Looking back at that thread.. Damn Streetlight X was an annoying asshole.. I don't care how well-read he was :lol:.

I mean here an ACCOUNT, not just a self-evident conclusion. That seems ANTI-philosophical to just say, "Self-evident" wash one hands and make it the final word. In fact, it's the first word before we get to logic. I don't even mind if something like "evolution" is used, but I want an account, not just "because it makes sense RIGHT??!!!". I mine as well not do philosophy at all if all we are giving is "self-evident".

As a tie-in.. Apparently SIX YEARS AGO, I discussed similar issues, but tried to give an ACCOUNT. You may even be interested in the whole thread there:

However, I was trying to map his picture of human reality with other metaphysical and epistemological conceptions- namely realism, contingency, and necessity. One can construe Witt's metaphysics of these language-games to be be in purely nominalist or conventionalist terms. However, there may be some inherent, universal aspects to them which can characterize them to be necessary. It is necessary that humans inference, for example. It can be argued that general inferencing (this story/this phenomena/this observation is a specific or general case of X... This general case of X can be applied to specific cases of Y) may be a necessary human capability, dictated by evolutionary forces. In other words, in theory, any mode of survival is possible, in reality, evolution only allows certain modes of survival to actually continue. One such mode of survival, is inferencing. Since humans have no other recourse in terms of built-in instincts beyond very basic reflexes- our general processing minds, must recognize the very patterns of nature (through inferencing, and ratcheted with trial-and-error problem-solving, and cultural accumulated knowledge) which other animals exploit via instinctual models and lower-order learning behaviors/problem-solving skills.

....

This quote here, which I take to be a sort tie-in to my last post, seems to overextend its point. He is moving from primitive inferencing- something that is universal and even tribal cultures utilize, to Logic (capital "L") as conventionalized by Greek/Western contingent historical circumstances. Inferencing + cultural contingencies of the Greek city-states + further contingencies of history led to our current conventions of logic. So it is a mix of taking an already universal trait and then exposing it to the contingencies of civilizations that mined it thoroughly and saw use for it.

However, that's not all. ONCE these contingently ratchted inferencing techniques were applied to natural phenomena, we found not only that the conventions worked internally in its own language-game, but that it did something more than mere usefulness to human survival/language-game-following. It actually mapped out predictions and concepts in the world that worked. New techniques now harnessed natural forces and patterns to technological use, far beyond what came before. Math-based empirical knowledge "found" something "about the world" that was cashed out in technology and accurate predictive models. This is then something else- not just conventionalized language games. This particular language-game did something different than other language games.

My own conclusions from this is that the inferencing pattern-seeking we employ as a species, to survive more-or-less tribally and at the least communally, by way of contingency, hit upon real metaphysical patterns of nature. Thus my statement in another thread that while other animals follow patterns of nature, humans primarily recognize patterns of nature in order to survive. — Philosophical Investigations, reading it together.

He is proposing what he calls "psycho / logical monism" and claiming Wittgenstein as a fellow monist. Understanding this is, for me, by far the most difficult part of the book, and Kimhi occasionally indulges in an obscurity worthy of, yes, Hegel. But what this tells me is merely that it's hard, and that Kimhi is not the greatest writer -- I'm by no means ready to dismiss his ideas just because I'm still working on them. Sorry not to be able yet to explain the monism part, but I undertstand it better each time I reread. The clue, once more, is that "The difference between 'p' and 'I think p' is syncategorematic," or metaphysical, rather than a matter of logical form. Kimhi wants to go on to show how this distinction will lead to a unity of thinking and being, in a very old tradition he traces back to Plato and Aristotle. — J

Unless these philosophers explain WHY thought MUST reflect reality (via "logic"), it doesn't seem to have any force to me, except as, ironically, unsupported assertions.

Plato came closest out of the three people you mentioned. Logic is somehow grounded in an abstract logic whereby our intellects are part of, and can't help but reflect. It has a hierarchy and the highest forms of knowledge are simply "knowing" the Forms in a quietist/spiritual way (no longer in concrete or even abstracted form).

Aristotle, is harder to discern how his logic reflects a deeper sense of being. I leave it to the experts of Aristotle..

Wittgenstein is the most egregious in leaving out an explanation of how logic reflects what is the case in reality. It is truly unsupported assertion all the way down. One of my biggest gripes with Tractatus is there is no "there" there as to how the correspondence holds... Vaguely we get "states of affairs" and "objects" beneath "atomic facts", but for a modern philosopher, I expect more on what justifies this.

Yes, Kimhi calls this "psycho / logical dualism" and rejects it. According to him, neither the Platonists nor the "it's just how we think" philosophers are correct, because the dualism is all wrong. — J

Ok, so that is what he is against. What is the theory he is proposing. The name of the book is Thinking and Being... This reminds evokes ideas like Hegel's dialectic, or even Stoic's Natural Reason. If it's not psychological, what is it, other than some variation of "World Spirit", or Logos?

I just don't get what the "self-consciousness" aspect adds to it, other than a sort of call to more basic epistemological questions like "How do we even know what we know?". But I see logic as just a way to structure language so as to be clear. That is to say, the "thinking" part, according to this view, is "behind the scenes". The conclusions are then taken from the "thinking part" and put forth in logical terms so as to be clear and consistent so nothing is misconstrued. Logic is more about clarity, not necessarily the "truth". That is why I said before this whole discussion (upon what I still don't know), that the more interesting and basic question is how we decipher truth (the thinking behind the scenes), not how we present it in some logical form. That part to me is simply how to present one's conclusions so as to be not contradictory to its own argument or what it is presenting.

Thinking can be messy, perhaps non-logical.. It can be pictures, intuitions, thought-patterns. Logic puts these into consistent non-contradictory presentation to other thinkers. Thus you may have an intuition or insight that turns into a rigorous physics/philosophical/mathematical proof, for example.

Edit: Socratically arguing with myself here.. I am sure Kimhi et al. would say something like the following:

But thinking IS logical.. It is self-reflective and there is a certain way we engage with the world (I am not sure what they propose that grand theory is, but I would be interested). And this way we engage with the world is ITSELF logic.. And thus something akin to either the Stoic's "Natural Reason" or Hegel's "dialectic" might capture this "inner logic". And it is THIS process of how we interpret the world that is not captured in formal logic (like Frege's).

Edit 2:
I read up more on Frege's meta-logical theory, and it seems that he was a sort of Platonist about logical truths.. So finally, I think I see what the goal of Kimhi here is. It's not the FORM per se, but Frege's underlying assumptions of logic.. That logic is not psychological, according to Frege, but rather metaphysically real in some Platonic way... Ok, so this just goes back to an old debate about the nature of truth. Is "Truth" independent of human thinking, or is it "True" irrespective of the interpreter (or psychology)?

Edit 3:
And of course, behind all this is an old debate of "real" vs. "psychological/ideal" etc. And then this just goes right back to my initial question, "How do we discern truth"? And so for example, if Frege is a Platonist, then how does one discern the "real objects" of the abstract realm? The cat is on the mat, so is it just going back to the verification and/or falsification principles yet again?

Oh I guess.. and this is just basic.. Because
All humans are mortal
Socrates is a human
Socrates is therefore mortal..

I guess the combining of the major and minor premise is considered the "thinking" part.. but is it really that basic? It is still proffered as if everything true and thus the conclusion is true. Still not getting the profound implication here about Aristotle versus Frege.

More a group sharing a way of life and language. — Banno

That could still be either one.

But I guess the bigger picture here is that Kimhi seems to think Frege is lacking something that say, someone like Aristotle captured in his logic- some sort of active engagement of the thinker and the logic. I guess I just don't see the difference really in how Aristotle adds the "active" engagement part. As far as I see from their logical forms, they are different ways of saying the same thing. I don't see anything like "Thucydides thinks that Socrates is mortal". Rather Aristotle's example would be "Socrates is mortal". I guess I don't get Kimhi's comparison and how he thinks Aristotle captures the "thinking" part.

Now my response is that we as a community choose to use "the sky is blue" to set out something about the way things are (or are not, when it is overcast). But you don't seem to like this answer. I suspect you want a theory that sets out, for any given sentence, if it is true or no. That's not what logic does. Rather it is about the consistency of what we say. — Banno

The way I would reply would depend on whether you meant "community" of philosophers/logicians or the general public.

Indeed, calling it an "inference" is extremely problematic. — Banno

This goes back to my original question, what gives the assertion any truth-value in the first place? Whether you say "This person thinks X is true and judges correctly" or just "X is true", besides just a more efficient logical form, what does it matter really? How we say, "The sky is blue" in a logical form, and whether the fact that the sky is actually blue seem two separate things, the it is the latter that is the most important.

I'd have to agree here. I think in this sort of thing, we must work backwards and then go from there. For example, if Kimhi is saying something about logic and its connection to "thinking and being", we first must understand what his main claim is here, and then we can work to his examples in Frege. Right now we are only working with partial ideas which by itself seem more perplexing than enlightening. No one has yet explained the main premise, or in any clear manner I can discern. From what I gather, logic is something that is entailed in human thought and being. But what this means, how this is, why this matters, etc. is not explained. And thus this Frege stuff doesn't seem like its leading anywhere other than he doesn't like the little marker that says "This statement is asserted as true".

Not for Frege or Kimhi (or Aristotle). If Kimhi or Frege thought logic were just a tool or an approximation or a pragmatic matter, then Kimhi's book would be completely moot.

To be fair, Aristotle would probably admit that his "syllogistic" maps human inference only imperfectly, but if you read that syllogistic in context it is not meant to be self-supporting. — Leontiskos

The problem with all this is it seems very much arguing abstractly.. like we are arguing over something that doesn't seem to have a real "center". WHAT exactly is Kimhi proposing.. Logic is part of thinking and being.. Okay, but WHAT does that really MEAN. I get he criticizes Frege for making logic more of a tool of analysis rather than tying it to human "use-contexts", or whathaveyou (or I think that's his complaint), but what of it? What is the real insight here that is profound, insightful, or meaningful? Why would his work matter?

And if it goes back to some more minutia about Frege, I think you have not quite got what it is that would answer this question.

I don't get why the "judgement stroke" shown at the beginning of the claim matters so much to Kimhi.. What am I not getting.. This is almost the definition of minutia-mongering to me..

"The grass is green", and rephrasing it in another way whereby it is indicated by a symbol that this is a judgement, seems like a bafflingly tenuous thing to take umbrage to.

If his point is that propositional logic takes the context out of the equation and thus makes the subtleties of human life distorted due to the logic, okay... But it's simply a tool, and can probably be used in a number of manners that can make it fit. But maybe I am not seeing how insidiously wrong Frege's analysis tool is..

If this helps, this NYT article seems to summarize pretty nicely Kimhi's main claim:

Kimhi wants to rescue the intuition that it is a logical contradiction to say, “It’s raining, but I don’t believe it’s raining.” But to do this, he has to reject the idea that when you assert a proposition, what you are doing is adding psychological force (“I think … ”) to abstract content (“it’s raining”). Instead, Kimhi argues that a self-conscious, first-person perspective — an “I” — is internal to logic. For him, to judge that “it’s raining” is the same as judging “I believe it’s raining,” which is the same as judging “it’s false that it’s not raining.” All are facets of a single act of mind.

One consequence of Kimhi’s view is that “It’s raining, but I don’t believe it’s raining” becomes a logical contradiction. Another consequence is that a contradiction becomes something that you cannot believe, as opposed to something that you psychologically can but logically ought not to believe (as the traditional cleavage between psychology and logic might suggest). A final consequence is that thinking is not just a cognitive psychological act, but also one that is governed by logical law.

In other words, the distinction between psychology and logic collapses. Logic is not a set of rules for how to think; it is how we think, just not in a way that can be captured in conventional scientific terms. Thinking emerges as a unique and peculiar activity, something that is part of the natural world, but which cannot be understood in the manner of other events in the natural world. Indeed, Kimhi sees his book, in large part, as lamenting “the different ways in which philosophers have failed to acknowledge — or even denied — the uniqueness of thinking.” — https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/books/review/irad-kimhi-thinking-and-being.html

He does indeed argue that anal phil was wrong from the start in creating a sort of dualism between what can be thought and what the world contains, but that’s different. He wants us to recognize a unity here. Where this might take us in terms of understanding truth, I’m not yet sure. — J

I mean, I think this actually contradicts your assertion here:

Frege, and therefore it appears that the topic itself is missing from his writings. But a huge meta-question in anal phil (sorry, couldn’t resist) is not just “How do we know which propositions are true?” but “How do we decide what truth refers to, what we can say about it, what logic might tell us about it?” etc. etc. — J

Rather, from what I've read so far, it seems Kimhi is trying to say that philosophy has to go back in a way to WHAT COUNTS. What counts? Things like Parmenides project (how is the one many?), etc. It seems like a sub-category of a kind of viewpoint about philosophy excoriating it for not getting back to the fundamentals of being, metaphysics, ethics, and discerning what is true and what is not. Rather, if one is lost in the world of parsing sentences (Frege, early Witt, Russell, et al) or even simply understanding how a sentence fits into a context (late Witt, postmodernists, etc.), then we are not getting to what matters (what is the world really? What are the fundamentals of reality? etc.). Again, this is just my interpretation.

Or we can just agree to disagree about what makes a statement true, and stay focused on the Kimhi-inspired challenges to Frege. — J

I guess my question then is thus:
I have a thread about uninteresting philosophies.. My criteria for this is pedantic minutia-mongering and/or it takes common sense notions and makes it "write large" (as if it is profound revelation).

Curious, I know you find the topic interesting, but can you see why this might fall under those categories? I guess what I am trying to ask here for what Kimhi is saying about Frege is, can you find the important point that makes this interesting?

I'll make my own attempt at elevating this topic (to my own standards of interest)...

Frege created a system of logical symbolism whereby we can parse out various categories of a statement so that one can understand that we are referring to the same object, but with different senses.

However, his system seems to neglect the important question (one would think!) which is to say, "How do we know which propositions are true propositions?". And this question, the important one, is missing from Frege.. In fact, it's a throughline missing throughout some analytic philosophy, up to and including Wittgenstein's Tractatus (at which point he combines Russell's theory of atomic objects and such). It certainly is felt in later Wittgenstein, for example, in language games, and "context" (use). So, as far as I see Kimhi's critique as being interesting or relevant beyond some picuyunish ones, is that he is saying that analytic philosophy often loses its way when it doesn't focus on the older tradition of discerning TRUE propositions, rather than focusing on purely on language structures and how they are most clearly communicated to understand their sense and identity and things such as this.

Sorry, I didn't understand a word of that. — Srap Tasmaner

The real-world context of an argument matters. That's the gist of it.

I think the argument has been that Frege believes this must be so, and Kimhi claims it ain't necessarily so, but sometimes it is. I haven't wrapped my head around what is supposedly the main topic of this thread yet. — Srap Tasmaner

Eh, I probably don't have it, but when I look at it, it looks like Kimhi is accusing Frege of treating something like, "Sky is blue!" no differently if it was an actual assertion of something else, that would later be parsed out if we understood the real world context. In other words, we need real world context, and probably why @Banno mentioned the notion of "satisfaction".

This phrase "criteria for truth" -- what could that possibly mean? How can anyone have one of those? — Srap Tasmaner

This is more what I'm interested in, because I think at the end of the day, this is what the questions here circle around. What makes an assertion true... I think it's a lesser question whether the statement itself is being offered up as an assertion or something else.

Too far off topic. — Banno

Isn't it about judgements of truth versus simply finding the right logical architecture? And if it is about judgements of truth, I would think that that criteria would be of utmost importance.

Frege wrote that his most important contribution to philosophy was “dissociating the assertoric force from the predicate.” We make statements in predicate logic that are blind or innocent as regards to truth-in-the-world. Frege says, “A proposition may be thought, and again it may be true; let us never confuse the two things.” (Foundations of Arithmetic) We can understand “The grass is green” without knowing whether or not it is true, and whether we should affirm or deny it. — J

It is that last part I am trying to focus on.. As clearly Frege believes it and Kimhi agrees.

So all good stuff here, but my question at hand here is what is the criteria for truth, for Frege or otherwise. We all seem to be circling in agreement that it isn't just symbol manipulation. You mention "judgements" for example. What are these judgements? What shall the be composed of? To Frege. To others...

What counts as being true is being satisfied, under some interpretation.

So if you are talking about Australian Summer, grass is brown.

Point being we can pretty much drop truth for satisfaction. — Banno

To me this just means "context matters". But in almost all instances, it seems when we are saying "true" about a proposition (or by extension a premise in a logical argument, leading to its soundness), then we are saying something about the verification and falsification principle. Thus:

a) Grass is green

If made as a categorical/universal statement about grass can be falsified that indeed under some circumstances it is not, usually via empirical means.

b) THAT grass (right now, right over there) is green

If made about a specific instance/case/existential quantification of grass can be said to be green if it is verified through empirical means.

But in almost any case here, we are almost always using some empirical verification/falsification aspect to these kind of statements for truth (or if you want to say "satisfy", I just see that as a specific context of truth in X circumstance).

Now you may say the truth changes based on how it is satisfied (in various circumstances.. or how it is "used" if you want to say), but in all these cases, it seems to be empirical verification of some sort that counts as what is "true".

I don't think so. Asserting that ρ is true is different to asserting that ρ is sound or valid. Not that ρ on its own could be either sound or valid. So I'm not sure what you mean. — Banno

So this is too much technical parsing.. A "formal argument" having a "valid" conclusion and "sound" premise in many circles would be required for "TRUTH" to be claimed.

In regular conversational parlance, a PROPOSITION can be true or false. So either way, I think the TRUE of a propositional statement (the grass is green), and the TRUE of an argument's soundness (the premise 1 : the grass over there is green if I can see that it is green. Premise 2: I see that it is green. Conclusion: The grass is green.

The question at hand that I am asking, "What counts as it being TRUE", would be valid for the proposition "The grass is green." And the premises of a formal argument about the grass being green.

Ok I read @Banno's post. Yes, I think I agree with all he said there as to how emphasis on "truth" has been put aside for emphasis on proper structure and rules. I think it parallels what I was saying pretty much. But my question is rather, the question at hand (or so it would seem), "WHAT" criteria needs to be added to make it truth? Is it just default "judgements made from some amalgamation of verification and/or falsification principle"?

Ugh, are we Wittgensteining Banno now? I'll let Banno reference himself (I'm waiting for him to copy and paste your text :razz: ).

What's salient here is that making an assertion is as much part of the illocutionary force of an utterance as is asking a question or giving an instruction.One might see this as setting aside the "assertoric" aspect of the sentence in order to deal with other aspects of its structure - what it is about.

The rather large advantage of this is the structure of formal logic. This is no small thing, since this provides the foundations of mathematics and computer science. Treating sentences in this way has undeniable advantages. — Banno

Isn't this just the difference between validity and soundness? In computer science, for example, all that matters is the structure can be parsed using the correct language structure to manipulate the 0s and 1s when it is compiled to machine code/binary. That doesn't convey truth. Something else needs to be added.

You can correct my summation if you want and transform it from common sense insight to brilliant new revelation that shatters all philosophies. I don’t think you will. More drivel is spent explaining him than he spent explaining him.

Wittgenstein-scholastics?

Russell comes closest in that his goal seems misguided and naive — Leontiskos

Can you explain a bit? Is this more the logical positivists "anti-metaphysics" bent?

The scholastics can be quite boring and uninteresting at times, given that they were not motivated as much by their own idiosyncratic and subjective interests. Aristotle, too. — Leontiskos

Yeah, when everything serves a religious end-goal, that does make debate sort of uninteresting.

Maybe the philosopher is characteristically interested in things that most people find uninteresting or not worth attending to. — Leontiskos

Interesting, because I find philosophy to deal with the MOST interesting things.. But others might find it too abstract, for example. They love the minutia- the "certainty" that this drill causes this hole, that causes this screw to join these wood panels, etc..

But I do agree with your comments about Witt. — Hanover

Well, at least there's that.

I'll dispense with the obvious for your benefit and say it's antii- natalism. — Hanover

I mean, I knew that one was coming. I don't see antinatalism as uninteresting, as they don't fit the category of "common sense writ large", nor about small topics, but since I don't know your criteria, I can't even comment why it wouldn't fit in yours or any criteria.

Fair enough, but it's more the reasoning, than anything else. Like It's not just that I don't like Wittgenstein because I disagree with him. I actually think what is considered profound is actually not that interesting an insight.

Schopenhauer for example has an extremely interesting philosophy. But I don't agree with all of it.

Uninteresting I guess has many different criteria, so it would have to include the criteria and the reasoning for why it fits that criteria to be an interesting answer :D.

For me, uninteresting can be most captured as "making common sense notions into philosophical insights".

AS IF to rebel against he baroqueness of certain philosophies (19th century idealism for example), going the complete opposite makes it simply "more rigorous" or "correct", when in fact you just reified common notions.

Prior to learning, the capacities to sense are there. The “place of perception” isn’t just from communal activity. The ability to sense has to be there too. Inevitably this leads to p-zombie conversations but it need not. It’s simply recognizing that subjectivity is not purely about communal learning. There is “something it’s like to be” something prior to it.

I think we would find it very hard to explain "internal" here, apart from contrasting it with "communal". — Banno

I’m just saying you need that capacity for senses a priori, the community might shape it, but community alone, without these a priori capacities doesn’t seem to be the case. There is some cognitivist aspects to this. This also isn’t controversial afaik.

The big difference is the Wittgenstein rejects the solipsism of phenomenology by insisting on the place of perception as communal activity. — Banno

It’s a bit of both. The internal aspect can’t just simply be communal activity. Communal activity activates neural networks, but there’s more to it than purely experience arranging neurons.

You can't see the obvious here? You want a debate without words? — Banno

Yeah I get it, you know the critiques I will say probably, that he is likened unto a "prophet", in this case a "Zen master", and whatnot. And what he says is "silence", like those Zen masters.

There are two major critiques here:
1) One can reasonably talk about the conditions for knowledge and experience and things prior to language, using language to describe them (Kant may represent this approach.. one done by many philosophers)
2) Witt's notion: at some point language games cannot exist without certain "hinge" beliefs. Yet we can explore where hinge beliefs originate to some degree, even using empirical methods (developmental psychology and such).

@Banno
I maintain they affectively function the same. There are things "beyond doubt". But as you said with "normative", Kant would place the necessity at the level of cognition (the container), and Wittgenstein at beliefs (the content). Kant is thinking beyond the confines of language, but necessities for which experience itself takes place. Again, why Wittgenstein seems to feel trivial. Why does saying commonsense things like, "Some things we must simply take for granted to move forward in a conversation", add anything to our knowledge?

This goes back to my claims earlier that if I say something as a politician like "Family is good", and that is taken as profound policy, something has gone wrong.

I get that Witt's later stuff is basically "Meaning comes from practice within a language community", but why cannot there be a robust debate as to whether philosophy of language come prior or after formal epistemology? Why does it have to subsume it, as many 20th century thinkers seemed to want (first with focus on formal language and logic, and then with ordinary language analysis). Meaning is use, yes yes.. But then whence meaning? Whence use?

I don't see Witt as saying hinges are like Kant's a priori statements, i.e., outside experience. — Sam26

Well, he isn’t saying it’s like Kant, and that’s the problem as it is…

As for outside experience, I simply mean functions for which propositional truth can even take place. Kant thought they were simply necessary, modern theories would say they’re necessary but constructed from experience. Either way, the similarity is enough to draw the parallels, I.e necessary conditions. You can try to weasel out of it by saying “outside experience” was not mentioned so it’s fundamentally different, but I see that as being overly focused on that term to make a gulf rather than splitting hairs on a vague term that functions similarly.

Yes but explain what you think Witt is saying and how it connects with Kant, and then I'll respond. I'm not sure we're on the same page. — Sam26

:roll:

You are familiar with Kant's idea of synthetic a priori, no? The notion like "every event has a cause", he believes is "a priori" (outside experience), yet its very condition are necessary for which the possibility of knowing things in the world exist.

Witt's hinge propositions function the same.. They too are necessary conditions and outside experience.. Their examples might be different, but their functional roles are about the same. They both propose preconditions that are cognitive frameworks for knowledge and experience to take place.

I'm not sure what conclusions you're referring to. What do you think the conclusions of OC are? — Sam26

That there is a necessary background that underlies epistemic practices.

We don’t. We need to read On Certainty to reach conclusions that move beyond Kant’s thinking. Synthetic a priori truths begin by splitting off the world in itself from the activity of the subject and then piece them together again. — Joshs

@Banno
I think the "world in itself" didn't even concern Witt, nor did Kant really discuss much about it other than what it is not (the phenomenal). And it was the phenomenal Kant could discuss at length the various ways it is shaped by the cognitive apparatus. In fact, the "in itself' can be be almost aligned with Witt's famous "silence" on metaphysics, ethics, etc. So again, I just see this as stumbling upon what was already thoroughly discussed. He must have known he was mirroring this notion, no?

I don't mind the rehashing of old arguments, and even permuting them into language, but to not draw the parallels seems unnecessarily ahistorical.

@Banno
Why do we need to read Wittgenstein's "On Certainty" to get back to conclusions which Kant already implied with his ideas of "synthetic a priori truths"?

If joint attention theory is correct, “hinge propositions” are simply those that must be formed when working with another in a common ground. The very act of and ability to coordinate attention forms these “hinge propositions” where a world exists, others have minds, etc.