I'd say the main point of the OP was snark, hitting back at those ancient proofs for the existence of God that can't seem to go away. It points out that attempts to bootstrap something from from logic alone lead to — Hanover

:up:

At what realm do you suppose symbolic logic makes sense besides mathematic proofs? Just philosophy journals as a way to gain street cred, that one knows the game?

Edit: I ask because clearly the reasoning and analysis matters more than turning the argument into symbolic logic. If anything, exercises like this show this.

@Leontiskos @Hanover

I guess the silence speaks for itself :meh:

If you treat the premises as contingent statements that have a truth value of their own based upon empirical information or whatever you use to decide if a statement about the world is valid, then you end up with non-sequitur issues, but those non-sequiter issues are not deductive logic fallacies, but are inductive ones. — Hanover

Yep, makes sense. So I guess what's the bigger picture? We can do funny things with symbolic logic seems a bit arbitrary. We need more than symbolic logic to say anything meaningful seems a truism. So what then?

Does this whole exercise imply something about logic's usefulness with natural language? :chin:.

If there is a step before logical notation that is needed to translate, what is THIS?

Well, I suppose that’s what my first post above does. The (valid) formal logic is an improper translation of the English language sentence. — Michael

:up:

Same question https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/939929

The argument in Banno’s post is a link to a logic tree diagram that shows you why it’s valid. — Michael

Can you have a non-sequitur critique of a structurally valid statement? Does content matter?

~P
∴(P→A) — Leontiskos

No.

I don't see how the conclusion can be derived conditionally from the premises- it is tacked on.

Why isn't the conclusion just a non-sequitur?

Methodological naturalism says behave as if it were and get on with it. Physicalism seems like a vacuous piece of extra metaphysical naturalist baggage in that context. — Baden

I'd tend to agree, but I think what's going on here is that physicalism is a set of beliefs that one commits to when answering questions regarding the nature of things. Presumably, you can have the same critique of any number of metaphysical takes on reality, not just physicalism. These metaphysical takes can be grounded in non-supernatural beliefs, even but be very disparate. For example, the metaphysics of someone, let's say like Richard Dawkins (who I would presume comes close to what @Wayfarer means by a "scientism") and the metaphysics of someone like apokrisis (who whatever else you think of his ideas, is scientifically oriented in regards to his metaphysics), would be very different.

Presumably, BOTH consider metaphysical questions, but maybe not. Perhaps it is the case that someone like Richard Dawkins, may not really grapple with metaphysical questions, yet unknowingly takes a metaphysical stance anyways (i.e. physicalism). My question then is:

Which is worse?
1) Being scientifically-oriented (using methodological physicalism), considering the metaphysical questions and making a (critical yet speculative) stance on it.

OR

2) Being scientifically oriented (using methodological physicalism), but not consciously considering metaphysical questions at all, YET inadvertently making metaphysical conclusions about reality from it?

If 1 is worse, then you have something against any metaphysical speculation. If 2 is worse, you simply don't like non-critically examined metaphysical theories.

Where methodological naturalism needs to be made explicit is when it appears in the guise of a metaphysic - which happens most often in the attempt to subject philosophical problems to scientific scrutiny. To scientism, in other words. That's when it becomes metaphysical, as distinct from methodological, naturalism. — Wayfarer

What is the difference between "scientism" and let's say something like a "pansemiosis"? Would scientism not add any more than what is gleaned from the scientific theories/conclusions? Pansemiosis (like the totalizing ones that someone like apokrisis advocates for), add a non-scientific addition- a mechanism that connects all the disparate things in a connective tissue. It isn't "physical" but some sort of logical structure that transcends the physical but totalizes it. These kind of theories aren't based on "physicalism", but neither do they seem to rely on/point to anything related to "mental" let alone "supernatural". Where do those theories fall then? I wouldn't say it's "scientism". That is to say, it would seem like "scientism" itself would never even come to the level of philosophy. It would simply be repeating the conclusions of science. Philosophy would have to take that and structure it into something more than these conclusions. The instant you try to do such a thing, you have to answer metaphysical questions (e.g.'What is the nature of X") the instant this is answered, you have a metaphysics beyond the scientific conclusions. Presumably, this would no longer be "scientism". Or perhaps, scientism is more about fooling oneself. One doesn't realize that one's metaphysical beliefs are in fact metaphysical.

But when language enters the picture, we get a series of explanations that all involve the sun doing things like rising and falling. While this is accurate pattern recognition, it happens to be untrue. So . . . what is it that allows language to move beyond mere phenomena, and strive for a truth that is observer-independent? — J

I think I did set out a historical framework for how this developed though:

He is moving from primitive inferencing- something that is universal and even tribal cultures utilize, to Logic (capital "L") as conventionalized by Greek/Western contingent historical circumstances. Inferencing + cultural contingencies of the Greek city-states + further contingencies of history led to our current conventions of logic. So it is a mix of taking an already universal trait and then exposing it to the contingencies of civilizations that mined it thoroughly and saw use for it.

However, that's not all. ONCE these contingently ratchted inferencing techniques were applied to natural phenomena, we found not only that the conventions worked internally in its own language-game, but that it did something more than mere usefulness to human survival/language-game-following. It actually mapped out predictions and concepts in the world that worked. New techniques now harnessed natural forces and patterns to technological use, far beyond what came before. Math-based empirical knowledge "found" something "about the world" that was cashed out in technology and accurate predictive models. This is then something else- not just conventionalized language games. This particular language-game did something different than other language games.

That is to say, you cannot discount how the capacities of language led to both "formalized logic" and "empirical pattern-recognition" through contingencies of historical development that took place (for example, the culture of ancient Greece, the conditions of Renaissance Italy, etc.). I think WITHOUT historical contingencies, indeed, we MIGHT NOT be talking about the formal logic/math/scientific systems we are doing now. In other words, our current concepts and uses of logic/science WAS NOT a necessary/foregone conclusion. The capacity was nascent in the human by necessity of evolutionary demand, but it was an EXAPTATION that we hit upon these more formal versions of what we could do primitively as hunter-gatherers.

However, I do allude to the fact that the pattern-recognition itself, which we can call "nascent/primitive/en potential" in the early human, might have some connection to the fact that it could not go any other way. The universe has perhaps a certain set of patterns that cannot be be helped to have lifeforms that in turn recognize them. Imagine a spiral with a line running from the end of the spiral throughout the whole spiral system (humans are created from the patterns but can recognize the patterns, but this wouldn't be disconnected).

ground — Ludwig V

Doesn’t ground mean some sort of cognitive capacity? Learning to use this capacity, and having this capacity in the first place are two different things. There seems to be a debate as to how modular our cognitive systems are. Is the brain a general processor or does it have domains? If it has domains does “rational thinking” count as a domain- a specialized brain/cognitive capacity? A dog solving a puzzle and a human inferencing- is that the same capacity/region or two similar but different capacities?

Don’t want to go there. I was just trying to think of some ‘edge cases’ where there might be actual metaphysical considerations. — Wayfarer

I thought it interesting. I’m not sure id characterize it as metaphysical, certainly a case of “mental affects/effects reality”. Beliefs shouldn’t create such distortions/delusions in reality, but they do. X action shouldn’t lead to Y deluded distortion, but it does. Generally we think of chemicals doing this, like drugs, not beliefs. The physical causes the mental change. Of course, this can just be more proof that mental beliefs are physical events whereby the x delusions are simply unhealthily potentatiated neural pathways with physiological centers that simulate the same feeling as if it was a physical cause.

psychosomatic — Wayfarer

What do you suppose this can be characterized as? For example, superstitions that manifest in physical realities for that person as if they are real- but to that person, they are real?

His version is idiosyncratic though. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Funny, because that's the exact word I was going to use :lol:

Semiotics, through Aquinas, John Poinsot, C.S. Perice, and John Deeley is one particularly developed area that has a lot of overlap with this question (Sausser-inspired and post-modern semiotics largely considers the question unanswerable/meaningless and so ignores it though). — Count Timothy von Icarus

You seem to summon the philosophy of apokrisis. The all-encompassing "information" of the language-species AND the universe versus the context-dependent post-modernists.

Edit: I see we've engaged with this briefly before: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/825333

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14334/adventures-in-metaphysics-2-information-vs-stories/p1

Self-recognizing as bad habit seems to be vague then. You are stating a truism rather than a normative course of action.

I don't think there is an easy answer to this, but I would say that a bad habit should change when it is self-consciously recognized to be a bad habit and the necessary resources to make a change are available. This applies to individuals and cultures. — Leontiskos

At what point though is it incumbent upon the person with the "bad (cultural) habit" to change them, ethically? When it leads to harm? When should a cultural habit that leads to possible harm be excused?

That is, when speaking of the war, Germany did not seek to change itself. Instead, an external set of agents sought to change Germany. — Leontiskos

Sure, but there was something in German society at that time whereby when the leadership was defeated, and the country basically conquered militarily, there was no further uprisings/insurrections. That is to say, the country had traditions, or a sense of "unification" (in its government/leadership) whereby formal treaties of war are respected and followed (even if they had the most despicable forms of rule of all humanity prior to that formal surrender). One can imagine a different cultural milieu, in which insurrections of ex-military or rogue groups, kept the fight going continuously, even using terrorist methods of asymmetrical warfare. Places like Afghanistan, Iraq, and other parts of the Middle East, would be a different story in terms of how a military defeats a region. Of course, this might have less to do with culture than political arrangements (fractured leadership, ethnic divides, non-unified sense of national identity).

So…
...Can we not apply Occam’s razor, rid ourselves of physicalism, remain metaphysically agnostic, and follow the scientific method where it leads? Leave the empty suitcase behind and go where the plane takes us? What is the real barrier to doing so? — Baden

Metaphysics, in my view, provides "aesthetic frameworks" rather than definitive answers. For example, a physicist proposing the "many worlds" hypothesis to address quantum problems would have a vastly different metaphysical outlook than someone who believes in only one universe. This brings us to the question: "What is physical?" Is space-time physical? If the many worlds exist, are they physical? The term “physical” starts losing clarity if it encompasses everything.

Still, I believe we can distinguish between physical and non-material realities. Physical reality consists of things we can observe, measure, and interact with directly. Physicalism is most useful when it suggests that reality is, in principle, measurable. What lies beyond measurement—whether events, objects, or processes—is hidden, as object-oriented ontology suggests.

There are major problems with physicalism, though:

Philosophy of Mind: Describing the brain's workings (mapping the terrain) is not the same as understanding conscious experience (the terrain itself). If you call that "physical," you're offering no new insight.

Supernatural phenomena: Some suggest a pantheistic view, where all possible forms and arrangements of reality are "God" or part of a process theology. But at this point, it’s just a matter of semantics over what we call metaphysical realities.

I'll spend some time on your longer post, Schop. — J

:up:

Yes, because there is a greater level of intentionality involved in the badness of the second person. They are doing the bad thing more purposefully and intentionally. — Leontiskos

I basically agree. Now, the more complex question though, is when does it become incumbent upon people of a certain culture to evaluate a possible negative cultural trait/feature to see if it needs to change?

If in a previous culture, dogs were allowed to roam around a village, sometimes getting injured, sometimes getting lost, mostly doing "ok", getting fed by all the people of the village, and then in the new culture, dogs are supposed to be solely the responsibility of a certain person/family at a certain boundary of property for the safety/well-being of others who might be affected as well as the animal's welfare, at what point should the previous culture adopt/adapt to the new culture, if at all? At what point might one take the new cultural feature (FOR ETHICAL/PHILOSOHPICAL/REASONED considerations) and change the previous culture, if at all? [Please note, I don't mean change to "fit in", but because one has reasoned it's in some way axiologically perceived as a better/improved cultural habit.]

This of course, is a very mild example. There are more extreme ones revolving around education, "rights", martyrdom, and a whole host of things. It also gets tricky because "culture" can easily be misconstrued with "political philosophy" (think the individualism of Anglo-American culture vs. the social democracy of Scandinavian countries perhaps).

Isn't that oddly passive? A bit like puzzling over how the Philips Head driver just happens to fit a Philips head screw. We use language so that we can talk about the world. If it didn't work, we would use a different language. — Banno

Yes I fully agree. Please see my full reply (which includes more-or-less my birdseyeview of language and its efficacy) in the post to J above:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/939555

"The cat is on the mat" and 1) the idea of a cat on a mat, and/or 2) the fact of an actual cat on a mat, it's still puzzling, from a certain angle, why we can rely on language to make reliable connections of this sort. — J

But why should it be so puzzling with theories of evolutionary adaptation/exaptation? That is to say, clearly our species has a linguistic capacity. Academics like Steven Pinker (The Language Instinct) and Terrence Deacon (The Symbolic Species) even think that language is THE defining human feature. It seems to me, evolutionary development holds the key to why our species is able to parse the world out in discrete objects, and arrange them together using various verbs/prepositions, describing them with adjectives, and the like. I wrote this a long time ago, but I think it applies here.. This might be my most articulate and developed explanation for this set of phenomena revolving around human capacity for language, and language's subsequent ability to recognize natural patterns (what I now am calling "correlation-distillation"). Let me know what you think:

there are language/mathematical/logical communities that DO special things. For example, the conventional math-languages used in the sciences and engineering DO solve problems of a much more complex nature than the problems that other language games solve. It creates predictive models for which other language games do not have the ability to predict. How can this language game be so useful compared with others, in mining complexity in natural phenomena and in secondarily creating synthetic technologies from those original mined complexities?

And here we can say there is perhaps a realism to the complexities of these special language-games. Perhaps a realism that is above and beyond mere forms of life only. Contingency would imply caprice- that the efficacy would work as well as any other convention.

Perhaps these complexities, or what I call "patterns", are part of a bigger picture of explanation. Language-games may be true (pace Wittgenstein), but some language-games are based in a realism of necessary pattern-recognition that is necessary by way of evolutionary necessity. Animals that do not recognize patterns, would not survive. Thus there is a realism underlying the conventionalism or nominalism of Wittgenstein's project.

However, I was trying to map his picture of human reality with other metaphysical and epistemological conceptions- namely realism, contingency, and necessity. One can construe Witt's metaphysics of these language-games to be be in purely nominalist or conventionalist terms. However, there may be some inherent, universal aspects to them which can characterize them to be necessary. It is necessary that humans inference, for example. It can be argued that general inferencing (this story/this phenomena/this observation is a specific or general case of X... This general case of X can be applied to specific cases of Y) may be a necessary human capability, dictated by evolutionary forces. In other words, in theory, any mode of survival is possible, in reality, evolution only allows certain modes of survival to actually continue. One such mode of survival, is inferencing. Since humans have no other recourse in terms of built-in instincts beyond very basic reflexes- our general processing minds, must recognize the very patterns of nature (through inferencing, and ratcheted with trial-and-error problem-solving, and cultural accumulated knowledge) which other animals exploit via instinctual models and lower-order learning behaviors/problem-solving skills.

.....

He is moving from primitive inferencing- something that is universal and even tribal cultures utilize, to Logic (capital "L") as conventionalized by Greek/Western contingent historical circumstances. Inferencing + cultural contingencies of the Greek city-states + further contingencies of history led to our current conventions of logic. So it is a mix of taking an already universal trait and then exposing it to the contingencies of civilizations that mined it thoroughly and saw use for it.

However, that's not all. ONCE these contingently ratchted inferencing techniques were applied to natural phenomena, we found not only that the conventions worked internally in its own language-game, but that it did something more than mere usefulness to human survival/language-game-following. It actually mapped out predictions and concepts in the world that worked. New techniques now harnessed natural forces and patterns to technological use, far beyond what came before. Math-based empirical knowledge "found" something "about the world" that was cashed out in technology and accurate predictive models. This is then something else- not just conventionalized language games. This particular language-game did something different than other language games.

My own conclusions from this is that the inferencing pattern-seeking we employ as a species, to survive more-or-less tribally and at the least communally, by way of contingency, hit upon real metaphysical patterns of nature. Thus my statement in another thread that while other animals follow patterns of nature, humans primarily recognize patterns of nature in order to survive.

I want disagreeing BTW, just chiming in. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Cool. :smile: :up:

Well, in terms of priority, it would seem that perception is prior to speech, both in evolutionary terms and in the development of the individual. But then we would do well to remember Aristotle's dictum that "what is best known to us," are the concrete particulars (the "Many") whereas what is "best known in itself" are the generating principles/principles of unity (the "One"). Prima facie, it seems that the intelligibility of being must be prior to knowledge in the order of being/becoming, while the reverse is true in the order of becoming. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure, I didn't say that perception/basic experiential sensation isn't prior to language. Rather, I am simply saying that language seems to have a logic and so do the "empirical rules" that one can distill from repeated testing/correlation-distillation. These are different but related. Prior to the scientific/empirical rules, language, and its adjacent abilities (conceptual-thinking, capacity for inference, etc.) seem to need to be in place. Both need to be explained for a proper metaphysics, and in some theories (like information theories), they aren't so separated as part of the same type of thing going on.

Specifically, it's provided by Statistical mathematics which reaches for an approximation to the truth. Which is probably why it's reliable, unlike syllogism which fails to account for unknown error. Which points to my earlier misadventures of pointing out that knowing A; entails the possibilty of being wrong about A and asserting it is true. The problem isn't in the system of logic but the flux of the evidence.

'What is, is' only works if you're correct about what it is initially. — Cheshire

A thought came to mind about Kant's (still useful) way of breaking up the world. Logic is a way of recognizing rules. This is how information is parsed out. Scientific principles regard distilling correlations to a point of being able to distill rules (of the empirical). The two logics are different- one has to do with language pattern, and one has to do with empirical patterns. However, they are both intertwined, as the rules of logic seem embedded in language, something that comes prior to the empirical correlation-distillation that takes place in the cultural practice of scientific research.

So what I mean is, basically, as I see it, the Tractatus is simply a common sense point of view. X event happens in the world, we make statements that reflect these events. Actual events in the world (states of affairs) are reflected by accurate statements (true propositions). X state of affairs is reflected by Y true proposition (about/describing that state of affairs). — schopenhauer1

And so the question becomes interesting as to:
a) Why would our language/logic correspond to the world?
b) How do we know something is veridically accurate?

And thus this opens up interesting notions of information. Information theory seems to have some role to play for why "The grass is green" makes sense, AND then what it means to say, "It is true that grass is green". These are two different capabilities, possibly being conflated in this discussion, revolving around Frege. And Frege perhaps, did not have the tools to really go further with it. Modern ideas of information, linguistic evolution, and other forms, possibly outside of formal "logical systems", would help elucidate this. Yet this discussion becomes hermetically sealed to the dates of 1870-1950 when it is not opened up to these subjects which better tackle these confusions of the early analytics.

don't know what, exactly, suicide bomber martyrs feel just before they blow themselves up in a crowded cafe. Maybe not much of an adrenalin kick, maybe not much of a highly motivated limbic burn. After all, they don't want to give themselves away too soon, by looking like an hysterical crazy person, for instance. Maybe they feel a beatific calm. — BC

Glorification of martyrdom (achieved in cultural indoctrination) seems like it has to tap into the motivational power of the limbic system--which is provided by nature. Nothing too odd about that -- soldiers are prepared to fight (and die, perhaps) through indoctrination and "feeling the burn" of hitting the beach, going over the top of the ridge, moving forward under fire. Adrenalin plays a role here. — BC

What about holding hostages of another country which in turn holds your own people hostage? Your version is 20 years old. Though I know trends make a come back :death:

That confusion was addressed in PI. But on that, as I recall, you disagree. — Banno

I won't open that can of worms at this time.. Witt's theory of language in context/use and shift away from language as static correspondence, etc. However..

The SEP article that frank introduced has arguments - section 1.2 - for the need to introduce states of affairs. — Banno

In that article SOA are possibilities, where facts are what is the case from those possibilities. As far as I know, SOA that obtain are what Wittgenstein is saying is captured by true propositions.. Either way, whether modal possibilities of possible arrangements exist, versus the actual arrangements, he seemed to posit that there was a "something" that was being captured by true statement ("facts" or SOA that obtains).

To me, this is still a (barebones) metaphysics. It's a realist metaphysics that puts a lot of value on declarative statements are mapping "reality" in some veridically accurate way. The barebones aspect is that the "reality" is given short shrift in his koans referring to "objects" and states of affairs, and "facts", etc.

Happy to go with you, but could you restate the question? Something off about the grammar. — J

So what I mean is, basically, as I see it, the Tractatus is simply a common sense point of view. X event happens in the world, we make statements that reflect these events. Actual events in the world (states of affairs) are reflected by accurate statements (true propositions). X state of affairs is reflected by Y true proposition (about/describing that state of affairs).

A state of affairs is not a something apart from how things are.

Folk are welcome to talk about states of affairs, but might do well to remember that they are a turn of phrase, not a piece of ontology. — Banno

That’s why Tractatus is confusing. It posits an ontology but doesn’t want to remain there too long. Objects, state of affairs. Call them “real” or tokens, but they are something that he is “corresponding” with propositions. I hired they could be thoughts if one is to make an idealism from it.

Added more

Even if we agree that a state of affairs does not differ from what a statement sets out, it does not follow that a state of affairs does not differ from a statement. A statement is a locution; a state of affairs is not. — Leontiskos

How do you know? You are referring to something. Yet your reference is cognitively something. That doesn’t have to be a state of affairs.

I'm happy to drop either "fact" or "state of affairs," as long as it's clear that, whichever one we retain, it's the non-linguistic referent of a statement. — J

Yikes! But I don't think so. We need to make statements in order to talk about anything, certainly, but that doesn't mean that everything we talk about is also made of statements. — J

I didn't mean everything was "made of statements".. I'll lead you to something, but first let me take the route there..

Why do you think the Tractarian vision of "states of affairs" and "true propositions" pointing to the states of affairs as anything really profound rather than common sense? That is to say, this notion that the world exists, we talk about it with statements that pick out possibly true ones.

SO how does a state of affairs differ from that which a statement sets out? — Banno

As I said:

Sounds like a performative contradiction to me! Can't get out of statements! — schopenhauer1

Agreed, but just about no one mistakes the statement for the state of affairs. But you know this, so I realize there's something I'm not understanding here. Expand? — J

Sounds like a performative contradiction to me! Can't get out of statements!

That would be an application of an overarching ontology to X. — frank

Right, but that's not "the whole world"- the overriding ontology though, true.

So, okay, getting back to evolution and history of universe, you said:

Language is for talking about things in the world, like evolution or cosmology. — frank

Yet you said:

It would be like the knight on a chess board describing the game of chess. It can't have that vantage point. — frank

Yet evolution and history of the universe are things we cannot have a vantage point about. Same goes perhaps about the evolution of language, or for that matter, "the ontology of language", or the "ontology of information", yet here we are sharing information, using language, evolved from a universe over the processes of time and space.