But not for the purpose of explaining thunder and lightning because they didn't know science.
I don't actually care what each believer believes or pretends to; only about how they treat other people. I don't actually care whether they think their god created evil, condones evil or is evil; I only care whether they do evil. Because I don't think evil has anything to do with gods or faiths: it's a human concept, a human attribute. — Vera Mont

Me and thee, and most believers. A good god fits the lifestyle of the believer. What your god is most concerned about is likely what any given believer is most concerned about. What's your thing? Refugees? Then god is the rescuer, comforter, and principle advocate for refugees. Balanced budgets? Then god is prudent, looks to the future, wastes not/wants not. Gay liberation? Then god blesses whatever one and one's local gay brethren get up to. Peace? Then god is against war, against the bombing (whatever bombing wherever), against unprovoked aggression, etc. Justice? God's always up for justice! Let justice roll down like the water! But whose justice for whom? — BC

@Wayfarer

I think this is why Schopenhauer is one of the best synthesizers of a non-theistic understanding of a Ground of Being (I won't go as far to say "God" here). The world has something going on here. There is a will in each of us that propels us forward. There is some dissatisfaction as marked by our own needs of survival and entertainment. There are external factors of harm that befall us. There are frustrations.

Questioning this situation, its necessity, is the most paramount of philosophical pursuits.

Demopheles. How often must I repeat that religion is anything but a pack of lies? It is truth itself, only in a mythical, allegorical vesture. But when you spoke of your plan of everyone being his own founder of religion, I wanted to say that a particularism like this is totally opposed to human nature, and would consequently destroy all social order. Man is a metaphysical animal,—that is to say, he has paramount metaphysical necessities; accordingly, he conceives life above all in its metaphysical signification, and wishes to bring everything into line with that. Consequently, however strange it may sound in view of the uncertainty of all dogmas, agreement in the fundamentals of metaphysics is the chief thing, because a genuine and lasting bond of union is only possible among those who are of one opinion on these points. As a result of this, the main point of likeness and of contrast between nations is rather religion than government, or even language; and so the fabric of society, the State, will stand firm only when founded on a system of metaphysics which is acknowledged by all. This, of course, can only be a popular system,—that is, a religion: it becomes part and parcel of the constitution of the State, of all the public manifestations of the national life, and also of all solemn acts of individuals. This was the case in ancient India, among the Persians, Egyptians, Jews, Greeks and Romans; it is still the case in the Brahman, Buddhist and Mohammedan nations. In China there are three faiths, it is true, of which the most prevalent—Buddhism—is precisely the one which is not protected by the State; still, there is a saying in China, universally acknowledged, and of daily application, that "the three faiths are only one,"—that is to say, they agree in essentials. The Emperor confesses all three together at the same time. And Europe is the union of Christian States: Christianity is the basis of every one of the members, and the common bond of all. Hence Turkey, though geographically in Europe, is not properly to be reckoned as belonging to it. In the same way, the European princes hold their place "by the grace of God:" and the Pope is the vicegerent of God. Accordingly, as his throne was the highest, he used to wish all thrones to be regarded as held in fee from him. In the same way, too, Archbishops and Bishops, as such, possessed temporal power; and in England they still have seats and votes in the Upper House. Protestant princes, as such, are heads of their churches: in England, a few years ago, this was a girl eighteen years old. By the revolt from the Pope, the Reformation shattered the European fabric, and in a special degree dissolved the true unity of Germany by destroying its common religious faith. This union, which had practically come to an end, had, accordingly, to be restored later on by artificial and purely political means. You see, then, how closely connected a common faith is with the social order and the constitution of every State. Faith is everywhere the support of the laws and the constitution, the foundation, therefore, of the social fabric, which could hardly hold together at all if religion did not lend weight to the authority of government and the dignity of the ruler.

Philalethes. Oh, yes, princes use God as a kind of bogey to frighten grown-up children to bed with, if nothing else avails: that's why they attach so much importance to the Deity. Very well. Let me, in passing, recommend our rulers to give their serious attention, regularly twice every year, to the fifteenth chapter of the First Book of Samuel, that they may be constantly reminded of what it means to prop the throne on the altar. Besides, since the stake, that ultima ration theologorum, has gone out of fashion, this method of government has lost its efficacy. For, as you know, religions are like glow-worms; they shine only when it is dark. A certain amount of general ignorance is the condition of all religions, the element in which alone they can exist. And as soon as astronomy, natural science, geology, history, the knowledge of countries and peoples have spread their light broadcast, and philosophy finally is permitted to say a word, every faith founded on miracles and revelation must disappear; and philosophy takes its place. In Europe the day of knowledge and science dawned towards the end of the fifteenth century with the appearance of the Renaissance Platonists: its sun rose higher in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries so rich in results, and scattered the mists of the Middle Age. Church and Faith were compelled to disappear in the same proportion; and so in the eighteenth century English and French philosophers were able to take up an attitude of direct hostility; until, finally, under Frederick the Great, Kant appeared, and took away from religious belief the support it had previously enjoyed from philosophy: he emancipated the handmaid of theology, and in attacking the question with German thoroughness and patience, gave it an earnest instead of a frivolous tone. The consequence of this is that we see Christianity undermined in the nineteenth century, a serious faith in it almost completely gone; we see it fighting even for bare existence, whilst anxious princes try to set it up a little by artificial means, as a doctor uses a drug on a dying patient. In this connection there is a passage in Condorcet's "Des Progrès de l'esprit humain" which looks as if written as a warning to our age: "the religious zeal shown by philosophers and great men was only a political devotion; and every religion which allows itself to be defended as a belief that may usefully be left to the people, can only hope for an agony more or less prolonged." In the whole course of the events which I have indicated, you may always observe that faith and knowledge are related as the two scales of a balance; when the one goes up, the other goes down. So sensitive is the balance that it indicates momentary influences. When, for instance, at the beginning of this century, those inroads of French robbers under the leadership of Bonaparte, and the enormous efforts necessary for driving them out and punishing them, had brought about a temporary neglect of science and consequently a certain decline in the general increase of knowledge, the Church immediately began to raise her head again and Faith began to show fresh signs of life; which, to be sure, in keeping with the times, was partly poetical in its nature. On the other hand, in the more than thirty years of peace which followed, leisure and prosperity furthered the building up of science and the spread of knowledge in an extraordinary degree: the consequence of which is what I have indicated, the dissolution and threatened fall of religion. Perhaps the time is approaching which has so often been prophesied, when religion will take her departure from European humanity, like a nurse which the child has outgrown: the child will now be given over to the instructions of a tutor. For there is no doubt that religious doctrines which are founded merely on authority, miracles and revelations, are only suited to the childhood of humanity. Everyone will admit that a race, the past duration of which on the earth all accounts, physical and historical, agree in placing at not more than some hundred times the life of a man of sixty, is as yet only in its first childhood. — Arthur Schopenhauer- Religion: A Dialogue

Not at all. I simply mean that any merit there may have been in distinguishing the purpose and function of organized, civilized religions from grass-roots, primitive religions has been lost in the Judeo-Christian history and is no longer relevant. — Vera Mont

:up:

Everything in it is by its nature subject to death, decay and misadventure. 'There is no sickness toil or danger in the place to which I go' (Poor Wayfaring Stranger, trad. hymn.) Whereas for us moderns, 'this life' is the only realm there is, and the fact that it's less than perfect provokes a sense of outrage and frustration. — Wayfarer

Isn’t that the point?

I concede. All general comments on the nature of organized religions hereby withdrawn. — Vera Mont

You mean this sarcastically?

The main difference between the religion of Judah/Israel and all the others is that no other nation's scribe-recorded chronicles ended up as the Holy Book of a very different, much more powerful nation. — Vera Mont

Why would you use the singular here? First off, it was the Roman Empire a huge empire, not just a "nation", unless you're being real liberal with that word. And yes, one can say that Constantine saw it as a way to unify an empire in fracture. He himself didn't seem to really believe in it as much as endorsed it. The original cultic network of the Roman Republic/Empire was not as useful. Vestal Virgins and Roman oracles and priests weren't cutting it. With the rise of Near Eastern religions, Christianity was the best contender for an already-existent infrastructure. It just took him to coopt it. And it wasn't until Theodosius I that it actually became the "official" religion (thus starting the official banning of pagan ones, until the final pagan academy was destroyed in Athens in 529 CE).

Edit: But mind you I come from the school of thought whereby historical context DOES matter. The Bible was meant for a time and place (basically Persian Period Judah, perhaps into the Hellenistic and Roman Era). The minute Pauline Christianity infused a Platonized, mystery cult-based religion into an apocalyptic Jewish sect (the John the Baptist/Jesus one), it became something different. So when Rome was coopting that infrastructure of bishops and various church communities, he was coopting something that was divorced from the the context of the Bible (the Hebrew Scriptures at least).

Ok, but there is clearly material that pre-dates this. Some of the poems like Song of the Sea and Song of Moses are very ancient and I've seen these dated to the ~11th/12th century BC. Scholarship traditionally places the Y and E sources at around the 10th and 9th century BC respectively. Y and E have always been the most interesting to me. IMHO they write without a clear political agenda. They two have their theological perspectives, but one portrays God as immanent while the other portrays his as transcendent. — BitconnectCarlos

I wouldn't trace them that far back, but yes the Song of Miriam (Song of the Sea) and the Song of Moses and the Song of Deborah- basically small poems embedded in the text are probably the oldest substrata, as I noted here (though not clearly enough):

At this point, this stratified document, starting from pre-exilic time, and working of myths and accounts and writings from even earlier, was redacted in much of the final form. — schopenhauer1

So this would represent some of the very first layers of collections of poems. As a side note, and much more speculative, I am willing to entertain the notion that the earliest strata of the Moses story came from a tribe (such as the Shasu) that were a Midianite tribe and were associated or alternatively known to by their nickname Levi (a variant on the Hebrew "to join").. The theory goes that the Levites coming up from Midian (possibly actually escaping Egypt in some manner), brought Yahweh with them and even some rituals (nothing like the full blown Torah), and that when they encountered the tribes in Canaan, they "joined" them becoming their priestly class.. One evidence for this is the obvious emphasis on Levites (especially Moses.. an Egyptian name), and if you look at almost all the Levites names in the Torah, they are all Egyptian while the other tribes are usual Canaanite/Israelite names. Anyways, that is just speculation, but even if only part of that is true (the Midianite origins), that makes some sense based on the archaeological evidence.

Edit: Also the burning bush, Jethro in land of Midian.. Even depictions not redacted smoothly where Moses seems like he had nothing to do with the people he's rescuing.. etc.).

In that instance. Which supplied a nice underpinning for the eventual king-making power of the RCC, and the theocracies of Islam.

I was referring to the general purpose common to all organized religions - which, of course, began as state religions - which was to reinforce the authority of whoever was already in power, and ensure the continuity of the regime.
E.g., as noted above, the divine right of kings as a doctrine, and then the custom of archbishops anointing kings - lest they forget which side their power is buttered. Without the clergy and its revenue-generating carrot, they would have to rely on expensive the military stick alone. — Vera Mont

Yep, but there is a crucial difference here. Your theory in essence is saying that "The state is in search of a way to legitimize power". However, the Bible itself in the context of why/when it was written, contradicts some of that. Rather, it distinctly chastises kings, and then promotes covenants of the deity with "the people" (and the priests for sure). The Bible was written when Israel and Judah were defeated, and Judah was reconstituted as a small province under the satraps of the Persian Empire. Nehemiah himself was a governor. Before him was Zerubbabel (actually a descendent from the original Judean/Davidic lineage) and Joshua ben Johazadek. These figures could not officially claim "kingship" however, lest they become enemies of the mostly tolerant Persian Empire. So the Bible in a way was a group of writings that were redacted and strung together to present the case that the national deity could be made sans Kingship.. However, I will agree, that Second Temple Judaism did revolve around one official place for Yahweh to be worshipped with one official set of priesthood (that became contested over time). The Levites and Koheins were certainly the main authority during this period.

When the Maccabees took up the cause against Antiochus IV Hellenizing efforts (they made the Judeans sacrifice pigs on the alter in Jerusalem and worship Zeus instead!), they probably sided with the most monotheistic variant (as I said "Ezra's Vision" as evinced in Ezra-Nehemiah), and this one, that included the writings of the Torah, now well-known in those circles since the 400s BCE when it was compiled, was the one that became the "state religion". It legitimized their role, giving the Sadducean party (the Priestly elites from which they themselves descended), the most authority (and were opposed by the Pharisees who saw this as an usurpation of their authority). Anyways, in this way, religion might be said to legitimize their rule.

However, one can view the apocalyptic writings during this period, like Daniel as threatening to the Hasmonean dynasty as they were priests, and the Daniel prophecies were about a future king (messiah) who would restore order.. That would be the type of literature they would downplay. I would speculate this makes sense if we look at the fact that the Sadducees ONLY viewed the Torah as legitimate, and not the later Prophets... Why? Perhaps because later prophetic writings like Daniel speak against the current (priestly) authority for an immanent "return of the king" to reestablish a better way of life.

We could probably trace a similar history for the pantheons of all civilizations.
They didn't all need the series of prophets predicting a very predictable conquest by a much bigger power and blaming the disobedience by their king to of god's edicts. So, the god is secure, and the nation will be okay under the guidance of the priesthood ... nothing self-serving there! — Vera Mont

I never said it wasn't :D! But you mentioned a purpose, and I gave you some purpose(s) from the many layers. Those purposes certainly had the intent of keeping authority in the hands of certain people (the priests.. as envisioned by Ezra-Nehemiah). However, they were along the way creating an identity outside the original context of a kingdom-state. It was also creating from the ashes of destruction a way of uniting a nation without state, or without a king at least.

Scripture was purposeful. Obviously, the authors incorporated all the elements of myth, legend and traditional folklore as an institutional religion would carry - and they themselves may even have believed some or most of it. That didn't prevent them depicting the hierarchy of their pantheons as a reflection of their own realms, or identifying the deities with their own ruling class, or setting out divine laws that serves the good order of their own social system. — Vera Mont

@BC

Indeed the purpose was to maintain a people without a king/kingdom.
Thus you have to work backwards and forwards in time from the Kingdoms of Judah an Israel for you to get the gist of what the authors/scribes/redactors of the texts (that became the Torah, Prophets, and Writings) were doing...

The Kingdom Narrative would be the first strata.. That would be various histories as represented in Samuel, Kings, and Chronicles. These would be more about the wars, conflicts, successions, of kings. It would have been compiled by Judah with the help of Israelite scribes around the 700s BCE.

Israel was destroyed by Assyria in 722 BCE. At exactly the same time, the Kingdom of Judah doubled in size. This isn't a coincidence. The story is of the "Lost 10 tribes of Israel". Some were indeed taken. But many fled as refugees to their southern brethren. These scribes, priests, and artisans from cities like Samaria to the north (which was much more educated and powerful than the rinky dink Judah to the south) could be employed in the service to the kings of Judah now.

Here you have an interesting addition by Judhaite scribes to the Kingdom Narrative. Now you get Judah's semi-mythical kings of David and Solomon as not just Kings of Judah, but Kings of a UNITED Israel and Judah. Why would they want this? It would be easier to welcome the incoming Northerners to the kingdom and have them incorporated as ALWAYS being in someway united in some mythological past. The reason they were similar but different was the wayward ways of Solomon's descendants. It also squarely puts JERUSALEM (not Samaria) as the center of BOTH Israel AND Judah (not just Judah).

Also, the Israelite scribes that fled to Judah started creating the Family Narrative. That is to say piecing together the separate stories of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob into a cohesive story of the creation of Israel WITHOUT a kingdom as the start (the real story) but rather a much more distant start in the Bronze Age.

The Israelite scribes also probably created the Exodus-Conquest Narrative which also conferred authority NOT to kings (theirs were destroyed), but also to Bronze Age heroes (Moses, Joshua, various Judges). Thus the intent here is to bypass Kingly authority for various other ones, generally between the "people in general" or "priests" to the deity.

Once the Kingdom of Judah itself was destroyed, this time by the Babylonians, it too had an identity crisis. Just as the Northern Kingdom had to reconfigure its mythical origins, Judah too had to do this as they were now a people in exile without a king. They incorporated the northern stories of the Family Narrative and Exodus-Conquest narrative and tacked that at the beginning of the story. These group of scribes were starting to form an identity without a king. They saw in the cards that Babylonia was itself going to be conquered by Persia and the possibility of reestablishing a new order with a second Temple in Jerusalem, now firmly under the rule of priests.

And that brings us to the final redaction/layer, the Priestly Scribal one. In this one, not only do we have the story begin at the start of the Israelite/Judahite tribal history (Abraham et al), but we have it start at the beginning of creation itself. Here, there are remnants of the Sumerian/Assyrian/Babylonian myths transformed. And along with these additions in Genesis you have the Priestly Code (mainly Leviticus, some of Exodus and Numbers, and much of Deuteronomy).

At this point, this stratified document, starting from pre-exilic time, and working of myths and accounts and writings from even earlier, was redacted in much of the final form. This version was the one probably referenced in Ezra-Nehemiah when it depicts Ezra presenting the books to the Judeans, teaching (or "reteaching in the orthodox account") them the Laws (as if they were there but lost). That was in the 400s BCE. However, as the archaeological evidence shows, this event, if it happened at all was still very small, probably amongst a group of priests/prophets that returned to Jerusalem from Babylonia to reform the institutions there under the graces of the Darius II. Either way, this still wasn't when the "Bible became holy".. That was more an idealized goal of the scribes written into the story. Rather, more likely, as I was saying, it was around the time of the Greeks, and specifically the rise of the Hasmonean rulers, that once and for all a formalized "Judaism" took shape. That didn't mean there weren't priests sacrificing to the national deity in the Second Temple throughout the Persian and early Greek period. It's just that, they weren't necessarily formalized along the exact confines of a written Torah as we know it. Again, some of the priests surely had early versions of it, some possibly had very different notions, even henotheistic ones.. But the faction with the Torah as the basis "won out" amongst the other variations (like the one perhaps exemplified in Elephantine Island). We can call this strand that won out "Ezra's Vision", because it seems he was around the time that that version was compiled (the last books of the Bible basically explain this through its own lens of how it happened).

Great stuff. Thanks! — BC

:up:

Remember that the Bible was not, after all, written by the Holy Spirit in one go. It's a collection of diverse narratives for various purposes--NOT a unitary whole. — BC

I think this is the biggest thing to remember when approaching "The Bible" (aka the Hebrew Scriptures). That is to say, they were works that were compiled, redacted, and edited from previous/original iterations. Most likely, the original materials were less ethical and more to do with the exhortations to do as the national god, Yahweh asks. The main goal was to keep the Kingdom of Israel and Judah prosperous and secure from foreigners (e.g. Assyria, Egypt, Moab, Edom, and Babylonia). Prophets were a class, perhaps even a "guild" of sorts attached to the kingly court. These original oracular writings written by the prophets and or their scribes were probably elaborated upon, especially after catastrophic events already happened to give more ethical underpinnings to the "why" it happened. These writings were originally only circulated amongst the elites of Israel and Judah, perhaps the priests, the aristocratic/royal lineages, and the scribes themselves. There is no evidence that true "monotheism" even took hold in Jerusalem as late as the Persian period (300s BCE). Look at the letters back and forth between Elaphantine Island, a Jewish outpost guarding Persia's southern flank. Elephantine had a long thriving community of Jews there to serve the Persian king. They were so big they formed their own temple to Yahweh. There were letters back and forth between Jerusalem and Elephantine whereby Elephantine asked questions on holidays and rituals. Jerusalem's experts had no problem with Elephantine's apparent tendency for a polytheistic/henotheistic system with an "Anat-Yahu" consort and child.

See here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elephantine_papyri_and_ostraca#Jewish_temple_at_Elephantine
https://www.biu.ac.il/en/article/11073#:~:text=In%20one%20of%20the%20letters,of%20Nisan%20until%20the%2021st.

It was slowly over time, probably around the time of the Hasmonean/Maccabean dynasty* that "The Bible" (mainly the Torah itself) became "Law of the land", and true monotheism started to take hold through synagogues that spread throughout the land. This gets more complicated between the various sects such as the Pharisees, Sadducees, and Essenes (possibly Dead Sea Scroll Sect), that had their own versions of authority circling around similar themes.

So it is good to keep in mind that the history and development of these writings are often based on contexts of a people during a certain time/place. To cherry-pick any particular passage, even from something like "Psalms" and not understand at which "layer" of scribal addition it comes from, its main context and purpose (usually dealing with events in the Kingdoms of Judah and Israel, or its leaders), and THEN understanding the redactions to put a certain "spin" on it- perhaps Priestly layer added in the Persian/Greek period adding an ethical/ritual spin on a more generic/historical one), would seem highly misleading to its intent and origins.

*The Levite family from the Hannukah story headed by Judas Maccabeaus that led a guerilla war campaign against the Greek forces.

Well, not unusual to Classical phil, but unusual now. — J

Queue my point :D.

And of the illocution of making an assertion. So how does assertoric force differ from the illocution of making an assertion? — Banno

Illocution is the intent behind the statement. "The sky is blue" might be intended as a poem, a riddle, a question, etc. It may be an assertion, but not necessarily.

Assertoric force would be one that is a type of illocution relating to the judgement of a statement being true.

I don't think the notion of assertoric force is clear enough to be understood, if it is something different from denotation or illocutionary force. — Banno

For Frege, isn't it about the "judgement of a statement as true".

"It is true that the sky is blue" would be an example of something with assertoric force.

Assertion does NOT equal denotation.. "The cat" is a reference to something "in the world".

All of this goes back to various things I've asked earlier and no one cared to pick up (i.e. the nature of "truth", how it is related to the judgement of a sentence, metaphysics and epistemology, and all that).

Edit: For Frege, for example, it is good to know he is a Platonist about propositions metaphysically. It is good to know how he viewed epistemology in how we can judge a proposition as true, etc. etc. It would be even better if we knew how he connected reference to words (thoughts?).

Do you mean that we (or some philosophers) are making claims about metaphysics without realizing that they are in fact only claims, from someone's point of view -- thoughts, in other words? I can sort of see how this might connect to Kimhi's insistence on uniting what he calls the ontological and psychological explanations of logic. He doesn't think the "detachment" can happen at all. — J

Yes, that's basically it. If someone like Frege is saying, "The cat on the mat" is not just something that is an epistemological claim then it seems to be a metaphysical one. That is to say, which is it? Making an "assertion", either means someone "knows" something, or is describing "what IS the case" (more than one's psychological understanding of what's going on but what IS ACTUALLY going on). There is a whole set of assumptions that the audience would not be privy to simply by looking at symbolic logic. Frege, for example, if I read this right, was a sort of "Platonist" regarding propositions. So, that's a HUGE worldview that is not connected to the logic itself, and perhaps should be connected to indicate what we mean by the "assertion stroke".

By "dealt with" do you mean "resolved"? Surely not. If you only mean "recognized and discussed," then Kimhi, for one, would be the first to insist on this. — J

The bolded.

the point being that psychology (aka "psychologism") structures the world such that A is ~A, but we cannot see but the metaphysical reality is thusly obscured.
— schopenhauer1

I want to understand this, but can't quite. Could you elaborate? I would have thought that psychology strutures the world so that A is not ~A. — J

Sorry yes, that's what I meant :). Thus.. the rest follows here:
Reality and illusion is at the heart of much of early philosophy. Analytics seem to just want to clarify the phenomenal reality and to do so, want to provide basic rules to communicate what our psychology tells us. The minute you don't ascribe it to psychology, you are making a METAPHYSICAL claim and not an epistemological one. Schopenhauer had four volumes on his metaphysical claims. Platonists/Neoplatonists also had such writings. There is generally a lack of such claims in linguistically-based analytic philosophy. The problem I see here is that the metaphysics has been detached from the claims. Perhaps Kimhi is decrying this.

Edit: Furthermore, Kimhi may also be alluding to various forms of computationalism. That is to say, there might be a sort of fundamental "mentalese" underlying language. Logic is an extension of this perhaps, and thus the assertion stroke makes it seem as if written logic is separate from the "mentalese logic" of the human mind. I don't see the problem with this gripe though. Mentalese would have to be understood through various linguistic analysis, cognitive psychological studies, and such, and would be very hard to actually determine. I would imagine we would have to consult various studies on how we inference, integrate new concepts, calculate, process, and the like. But none of that to me matters to the assertion itself regarding a fact of the world.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/935118

Not at all. And if you regard “Either A or ~A” as a Humean generality, then your view of the connection between logic and the world would fall under Kimhi’s category of “psycho / logicism” -- “Either A or ~A” is how things look to us given that OPNC is only an expectation rooted in logic. There may be some version of reality, beyond our ken, in which "The cat is black" and "The cat is not black" happily coexist. (Not talking fuzzy logic here, of course.) His category of “logo / psychism” flips it the other way round – now it’s the world that is indeed displaying logical structure, and if logic as thought does the same, that is an application of the OPNC, not a new principle; we think logically because the world is logical. — J

All these problems have been dealt before by the ancients and then by the Kantians. Parmenides asserts the world is ONE but we falsely perceive it as a multiplicity. A is ~A here. The hard part for Parmenides (and other like him) is getting how A is ~A. Schopenhauer, for example, said that this is because (taking from Kant), the world is Ideal, and thus the mind is structured from manifestations of the ONE (Will). I don't think he quite threads the needle... However, the point being that psychology (aka "psychologism") structures the world such that A is ~A, but we cannot see but the metaphysical reality is thusly obscured. It is the same with Buddhist's Nirvana, etc. Reality and illusion is at the heart of much of early philosophy. Analytics seem to just want to clarify the phenomenal reality and to do so, want to provide basic rules to communicate what our psychology tells us. The minute you don't ascribe it to psychology, you are making a METAPHYSICAL claim and not an epistemological one. Schopenhauer had four volumes on his metaphysical claims. Platonists/Neoplatonists also had such writings. There is generally a lack of such claims in linguistically-based analytic philosophy. The problem I see here is that the metaphysics has been detached from the claims. Perhaps Kimhi is decrying this.

I get that. It's just that when I've tried to pin down the ontological significance of "abstract object", the answer seems to be that this question doesn't need to be answered. We're more in the realm of just identifying what we can't do without. — frank

Well that's what has become the discussion oddly. We must talk about how the logic is presented but then nothing that would ground the logic itself (thought, psychology, epistemology, metaphysics, science)? Odd. This has been a theme it seems of a lot of language philosophy. For example the Tractatus asserts atomic facts, states of affairs, and objects, but grounds them in nothing. So the whole theory of correspondence of propositions to states of affairs in the world is taken on simply taking the original assertions at face value. There are no proofs for it. There is no evidence for it.

If, for example, propositional thinking is said to be part of the human animal, that needs to be explained. I was under the impression that philosophy involves a certain amount of rigorous explanatory power, not simply various assertions.

I don't think abstract object implies any ontological commitment. It just means it's not a physical thing, but it's not a mental object like if you're picturing a flower in your mind. An abstract object is something I could be wrong about, for example if I say that 2 squared is 5. — frank

Why would that not be ontological? You are literally discussing someone's understanding of what an object is. Pondering the nature of objects/entities seems to fit that pretty well.

Hi! I was hoping to get some clarification from a professional. Did Frege think propositions were thoughts? Abstract objects, but basically thoughts? — frank

Now you are getting into metaphysics, I was told that this shan't be done for this discussion.

This thread belongs in the Lounge. What people find interesting or uninteresting in philosophy says more about them than about philosophy. — SophistiCat

Why? How unphilosophical to assert. That in itself is a hefty claim. Not sophisti-cated.

Thus for Frege, assertion is a relation between an agent and a thought. — frank

As opposed to what?

Why shouldn't it make a difference? Is justification the only thing that matters? The only thing we can talk about? If you want a thread on justification then you should start it. This thread is not about justification. — Leontiskos

Ok, what do you think it's about? I still don't understand the point.

One represents a functional understanding of logic, the other a "psychological." One inquires into what it means to say that something is true, the other does not. For someone who sees logic as the art of human reasoning and knowledge, the question of truth simply cannot be neglected. — Leontiskos

I don't think this really addressed any of what I wrote by making some arbitrary functional psycho distinction. Frege/Tarski/Aristotle without the metaphysics/epistemology/psychology behind the truth values.. what does it matter? Calling their logical systems functional doesn't MEAN anything. It is just a way of expressing language.

If you find a logical system that says "The sky is blue" and the "snow is white" and all you are doing is writing expressions like, "This is a fact." "this is a true assertion".. what the duckn difference does it make if you cannot show why it's true, or how it's true?

As far as the general idea of language games, that's fine. I think it might be perhaps the project of turning philosophy into "philosophy of language" that I'm not a fan of. It would have been more interesting to get an actual epistemology and metaphysics, but you see, he insulated himself because he made the idea seem legitimate that "One must be silent whereof.." and/or we can never really reveal anything beside constructed games from communities. Also these notions like "language games" and "hinge propositions" seem like common sense "writ large". Perhaps he was the first to write it "explicitly" as philosophy, but I think in some sense we all have these notions of language games and meaning as use and that we take for granted certain concepts when we use language (so-called hinge propositions).

The Tractatus is also a program without a foundation and so lacks the metaphysics and epistemology that the correspondence theory supposedly shows. It needs the psychology that is lacking. In fact, as far as I see, all these debates around logic, correspondence, truth statements, etc. are missing the "how" foundations. People in PoL want to tell me that you don't need that to discuss the logic itself, but it seems like pointless twiddle twaddle if you remove the epistemic and metaphysical questions from the supposed language that is conveying the meaning and content of sentences. They want to separate them, but it's like doing something with half the necessary tools. Oh well. But I'm sure I'll be "schooled" about how great PoL is without epistemology, metaphysics, and psychology. I will surely be told that truth statements can be simply derived by parsing the logic itself.

The guy who said snow is white if and only if snow is white... That's like ... deep ... ya know... — Tobias

Some might say that the big concept here is it merely needs to satisfy an object language and meta-language. I’d imagine some would say this is just adding more stuff to make things work out. “Snow is white” is object. “Snow is white if and only if snow is white” is the meta language that reflects whether the statement satisfies. I mean this all goes back to “how does one know?” But I’m always dismissed that how we know matters not to the logic itself.

Hint: It’s probably some verification/falsification theory

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/933474

Question: are assholes (under the severe meaning) becoming more common, and are they becoming worse? It seems like being a complete asshole is similar, no matter when or where one existed. Some people just have a fairly thorough contempt for other people--any other people. They have been appearing among us at a fairly stead rate, and they aren't getting worse. They were worse to start with. — BC

This goes back to an initial question- is one born an asshole or does one learn to be an asshole? Either way, which is worse, expressing one's inner asshole or choosing to be an asshole?

It seems for Trump, he cannot have it any other way, he MUST be an asshole. Do you notice that a lot of assholes are often in top positions? Is it the asshole that makes the success, or does the success make the asshole?

What to do about them? Labeling an asshole 'asshole' clearly has no effect. Assholes don't care about our feelings on the matter. If someone cares about their reputation enough to stop being a total jerk, then they are not an asshole. If they don't care, well, then they don't care what we think. We can put away our guns and go home. — BC

Is there an inbuilt entitlement there? Smugness? Is there an undefinable charisma that allows for the smugness/nastiness to flow forth without much consequence? Is there a wittiness that goes with being a good asshole? Can someone be a good asshole? Is Trump "good" at being an asshole? Is JD Vance an example of someone who is "bad" at being an asshole? Is Trump just "born with it", and Vance isn't and thus the difference in talent? If someone is a shitty asshole, does that make him an assclown? Does JD qualify then as an assclown?

What relationship exists between "total jerks" and "assholes"? Does the first lead to the second? Which is worse? How much difference does the intensifier "fucking" affect our estimation of jerkhood or assholery? Is a 'fucking asshole' worse than an unmodified asshole? How about all those fucking jerks out there? — BC

Now those are some good questions.. "Fucking" adds a sense of "frustration". So a "Fucking asshole" is an asshole who is frustrating. That can be considered a sort of synonym but I don't think so. "My fuckn car won't start" connotes that the car is frustrating. The "fuckn" part conveys that one is frustrated with dealing with an asshole.

I don’t know if T is an asshole. Seems too mild an epithet, I think he’s more of a malignant grifter. But as I said, this assessment will always be subject to some criterion of value. I think an asshole is generally obnoxious. A narcissist may be utterly charming.

But this is not a science. — Tom Storm

Why do you think we can so easily detect (at least when we think) when someone is being an asshole? Why is it so visceral? Also, why do some people not mind or even gravitate to assholes?

For sure, I don't want to celebrate the quality in that way. And hard-core assholes do not regret anything. — Paine

Trump.. But then that could just be a narcissist. Are narcissists simply default/pathological assholes? I would imagine at the least, one can be a pathological asshole but not be a narcissist.. but how to determine which is which?

I see this in a somewhat more positive light. It is often true that I recognize qualities in a person that compensate for any difficulties in their behavior. As an engineer, it was much more important whether a coworker was competent than that they were a bit cranky or tactless. — T Clark

But you seem to be using the notion of "useful" as the arbiter of moral import here.. Which is indeed revealing. If "character counts" in some way, this notion of "useful" would be contested at least as far as moral value.

So by this:

This does seem to be an equivalent identity. Or would the sense change? Is an asshole really an arsehole? — schopenhauer1

I mean, perhaps an arsehole is a less cutting way of saying asshole. A genuine asshole might think of HIMSELF as JUST being an arsehole, when in fact he comes off or is truly being an asshole.

It's arsehole. — Banno

This does seem to be an equivalent identity. Or would the sense change? Is an asshole really an arsehole?

I regret many episodes of what I did while parenting. As much as I don't like the quality, it is a part of me as it is with the people who I oppose. — Paine

You recognize it and regret it. Is that really an asshole? Does an asshole own it usually? See quote above from Aaron James essay..

Nope, I knew I was wrong! I found a much better definition from a philosopher:

After considerable tinkering and with the help friends, I settled on this definition: the asshole is the guy who systematically allows himself special advantages in cooperative life out of an entrenched sense of entitlement that immunises him against the complaints of other people. — The Meaning of an Asshole- Aaron James

I soon discovered linguistic evidence for this “cognitivist” rather than “expressivist” treatment of the word. It makes perfect sense to say of someone, “Yes, he is my friend, and he’s fine to me personally, but I admit he’s an asshole”. You can also coherently say things like “General MacArthur was plainly an asshole, but in the end a force for good”. Now maybe those contexts don’t express all-out disapproval, because they still express disapproval in a muted form that is outweighed by other considerations. Yet even all-out approval seems perfectly coherent. It is coherent – and indeed commonplace – for an asshole to proudly own the name. He boasts “Yes I’m an asshole – deal with it”. He taunts his subjects with this pronouncement precisely because he seems to approve wholeheartedly. — The Meaning of an Asshole- Aaron James

https://philosophersmag.com/the-meaning-of-asshole/

I am demonstrating "being an asshole" by flagging this thread to be put in the lounge. — Metaphysician Undercover

And yes, thank you for being an exemplar. We needed a first go.

I am demonstrating "being an asshole" by flagging this thread to be put in the lounge. — Metaphysician Undercover

Mind you there is a whole philosophical book on it
https://www.amazon.com/Assholes-Theory-Aaron-James/dp/0804171351

I think we need to pars the notion of 'asshole' a bit more. — Tom Storm

The definitions from various dictionaries include:

a usually vulgar : a stupid, annoying, or detestable person
b usually vulgar : the least attractive or desirable part or area —used in phrases like asshole of the world — Merriam-Webster

an unpleasant or stupid person:
Some asshole had parked so I couldn't get out. — Cambridge Dictionary

I would say an asshole is a generally mean or mean-spirited person. I would reserve "stupid person" for some other words so we can focus on the mean aspect.

But if that is the case, there is a time and place to be mean. Sometimes you have to be "mean" to your kids to cajole them to behave. You have to "be an asshole". That doesn't mean you necessarily ARE an asshole. But if a parent continually beats their kids, berates them, belittles them, then they certainly ARE assholes.. So there is definitely something going on here regarding the nature of appropriate assholeness.

What I have noticed (and this is old school wisdom) if everyone around you appears to be an asshole... the odds are it is you that's the asshole. — Tom Storm

SO if Trump surrounds himself with assholes and thinks everyone who is against him is an asshole, he is NOT the asshole?

I think we need to pars the notion of 'asshole' a bit more. There's deliberate assholes and accidental assholes. And there's the fact that one man's asshole is another's truth teller. How do we objectively determine who is an asshole and who is just misunderstood? :wink: — Tom Storm

I mean let's stick with the Trump example then...