So it is making an assertion. Attaching an illocutionary force. Doing something with the proposition. — Banno
Could that be becasue the question is muddled?but the problem with phrasing it that way is that it closes the question that is supposed to remain open. — Leontiskos
Not everyone. Very few, I suspect. To remove the "assertoric force" is to remove whatever it is that makes a declaration into an assertion. And that is what the illocutionary force of does.And presumably everyone is in agreement that you can remove the illocutionary force, without being in agreement on whether you can remove the assertoric force, which in itself shows that the two are different. — Leontiskos
Indeed. To the point of invisibility.The question is subtle. — Leontiskos
We can understand what it would take for a statement to be true or false, without assigning a judgement to the statement. — Banno
Could that be becasue the question is muddled? — Banno
But you can imagine learning English without anyone ever having resorted to veridical descriptions of the situation shown in a picture or plainly visible to you? — Srap Tasmaner
I don't think the notion of assertoric force is clear enough to be understood, if it is something different from denotation or illocutionary force. — Banno
We learn to use a language by using it. — Banno
And presumably everyone is in agreement that you can remove the illocutionary force, without being in agreement on whether you can remove the assertoric force, which in itself shows that the two are different. Illocutionary force is apparently meant to be something superadded, whereas critics of Frege think that assertoric force is not superadded in the way that Frege supposed.
The question is subtle. It asks whether an (unasserted) declarative sentence has some kind of latent or dormant assertoric force which is inseparable from the sentence itself. Presumably no one is wondering if sentences have latent or dormant illocutionary force. — Leontiskos
And of the illocution of making an assertion. So how does assertoric force differ from the illocution of making an assertion?"It is true that the sky is blue" would be an example of something with assertoric force. — schopenhauer1
And of the illocution of making an assertion. So how does assertoric force differ from the illocution of making an assertion? — Banno
And how does this relate to assertoric force? What is assertoric force? It's not the illocutionary force of making an assertion...? It's not what is involved in denoting this rather than that? It's something in between, but what? — Banno
I don't think the notion of assertoric force is clear enough to be understood, if it is something different from denotation or illocutionary force. — Banno
4.063 An illustration to explain the concept of truth. A black spot on white paper; the form of the spot can be described by saying of each point of the plane whether it is white or black. To the fact that a point is black corresponds a positive fact; to the fact that a point is white (not black), a negative fact. If I indicate [andeuten] a point of the plane (a truth-value in Frege’s terminology), this corresponds to the assumption [Annahme] proposed for judgement, etc. etc.
But to be able to say that a point is black or white, I must first know under what conditions a point is called white or black; in order to be able to say ‘p’ is true (or false) I must have determined under what conditions I call ‘p’ true, and thereby I determine the meaning [Sinnw] of the sentence.
The point at which the simile breaks down is this: we can indicate [zeigen] a point on the paper, without knowing what white and black are; but to a sentence without a meaning corresponds nothing at all, for it signifies [bezeichnet] no thing (truth-value) whose properties are called “false” or “true”; the verb of the sentence is not “is true” or “is false” - as Frege thought - but that which “is true” must already contain the verb.
4.064 Every sentence must already have a meaning [Sinnw]; the affirmation [Bejahung] cannot give it a meaning, for what it affirms is the meaning itself. And the same holds of denial, etc. — Rombout quoting Wittgenstein, 60
So what is the force in assertoric force? Is what you are claiming that the assertoric force is how "The cat" denotes the cat? Than it's about denotation, and fine. But that's not ↪Leontiskos's "some kind of latent or dormant assertoric force which is inseparable from the sentence itself." It's picking stuff out. — Banno
Yeah, agreed, but it covers much the same territory. Instead of talking of illocutionary force we might talk of propositional attitude. What's at issue is the supposed difference between an attitude towards a proposition and an attitude within a proposition; Kimhi, on the accounts given here, thinks there is an force that is somehow a part of the content of the proposition, and not of what is being done with it.Kimhi's forces aren't quite illocutionary forces, we're not talking about speech act theory, by my reckoning we're closer to talking about logic — fdrake
This is starting to get hair-splitty, but yes, I would still say that an "assertoric force not limited to assertions" is either incoherent or, in some sense or manifestation, also non-assertoric. — J
Which is a bit odd when you think about it, since you're supposed to be dealing with things that have no forces... but there they are in the logic. — fdrake
Michael's recent project of denying that promises exist by denying that one can bind themselves to a future course. — Leontiskos
Martin shows that there are forces in the logic itself, and that logic is not separable from a process of temporal human acts. — Leontiskos
Frege was saying that the above propositions haven't ever been asserted. His focus is on how one thought follows another, and thoughts which have never been asserted abound in the processing of the mind.
Kimhe says this way of thinking about propositions disconnects thought from the world as if there's some inner sanctum where they dance around isolated from the world of time and space. — frank
we can contemplate it for its meaning alone, think about it, play with it. — J
But you do know what "the sun rises in the east" is about, as much as "the sun rises in the north" or "the sun does not rise". These are not disconnected from the world, isolated from time and space. — Banno
You're providing the sentences involved with that connection, though. — frank
Secretly in the content? But you understand what "the sun rises in the south" is about, without asserting it's truth. If all that he means is that to understand "the sun rises in the south" is to understand what would be the case for it to be true or false, then yes, I agree.He says that the act of assertion, which pins the meaning of a proposition down to the actual world, is secretly there: "smuggled in.". — frank
We have the propositional content and we have the propositional attitude. Folk here say Kimhi thinks there is a "force" not captured by either of these. I'm asking what that force is. — Banno
From my first postI develop propositional attitude by analyzing the context of utterance, — frank
First we should be clear about the nature of illocutionary force. Taking your example, "The grass is green", we can imagine various situations in which this utterance does quite different things. Imagine a meeting in which a landscape gardener is presenting their plan for the forecourt of a new build. One of those present is unclear as to which parts of the drawing are cement and which are lawn, and asks "The grass is green?". The designer replies, "Yes. The grass is green." There follows a conversation about how best to represent the lawn after which the manager gives the instruction "The grass is green!". Here we have the same sentence being used in three quite different ways - as a question, as a statement and as an instruction. The same sentence is being used with three differing illocutionary forces. — Banno
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