I mean, who is to say the tribes that have a word for "one", "two" "three" "anything more than three" is wrong? If used in a way that everyone gets by, there you go.

Yes, definitely. The challenge ends up being about the meaning of any word. — frank

Cool.

Is this something about word-games and their context?
In another thread I was saying thus, and I think it might have some relevance about context and the meaning of terms (like plus and quus):

For physicists, "nothing" has a different connotation than the classic philosophical notions of nothing. It just needs zero energy to be considered "nothing" in physics I guess. And of course, that is unsatisfying in a philosophical sense that the theoretical principles and laws and fields that underlie this "nothing" still need to be accounted for.

So yeah, various terms can be thought of differently (have different definitions and uses) in different language communities.

Quus guy's logic is using it differently than plus guy's.

The only other answer is Quus guy simply misinterprets the language-game of a particular mathematics-using community.

The poster asked if I was aware of something from nothing in physics and I gave him the main example I knew from the popular science book. Yes, I am aware of the scientism of many scientists. The context of the debate often revolves around the use of words and the misguided acknowledgment of what these terms mean for each side.

For physicists, "nothing" has a different connotation than the classic philosophical notions of nothing. It just needs zero energy to be considered "nothing" in physics I guess. And of course, that is unsatisfying in a philosophical sense that the theoretical principles and laws and fields that underlie this "nothing" still need to be accounted for.

This looks to be a decent explanation of "nothing" in physics.
https://www.quantamagazine.org/how-the-physics-of-nothing-underlies-everything-20220809/#:~:text=Quantum%20Nothingness&text=In%20classical%20physics%2C%20a%20field's,%E2%80%9CNothing%20is%20happening.%E2%80%9D

What do you think about "something from nothing" in terms of physics? — Gregory

I don't think much of it. There have been ideas from people like Lawrence Krauss'A Universe from Nothing that posits just that. I think it's plausible, but look at the explanation:

KRAUSS: That's exactly right. Empty space is a boiling, bubbling brew of virtual particles that pop in and out of existence in a time scale so short that you can't even measure them. Now, that sounds of course like counting angels on the head of a pin; if you can't measure them, then it doesn't sound like it's science, but in fact you can't measure them directly.

But we can measure their effects indirectly. These particles that are popping in and out of existence actually affect the properties of atoms and nuclei and actually are responsible for most of the mass inside your body. And in fact, really one of the things that motivated this book was the most profound discovery in recent times, and you even alluded to it in the last segment, the discovery that most of the energy of the universe actually resides in empty space.

You take space, get rid of all the particles, all the radiation, and it actually carries energy, and that notion that in fact empty space - once you allow gravity into the game, what seems impossible is possible. It sounds like it would violate the conservation of energy for you to start with nothing and end up with lots of stuff, but the great thing about gravity is it's a little trickier.

Gravity allows positive energy and negative energy, and out of nothing you can create positive energy particles, and as long as a gravitational attraction produces enough negative energy, the sum of their energy can be zero. And in fact when we look out at the universe and try and measure its total energy, we come up with zero.

I like to think of it as the difference between, say, a savvy stockbroker and an embezzler. The savvy stockbroker will buy stocks on margin with more money than they have, and as long as they get that money back in there before anyone notices, and in fact if the stocks go up, they end with money where they didn't have any before, whereas the embezzler, of course, is discovered.

Well, the universe is a savvy stockbroker. It can borrow energy, and if there's no gravity, it gets rid of it back before anyone notices. But if gravity is there, it can actually create stuff where there was none before. And you can actually create enough stuff to account for everything we see in the universe.

But, you know, it's more than that because some people would say, and I've had this discussion with theologians and others, well, you know, just empty space isn't nothing. You know, there's space. How did the space get there? But the amazing thing is, once you apply in fact quantum mechanics to gravity, as you were beginning to allude again in the last segment, then it's possible, in fact it's implied, that space itself can be created where there was nothing before, that literally whole universes can pop out of nothing by the laws of quantum mechanics.

And in fact the question why is there something rather than nothing then becomes sort of trite because nothing is unstable. It will always produce something. The more interesting or surprising question might be why is there nothing. But of course if we ask that question, well, we wouldn't be here if that was true. — NPR Interview with Lawrence Krauss

I'm not sure if that really is in favor of anything like Will being omnipresent.

I don't think so. Kant was no anti-natalist afaik (although he failed to procreate afaik). I see Kant's project as determining the limits of reason to make way for faith. he didn't want to, couldn't, say what the thing in itself is. — Janus

No I wasn't talking directly about Kant, I was using that as analogy of what I was doing with Schopenhauer.. I was saying that my discussion was fair game regarding the Thing Itself as Schopenhauer saw. If this was a discussion about Kant's Transcendental Idealism, and I touched upon various topics surrounding that, it would be analogous to discussing Schopenhauer's Will and Thing Itself and various topics surrounding that. I was not trying to actually discuss Kant's Transcendental Idealism.

Anyway, it has everything to do with personal preferences, or if nothing to do with personal preference then people will do as they are determined to do and that's the end of it, and I am not going to be drawn any further into these futile under-determined arguments. — Janus

You make an argument and then walk away. Then don't make the argument. don't argue about it. Let it go as I was trying to do.. but you went on despite saying you don't want to...

So I will respond in kind as I am not going to let wrong-headedness just slip by in a reply to my statement. And you called it "under-determined" which of course will drag this argument further being you tried to negatively characterize it, so that's on you for throwing the punches.....I have no sympathy for you now regarding this discussion and you can't play the "I'm a victim of your moralizing" when you do shit like that. If you are going to metaphorically punch someone in the face, get ready for a counter-punch.

People are going to do what they decide to do. Determined is a loaded word and is smuggled in via debates about free will. Such meta-ethics doesn't need to be brought in. People have reasons, and sometimes "accidents" (or "don't care about the consequences" which is still a stance) for why they procreate or not procreate. To play stupid and pretend that no one has reasons for anything and it's all blind robots is more than wrong, it's intellectually dishonest.

As to your idea of "it has everything to do with preferences", you are pretending that the issue of whether or not other people should be born is not a moral issue at all. It's just another action in the world. Well many behaviors have a moral element to them and this is one of them. Life entails suffering/Suffering (western/Eastern notions of), and this would be something a person born would have to deal with. Is it okay to cause this for another person to deal with? You can't hide behind "good experiences". No one is denying that. It is only questioning whether causing the conditions for negative experiences is a morally justified action.

It's not about condemning or judging people. It's about reasoning about if we should impose suffering onto others which seems to violate rules of non-malfeasance, and autonomy when carried out.

When Kant said that the thing in itself causes phenomena, he knew already that he placed causality within phenomena; so it's only by analogy that we speak of Will's action. There is no "why" to pure will. — Gregory

I just find this to be pretty uninteresting. "There is no why". The end. It just doesn't have the philosophical heft to explain the systems it relies upon. That is to say, how is it that Will "objectifies" itself? What can that mean if all is a unitary one? Why objectification from a unitary being? Why space/time, etc? Whether it's illusory or not, it's still something that is there in the picture.

If instead of saying ‘the thing in itself’, you were to say ‘the world as it is in itself’ or ‘reality as it is in itself’ or even ‘reality as it truly is’, I think it would convey the gist better. In Buddhist philosophy, one of the attributes of the Buddha is ‘yathābhūtaṃ’ which means ‘to see the world as it truly is’. — Quixodian

Good point, but I get stuck on "truly is" because either Will is magically asserted or Maya is magically asserted. However, we "know" Maya (e.g. the cogito).

Here is a question.. What does it even mean once you are enlightened? How can you say that it is anything but a dispositional state (tranquility/calmness)? But Buddha felt pain after his enlightenment. You can say that he experienced some sort of ego-death. He no longer cared if he got something or didn't get something, etc. Besides that being unproven (that he truly achieved that throughout his post-enlightenment), nothing can be proved about that state of affairs other than it is a state of affairs about someone in the world. That this meant something like a mystical/spiritual thing, can always be questioned and never proven. Why is that even attached to it other than cultural traditions of the Vedic/Hindu contingent traditions from which it sprang. Perhaps Greeks had a similar notion, maybe even some sort of Indo origin to both of them that was in the cultural substrate. Perhaps it evolved in both cultures convergently like a bat and a bird evolved wings, but not from the same origin.

The compendium contained additions and interpolations by the translator from a variety of sources (including Yogācāra Buddhism). In any case, the key point as always is that the illusory realm of māyā is ‘seen through’ by the liberated ‘mukti’. — Quixodian

Yes that does seem to be the thrust of Schop's idea of the ascetic in book 4.

The OP says nothing about Schopenhauer's pessimism. The fact that Schopenhauer thinks we can know something about the thing in itself by introspection, that i it is blind will or striving, says nothing at all about whether the thing in itself is good, bad or neutral. — Janus

If we discussed Kant's notion of Transcendental Idealism and then I ventured into his ideas that surround that, I believe I would be justified.

If we discussed Schop's notion of "thing in itself" and we discussed what that meant for Schopenhauer we would be justified. It means for him, a blind striving Will. And it was discussed at length as to how Will can form Representation and Objects and the PSR. How is All Will if Will is also Representation? Whence this Representation? That was all discussed previously and more than tangentially touch on the idea of Thing Itself and how it becomes "known to itself" (through Representation). So I would kindly just end this little line of bullshit because it is fruitless to the topic. I get it, you don't want to talk about other stuff related to Schop's idea of Will and my general conclusions from his ideas etc. etc.. GOT IT! So you can drop it if you want as I don't care to discuss why were are discussing what we are discussing and the boundaries of if we can or cannot discuss what we are discussing. I find that pedantic and exhausting.

All I can think about that is that your experience must be very different than mine. I love life and have never regreted being born. If I could choose to come back again and again I would. — Janus

But you don't choose, and you can't. And if you didn't come back, no one would lose out. There is no ghost version that is deprived or in regret or is distraught over non-spilled milk.

If suffering counts for anything, it is not up to us to determine if other people should be burdened with it. And on and on. You know the arguments, you said. They have nothing to do with personal preferences. Personal preferences should not be the determinate for what others should have to endure. If I like football, that doesn't mean football players should be forced to play so I can be entertained.

I understood this thread to be about whether we can know the nature of the in-itself — Janus

More precisely, it was questioning if the Thing Itself can be referred to as a referent, as if it was a phenomenal thing. That being said, you can't just talk about this stuff in isolation. Schop's ideas were a system infused with pessimism. The Thing Itself is ultimately striving nature of existence and if you weren't following the whole thread, I can see how you would think it was out of left field, but it comes more from my conversation with Quixodian. I think I picked up on something you said and kind of wrapped you up in that conversation too.. So, I can see your confusion perhaps. I invite you to look back at the full conversation I was having in the thread though if you did want to meet me back here, which I am sure you are not inclined to do, so carry on.

Does that sentence state that you sit in judgement on procreators? Do you sit in judgement on them? — Janus

It seemed to imply you don't judge procreation, people, but I do.. Like I was judging someone's clothes or trying to make someone feel bad or something else of a negative connotation of how "judging others" is used.

That which I didn't address was off-topic in this thread, and I have no interest in going over you anti-natalism arguments again. — Janus

It's very much on topic. Here were the steps of this conversation. Schopenhauer's Thing Itself > Escape from it possible? (Quixodian yes/ schopenhaer1 no) > If we can't escape then don't start in the first place. Wasn't far off really but a dialectical conversation that leads to ethics. Conversations aren't completely static and Schop's Thing-Itself bereft of Pessimism would be completely off.

Did I say you are judging people? I understand you are against procreation, and you are entitled to your opinion. I know all the arguments, and I am not convinced by them. Not everyone must think as you do. — Janus

You said,

I've told you before that I have never had a desire to reproduce, but I don't sit in judgement on those who do. — Janus

But there’s no use denying the fact that we exist in the first place. — Quixodian

Oddly enough, isn't that the kind of thing the ascetics question? Bundle theory and all that.

A coherent response to the human condition amounts to more than regret for being part of it. — Quixodian

Communal catharsis. It's right understanding.

I know the question I have for Schopenhauer - if will is blind, and the origin of everything, then how to account for mind? In Neoplatonism, nous is seen as a universal, but Schopenhauer seems to expunge it of actual intelligence, leaving only ‘striving’ or ‘energy’. So where in his scheme to mind/nous/intelligence originate? — Quixodian

Yep. My question too.

I was not aiming for a pessimistic characterization of human life in toto, but rather in general. I think some individuals can accept their mortality and find peace and be sensible enough to be overall happy with their life onon Earth; I know I am. — Janus

Lame-duck sauce response, but at least it's not snide. That is to say, it really didn't address much of what I wrote.

Others are able to have unshakeable faith in eternal life, or in the possibility of progress towards enlightenment. I don't claim those things can be logically or empirically justified, but that doesn't seem to matter to some. Others, perhaps a majority, don't seem to be interested in thinking about such things at all. I don't draw any conclusions or make any judgements about such matters: I am agnostic. — Janus

Eek. You think I am simply "judging people" like procreation is a fashion trend that I find repulsive? You negate the very reason for the judgement (and not the 'judging'- there is a difference).

The difference between them and Schopenhauer is that his philosophy is actually soteriological - there is a possible escape from the futility of existence. Still reckon that's the aspect of his thinking you can't accept. — Quixodian

Indeed, ironically, I think Schopenhauer too optimistic. There is no blissful escape. But more interestingly, the fact that there are schools of thought regarding "escaping from life's suffering/Suffering (western/Eastern sense of the word), is telling about life in the first place and should be a warning about putting more people into it in the first place. In other words, the only logical outcome are the monks and ascetic practice of no procreation. That's it. Everything else is dealing with the already existing fallout. Don't drop the bomb rather than having to figure out how to live with the radiation.

If I have a soteriological inclination, I think it would be more in line with Hartmann's:

The essential feature of the morality built upon the basis of Von Hartmann's philosophy is the realization that all is one and that, while every attempt to gain happiness is illusory, yet before deliverance is possible, all forms of the illusion must appear and be tried to the utmost. Even he who recognizes the vanity of life best serves the highest aims by giving himself up to the illusion, and living as eagerly as if he thought life good. It is only through the constant attempt to gain happiness that people can learn the desirability of nothingness; and when this knowledge has become universal, or at least general, deliverance will come and the world will cease. No better proof of the rational nature of the universe is needed than that afforded by the different ways in which men have hoped to find happiness and so have been led unconsciously to work for the final goal. The first of these is the hope of good in the present, the confidence in the pleasures of this world, such as was felt by the Greeks. This is followed by the Christian transference of happiness to another and better life, to which in turn succeeds the illusion that looks for happiness in progress, and dreams of a future made worth while by the achievements of science. All alike are empty promises, and known as such in the final stage, which sees all human desires as equally vain and the only good in the peace of Nirvana. — Eduard von Hartmann Wiki

That is to say, only the right understanding is possible. I can only go back to Zapffe again, for what we tend to do when we get too close to this understanding:

Isolation is "a fully arbitrary dismissal from consciousness of all disturbing and destructive thought and feeling".[5]

Anchoring is the "fixation of points within, or construction of walls around, the liquid fray of consciousness".[5] The anchoring mechanism provides individuals with a value or an ideal to consistently focus their attention on. Zapffe also applied the anchoring principle to society and stated that "God, the Church, the State, morality, fate, the laws of life, the people, the future"[5] are all examples of collective primary anchoring firmaments.

Distraction is when "one limits attention to the critical bounds by constantly enthralling it with impressions".[5] Distraction focuses all of one's energy on a task or idea to prevent the mind from turning in on itself.

Sublimation is the refocusing of energy away from negative outlets, toward positive ones. The individuals distance themselves and look at their existence from an aesthetic point of view (e.g., writers, poets, painters). Zapffe himself pointed out that his produced works were the product of sublimation. — Zapffe Wiki

That is to say, if we are not defending our projects with anchoring mechanisms like "Tradition, Pursuit of Happiness/Pleasure, Science, Progress, Family, Country", we are distracting with the little things "hobbies, gardening, travel". And if we are not lucky enough to have gotten at these stages of "Maslow's Hierarchy", safety, security, and mere physiological survival.

We can think in the abstract, and that has produced great intellectual achievements, and works in the arts, but it has also produced horrors, nightmares. We cannot accept our mortality and that has produced vain dreams of eternal life and paradise, while we cannot even be sensible enough to be happy on Earth during our brief existence between two nothingnesses. — Janus

Nice characterization there.. Using your abstracting skills. I would simply add that there is no reason to create the stuff between the two nothingnesses. Anytime we force someone else's hand, it's a political move. What is the motive behind throwing more people into the world? We want someone else to go through the disturbing episode. After just extolling our abstraction abilities, you cannot hide behind "instinct" for why. We clearly can do the opposite of our initial desires. We do it all the time. If you say it is so that they can experience the joy that you sometimes feel, that is ignoring the logical other side of life. That is becoming the judge and executioner for someone else, making it their burden. And so the disturbing episodes continue.

All we have left is snide remarks about how depressives aren't wanted here and to go away. But then Ligotti had the delightful observation of optimistic responses here in possibly the most pessimistic thing ever written (notice I said pessimistic, not necessarily gruesome:

Should you conclude that life is objectionable or that nothing mat­ters—do not waste our time with your nonsense. We are on our way to the future, and the philosophically disheartening or the emotionally impaired are not going to hinder our progress. If you cannot say something positive, or at least equivocal, keep it to yourself. Pessimists and depressives need not apply for a position in the enterprise of life. You have two choices: Start thinking the way God and your society want you to think or be forsaken by all. The decision is yours, since you are a free agent who can choose to rejoin our fabricated world or stubbornly insist on . . . what? That we should mollycoddle non-positive thinkers like you or rethink how the whole world transacts its business? That we should start over from scratch? Or that we should go extinct? Try to be realistic. We did the best we could with the tools we had. After all, we are only human, as we like to say. Our world may not be in accord with nature's way, but it did develop organically according to our consciousness, which delivered us to a lofty prominence over the Creation. The whole thing just took on a life of its own, and nothing is going to stop it anytime soon. There can be no starting over and no going back. No major readjustments are up for a vote. And no melancholic head-case is going to bad-mouth our catastro­phe. The universe was created by the Creator, damn it. We live in a country we love and that loves us back. We have families and friends and jobs that make it all worthwhile. We are some­ bodies, not a bunch of nobodies without names or numbers or retirement plans. None of this is going to be overhauled by a thought criminal who contends that the world is not double­plusgood and never will be. Our lives may not be unflawed­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­—that would deny us a better future to work toward—but if this charade is good enough for us, then it should be good enough for you. So if you cannot get your mind right, try walking away. You will find no place to go and no one who will have you. You will find only the same old trap the world over. Lighten up or leave us alone. You will never get us to give up our hopes. You will never get us to wake up from our dreams. We are not contradictory beings whose continuance only worsens our plight as mutants who embody the contorted logic of a para­dox. Such opinions will not be accredited by institutions of au­thority or by the middling run of humanity. To lay it on the line, whatever thoughts may enter your chemically imbalanced brain are invalid, inauthentic, or whatever dismissive term we care to hang on you, who are only "one of those people." So start pretending that you feel good enough for long enough, stop your complaining, and get back in line. If you are not as strong as Samson—that no-good suicide and slaughterer of Phil­istines—then get loaded to the gills and return to the trap. Keep your medicine cabinet and your liquor cabinet well stocked, just like the rest of us. Come on and join the party. No pessi­mists or depressives invited. Do you think we are morons? We know all about those complaints of yours. The only difference is that we have sense enough and feel good enough for long enough not to speak of them. Keep your powder dry and your brains blocked. Our shibboleth: "Up the Conspiracy and down with Consciousness." — Thomas Ligotti- CATHR

Best quote on this is succinct though:

“We can regard our life as a uselessly disturbing episode in the blissful repose of nothingness.” — Schopenhauer

So yeah, any gaslight-y snide answer to the Pessimist has been noted and lampooned, so you can stop before you start :wink:.

If you weren't going to give a pat optimistic snide remark towards the pessimistic stance, carry on and ignore.

I would prefer 'the human condition'. — Quixodian

Yes, I would say that Zapffe captures this paradox of self-awareness the best:

Zapffe's view is that humans are born with an overdeveloped skill (understanding, self-knowledge) which does not fit into nature's design. The human craving for justification on matters such as life and death cannot be satisfied, hence humanity has a need that nature cannot satisfy. The tragedy, following this theory, is that humans spend all their time trying not to be human. The human being, therefore, is a paradox. — Zapffe Wiki

And directly here:

The tragedy of a species becoming unfit for life by over-evolving one ability is not confined to humankind. Thus it is thought, for instance, that certain deer in paleontological times succumbed as they acquired overly-heavy horns. The mutations must be considered blind, they work, are thrown forth, without any contact of interest with their environment. In depressive states, the mind may be seen in the image of such an antler, in all its fantastic splendour pinning its bearer to the ground. — Peter Wessel Zapffe, The Last Messiah

That is to say, we done fuckd it up. It's too late for us. Secondary consciousness forbids the return to Eden. All these religious attempts at ecstasy, or calm, or peace, or serenity in vain. All seeking what is genetically not in our cards.

So I am at a loss of how you want to go ahead communicating, as you seem to start from the end of the conversation. So let's start over. Let's start from this post here and you can let me know
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/831351

There is no multiplicity because Will is all and Will is one. So nothing has happened. What you see is Maya — Gregory

Don't quote this, but quote the comment above. However, to add to what you said here, my comment above is about whence Maya? If all is Will, why the Representation? That is why I said it was asserted (hint: read comment above and reply to specific text in that).

Individuality and identity have their issues, to be sure. I tend to think of individuation as something real that forces itself onto our attention, and identity as just a kind of placeholder that signifies that individuals can be identified on account of their differences. No two things in the world are exactly the same. Individual things are perhaps never the same from one moment to the next, some more obviously different through time than others, of course. The hill near my house, covered with tall eucalypts looks the same from day to day, but if I cast my thoughts back a few years I remember the trees were much shorter (Flooded gums grow 3-4 meters a year). — Janus

That's because your thinking is mired in human exceptionalism. This kind of thinking brought us to the dire situation regarding the environment we find ourselves in today. — Janus

I wouldn't be so quick to condemn this thinking. Humans do have obvious differences that make a difference. We seem to be a largely cultural animal which internalize the cultural ideas with various degrees of freedom, using our individual personality-propensities and decisions to "get stuff done".

There must be a difference a kind of mind that has conceptual-linguistic-based thoughts versus ones that do not. That must count for something.

I think 'theisitic' is the wrong term. Certainly, many a Christian critic of Schopenhauer would agree with his own self-professed atheism. If, as both Schopenhauer and the other sources say, insight into the One is only attained through a kind of ecstatic intuition, then that is something other than 'theistic speculation' (and indeed later chapters in Schopenhauer's Compass explore the inherent tension between his kind of pantheist mysticism and religious orthodoxy). The question of how and why 'the One' has become 'the Many' is indeed the central issue of all ancient and classical metaphysics, but I can't see how the various interpretations of those ideas culminate in 'mere assertion', even while acknowledging that I myself only have a very hazy understanding of the matter (although I am still continuing to educate myself in it.) — Quixodian

By 'theistic' I mean some sort of logos/reason/desire for it. What I was getting at is Schop seems to have painted himself in a corner. It is "blind Will" but "blind Will", dagnabit, just so happens produce the exact Representation that creates individuation. It just "does", right? Well, look at that, Will "just so happened" to create this complicated system out of its blind willing nature. Do you see what I'm getting at.. It almost certainly leads to a quasi-theological understanding. Will then is blind, but it's blind and needs its playground (representation). All of a sudden you have a reason, a story, a myth, what have you. However, that's a reason. He then is stuck on these ideas of Platonic Forms by way of the influences that book nicely lays out (Schelling, Bohme, Neoplatonics, and the rest). That is to say, he has a ready-made metaphysics that is in need of a new home.

Would I be correct in surmising that your original interest in Schopenhauer was motivated by your oft-stated antinatalism, on the grounds that his pessimistic philosophy provides support for such views? And that digging deeper into what he said, finding ideas that seem to have religious implications undermines that interpretation? — Quixodian

I think this is a distraction to the debate at hand. I thought his notions of suffering, and striving were very accurate. That is say, his Eastern notion of suffering of being always dissatisfied. This seems to characterize the human animal. One doesn't need the architectonics for this conclusion to be true though. One doesn't need to believe in the Platonic Forms, or in a metaphysical Will, or even the transcendental nature of time/space/causality. However, even so, I do entertain his ideas with the principle of charity as I think he had a great understanding of the nature of being (a human and animal), and think he had inventive ways of answering questions.

So Will in Schopenhauer: the point is that Will chooses everything for us and we are Will. If you have a bad life, Will choose that. Will is completely free. Do you realize Will is willing? It doesnt choose what we want or think we need. It's on its own and has no one to take it to account. Reason brings in ends and "my life should be different". The Will for Schop can do no wrong. You might as well call it random, but it is choosing. Will acts. I remember that Descartes thought God was Will — Gregory

Will wills, yes. However, why is it that entailed in willing is this superstructure of the PSR, objects, space/time/causality as this aspect of Representation?

I answered your objection. If reason comes from will than reason can NOT give an account of Will as you try to do. Reason inly knows reason. What is prior to reasoning is beyond reasoning. — Gregory

Hey sorry if I was harsh earlier.. but could you quote some specific things I said so I can reference that? Otherwise, I may think you are addressing something else. Also, it seems like you kind of gloss over what I am saying for a general reply when you don't quote specific text.

Ok, so that is great, but that is not my question. That is to say, to posit that we reason is a given. To posit that there is Will is the thing to be explained. However, my question was more about to why Will has to have a multiplicity.

Once one tries to say that death is a long sleep or terrible isolation or whatever, it becomes kind of empty talk, imo. It's just whatever metaphor you prefer to use. — Manuel

I don’t think he says that, but rather the absence of being. The whole project from BigBang onwards is moving towards non-being I think is the idea. Kind of like BigBang to Heat Death.

The conundrum there would be why individual nonbeing matters but if we take it that Will is our inner aspect, the every shard of the exploded god ceasing is I guess achieving that aim?

Interestingly by individualizing the perspectives thoroughly, it probably influenced Nietzsches later perspectivism, not that I much care for Nietzsches will to power crap.

Perhaps Mainlander does a better job here. — Manuel

At least he has an explanation! It's pessimistically theological .

Working in the metaphysical framework of Schopenhauer, Mainländer sees the "will" as the innermost core of being, the ontological arche. However, he deviates from Schopenhauer in important respects. With Schopenhauer the will is singular, unified and beyond time and space. Schopenhauer's transcendental idealism leads him to conclude that we only have access to a certain aspect of the thing-in-itself by introspective observation of our own bodies. What we observe as will is all there is to observe, nothing more. There are no hidden aspects. Furthermore, via introspection we can only observe our individual will. This also leads Mainländer to the philosophical position of pluralism.[2]: 202  The goals he set for himself and for his system are reminiscent of ancient Greek philosophy: what is the relation between the undivided existence of the "One" and the everchanging world of becoming that we experience.

Additionally, Mainländer accentuates on the idea of salvation for all of creation. This is yet another respect in which he differentiates his philosophy from that of Schopenhauer. With Schopenhauer, the silencing of the will is a rare event. The artistic genius can achieve this state temporarily, while only a few saints have achieved total cessation throughout history. For Mainländer, the entirety of the cosmos is slowly but surely moving towards the silencing of the will to live and to (as he calls it) "redemption".

Mainländer theorized that an initial singularity dispersed and expanded into the known universe. This dispersion from a singular unity to a multitude of things offered a smooth transition between monism and pluralism. Mainländer thought that with the regression of time, all kinds of pluralism and multiplicity would revert to monism and he believed that, with his philosophy, he had managed to explain this transition from oneness to multiplicity and becoming.[16]

Death of God
Main article: God is dead
Despite his scientific means of explanation, Mainländer was not afraid to philosophize in allegorical terms. Formulating his own "myth of creation", Mainländer equated this initial singularity with God.

Mainländer reinterprets Schopenhauer's metaphysics in two important aspects. Primarily, in Mainländer's system there is no "singular will". The basic unity has broken apart into individual wills and each subject in existence possesses an individual will of his own. Because of this, Mainländer can claim that once an "individual will" is silenced and dies, it achieves absolute nothingness and not the relative nothingness we find in Schopenhauer. By recognizing death as salvation and by giving nothingness an absolute quality, Mainländer's system manages to offer "wider" means for redemption. Secondarily, Mainländer reinterprets the Schopenhauerian will-to-live as an underlying will-to-die, i.e. the will-to-live is the means towards the will-to-die. — Mainlander Wiki

What I find interesting is that this seems to be an even more pessimistic idea than Schop's. Whereby we can go back to the comfort of a womb-like unity with the hope of Nirvana in Schopenhauer, Mainlander's individuation is complete and isolated, leading to complete annihilation. No unity, but intractably individuated. All is individual, all the way down, unitary origins or not.

I see it as fatal to Schop's own endeavor, as interesting as it is.

What comes prior to something, must be simpler that the resultant. Likewise, these separate things we see in the universe, must have been more closely united then they are now and our best theory suggests something like this via the Big Bang Model. — Manuel

This would be contra, Schop though. This would externalize time/space in a way that is contrary to Schop's idea that Will is atemporal. The unity is ever-present and now, and not something in the past. However, I do recognize that ideas like the "block universe" can preserve Schop and the Big Bang perhaps. What is clear though, is that time is not metaphysically real, only epistemically so for Schopenhauer.

Religious is an ambiguous term. Schop like the religions of the East — Gregory

I'm starting to see why @Banno was frustrated at your answers. Are you reading my posts in full where I cover this? There is nothing more frustrating in a forum where someone answers your post as if you did not already cover that topic, as if bringing up the topic as if it wasn't discussed previously when in fact, it was. Please read my previous response again and if you want to pull specifics, we can discuss that.

I'm more inclined to wonder "how" reason can be Will. "Why" implies there's a teleology before mind, which Schop denies. Kant advocated for blind faith in God. Maybe understanding Will takes some faith since it's beyond reason. You don't seem to be satisfied with this line of thought nevertheless. Sorry — Gregory

Have you read my full posts? I go over how Schop is not theological. So sure, change it to how. Whatever. It's still asking the same question. And I go over the point that this is exactly where Schop seems to be at a loss. How/Why a unity is multiplicity without theological implications. Does Will need Representation? How is it that there is this Will with a sort of "glitch" of Representation in the first place? Why not just Will without that "glitch"? Religions have all sorts of poetic answers to this.

Kant didn't say if the thing-in-itself was an object or subject. Schop said it was Will but mind understands the Forms, not Will. So the thing in itself is unknowable for him and also how reason comes from will. I know you like to think of it like two sides of a coin, but doesnt Schop say *everything* is will? So reason is somehow will I'm guessing — Gregory

You keep just reiterating what it is that needs to be explained. Why is there a mind that understand the Forms and reasons, if all is Will? Why multiplicity if all is in reality Will?

Ok, I read a little and it looks like I pretty much got it right as to his "mechanism" earlier in this thread. The book said:

Notice specifically the three step process of Schelling.

See what I said earlier:

I kind of liken the metaphysics to a sort of neo-platonism. That is to say, there is an architectonic aspect to it that sort of "emanates". The emanation is not in time/space, but is all-at-once, so should not be thought of causally, like a dominoes, as another quote said.

That is to say, there is an aspect of Will that is transcendent. Perhaps this is akin to a state of Nirvana or supreme unity or some such, but cannot be felt or shared. But from Will, there becomes this "house of mirrors" effect where it also has "objects" for which is the manifestation of itself, for which then creates a series of bouncing "back-and-forth" for which causality, time, space and subject/object become "as if" it is external, when in fact it is just the "house of mirrors" effect of Will "objectifying itself" eternally. — schopenhauer1

But again, as poetic as this looks, as I indicated in that quote, it loses any explanation outside of theistic speculation. Theism would denote that God (All-Will) wanted to reveal himself to himself and thus individuated himself via emanations into lower worlds via some Platonic unfolding from universalized Forms to gross individualized forms in the world of time and space. This is all Platonic/Neoplatonic.

Schop is advocating for non-theistic All-Oneness that individuates into multiplicity. That is harder to explain intelligibly as to how All-Will can become multiplicity. This in the end, for all his awesome ideas, becomes a mere assertion. All he can do is point to other non-helpful assertions such as the Vedas/Upanishads whereby the idea of Maya and "illusion" enters the equation. All is one, but we don't realize it. But then the illusion becomes the thing to be explained. Why is the "illusion" so complicated in its phenomenal form if everything is at base oneness? If anything, the more complexity of scientific discoveries reveals this. You can superficially say that physics reveals a sort of "oneneess" in something like a Unified Field Theory, but that is very superficial as that itself is gotten to because of complex mathematical formulations that reveal that, not because it is so apparent because of its basicness to being.

Rather, being seems to be interminably complex and individuated, contra Schopenhauer. He (and others) take the idea of things like "ego" (individual-selfish-drive) and "compassion" (the drive to feel empathy and help people despite one's selfish pull), as some sort of reified unity, when in fact they are just dispositional psychological attitudes, nothing more. They are complex pheonemona and it's often hard to tell what is purely ego and purely compassionate. One can twist those two concepts to variations all day (loving myself is loving others is loving everything is loving myself again, etc. etc.). But this is all just word-play and concept-games at this point, not true metaphysics.

It is yet to be determined why illusion would enter the system at all for Schopenhauer. My way to try to recover this is to emphasize Schop's idea of Will's immediacy and not it's transcendence. That is to say, there can never be a prioricity in his system. This World of Appearance is literally Will-objectified/personified. There is no Will and then appearance. But again, that doesn't say much either except what we already know, that the world appears to us a certain familiar way and that there is another aspect of it that is mere unity. That doesn't explain why unity needs appearance.

Perhaps the only answer is a quasi-theological one. Will needs appearance to be its double-aspect because Will wants it in some way so as to have a way to enact its striving nature. Striving without objects, is basically nothing. But then, here we go again with a theological explanation of some sort of logos, desire, reason, etc.

Let me know if you find anything.

Yes, that I know very well. It's his conclusions that are most interesting to me, not his metaphysics so that part you have to explain the least to me (i.e. blind striving will leading to suffering in the animal/human perspective). And I agree, SEP does a good job characterizing it thus.

However, that still doesn't answer my actual question at hand about Schop's metaphysics:

But is not All Will? Why Object (and its form space/time)? He only says a subject is for an object, like it's just a matter of course. But then why posit undifferentiated Will? Essentially he is positing epistemic dualism and metaphysical monism. But why is there an epistemic coming from the metaphysical at all? — schopenhauer1

and previously put in more detail along similar lines:

Ok, so my problem again is that whence the individuation and PSR and mind and objects if all is unindividuated Will? Without making non-helpful analogizes to "maya" and such, many-is-one thing isn't explained. Again my question is:

Whence PSR if all is Will? Whence objects, and their more Platonic Forms? That is to say how can the Will be "doing" anything (like objectification) if Will is atemporal?

My guess is that "objectification" is an eternal process that is foundational to Will, not contingent upon it. If Schop is to maintain a double-aspect, Will and Representation are never primary and secondary but always one and the same thing. But it begs the question, why is there a PSR, a mind, and individuation and all its manifestations? Why is this an aspect of Will? Why is Will not just undifferentiated Will and that's it? Any answer belies some sort of theological implication and Schop certainly said he didn't believe in a telos of the Will.
— schopenhauer1

Your answer didn't seem to answer that but reiterated that we have reason and understanding and such by way of Will. That doesn't seem to answer my questions though. — schopenhauer1

Maybe Schopenhauer would regard a rational world emerging from Will as a kind of miracle. — Gregory

Then, to me, not much of an explanation. All things can be solved thus.

So then the world as idea, the only aspect in which we consider it at present, has two fundamental, necessary, and inseparable halves. The one half is the object, the forms of which are space and time, and through these multiplicity. The other half is the subject, which is not in space and time, for it is present, entire and undivided, in every percipient being.

So there at least you have the beginning of an answer - that multiplicity belongs to the domain of objects, but that the subject - that which knows but is never known - has neither multiplicity nor its opposite. — Quixodian

Right. Good quote there. But is not All Will? Why Object (and its form space/time)? He only says a subject is for an object, like it's just a matter of course. But then why posit undifferentiated Will? Essentially he is positing epistemic dualism and metaphysical monism. But why is there an epistemic coming from the metaphysical at all?

So, it does not seem to me at all self-contradictory to say that the cosmos existed prior to humans provided it is not presumed to say what the nature of a perspectiveless existence could be.

I don't doubt that some things make sense to some and not to others, which means that this issue is probably not susceptible to rational argument at all. — Janus

I actually might agree here, and I am glad to see the word "perspectiveless" in there.

Damn, bringing in the speculative realists!
:clap:

No, I don't think so. Schopenhauer retained the essentials of transcendental idealism in respect of the second-last paragraph. The other points are very much his own. — Quixodian

Ok, so my problem again is that whence the individuation and PSR and mind and objects if all is unindividuated Will? Without making non-helpful analogizes to "maya" and such, many-is-one thing isn't explained. Again my question is:

Whence PSR if all is Will? Whence objects, and their more Platonic Forms? That is to say how can the Will be "doing" anything (like objectification) if Will is atemporal?

My guess is that "objectification" is an eternal process that is foundational to Will, not contingent upon it. If Schop is to maintain a double-aspect, Will and Representation are never primary and secondary but always one and the same thing. But it begs the question, why is there a PSR, a mind, and individuation and all its manifestations? Why is this an aspect of Will? Why is Will not just undifferentiated Will and that's it? Any answer belies some sort of theological implication and Schop certainly said he didn't believe in a telos of the Will. — schopenhauer1

Your answer didn't seem to answer that but reiterated that we have reason and understanding and such by way of Will. That doesn't seem to answer my questions though.

For Schopenhauer Subjectivity includes Reason, Understanding and Will.

Will is the inner drive of which the forces of physics (attraction, repulsion, etc) are an outer manifestation.

Reason is the capacity to form abstract concepts. Schopenhauer is consistent with the larger tradition in saying that this is the prerogative of h. sapiens. (He implicitly recognises evolution although obviously not natural selection as that was published 40 years after his major work.)

Understanding automatically provides a spatio-temporal conceptual framework for our experience which is pre-rational (from Kant’s Transcendental Idealism)

Will is the primal drive that manifests as feelings, all of which are ultimately reducible to pleasure and pain in relation to willed objects, often subliminally. — Quixodian

I could be mistaken, but this seems more Kant than Schopenhauer's take on Kant.

We are all Will because it is everywhere and Will is beyond us because it is nowhere. Only an infinite method can grasp Will, so only no method can. The finite cognition can never understand the infinite. Science assumes will must be in a brain because science is a finite method. With regard to Schopenhauer's idea of Will's atemporality, I quote Heraclitus, "In the case of the circle's circumference, the beginning and end are common." Fire apply depicts the Will, and while Heraclitus thought the fire was also Logos, Schopenhauer was seeking to reject the PSR as ontologically basic. For him we can approximate what the Will is like by comparing different manifestations of will. Perhaps he thought Will randomly or whatever chose a rational world. So his grounded reason finds it has no ground. Nirvana? — Gregory

Right, again, cool stuff, but doesn't answer my question. Whence PSR if all is Will? Whence objects, and their more Platonic Forms? That is to say how can the Will be "doing" anything (like objectification) if Will is atemporal?

My guess is that "objectification" is an eternal process that is foundational to Will, not contingent upon it. If Schop is to maintain a double-aspect, Will and Representation are never primary and secondary but always one and the same thing. But it begs the question, why is there a PSR, a mind, and individuation and all its manifestations? Why is this an aspect of Will? Why is Will not just undifferentiated Will and that's it? Any answer belies some sort of theological implication and Schop certainly said he didn't believe in a telos of the Will.

Yep. Those who get past first year do so by criticising what they were told in first year. Those who get past being an undergrad do so by criticising what they were told as undergrads. Hopefully. — Banno

Look, I know that graduate level philosophy of mind is heavily based on "materialism" or takes that for granted to the point that it's not even materialism. It's Philosophy of Science adjacent and Cognitive Science heavy. That is to say, the easier problems.

What I think has happened is that philosophy of mind has expanded to many things, not just the hard problem. Fodor's idea of mentalese was in style for a bit. Debates over connectionism and computationalism. Finding correlates of consciousness in various brain domains. There are parallels with anthropology and social learning.. Extended and embodied cognition..flirting with ditching qualia and folk psychology in eliminativism, neural networks and their implications.. language and its implications (concept formation, semantics and meaning, representation, etc.). But these seem to not touch on the hard problem.

What I think happened rather, is perhaps the hard problem was put on the back burner for a while, and it has come back with a vengeance. Just my interpretation of the trends and such.

When someone nails their flag to the mast, say by using the name of their favourite philosopher as their moniker in an on line forum, they will feel obligated to come to the defence of said favourite at every turn. Makes for an inability to learn. — Banno

Oh blah. No, I don't even necessarily agree with Schopenhauer on his metaphysics and I've said that multiple times. I do however, find his ideas fascinating and try to be charitable to them as they are still relevant in the questions asked and the unique way he answered them. Obviously, if you look at the questions I am asking about his ideas, I find there to be some large conundrums and confusion with the ideas.

Plato and Aristotle weren't right on all accounts either, but many topics they brought up are still relevant today, and may papers are still using their ideas.

Schopenhauer's claim that introspection yields knowledge of the thing in itself might seem plausible to you, but it does not to me, the reason being that he claims that a blind will is fundamental, and I see that as failing to explain how we all see the same things, unless it is interpreted as energy which is structured to produce the things we perceive, or a universal mind which thinks those things into existence (pace Berkeley). The first would be a materialistic interpretation and the latter an idealistic interpretation, but would there be any difference that actually makes a difference between these models if the latter is not understand as an intentional, or even a personal, universal mind? — Janus

I think that there isn't much of a difference, and it would seem to me, Schop wouldn't have a problem with that either.

He was making a series of jumps from our "immediate object" (the self), to other objects. But the bigger jump was that this immediacy was some sort of illusory interplay that the Will carries out as its "devlish" double-aspected "representation" (the PSR applied to Forms I guess).

I must admit, I do not get how Will-Proper (Will unaffected by the PSR), is somehow the "real" reality if it is all double-aspect all the way down.