasp the ontological principle of non-contradiction (A putative thing cannot both be and not be at one and the same time in one and the same sense.) It is this principle that is applied here.

Time for you to define existence and being, or to save you some trouble, to correct mine. Allow me to make a division into two classes: mental reality and extra-mental reality. Seven, for example, is a mental reality and not an extra-mental reality, as are all numbers, truth, justice, love, and the American way. — tim wood

I answered your definition question in the OP.

Wait, so an infinite being cannot engage in any possible act? — Theorem

Yes, it can. An infinite being acting as only a finite being can is not a possible act.

You seem to be saying that there are certain acts that only a finite being can accomplish. This seems problematic. — Theorem

Why is it problematic? Truly eating requires a number of operations that imply finiteness: changing in the course of chewing means that the eater has unrealized potencies. Using and requiring nutrients to maintain one's being implies contingency. and so on. So, you must see the acts, not in abstraction (which would be Whitehead's fallacy of misplaced concreteness), but in the context of being done by an unlimited being.

You might think it genius but as you said in the OP, thinking something does not make it exist. — Fooloso4

That is why I provided a proof.

Aristotle saw that the cause of being cannot be a being. Aquinas, in line with the belief in a Creator, avoids the problem by simply declaring that there is an uncaused being that is the cause of other beings. A being that is (existence) because to be is what it is (essence). — Fooloso4

Do you have a citation for Aristotle?

No, Aquinas did not make a faith claim. He provided a proof. Also, my use of "explanation" is not the same as Aquinas's use of "cause" in "uncaused cause." Aquinas's "causes" must be extrinsic, while my "explanation" can be intrinsic or extrinsic.

The same tired old argument. — Fooloso4

I agree that my argument uses insights due to Aristotle, ibn Sina and Aquinas. Still, being old is not a fallacy. Do you have an objection other than the ancient roots of my thought?

Aquinas did not write in ancient Greece — Fooloso4

Aquinas wrote for a more philosophically literate audience -- one that knew the distinction between essential and accidental causality.

The point is you are using the term in two fundamentally different ways - (1) fact(s) that are not dependent (God/infinite being) and (2) all other facts which are dependent on (1). — Fooloso4

Has that caused you any difficulty?

Let's clarify the "dependence" of facts. There is epistemological dependence. We need not know God before we know empirical facts. And, there is ontological/dynamical dependence. Contingent facts cannot explain themselves.

How does your argument for a self-explaining God differ from Aquinas' first cause, an efficient cause, an uncaused cause? — Fooloso4

I think you can work that out for yourself. The question is irrelevant to the soundness of my argument.

I apologize if you addressed this already, but could you clarify what you mean by any possible act? Could an infinite being eat a ham sandwich for lunch at my dining room table today? — Theorem

No, because that would entail the contraction of Its being limited, but It could create a finite being capable of doing so. Am I invited?

I do not see more than one brute fact as a problem; all that is required is a brute fact to act as the first cause for causality/time. — Devans99

But, there is no objective reason for such a limitation. It is all very subjective. Whenever you do not like where a line of explanation is leading, you can stop it by pulling the "brute fact" cord.

I think we have a very different conception of what God is. — Devans99

I agree.

Thank you for your reflections.

1) What does contradiction inhere in? — tim wood

I am not claiming that the contradictions can inhere in things as accidents, i.e.,as what Aristotle calls secondary beings. I am claiming that they cannot exist, and so do not exist. As they do not exist, they do not inhere, and as they do not inhere, they have no need of something to inhere in.

If you're asking how we can form/justify this judgement given that what we are talking about does not exist, I respond that the judgement is not based on any experience of non-existence (which is impossible), but on our experience of being. Everything we encounter exists, and this allows us to abstract a notion of existence. (I say "notion" because it is not a concept like other concepts.)

When we do so, we see that existing utterly excludes not existing, and so we grasp the ontological principle of non-contradiction (A putative thing cannot both be and not be at one and the same time in one and the same sense.) It is this principle that is applied here.

Time for you to define existence and being, or to save you some trouble, to correct mine. Allow me to make a division into two classes: mental reality and extra-mental reality. Seven, for example, is a mental reality and not an extra-mental reality, as are all numbers, truth, justice, love, and the American way. — tim wood

I answered your definition question in the OP, saying that "Dynamic ontology is built on the notion of [that] being can be explicated as the capacity to act." I see now that I made a typo, which I just corrected. As de-finition limits, and being is intrinsically unlimited, it cannot be de-fined, but it can be explicated and this is what I have done. Existence and the ability to act are convertible.

I am happy to accept your distinction between mental reality and extra-mental reality, but I don't think you've thought it through properly. Mental existents may be thought of in two ways: as they are in themselves, and as possible objects of thought. As they are in themselves, they are intentional beings, which is to say that their very nature is to be about something. The concept of red is about possible red objects, and the hope for happiness is about attaining a happy state. So, they are not monadic, but relational -- always beyond themselves to something that may or may not be real.

As possible objects of thought, mental realities are in the same class as any other possible object of thought. So, I don't see mental reality as disjoint from extramental reality, because I do not see knowing thought as any different than knowing beach balls. In order to be known, each must do something intelligible that existentially penetrates us -- that is presented to our awareness. To know is to be aware of present intelligibility -- and reality makes itself present by acting on us, by existentially penetrating us.

Why do I say "penetrating"? Because things are where they act. My seeing a ball is identically the ball being seen by me. This identity is only possible if we both act at the same time and place.

Now, let's discuss some of the abstactions you've mentioned. We are not born with the concept seven. We learn it in learning to count extramental objects. A collection of seven objects has a cardinality of seven -- i.e. it has a note of intelligiblity with a determinate relation to the concept seven. So, again, the concept is not monadic, but bears relational. It is applicable to any collection with a cardinality of seven, because any such collection is properly able to evoke it.

Truth also has a foundation in reality. We come to the concept when we realize that some thoughts and locutions are adequate to reality and some are not. So, again, we could not have the concept of truth independently of experiencing reality.

Because all of our concepts have a similar story, no concept is monadic. The ontogenesis of each is based on our experience of reality. So, while they may appear monadic when considered abstractly, their genesis is inexorably grounded in our experience of reality. The same applies to God. Sound proofs are based on experiences that implicate an infinite being.

Contradiction, then, being of thought, is not reified by being thought. But that only tells us about our own thought and our own limitations on our own thoughts. — tim wood

No, it does not. Contrary to Boole, logic is not about the laws of thought. It is about rules we must follow if we want our thought to reflect reality -- to be salve veritate, truth preserving. I have no trouble thinking "square circle," "five-sided triangle," or "infinite wealth." Nothing in my mental constitution, no "law of thought," precludes such thoughts. It is only when I wish my thought to reflect the nature of reality, of being, that I realize that such concepts should be excluded. Why? Because my understanding of being entails that no contradiction can be instantianted.

Our suppositions about contradictions, then, remain exactly - merely - and only that. — tim wood

No, as I just argued, they reflect the nature of being. Our experiential grasp of being is such that we know that it is utterly incompatible with non-being.

That is, references to extra-mental realities. It's easy to think in terms of cause, here, but "cause" is a very tricky word. — tim wood

That is why I have avoided it.

It seems to me that the extra-mental reality referenced by the explanation must be coterminous with the thing explained in both space and time. — tim wood

Yes, I would say "concurrent."

This says that if one thing exists (extra-mentally), then other things must exist (extra-mentally) as explanation. But this "argument" is a mental construct - not necessarily conclusive with respect to extra-mental reality. — tim wood

That is why I have outlined the relation between thought and reality. First, wrt traditional logic, that it reflects the nature of existence, and second wrt to concepts that ideogenesis is the result of our awarenss of present intellibility -- of the object existentially penetrating (acting within) us. For example, the neural modification that represents a sensed apple is identially the modification of my neural system by the apple acting on me. This identity is real, but partial. The modification of my neural system is not all of me, but it is still part of me. The modification of my neural system is not all the apple can do, but it is still the apple doing it. So, part of me is identically an act of the apple. That means the apple is really present (via its act) in me. We are not separate, but one and, as you say, coterminus.

Thus reason seems limited by itself and its own limitations. — tim wood

This is a very Kantian view, and, to my mind, wholly unjustified. I hope the little I've said will help you rethink it, but really, it deservfes a thread of its own.

In my understanding, logic is consequent on the nature of being, and all being is traceable to God. So, logic is posterior, not prior, to God. — Dfpolis

Right, so then God could presumably make anything He desired logically possible. — Terrapin Station

Give this a little thought. As I said, logic, as correct thought about existents, is based on the nature of existence. You are suggesting that existence is limiting, but it can't be. Existence is not a predicate like other predicates. If something is red, for example, it is limited, because the opposite of red is not-red and not-red things can exist. But, if, as you think, something were limited by being, what is excluded is not other kinds of things, but non-being. So, "everythng that is logically or ontologically possible" only excludes non-being, which is nothing. Clearly excluding nothing is not a limitation.

Good Aristotelian that you are, you apparently don't know about JS Bell and Bell's theorem/Bell's inequality. Do I need to explicate?

The short of it is that if reality as you describe it is ascribed to entangled particles, then they'll break your heart. — tim wood

Good physicist that I am, I've been studying entanglement for years and have found the flaw in Bell's proof. It is quite possible to have a local, realist and deterministic account of quantum theory -- where realist is to be understood in the Aristotelian, not the Platonic sense. I have discussed this possibility for a long time and my explanation has become better defined over time.

Continuing ...

At the simplest level, we understand being well enough to see that (1) Whatever is, is, (2) that a putative reality must either be or not be, and (3) that nothing can be and not be at one and the same time in one and the same way. — Dfpolis

Well, there seem to be physics theories that do not abide by this, such as Schrödinger's cat and the entire concept of entanglement. — alcontali

Yes, some irrational minds hold such views. That does not establish them as facts, or even good physics.

As I recall, Schrödinger proposed his thought experiment as a way of rebutting the Copenhagen Interpretation, not as a way of rebutting the foundations of logic. It should be clear to any physicist who approaches the collapse of the wave function at a fundamental level, that physics already accepts an understanding of bulk matter that entails the failure of superposition (e.g. the measurement problem, Schrödinger's cat, and the quantum-classical transition).

As I recently explained to David Hand on my YouTube channel, the wave function collapses because electron-electron interactions are nonlinear. Electrons interact via the electromagnetic field, represented by the 4-potential, A. The source of A is the 4-current j (charge density + current density), which is quadratic in the wave function, ψ. The interaction is represented by a jA term which is quartic (quadratic in two different ψs).

Superposition requires linearity. Before detection, we can treat a quantum as isolated, so its dynamics is linear to a good approximation. Once it starts to interact with a detector or any other form of bulk matter (which is bound by atomic electron-electron interactions) the system becomes nonlinear, and any superposition must collapse. So, Schrödinger's cat is physically impossible.

Turning to entanglement, Bell's theorem, spooky action-at-a-distance, etc., the issues raised attack neither the principles of being nor the foundations of logic, but a certain misunderstanding of physics. It is well-accepted that ERP/Aspect-type experiments imply no violation of the relativistic principle that no signal can travel faster than the speed of light. So, there is no violation of accepted physical principles, only a concern that a local, realistic, deterministic interpretation of quantum theory may not be possible. I assure you that is possible, as an assumption critical to Bell's proof (viz. detector independence) is false (it ignores accepted physics,i.e. the antisymmetry of multi-fermion wave functions under coordinate interchange aka the Pauli exclusion principle.)

The underlying error in most quantum mythology is Whitehead's fallacy of misplaced concreteness. It consists in treating abstractions as though they were actual, contextualized reality. The more formal and abstract, the more axiomatic, one's thinking, the more prone one is to this fallacy. One way of spotting such errors is that those making them are often forced to question fundamental metaphysical principles.

But then again, these theories are too physical-world to my taste. — alcontali

There's no point in being bound to reality.

I personally prefer the abstract, Platonic worlds of mathematics, for which you only need pen and paper. — alcontali

And the experience of being as quantifiable, from which to abstract the relevant concepts.

The mainstream view is that knowledge is a justified (true) belief: — alcontali

Ah! How powerful is the need for social acceptance! Still, I prefer to examine the foundations of "accepted" views, however common. Clearly, we may not believe (accept) what we know, which would be impossible if knowledge were a species of belief. As a historical example, Descartes knew he was in his chamber (an act of intellect = his awareness of present intelligibility), but chose to suspend belief that he was in his chamber (an act of will = the suspension of commitment to the truth of what was known).

Justified true belief is a definition of knowledge that gained approval during the Enlightenment, 'justified' standing in contrast to 'revealed'. There have been attempts to trace it back to Plato and his dialogues. — alcontali

Before the so-called Enlightenment. there was a clear distinction between experientially known reality (what is known by reason) and what was accepted by faith. So, this is a solution to a problem that did not exist. You can confirm the by reading the beginning of the Summa Theologiae, or by reading about the doctrine of the two books (the book of revelation and the book of nature) in James Hannam, The Genesis of Science: How the Christian Middle Ages Launched the Scientific Revolution.

In point of historical fact, the Enlightenment was an intellectually retrograde movement, in which ancient origins were thought more important to judging truth than rational reflection on empirical evidence.

P does not need to be knowledge. For example, axioms are not knowledge, because they are not justified. — alcontali

If you do not assume that the axioms are true, then one cannot assume that anything derived from them is true. If we only need begin with unjustified axioms, we can start with any assumptions and prove anything. That may satisfy you, but it certainly does not satisfy the general desire of humans to know.

In my view, axioms can be justified by abstraction, and most mathematical axioms are. A few, like the parallel postulate, are hypothetical, and are justified (confirmed) empirically because the sum of the measured interior angles of triangles is invariably two right angles to within the error of the measurements. If such measurements did not confirm this prediction, we would reject the parallel postulate -- as we do for non-Euclidean metrics.

Since we know the axioms are true any valid deduction from the axioms must be true (logic is salve veritate.)

It will initially, and possibly even never, be possible to turn a philosophical idea into a rigorous system. — alcontali

Thank you for the unargued faith claim. You have made no case that we cannot come to a certain knowledge of fundamental principles (of being, mathematics, and even physics) by abstraction. Until[ you do, all you have is unjustified belief.

quote="alcontali;304563"]Yes, of course. However, with access to the ToE -- which will never happen -- the distinction between axiomatic and empirical would disappear.[/quote]

Your recurring appeal to what we both agree is an impossibility is an annoying and pointless distraction.

Number theory is not even Turing-Complete, and hence, considered to be a relatively weak and incomplete axiomatization. — alcontali

I did not confine my definition to number theory, which does not include geometry and its subdisciplines, topology, analysis, calculus, distribution theory, chaos theory, etc., etc.

Still, a sincere thank you for stating the role of set theory in the minds of contemporary mathematicians. I knew many in grad school and discussed these topics, so I should have included set-theoretic relations in my description of the subject matter of mathematics (defined as what mathematicians study).

If you take mathematics to mean what mathematicians study, then you can say metamathematics is part of mathematics. If you take the position that fields of study are defined by what is studied (their material object) and the aspect under which it is studied (their formal object), then metamathematics is not mathematics, even if we include set theory in mathematics.

It does not matter that one can represent meta-mathematical relations mathematically, for if it did, mathematical physics would be subalterned to mathematics, and it is not. The use of mathematical representations is a tool, and tools do not define the subject matter they are used on. The material object of mathematical physics is the dynamics of natural processes, and its formal object is being viewed from a mathematical perspective. Similarly, the material object of metamathematics is the fundamental structure of mathematics and its formal object is being viewed from a mathematical perspective. Who undertakes such studies, and whether they also study other things from other perspectives is completely immaterial.

Every Turing-complete axiomatization is capable of expressing all possible knowledge in its associated language. — alcontali

This is a sweeping, and over-reaching, claim. How would one express, without circularity that lavender is not orchid? Of course, one could say that L ≠ O, but will not adequately express this fact to one who does not already know what lavender and orchid are. Or did you mean that one can [inadequately] express all possible knowledge in a Turing-complete axiomatization's associated language?

This is not a fatuous observation, but points to critical issues. Natural languages are not purely formal systems. They are not merely sign-sets following syntactic rules. In order to function they need the power to instantiate meaning in other minds, and to do so they need reference, which relates signs to certain aspects of reality. Formal languages lack determinant reference, and in order to provide such reference, one must employ natural language. I have yet to see a mathematical proof not contextualized by natural language text.

So, your claim is either false, of vacuous. (It is vacuous if you mean that what is wholly indeterminate can receive any determination.)

No, mathematics has quantitative relations as its subject matter — Dfpolis

Mathematics, science, and history are not subject matters. — alcontali

Did I say they were????

They are epistemic domains, i.e. the sets of knowledge statements -- with knowledge a justified (true) belief (JtB) -- that you can legitimately justify using their associated epistemic justification methods. — alcontali

If you want to say "epistemic domains" instead of "fields of study," be my guest. They are not, however sets of knowledge statements. Why? Because:
(1) Sets are well-defined collections of distinct objects, while accepted science is indeterminate because it varies over time. Newtonian physics was unquestioned for centuries, but is now known to be inaccurate.
(2) The definition of a science cannot change with the discoveries it makes. When Aristotle, Archimedes, Jean Buridan and other early physicists applied mathematics to the study of natural processes they were as much physicists as those struggling today to find a theory of quantum gravity. Yet, in their day little of what we now accept was or could be justified. What defines a science is what is studied (its material object) and the approach to studying it (its formal object) -- not what is actually known at any time.
(3) Your definition suffers not only from indefiniteness, but from being closed. As sets have to be well-defined, they cannot adequately represent fields that are open to new data and theoretical revision.

Also, while I agree that scientific findings can be justified beliefs, in many cases we have no way to determine whether they are true in any absolute sense. So, your definition of knowledge cannot be applied to scientific findings in general.

There is no mathematical subject matter, nor a scientific subject matter, nor a historical subject matter. — alcontali

Unless you are willing to argue a case, this claim is to absurd to be worth rebutting.

Furthermore, these epistemic domains exclude each other. It is not possible that a proposition can be justified by one epistemic method and also by another. — alcontali

Why is that?

Physics uses mathematical formalisms to maintain consistency in its theories, but has actually nothing to do with mathematics. — alcontali

Physics is not subalterned to math, but that does not mean it has nothing to do with math. (1) Many mathematical concepts were discovered as part of physics before being formalized by mathematics. For example, medieval physicists developed the concept of instantaneous velocity, which is the basis of the concept of a derivative. The first examples of chaos theory were discovered by physicists. Dirac's delta function gave rise to distribution theory. (These examples also show that same finding can be discovered by diverse methods -- rebutting your claim above.) (2) Routinely, the observable implications of physical theories are mathematically deduced.

With the term "method", I meant "epistemic method", i.e. knowledge-justification method, as in axiomatic "method", scientific "method", and historical "method". — alcontali

I do not see that there is an axiomatic method. There is deduction, which can be applied as much to deducing the consequences of axioms as those of hypotheses.

Axioms can be abstracted from reality, in which case abstraction is the method, or they can be hypothesized (like the parallel postulate or the axiom of choice), in which case we are dealing with an instance of the hypothetico-deductive method -- and one that it epistemically problematic, as unfalsifiable hypotheses are suspect. (Of course, we can confirm many consequences.)

Metaphysics does not establish the epistemic method for any area or research, including physics. It is epistemology that does that job. — alcontali

I did not say that metaphysics established the epistemic method for any area. I said "it deals with issues fundamental to all other areas of research." This means that it deals with foundational issues of logic and epistemology as well as physics.

Mathematics is what you can justify using the axiomatic method — alcontali

This is an absurd claim. How does the so-called "axiomatic method" justify its axioms? Clearly, it does not, for it takes them as given. Similarly, the scientific method takes takes observations and the logic involved in working out the implications of hypotheses as given, and provides no justification for either.

According to Karl Popper's 1963 "Science as Falsification", which has in the meanwhile become the dominant view in the philosophy of science, science consists of the theories that you can justify by experimental testing. — alcontali

You are equivocating. I said "science in the traditional sense," and you're discussing only sciences that use the hypothetico-deductive method. I have no problem with the concept of falsification in the context of the hypothetico-deductive method, but I hope we can agree that it is not the only method that can be applied to come to a rigorous systematic understanding. If it were, mathematics would not be scientific.

Furthermore, mathematics and science exclude each other. It is not possible to justify a theorem with both methods. — alcontali

This is obviously wrong. Newton did not develop fluxions in a rigorous, axiomatic way, but in a hypothetical way that was justified by its successful application to, and confirmation by, empirical findings. His empirically justified discovery was later "cleaned up" (axiomatically formalized) by mathematicians. The same is true of Dirac's discovery of the delta function and its later justification with the development of distribution theory. There are many other counterexamples I could cite.

It is absurd to think that any competent physicist would accept a proposed ToE absent rigorous experimental testing. — Dfpolis

According to the late Stephen Hawking, the problem will never even occur. According to him, there simply won't be anything to test — alcontali

First, this doesn't rebut my point, but only makes the claim that it's counterfactual. Second, it is an argumentum ab auctoritate from an unreliable source. Hawking, despite many admirable traits, has been wrong on fundamental matters much more central to his area of expertise. (See Leonard Susskind , The Black Hole War: My Battle with Stephen Hawking to Make the World Safe for Quantum Mechanics.)

Well, the ToE is an axiomatic system, and physicists seem to dream of finding it. — alcontali

While physics can be and has been axiomatized (e.g. quantum theory and quantum field theory), the axioms remain hypothetical, and so do not change the nature of the science. The justification for the axioms is that, so far, they seem to work. A ToE would be the same. Its axioms would not be deduced (or otherwise justified) on a priori grounds, but hypotheses that seem to work with respect to the available data.

Well, metaphysics seems to have very little influence nowadays on the practice of physics. This is not true for metamathematics, which thoroughly dominates the discourse in mathematics. — alcontali

I agree. Still, what is rational and what is in vogue are rarely the same. E.g., the interpretation of quantum theory is plagued by irrational and manifestly false beliefs.

If it is provable, then it is not about the real world. If it is about the real world, then it will not be provable. It harks back to the definition of the term "proof" as the derivation path between a theorem and its underlying axioms. Without axioms, no "proof". — alcontali

So, a bowl that holds only one apple and one pear cannot be proven to hold two pieces of fruit? Or, if Jane is actual, we can't conclude that Jane must be possible? You really believe that? I see such claims as in the same category as Daniel Dennett consciously denying that he is conscious.

A mathematical proof is an inferential argument for a mathematical statement. In the argument, other previously established statements, such as theorems, can be used. In principle, a proof can be traced back to self-evident or assumed [Italics mine] statements, known as axioms, along with accepted rules of inference.

You can clearly see that this is not possible in science. — alcontali

Think logically, please! Scientists routinely assume statements to be true. Such assumed truths are called "hypotheses" (h) and they can yield conditional predictions (p) true about the real world, viz. h => p. Scientists also take observations to be true and deduce implicit facts from observed facts and "self-evident" "axioms."

Of course, no proposition is truly "self-evident." All truths derive from experience. It is just that some judgements can be seen to be universally true after a single experience.

Rather, I see it as a complex, intelligible whole from which we may abstract some universal truths. — Dfpolis


Well, these "truths" -- I would rather say experimentally-tested "theories" -- have only been tested at best against observations in the visible part of the universe. — alcontali

So, 2 objects and 2 more objects might not yield a total count of 4 objects outside the visible universe? Sehr interessiert!

To be continued...

What is self-explaining (meaning 1) but cannot be explained (meaning 2) is a conjuring act. — Fooloso4

I have no idea what you're talking about. I said precisely how God is self-explaining. Please read what I posted.

All that is actual is possible, and our concern is with what is actual, that is, the universe as it is, was, and will be. — Fooloso4

First, you are begging the question by assuming that all reality is part of the universe. Most cosmologists, even though they are naturalists, believe that there may be other universes, with other laws (the multiverse). Second, you are confusing logical possibility with physical possibility. The laws of nature restrict what is physically possible, but they do not restrict what is logically possible. Third, things that happened in the past are possible in virtue of having actually happened, but they are not actual because they no longer exist.

We cannot extrapolate from our limited acquaintance with limited things to a universe that is limited. — Fooloso4

Yes, we can. Because whatever changes has to be limited. If it were not, it would be all that it could be, and so there would be nothing for it to change into.

You avoid Aristotle's causal language but do not side-step the problem. What distinction do you make between the fact(s) and some state of affairs? — Fooloso4

I avoided "cause" because I'm not writing in ancient Greece. Modern philsophy ignores essential causality and takes "causality" to mean Kant's "time sequence by rule." as I am not speaking of temporally prior events, but of concurrent agency, I carefully avoided the term "cause." I am perfectley happy with either "fact" or "state" of affairs as long as no confussion arises.

Your argument is ... and that the infinite being needs no explanation because it is infinite. — Fooloso4

That is a complete misstatement of my position that everything that is, has some underlying dynamics/explanation. It you are going to criticize, criticize what I actually say.

An uncaused cause. — Fooloso4

Thank you for illustrating why I did not use "cause" -- by misstating of my position.

The Euthyphro problem in a nutshell here is that either God could do things that are "logically impossible" if He were to choose to do so, or logic is primary/prior to God, who must obey it. — Terrapin Station

In my understanding, logic is consequent on the nature of being, and all being is traceable to God. So, logic is posterior, not prior, to God.

Your conclusion is a non-sequiteur, and it does logically not follow. You said something completely incongruent to my statement. You made an absolutely false claim because it does not pertain to my claim. — god must be atheist

I responded as I did because I assumed that you were talking about a point I made about the actualization of potency. If your not talking about that, it's hard to see what you are driving at.

Let's go back to what you said.

This is actually not true. A lower-level movement can create a higher-level movement, and there need not be, there is no, actualization process. — god must be atheist

Lower level movements do not create higher level movements, they are the same movement thought of in two distinct ways. I can think of a whole as a whole, or I can think of a whole in terms of its parts, but my way of thinking about the whole is purely subjective and does not change the objective reality of the whole in any way. So, lower-level movements do not create higher-level movements.

You can also see this in terms of priority. Temporally, lower and higher level movements simultaneous, and so neither can be a temporally prior event leading to the other (an accidental cause). Logically, one think of wholes without thinking of decomposing them into parts, but one cannot think of parts without reference to the whole of which they are parts. So, wholes are logically prior to parts and high level changes to low level changes.

Even if we completely forget about the relation of wholes and parts, your argument proves nothing. Why? Because it admits that there are low-level changes, which are still changes -- still the actualization of a potential insofar as it is still in potency -- and the union of all the lower level potencies is the higher level potency.

If you say that there's no potential for the relevant change, that is equivalent to saying that there is no possibility of the relevant change, which denies experiential reality of observed change.

Now, what point are you trying to make?

Just because something is not explained, (the finite to his self) AND assuming an explanation is possible, it does not necessarily follow that there is someone or something that can and will explain it.
— god must be atheist
...

My criticism stands both ways. Both if you consider explanation verbal, and if you consider explanation effective. — god must be atheist

First, I did not assume that anything is unexplained effectively, so your premise ("Just because something is not explained") is not mine, and consequently your criticism does not apply to my argument.

Second, I did not assume "an [effective] explanation is possible," but showed that it is necessary. Again, you are criticizing an argument I did not make.

There must be at least one timeless thing without at explanation and it must be capable of acting as a causal agent - the pyramid of causality within time requires a first cause. — Devans99

I agree with your conclusion, but not your time-based reasoning.

So I think the difference of opinion is that I have God as a timeless brute fact which clashes with your premise 4 - you have God as a 'self explaining being'. — Devans99

The problem with this is that if you allow one brute face, one exception to the need for adequate dynamics, one thing with no intelligible explanation, then there is no reason not to allow others -- and once you do that, your entire line of reasoning breaks down. If one arbitrary finite being can have no explanation why can't any arbitrary finite being have none, be a brute fact? So I see your reasoning self-refuting.

The genius of Aquinas's insight that God's essence is His existence is that it gives us an intelligible reason why God requires no extrinsic explanation.

To be a being is to be composed of information - otherwise we have null and void. — Devans99

I see no reason to accept this definition. Information is the reduction of possibility, while every new existent makes more acts possible. I agree that finite beings have an intelligible/informative essence that specifies what they can do, but the essence of infinite being does not limit possibility, and so is utterly uninformative. (This is confirmed by trans-cultural reports of mystical experience -- see W. T. Stace's works.)

Common sense is based on the common experience of finite being and does not conform to reports of mystical experience.

How is it possible to do anything possible and not be changed by the doing? — Devans99

It is possible if the change terminates outside the agent. If an agent is fully actualized intrinsically, it has no unactualized intrinsic potency and so cannot change intrinsically. That does not preclude acts terminating extrinsically.

There are things in the universe that are just plain bad for all intelligent beings. Black holes for example are purely destructive. — Devans99

There seems to be a black hole at the center of each galaxy, hinting that they may be essential to the formation of galaxies and the possibility of life.

If a proof leads to a conclusion that clashes with reality, one has to question the proof. One or more of these has to give:

- Omnipotence
- Omnipresence
- Omnibenevolence — Devans99

I've rebutted many such arguments in my book. If you have a new one, please state it.

Peace, Dennis

The intro and section 1 of this article are quite readable and on point:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/ — Theologian

It has been my experience that most contemporary philosophers have a hearsay acquaintance with Aristotle.

I also know what you mean about time management. That is why I have been absent for some time. We will miss your reason.

My point was purely and simply that completely unlimited being, by which you seem to mean completely unlimited capacity to do, cannot be the fact that makes some state of affairs be as it is.

It is logically incapable of being that fact because it is incapable of rendering any specific state of affairs necessary. Or perhaps to make things more concrete, I could say that it is incapable of rendering any specific state of affairs inevitable. — Theologian

I almost agree. Which is to say that I agree with some of your formulations, but not with others. Clearly, being capable of any possible act does not necessitate any specific act, because it is equally capable of a contrary act or no relevant act at all. That is why we agreed that an infinite being must have free will.

It further follows that any state of affairs it effects must be intrinsically contingent, not necessary. Thus, I agree that "it is incapable of rendering any specific state of affairs [intrinsically] necessary." I agree further that the mere existence of an infinite being does not logically imply the inevitability of any further state of affairs. That is why theologians in the Christian tradition, at least, consider creation a free act, not one necessitated by the nature of God.

I further agree that many, and specifically pagan neoplatonists such as Plotinus, have seen this as highly problematic, as they believed that the One, being intrinsically complete had no need to act outside of its own being.

The problem with this line of argument is that we know more than "there exists an infinite being." So our fact base is not confined to this alone. We also know that there are contingent beings, a whole universe full of them. This logically entails that the infinite being does, in fact, act outside of itself.

So, it is not necessary that the existence of infinite being logically (a priori) necessitate finite beings. They are logically necessitated a posteriori by our experience.

Further, infinite being's lack of logical necessity to act outside if itself, in no way precludes it from freely acting outside of itself, nor does it preclude it from being the agent effecting (the dynamical explanation of) such effects.

The terminology is confusing in this regard, because metamathematics is defined as a subdivision of mathematics, while metaphysics is defined as non-physics. — alcontali

No, mathematics has quantitative relations as its subject matter, and metamathematics has mathematics as its subject matter. the fact that it may use mathematical methods does not make it mathematics anymore than the fact that physics uses mathematical methods makes physics a branch of mathematics. Metaphysics deals with the foundational assumptions of physics, among other matters.

metaphysics is defined as non-physics. — alcontali

This is simply false. There are many fields that are not physics, and most to not deal with metaphysical issues. What we now call "metaphysics" was called "first philosophy" by Aristotle because it deals with issues fundamental to all other areas of research, including physics.

Metaphysics does NOT use the same scientific method (of experimental testing) as physics. Hence, physics is a subdiscipline of science, but metaphysics is not. — alcontali

If you're restricting "science" to disciplines using the hypothetico-deductive method, metaphysics is not that sort of science. Neither are mathematics and metamathematics. Still, all three are sciences in the more traditional sense of rigorous systematic fields of study.

The ideal of the ToE is to discard the scientific method, i.e. experimental testing, and be able to do science using the axiomatic method, i.e. proving by axiomatic derivation. The reason why science is not axiomatic, is because the axiomatic base for physics is lacking. — alcontali

As a physicist, I that is not my understanding of a ToE. A ToE is just like any other hypothetical construct in physics, but its targeted range of application spans all physical phenomena. It is absurd to think that any competent physicist would accept a proposed ToE absent rigorous experimental testing.

There are axiomatic formulations of a number of fields in physics, e.g. quantum theory and quantum field theory.

Science does not use the scientific method because it wants to, but simply because the desired alternative, i.e. axiomatic provability, is not attainable. — alcontali

I am not sure an axiomatic approach is the "desired alternative" in natural science. You'd need to make a case for that. It seems to me that many physics like the method of discovery they signed up for.

The ToE is exactly about replacing the scientific method by the axiomatic one. Stephen Hawking explores this possibility at length in his lecture, Gödel and the End of Physics. — alcontali

I don't think that Hawking's view is widely shared. Sir Arthur Eddington tried a similar approach in the 30s and 40s, famously predicting that the fine structure constant was exactly 1/136, then exactly 1/137. (It is neither.)

Again, you are confusing methodologies. Natural science uses the hypothetico-deductive method, while metaphysical proofs often use strict deduction. — Dfpolis

Well, the ToE is exactly about replacing the one by the other, and the very reasons why this is not possible. In the discourse on the ToE, the confusion is simply deliberate. — alcontali

While it is not, let us assume that it is. It is still irrelevant as the subject matter of physics is the measurable behavior of nature (which has intrinsic uncertainties, even in the absence of quantum uncertainty), while metaphysics is concerned with being as being, which is not subject to the vagaries of measurement.

This impossibility does not prove anything about the real world, but about the relationship between us and the real world. — alcontali

While I'm happy to admit that knowledge is a subject-object relation, I do not see that the admission precludes proofs about reality.

It just means that we do not have access to a copy of the axioms from which the real world has been/is being constructed. — alcontali

I am sorry, but I do not see nature as an axiomatic construct. Rather, I see it as a complex, intelligible whole from which we may abstract some universal truths. At the simplest level, we understand being well enough to see that (1) Whatever is, is, (2) that a putative reality must either be or not be, and (3) that nothing can be and not be at one and the same time in one and the same way. These ontological insights, informing our thought about reality, give us the logical principles of identity, excluded middle and non-contradiction. Thus, we are able to abstract principles of absolute certitude which can advance our inquiries.

The nature of knowledge as a justified (true) belief, JtB, requires that it has the shape of an arrow. — alcontali

I reject the thesis that knowledge is any form of belief. To know is to be aware of present intelligibility, and is an act of intellect (awareness). To believe is to commit to the truth of some judgement, and commitment is an act of will, not intellect. If knowledge were a species of belief, we would necessarily be committed to the truth of anything we knew. Clearly, this is not the case. One can be certain that one cannot afford a purchase and buy it anyway, showing no commitment to the known truth. So, knowledge cannot be a form of belief.

So if there are mathematical results that can not be proved, there are physical problems that can not be predicted. — alcontali

This, is true, but a non sequitur. Mathematical relations are possibly instantiated in nature, not assuredly instantiated. So, it is possible that we could deduce all actually instantiated relationships. The reason your conclusion is true is that we already know from nonlinear math in general (e.g the 3-body problem and chaos theory in particular (e.g. turbulence and neural processing) that there are predictive calculations we will never be able to carry out.

Still, I fail to see the relevance of this, as mathematics is not the basis of metaphysical thought. We know the consistency of metaphysical premises from the fact that they are instantiated in reality and one cannot instantiate a contradiction.

If Q can be justified from P, then Q is knowledge. Having access to Q is insufficient. It is not knowledge, until the necessity of the arrow, i.e. the justification, has been demonstrated. — alcontali

This analysis precludes any knowledge, for it leads to an infinite regress (How do we know P?). It has been known to be errant since Aristotle examined the foundations of knowledge. We know when our neurophysical system presents intelligible contents to awareness (Aristotle's agent intellect). Then, the intelligibility of the encoded contents is converted to actual knowledge by an act of awareness. Thus, there is no need for an infinite regress of Ps and Qs. We know by being aware of presented contents. We judge by abstracting concepts from those contents and grasping relations between those concepts. We can then deduce further justified relations.

You consider Q to be knowledge in and of itself. That is contrary to the Platonic definition, JtB — alcontali

I am not a Platonist. I counted 17 errors in Plato's epistemology pointed out by Aristotle in his Metaphysics.

Also, doxa in Plato means opinion, not belief. So JtB is not Plato's definition, but a modern misreading of the text.

Well, this is exactly what Gödel tries to achieve in his incompleteness theorems. — alcontali

No. Godel was working in the context of Hilbert's program, which it effectively destroyed. Hilbert's model was one of a priori consistency, with no connection to empirical reality. Godel's work showed that this approach is doomed to failure. Aristotelian metaphysics, on the other hand, is built on a posteriori, empirical foundations. Its concepts are abstracted from sensory experience and its judgements result from analyzing such experience. Because the relationships it builds upon are abstracted from reality, which is necessarily self-consistent, they are guaranteed to be self-consistent.

We already know that such procedure cannot exist. — alcontali

Yes, we do, but that is entirely irrelevant to the present discussion. Metaphysics does not even aspire to a physical description of the cosmos or a complete enumeration of all possible theorems in any axiomatic system. It deals with being qua being, abstracting away from both quantifiability and the detailed laws of nature.

That is a very constructivist remark — alcontali

So?

In the philosophy of mathematics, constructivism asserts that it is necessary to find (or "construct") a mathematical object to prove that it exists. — alcontali

That is not what I am saying. I am speaking of the epistemological basis of noetic systems, not their rules of application. Also, I do not consider philosophy to be a closed axiomatic system, but an open one -- always open to new, experientially based knowledge.

I consider constructivism to be heretical — alcontali

Please don't burn me!

Gödel proves that there is no knowable procedure possible to discover new knowledge. — alcontali

He does no such thing. He only considers closed, formal systems, not empirically open systems. If your claim were true, we would never have made progress in any science.

In other words, it will indeed never be possible to explain (as in knowledge) why humanity has managed to discover its existing stock of knowledge. If the human brain were just some kind of biological computer, it would not have been possible at all. — alcontali

Your conclusion is Penrose's point. However, I think we can explain how we come to know if we do not confine ourselves to a priori, axiomatic ways of thinking, but work out the implications of such facts as those we are discussing -- which is a point i develop at length in my book.

At the same time, there is absolutely no input that you could ever feed to a computer, short of the undiscoverable ToE (Theory of Everything) that will allow it to decide this question. — alcontali

I never thought there was. It is easy to show that the mind cannot be purely neurophysical. The neural representation of seeing a ball and the retina being modified by the image of a ball are identical, but their conceptual representations are not.

The terminology is confusing in this regard, because metamathematics is defined as a subdivision of mathematics, while metaphysics is defined as non-physics. — alcontali

No, mathematics has quantitative relations as its subject matter, and metamathematics has mathematics as its subject matter. the fact that it may use mathematical methods does not make it mathematics anymore than the fact that physics uses mathematical methods makes physics a branch of mathematics. Metaphysics deals with the foundational assumptions of physics, among other matters.

metaphysics is defined as non-physics. — alcontali

This is simply false. There are many fields that are not physics, and most to not deal with metaphysical issues. What we now call "metaphysics" was called "first philosophy" by Aristotle because it deals with issues fundamental to all other areas of research, including physics.

Metaphysics does NOT use the same scientific method (of experimental testing) as physics. Hence, physics is a subdiscipline of science, but metaphysics is not. — alcontali

If you're restricting "science" to disciplines using the hypothetico-deductive method, metaphysics is not that sort of science. Neither are mathematics and metamathematics. Still, all three are sciences in the more traditional sense of rigorous systematic fields of study.

The ideal of the ToE is to discard the scientific method, i.e. experimental testing, and be able to do science using the axiomatic method, i.e. proving by axiomatic derivation. The reason why science is not axiomatic, is because the axiomatic base for physics is lacking. — alcontali

As a physicist, I that is not my understanding of a ToE. A ToE is just like any other hypothetical construct in physics, but its targeted range of application spans all physical phenomena. It is absurd to think that any competent physicist would accept a proposed ToE absent rigorous experimental testing.

There are axiomatic formulations of a number of fields in physics, e.g. quantum theory and quantum field theory.

Science does not use the scientific method because it wants to, but simply because the desired alternative, i.e. axiomatic provability, is not attainable. — alcontali

I am not sure an axiomatic approach is the "desired alternative" in natural science. You'd need to make a case for that. It seems to me that many physics like the method of discovery they signed up for.

The ToE is exactly about replacing the scientific method by the axiomatic one. Stephen Hawking explores this possibility at length in his lecture, Gödel and the End of Physics. — alcontali

I don't think that Hawking's view is widely shared. Sir Arthur Eddington tried a similar approach in the 30s and 40s, famously predicting that the fine structure constant was exactly 1/136, then exactly 1/137. (It is neither.)

Again, you are confusing methodologies. Natural science uses the hypothetico-deductive method, while metaphysical proofs often use strict deduction. — Dfpolis

Well, the ToE is exactly about replacing the one by the other, and the very reasons why this is not possible. In the discourse on the ToE, the confusion is simply deliberate. — alcontali

While it is not, let us assume that it is. It is still irrelevant as the subject matter of physics is the measurable behavior of nature (which has intrinsic uncertainties, even in the absence of quantum uncertainty), while metaphysics is concerned with being as being, which is not subject to the vagaries of measurement.

This impossibility does not prove anything about the real world, but about the relationship between us and the real world. — alcontali

While I'm happy to admit that knowledge is a subject-object relation, I do not see that the admission precludes proofs about reality.

It just means that we do not have access to a copy of the axioms from which the real world has been/is being constructed. — alcontali

I am sorry, but I do not see nature as an axiomatic construct. Rather, I see it as a complex, intelligible whole from which we may abstract some universal truths. At the simplest level, we understand being well enough to see that (1) Whatever is, is, (2) that a putative reality must either be or not be, and (3) that nothing can be and not be at one and the same time in one and the same way. These ontological insights, informing our thought about reality, give us the logical principles of identity, excluded middle and non-contradiction. Thus, we are able to abstract principles of absolute certitude which can advance our inquiries.

The nature of knowledge as a justified (true) belief, JtB, requires that it has the shape of an arrow. — alcontali

I reject the thesis that knowledge is any form of belief. To know is to be aware of present intelligibility, and is an act of intellect (awareness). To believe is to commit to the truth of some judgement, and commitment is an act of will, not intellect. If knowledge were a species of belief, we would necessarily be committed to the truth of anything we knew. Clearly, this is not the case. One can be certain that one cannot afford a purchase and buy it anyway, showing no commitment to the known truth. So, knowledge cannot be a form of belief.

So if there are mathematical results that can not be proved, there are physical problems that can not be predicted. — alcontali

This, is true, but a non sequitur. Mathematical relations are possibly instantiated in nature, not assuredly instantiated. So, it is possible that we could deduce all actually instantiated relationships. The reason your conclusion is true is that we already know from nonlinear math in general (e.g the 3-body problem and chaos theory in particular (e.g. turbulence and neural processing) that there are predictive calculations we will never be able to carry out.

Still, I fail to see the relevance of this, as mathematics is not the basis of metaphysical thought. We know the consistency of metaphysical premises from the fact that they are instantiated in reality and one cannot instantiate a contradiction.

If Q can be justified from P, then Q is knowledge. Having access to Q is insufficient. It is not knowledge, until the necessity of the arrow, i.e. the justification, has been demonstrated. — alcontali

This analysis precludes any knowledge, for it leads to an infinite regress (How do we know P?). It has been known to be errant since Aristotle examined the foundations of knowledge. We know when our neurophysical system presents intelligible contents to awareness (Aristotle's agent intellect). Then, the intelligibility of the encoded contents is converted to actual knowledge by an act of awareness. Thus, there is no need for an infinite regress of Ps and Qs. We know by being aware of presented contents. We judge by abstracting concepts from those contents and grasping relations between those concepts. We can then deduce further justified relations.

You consider Q to be knowledge in and of itself. That is contrary to the Platonic definition, JtB — alcontali

I am not a Platonist. I counted 17 errors in Plato's epistemology pointed out by Aristotle in his Metaphysics.

Also, doxa in Plato means opinion, not belief. So JtB is not Plato's definition, but a modern misreading of the text.

Well, this is exactly what Gödel tries to achieve in his incompleteness theorems. — alcontali

No. Godel was working in the context of Hilbert's program, which it effectively destroyed. Hilbert's model was one of a priori consistency, with no connection to empirical reality. Godel's work showed that this approach is doomed to failure. Aristotelian metaphysics, on the other hand, is built on a posteriori, empirical foundations. Its concepts are abstracted from sensory experience and its judgements result from analyzing such experience. Because the relationships it builds upon are abstracted from reality, which is necessarily self-consistent, they are guaranteed to be self-consistent.

We already know that such procedure cannot exist. — alcontali

Yes, we do, but that is entirely irrelevant to the present discussion. Metaphysics does not even aspire to a physical description of the cosmos or a complete enumeration of all possible theorems in any axiomatic system. It deals with being qua being, abstracting away from both quantifiability and the detailed laws of nature.

That is a very constructivist remark — alcontali

So?

In the philosophy of mathematics, constructivism asserts that it is necessary to find (or "construct") a mathematical object to prove that it exists. — alcontali

That is not what I am saying. I am speaking of the epistemological basis of noetic systems, not their rules of application. Also, I do not consider philosophy to be a closed axiomatic system, but an open one -- always open to new, experientially based knowledge.

I consider constructivism to be heretical — alcontali

Please don't burn me!

Gödel proves that there is no knowable procedure possible to discover new knowledge. — alcontali

He does no such thing. He only considers closed, formal systems, not empirically open systems. If your claim were true, we would never have made progress in any science.

In other words, it will indeed never be possible to explain (as in knowledge) why humanity has managed to discover its existing stock of knowledge. If the human brain were just some kind of biological computer, it would not have been possible at all. — alcontali

Your conclusion is Penrose's point. However, I think we can explain how we come to know if we do not confine ourselves to a priori, axiomatic ways of thinking, but work out the implications of such facts as those we are discussing -- which is a point i develop at length in my book.

At the same time, there is absolutely no input that you could ever feed to a computer, short of the undiscoverable ToE (Theory of Everything) that will allow it to decide this question. — alcontali

I never thought there was. It is easy to show that the mind cannot be purely neurophysical. The neural representation of seeing a ball and the retina being modified by the image of a ball are identical, but their conceptual representations are not.

I have not said that God is unexplained, but self-explaining. — Dfpolis

Then your "proof" would be superfluous — Fooloso4

This is silly, As most people are unaware that what God is entails that God is, it is quite worthwhile explaining this fact.

Your appeal to intuition is a dodge and circular - God is only self-explaining to those to whom this is intuitively evident. — Fooloso4

My actual claim is quite the opposite. It is that a proof is possible because most people know, via ordinary experiential means, all that they need to know to prove that God exists, but lack the extraordinary intuitive insight to see the connections. Fortunately some (e.g. Aristotle, ibn Sina, and Aquinas) have had the insight to point the way.

I would assume that your infinite God could explain itself to everyone without your help! — Fooloso4

It does not help you case to equivocate on the two meanings of "explanation" (verbal vs effective) that I carefully distinguished. A careful reading of my OP may refresh your memory.

With regard to your distinction between essence and existence, what is the essence of what is not? — Fooloso4

As I explain earlier, essences specify possible acts, while existence makes powers operational. Knowing what a thing is, is convertible with knowing what it can do. But, knowing what a thing could do if it existed is not the same as knowing that a thing actually exists. So, essence and existence are distinct concepts.

How do you explain the claim that if a being exists, its explanation must exist? There is nothing self-evident about this claim. — Fooloso4

I already answered this in a response to Echarmion on p.3, giving three reasons. I did not claim it was self-evident, but a requirement of scientific thought.

Science does not explain existence in toto. — Fooloso4

Agreed, That is why we need to study metaphysics.

Your claim that an explanation means the fact(s) that make some state of affairs be as it is does not explain those fact(s). — Fooloso4

Definitions of terms are only intended to explain how the relevant terms are used.

To claim that the fact(s) are self-explaining because without the fact(s) we can't explain anything does not show that the fact(s) exist. It may be that at some point we reach the limit of explanation. — Fooloso4

If there are facts with no underlying dynamics/explanations ("brute facts" that "just are"), then the logic of science fails. Once you allow exceptions to avoid a consequence you do not like, a principle is no longer universal, and there is no reason to think it applies when you like its consequences. If the principle is not universal, any scientific observation may be a "brute fact" with no underlying dynamics -- and not evidence confirming or falsifying a hypothesis. Thus, denying the universality of the principle converts science from an objective search for truth into an enterprise ruled by subjective whim.

I know that this is a practical, not a theoretical argument, but it shows the grave implications of your line of thought. Since it is only practical, I gave two theoretical justifications in my response to Echarmion,

Still. Where does god enter the picture? Just because something is not explained, (the finite to his self) AND assuming an explanation is possible, it does not necessarily follow that there is someone or something that can and will explain it. — god must be atheist

I think you are confusing the two meanings (verbal and effective) of "explanation" I distinguished. the proof deals with what makes things so, not with our articulation fo what makes things so. Things work in a certain way whether or not anyone tells us they do.

Alcontali claimed (I wasn't there, but I believe you) that we can prove nothing about reality Alcontali SEEMED to have claimed (so he did not claim... you put words in his mouth, which he did not say, and you defeat his argument based on something he did not say... hence the strawman) to have proven (which he did not) that we can prove nothing about reality. — god must be atheist

It is not just that he claimed we can prove nothing, but that he did so in the context of proof theory, which is a highly logical structure. I acknowledged that he provided no actual proof, but the claim being made in that context, and with appeals to Godel's incompleteness theorems, strongly hinted at the existence of a proof. My post was designed to elicone if he had one. It was intended to be a challenge awaiting response, not the final word.

This is actually not true. A lower-level movement can create a higher-level movement, and there need not be, there is no, actualization process. — god must be atheist

Then no potential ever becomes actualized and there is no change,

Timeless things should be able to exist without an explanation (as a brute fact). — Devans99

"Should"? Why? What is the force of this "should"? And, what is the error of my analysis?

Asking for an explanation is like asking what engine size an elephant has; the first cause simply does not have a 'why' property. — Devans99

On what do you base this admitted belief?

The way I see it, I've presented a sound argument that shows the existence of an infinite, self explaining being. You object that you do not believe my conclusions. I give arguments you do not reply to. That is your privilege, but its not very persuasive.

So there must be a wider (timeless) container that contains God and the cosmos. — Devans99

It's a category error to think an infinite being can be confined to a location. If a being is contained, it can act in the container, but not outside of it, and so is limited.

It must be something, and if it is something, then it is finite (infinity has the property ∞+1=∞ which implies it can be changed without being changed which is a straight contradiction). — Devans99

This argument fails because we are not speaking of numerical but ontological infinity -- the capacity to do any possible act. An infinite being cannot change because an infinite being is a necessary being, and whatever is necessary cannot possibly be different.

God must clearly be benevolent, so how do you account for the problem of evil? — Devans99

I agree that it is a real problem, but having a problem does not mean that the proof is unsound. I think the problem is that what might be good for other things need not be good for humans. If dinosaurs could think they would have thought the asteroid that ended their era was evil, but it was good for us.

'Rationality' is merely a mental exercise with a particular 'coherence' claim, 'logic' being merely one such exercise. And you appear to be using 'truth' in an absolutist sense which for me begs the question of dubious status of any 'absolute' including 'God'. — fresco

I see "truth" not as an absolute, univocal term, but as analogously predicated. Following Isaac be Israel and Aquinas, I see truth as the approach to equality (adaequatio) between intellect and reality. This leads me to reflect on how near an approach need be. I key my response off the English cognate "adequate." What is adequate to the needs of one realm of discourse may be entirely inadequate in another. Still, respect for truth is due because it is a means of human self-realization.

I see logic as the art and science of correct thinking, where by "correct" I mean truth-preserving, not power preserving. So logic is not merely one exercise among many, but an indispensable means of dealing with reality -- and even more so in an era in which POTUS has told over 10,000 public lies since coming to office. Those who attack and belittle truth support, knowingly or ignorantly, the atrocities that such lies minimize.

So, while you are free to proceed irrationally, I choose to proceed with the greatest respect for truth, evidence and the kind of thinking that preserves them.

I'm not sure how much formal philosophical education you've had (I'm just a beginner myself), but the term "metaphysics" is just a historical accident. — Theologian

Yes, I know that it is because of the placement of Aristotle's work on first philosophy after his work on nature; nonetheless, there was a reason for the placement, viz. because the Metaphysics examines issues fundamental to, but outside of the scope of, the Physics -- just as metamathematics does with math.

I appreciate the thought you and other commenters are expending on my post.

:Being human: is present tense affirmative (nominative). Human is being, and therefore the human exists.

At one point you say that being human means the human exists, at another point you say being human means that the human does not exist. — god must be atheist

I hope that you are not wasting my time, but have a sincere inability to make the distinction between what a thing is and that it is. If you can't see that what a human is does not make it exist, I can see that following the OP would be difficult. As I do not see how to overcome that difficulty, there is no point in our continuing.

Thank you for your consideration.

My point was and is that the completely unlimited is logically incapable of being the fact that makes some state of affairs be as it is. It is incapable of being that fact because by definition it is equally of making the same state of affairs not be as it is. — Theologian

If you're saying that unlimited being has free will, I agree, but having free will does not preclude causal efficacy. Nor does the prior co-possibility of contrary states preclude the actualization of either possibility. Power need not be actualized to be power. For example, I may choose to go to the store or not, but if I choose to go to the store, I am the agent effecting my going to the store -- even though it was in my power to choose not to go.

You need more far more argument to show that that a free-willed being can't be causally effective. All you have actually shown is that God must have free will to be truly infinite.

Positing an unexplained God as an explanation of what cannot be explained is conjuring. — Fooloso4

I have not said that God is unexplained, but self-explaining.

Do *I* have an explanation, and if so, what is it? You seem to be saying that every being has a purpose. — Pattern-chaser

I'm talking about efficient causality or actualization, not final causality or purpose (we can discuss that later). Since you came to be, you need to have been actualized by something already operational. Since you continue to have your potential for further existence actualized, you need an operational on-going source of actualization.

Therefore, to prove the theorem, we would need access to the axiomatic construction logic of the real, physical world, also called, the theory of everything (ToE) — alcontali

I think you're considering the wrong realm of discourse. As metamathematical proofs do not belong to mathematics, so metaphysical proofs do not belong to physics. So progress (or lack of progress) toward a physical ToE is entirely irrelevant.

I think that Godel's work has little to say about a ToE, because the method of physics is not the method of mathematics. Physics is not built on a closed axiomatic foundation, but an open experiential foundation. That does not make a ToE possible, but it does make the analogy with mathematics highly questionable.

This implies that it is not possible to prove anything at all about the real world. It is not possible to prove that anything exists, and science does not prove anything about the real world. — alcontali

Again, you are confusing methodologies. Natural science uses the hypothetico-deductive method, while metaphysical proofs often use strict deduction. We can know with certitude that finite beings exist, that there is change and other facts which provide an adequate foundation for sound metaphysical conclusions.

Since you cannot prove anything about the real, physical world, you cannot prove anything about its creation. — alcontali

If by this, you mean its historical origin, this is a standard Aristotelian-Thomistic position. Nothing in my OP depends on the detailed history of the cosmos, and nothing in it draws any conclusions about its historical origin. So, while I disagree with your premise, I agree with your conclusion.

This does not mean that God exists or does not exists. It only means that our knowledge methods fail to reach the answer to this question. — alcontali

"Not proven." You've done a lot of hand waving, but provided little evidence-based argument. In fact, your entire line of thought seems self-contradictory. On the one hand, you claim we can prove nothing about reality, and, on the other hand, you seem to claim to have proven that we can prove nothing about reality -- which is proving something about reality.

For example, access to existing knowledge is insufficient for the purpose of discovering new knowledge. — alcontali

This shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of knowledge as awareness of present intelligibility. Knowledge is new if previously unactualized intelligibility is actualized by awareness. Yes, what is new may have been implicit in existing knowledge, but that only means that it was intelligible, not that it was actually known.

Otherwise, our existing knowledge would allow us to enumerate all possible knowledge theorems, and use that to discover new knowledge. — alcontali

This is a complete non sequitur. Just because what we already know can be the basis of some new knowledge, does not mean that it can be the basis for all possible knowledge. New knowledge can come both from reflection on what we already know and from new types of experience, e.g. the kinds of observations and experiments that have informed science since antiquity.

That is exactly, however, what Gödel's incompleteness theorems disallow. — alcontali

Let's consider the second incompleteness theorem, which rules out self-proofs of consistency. If we have a set of axioms that are not merely posited, but properly abstracted from reality, we do not need to prove that they are consistent, because no contradstictions can be instantiated in reality. That means that simultaneously instantiated axioms have to be mutually consistent. It is only if one restricts the knowledge base to an abstract system that there is a problem. Opening ourselves to reality can often resolve such problems.

Further, with respect to the first incompleteness theorem, while our axiom set may not allow us to prove that theorem is true, if it is true, it may be instantiated and if it is, we may be able to see and abstract it as new knowledge.

I suggest you read Roger Penrose, The Emperor's Mew Mind, in which he shows that human minds are able to solve uncomputable problems.

First, "not being able to do things that are logically impossible" would be a limitation. So if a god can't do things that are logically impossible, then the god isn't infinite, either. — Terrapin Station

I defined "infinite being" as being able to do any possible acts. If you want to see being unable to instantiate contradictions, be my guest. Such labels do not change the content.

If, instead, we say, "'infinite ability' refers to 'no limitation of ability within the scope of abilities that are possible'," then we invite discussion as to why we should consider logical-but-not-physical possibilities as within the scope of abilities that are possible, because we seem to be conflating what "ability" refers to. — Terrapin Station

This is because logical possibility is based on the nature of being, not on contingent restrictions as physical possibility is. For example, the reason for the logical principle of noncontradiction is that it is impossible to instantiate a contradiction in reality. On the other hand, the laws of nature are contingent and need to be discovered empirically.

I agree with what you wrote but you might want to expand on it to fill in the holes. I'm going to put in my journal and analyze it line by line. — christian2017

Thank you. Posting it is a means of eliciting criticism.

Yes, I was wondering what exactly Dfpolis has in mind by the term "being." Although if God is completely unlimited in ability to act the point becomes moot, since that would include the ability to act in all the ways that one would attribute to a sentient being. — Theologian

By "being" I mean what has the capacity to act in any way. Still, as I said to Terrapin Station, being aware is required to perform many possible acts, so we can conclude that infinite being entails some kind of awareness.

What are we supposedly quoting if not a person? — Terrapin Station

Yes, religious texts use anthropomorphic language. I think that is natural, but I do not think that God is a person in the same way humans are, or that God has fits of emotion. I think most theologians in the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition would agree.

Yet, if God can do every possible act, God must be aware, for many possible acts require awareness. So, God is personal in the sense of being aware of reality.

I am a human; I have come into existence, will pass out of existence. But my component parts, matter, have not gone in-and-out of existence — god must be atheist

You are a being, (an ostensible unity). Your parts are potential, not actual unities.

Further, Greek atomism is long dead. There are no immutable atoma. The quanta constituting you came into being, most of them shortly after the big bang. If our present understanding of cosmology is correct, they will cease to be in a future big crunch. In the meantime, they are subject to quantum creation and annihilation processes.

All existing humans exist.
I am a human.
Therefore I exist. — god must be atheist

Quite true. Now that we agree on the fact, by what dynamics do you exist?

Your reasoning is wrong in he sense that humans exist in a temporal fashion. But they do exist when they do. — god must be atheist

I do not deny, but affirm, that humans exist when they exist. I went even further, saying that once they begin to exist, it is necessary that they exist then. So, I have no idea what point you're trying to make.

The question is not about the fact, which we agree on, but on the dynamics behind the fact.

Being human implies that you currently exist. — god must be atheist

This sentence seems to be causing some confusion. What I mean is that our humanity entails our capacity to think, but humanity does not entail that we exist. Of course being means that we exist, but being human does not entail existing.

If specifications exist, then there is a creator. — god must be atheist

I do not mean "specification" in the sense of prior design. I mean it as a list of the powers we have -- as something that can be known, not as something used as a blueprint.

A finite being outside of time has no need to explain its own existence, it is beyond causality, it just 'IS'. — Devans99

Assuming there is one, if it is timelessly, it is necessarily. This necessity is either intrinsic (in which case it is self-explaining), or it is derived (in which case it is explained by another). In either case, it has an explanation.

I would argue that infinite (unlimited ability to act) is self-contradictory in a finite universe. — Devans99

I make no claim that the universe has infinite being.

'square circles exist or they don't' - complete disjunction so true. — Devans99

Sentences need to be meaningful to be true or false. Non-referential sentences are neither.

'The infinite exists' - contradictory (could a completely unlimited being exist in a finite universe?) — Devans99

I made no claim that God is "in" (limited to) the cosmos.

it needs to be demonstrated that an infinite being is not a logical contradiction. — Devans99

Proving that x exists shows that it is not contradictory as one cannot instantiate a contradiction.

Why do believers need 'proof' ? — fresco

Believers do not need proofs. They are quite content without them. Thinkers need to examine beliefs rationally because, as Aristotle says at the beginning of his Metaphysics, "All humans, by nature desire to know."

On the basis that 'proof', 'existence', 'thinghood', 'limit' and 'God' are all concepts with contextual utility, I suggest the main reason believers have for these (incestuous) word games is a 'belief reinforcement exercise' to shore up weaknesses in their 'utility insurance policy'. — fresco

Why would a rational person another's motives instead of their argument? Is truth no longer valued?

In other words your argument depends on a premise (finite entities can't explain themselves) that is shaky because it rests on the mistaken certainty that the finite can't explain itself. — TheMadFool

No, it rests on a proof, (not an assumption) that a finite being cannot explain its own existence. If you want to reject my argument, show why that proof fails.

I don’t think you ought to appeal to Buddhism for support of this kind of argument. Buddhists only generally address the existence of God in order to dispute it (regardless of what universalists are inclined to say.) — Wayfarer

I suggest you look at F. Th. Stcherbatskv, Buddhist Logic.

3 is contrary to what most cosmologists believe, which is that the universe is infinite. — andrewk

While belief is not evidence, granting that the universe has an infinite extent, does not mean that it has infinite being, viz. the ability to do any possible act.

4 and 5 are assertions of the existence of explanations, for which there is no logical need. The universe doesn't need an explanation. — andrewk

I find that strange in that you based your first objection on what cosmologists believe and all the cosmologists I know seek to explain the universe. I gave three reasons why phenomena need explanations in my response to Echarmion, above. Please explain why you object to them.

Further, I find the insistence that God must be omnipotent unnecessarily limiting, given the well-trodden logical problems with the notion of omnipotence. — andrewk

The proof shows that there is an infinite being. What you call the infinite being is up to you. If you think that an infinite being is problematic, we can discuss that in an other thread, as this one is too busy for that digression. The same applies to the imago dei.

As to the universe, what is changing can't be necessary.

Science does not require that literally everything have explanation. Science only requires that some things have explanation. — Theologian

I gave more arguments for this in my previous post to Echarmion. There I argued, inter alia, that if we allow exceptions to the universality of this postulate, the logic of science collapses. It is irrational to say that a foundational principle applies when I want it to apply and does not apply when I do not want it to apply.

Much of physics, as an intellectual project, has been an attempt to determine the fundamental laws of the universe. If there are fundamental laws, by definition they are unexplained. — Theologian

Something being fundamental and unexplained within a science is not the same as having no explanation or not being explained simpliciter. The foundations of mathematics are examined in metamathematics and the foundations of physics by metaphysics. So, your point relates to how humans choose to structure their inquiries rather than to the nature of reality.

at any one time there is a base level of explanation. — Theologian

This is not the sense in which I am using "explanation." I said:

Note that “explanation” has two senses: (1) the fact(s) that make some state of affairs be as it is. (We may or may not know these.) This is the sense I am using. (2) Our attempt to articulate our understanding of (1). This is not the sense I am using here.

I am not going to say that there are brute facts. I am going to say that it is not a self evident truth that there are not - and since you're the one offering the proof, the burden is on you. — Theologian

As noted earlier, I expanded on this in my response to Echarmion above. I gave two additional arguments there.

If brute facts are not for you, you also do not seem to consider the possibility of antifoundationalist infinite regress — Theologian

I considered any collection of finite beings, which includes infinite regresses. Also, in my book, I show by mathematical induction that an infinite regress cannot give a complete explanation. I did not repeat that proof here as regresses do not arise in the argument. If you feel they do, please say at what point.

Another unconsidered possibility here is that of an Escher-esque universe that is ontologically circular. — Theologian

(1) My argument uses exhaustion of possibilities by applying the Principle of Excluded Middle. If you feel that an Escheresque universe provides an alternative not covered by my application of excluded middle, please point out how I missed it.
(2) Time travel, by whatever means, may relate to accidental or Humean-Kantian time-sequenced causality, but my argument makes no appeal to that type of causality. Rather, it deals with concurrent explanations. As such explanations (e.g. explanations by the laws of nature) deal with simultaneous operations, they are not susptible to temporal paradoxes or even the fact that time may not be defined at scales beyond the Planck time.

I'm afraid I can't agree. To be human (or to be anything at all) is to exist. — Theologian

Yes, to be is to exist. That is a fact, not an explanation of the fact. What you have done is shift the emphasis (and so the meaning) from humanity to being. So, let me rephrase: My humanity explains my ability to think, but not my existence.

Yes, even if one accepted this proof (which I don't) one must be careful about the implicit leap ... — Theologian

I am providing an existence proof, not a manual of natural theology. I did indicate how one can proceed to a number of divine attributes.

You have a theory that can explain literally anything. It's the absolute antithesis of falsifiable. — Theologian

Falsifiability is a requirement applicable to the scientific or hypothetico-deductive method, not to strict deductions. It is no criticism of Godel's work to say that his conclusions are unfalsifiable. While it is irrational to posit a hypothesis that cannot be adequately tested, it is equally irrational to require falsifiability where it does not apply. We have a different, but well-defined method of examining deductions. We consider the truth of the premises and the validity of the logical moves. If both pass muster, the conclusion is true.