Sorry the above reply in haste was mis written. It should read, that the absolute certainty of proofs to that effect are , even if , a shade below expectations, may make a huge difference , in a retrospective effort to change the way things may have turned out. — Bella fekete
This is very helpful. It indicates that the foundation of personal identity, for you, is spatio-temporal continuity in the narrative of a life. If that's right, then you are denying that people who undergo changes that they think they have become a different person are simply wrong. I admit that is a bit problematic, but I don't see how you can dogmatically rule that out. Perhaps we need to think more carefully about what being a person is, and how it is something different from being a human being.And then, that body or mind is subject to changing experiences that could alter the course of their outlook, life, personality, etc. — schopenhauer1
I could have fair hair and still be me. I could be six inches shorter than I am and still be me. I could have musical talent as opposed to competence and still be me. Minor changes don't matter. — Ludwig V
I would suggest that this is a gross misunderstanding of personal identity. Identical twins are not the same person, and if someone undergoes gene therapy they do not become someone else, in the sense that a sober person is likewise the same person when drunk or that the same person can be happy at one time and sad at another, or young at one time and old at another. Wrt. social identity, we can stipulate a genetic absolute in this sort of way, but in such case I am identifiable by my genetic code or equally by my fingerprints, but not as them. — unenlightened
After the above has been agreed upon as a matter of fact, then we can possibly get into arguments of identity after the conception/birth of the person. If the person born was from the same gametes as you, would that person in fact really "be" you with various changes in their upbringing, etc.? You can even at this point, ask about indiscernibles regarding twins or clones because those are about the same genetics, and same gametes. I think for example, the case of maternal twins (twins from the same cell that splits), proves that identity is not necessarily wrapped up in genetic origin, otherwise twins would be considered the same person, which would seem absurd. In order for a person to be identified as a separate "person" or "being", one would have to take into account that they have their own X to some degree (body, and/or mind). And then, that body or mind is subject to changing experiences that could alter the course of their outlook, life, personality, etc. At that point, you can argue identity. But in no way, a person born of different gametes, even given the same set of experiences, would be "you". It would be an approximately similar person, however. So being of the same gametes is necessary but perhaps not sufficient to identity. — schopenhauer1
I'd think you can only imagine being yourself with such supeficial changes, but what about less obvious, but more profound differences? Suppose the genes this 'alternate you' got resulted in a person with an IQ 40 points lower than yours? Suppose the genes alternate you got resulted in schizophrenia? Would
you think the alternate you to be you in that case? — wonderer1
I read it, but i decided it would be a cold day in hell before your nonsense achieved much agreement. So I decided not to wait. — unenlightened
But if people can change in the course of their life, without those changes being so radical that they become a different person, what makes the gametes so important and sensitive that ANY change in them produces a different person. It seems absurd to suppose that if I was conceived 5 minutes earlier or later, the resulting person would not be me. — Ludwig V
I think what you say is right, at least in the sense that we are all unique organisms. If a different sperm had fertilized the ovum that grew to became you then it would not be you but someone else... — Janus
unless the theory of the soul as self were true. In the latter case it would be you in a different body. — Janus
In the latter case it would be you in a different body. So to speculate about possible worlds in which you were born to do different parents and so on, would always be to invoke such a theory of the soul, else the speculations be nonsense. — Janus
I do apologize, for breaking rules, with the assurance of admitting to be a slow lerner. On account of a rare but not unusual genetic trait, that neuropsychologists have been trumped by, but compelled to stay the course, and raise the impending necessity of accelerating said such learning.
Such uninspired damage control is quite similar and relative to the level of expected ‘internal’ change. — Bella fekete
I am making a claim that if the gametes are different than the one that was your set of gametes, whatever the case may be (whether they are similar to you or not), THAT person who was conceived a second before or after with different gametes is NOT you. I really want to establish THIS point, at the least. That THIS point is not a matter of debate or interpretation, but just a fact that that person born from a different set of gametes is not you. — schopenhauer1
I think far too much emphasis is put upon DNA when it comes to identity. DNA doesn't relate to who you are in some kind of easily explicable relationship. Just imagine that your own DNA has been mapped, as can be done, and you look at the map: a series of letters consisting of A G T and C. Which part of them causes you to type what you type here? None, of course. But if you cannot establish a relationship between the genetic code of an individual and what they do then I'd say you're mistaken that the genetic code is a necessary identifier. At least existentially what we do is who we are. And unenlightened has already pointed out how identical twins have identical DNA, but not identical identities. (though it's worth noting here that DNA morphs, too -- so just how identical the DNA is is up for dispute -- 99.99% matching between code is very similar, but not identical identical, and biological processes have a way of finding difference)
I think the real reason DNA is highlighted is because it helped courts. Finally, a marker of identity to prove beyond reasonable doubt that this blood was theirs!
But surely we are more than our legal identities, and that those are certainly up for interpretation. — Moliere
After the above has been agreed upon as a matter of fact, then we can possibly get into arguments of identity after the conception/birth of the person. If the person born was from the same gametes as you, would that person in fact really "be" you with various changes in their upbringing, etc.? You can even at this point, ask about indiscernibles regarding twins or clones because those are about the same genetics, and same gametes. I think for example, the case of maternal twins (twins from the same cell that splits), proves that identity is not necessarily wrapped up in genetic origin, otherwise twins would be considered the same person, which would seem absurd. In order for a person to be identified as a separate "person" or "being", one would have to take into account that they have their own X to some degree (body, and/or mind). And then, that body or mind is subject to changing experiences that could alter the course of their outlook, life, personality, etc. At that point, you can argue identity. But in no way, a person born of different gametes, even given the same set of experiences, would be "you". It would be an approximately similar person, however. So being of the same gametes is necessary but perhaps not sufficient to identity. — schopenhauer1
realize one can go on a wacky crusade of exceptions and give me some interesting sci-fi scenarios along the lines of a Ship of Theseus whereby someone's genetic code was replaced from its initial code to a different code, so would that then be a different person? Indeed, how much genetic engineering would the "person" then be a different "person" than the starting point? I could concede that it might be different. I would not know at what point. But certainly, if a different set of gametes were used, even by the same parent in artificial insemination, it would still be a different person. Each sperm cell has a different combination of genetic information that gets reshuffled in meiosis.
But it was said here:
But if people can change in the course of their life, without those changes being so radical that they become a different person, what makes the gametes so important and sensitive that ANY change in them produces a different person. It seems absurd to suppose that if I was conceived 5 minutes earlier or later, the resulting person would not be me.
— Ludwig V
So that's my point. There would be no YOU conceived. That person is someone else. You keep taking the POV of someone who can transpose their current personhood onto a different person. I contend, even if that person was conceived five minutes earlier, and had the same life experiences, that would be a different person. That would not be you, but someone else. — schopenhauer1
And then, that body or mind is subject to changing experiences that could alter the course of their outlook, life, personality, etc. At that point, you can argue identity. But in no way, a person born of different gametes, even given the same set of experiences, would be "you". — schopenhauer1
I think that what differs between these two sentences is the notion that if, at the time I was conceived, a different set of DNA, like the sperm nearby, would have started the process of birth then I'd be a different person. But in the second part you're acknowledging that there are processes after conception that can change twins to explain the initial idea that our gametes are necessary parts of our identity.
What I'm saying is that twin studies suggest that gametes aren't up to the level of necessity. So the scenario you're positing is if in the past when I was conceived I was conceived with different gametes, and you're saying that's absurd and I'm saying "Why?" — Moliere
The argument is about necessity, not sufficiency. — schopenhauer1
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