:razz:
But honestly.. would you be willing to answer those three or at least one of those questions based on the scenario?

Gotcha. There is a sort of justification regress then? So someone can say, "Happiness is an immutable subjective feeling" and someone can always say, "How do you know this is what happiness is?" and because of this uncertainty, other than their subjective notion or feeling, we can never really know if a person born is happy or not as there is no standard one can even compare that is justified.

2. There is no complete conception of what a good life is, but only partial representations of what may be considered a good life, and such a complete conception will probably never be known, i.e. a complete — darthbarracuda

Playing from devil's advocate perspective.. Can't someone just say that whatever a person thinks is a good life, is a good life for that person? They will say the evidence for their justification is their own sense of self-satisfaction with life. Thus they think their child will also have this sense, and thus be vindicated that having children is permissible if someone can have a sense that they can attain the good life.

The villain is taking away a pretty good game (life) and substituting it with something worse or equal. If the “villain” was kidnapping people who were living miserable lives and “imposed” a life a comfort on them, I’m not sure he’d be a villain. He’s a villain because he’s putting you in a likely worse or at best equal situation. — khaled

You are changing the premises. The people (mostly) like the game, have taught their children to like it, and are comfortable in it. In fact, the degrees of decisions by the generations that came after resemble life in all but origin.

Because he took people from a situation to another situation that is identical to it, without consent. Best case scenario: They don’t miss anything (neutral). Worst case scenario: They were pretty successful in life and so miss out on a lot (bad). — khaled

See above, I have given you the reactions over time. This is probably true of the original people maybe, other than that, the subsequent expanded edition looks and feels exactly the same. The next generation didn't even think about it. So you are now going down that slippery slope it looks like that if someone didn't exist at time X, it's okay to do something in time Y to them when they will exist. I mean in this logic, as long as a slave was born into conditions of slavery, it's okay because the slave knows nothing else. I think you are missing the forest for the trees in that the question is supposed to highlight as to what degree of freedom a human must experience in order for a forced situation to be legitimate. You aren't answering that one.

Again, in absence of a definition of what constitutes a non trivial imposition, you can’t be sure that life itself is a non trivial imposition. — khaled

I answered you that it can be subjective.. But I am trying to get at something here, if you stop making this about yourself, and actually be a charitable arguer rather than a constant combatant. I haven't seen you in any other mode when dealing with me. A troll is also a hard definition to define, but constant engagement with only combative tone without any letup seems to be part of it. Try engaging other posters too. Seem to be particularly targeting my posts..

What if we simply stop framing ourselves as helpless victims of a malign reality and instead embrace the responsibility of navigating our lives in a way that seems intelligent? — apokrisis

Humans don't just reproduce by instinct alone, so this would be a false narrative. Rather, people can make a choice and do. Thus the contest creator can very much be a human agent putting more people into the game (of life or otherwise). The fact that nature itself is the origin of human agency is a different matter.

I have to agree. Procreation is something people normally can not (or maybe they could, but they would not) consider rationally. It is something given, unquestionable. And like you said, it is the root of all other conflicts. — Antinatalist

Yes. The agenda is already baked in at this point. It's all politics once you are enacting something for someone else. Your decision (to what though?).. Perpetuate (what though?) because you want (what though?), etc.

It is. But it doesn't mean anything anymore than the 'right to eat' (ie. sustain yourself off of other living organisms). Such ideas of 'rights' are embedded in judeochristian heritage. The moral codes we've adopted have been for reasons that are not always valid, but if doing X and Y in one society and A and B in another, given our very silly brains, we assume the outcome in each society is dictated by A and B & X and Y even though they are singular factors that may have VERY little influence on what makes a 'better' society. — I like sushi

Not sure what this means, but there need be no society nor would the antinatalist claim care about abstract things like "society" (at least deontological ones). Unlike a "right to eat" let's say, one is decisions made on one's own behalf and the other is made on behalf of others, and that makes the difference here. Procreation very much becomes a political decision and agenda to enact. We think about technology, economics, finance, the climate in all sort of analytical ways, but procreation for people is "automatically" off the table, when it is the root of all other conflicts.

That's fine, but the philosophical part of it isn't the choice to have a child or not personally, but whether it is a moral question to bring someone into the world considering things like suffering and harm is entailed in existing, no consent can ever be had, and things of this nature. Do you have anything to say on that?

@RAW
Keep in mind the Benatarian argument pertains only to a situation where there is no person (but could be), not already existing people. In the former situation, he is taking the idea that when starting a life, suffering matters more than creating happiness, as happiness matters not unless a person is affected while prevented good is simply deemed "good". The question inevitably is why, and this is where axioms sort of grind to a halt. Benatar himself appeals to things like deserted planets not having happiness doesn't perturb people, but aliens that suffer would seem to invoke our compassion capacities. You can use a lot of other examples. Avoided harm seems more important in some ultimate/non-relative sense than missed happiness (for someone who isn't around to be deprived).

However, I would say that I don't think this axiom necessarily stands on its own. There are several points that I think need to be considered for this axiom to make sense:
1) Procreation is about other people. It would seem in moral matters, other people's considerations deserve more care as to not create unnecessary harm for that person. It's more permissible to create harm for oneself, but not for others, when one doesn't have to (which is why it is "unnecessary" as I call it).

2) We are discussing an unnecessary harm (for the person being affected). That is to say we are not ameliorating a prior condition that needs to be made better. That is to say, the person isn't already born and in order to now continue in life less pain free, we have to do some lesser harm to them to prevent a greater harm. In this case, the harm was unnecessary to create in the first place.

Those were my questions to you. But it made me a debate class bot.

I couldn’t care less about how you behave on the forum, just drop the stupid thing you do where you randomly start characterizing me as a dogged arguer with no interest in the conversation, especially when from my perspective you’re doing all the things I do to others.

Nothing is more annoying to me when people start debating and then randomly decide to attack their interlocutor.

And were you going to respond on the other thread? — khaled

But you realize our arguments had gone on for pages, right? ChatteringMonkey had a couple posts and was done. I did not randomly decide anything to do anything. At some point the argument must end and on the other side, one just doesn't even start the debate. It's not like ChatteringMonkey and I had multiple previous threads and he just decided this was enough after many discussions on this. He never started it.

And yes, I will try to answer it, but it will take time.

The guy was saying "let's agree to disagree". Then you proceeded to try to push him back into an argument. When I did that you called me a debate club bot. At least have some shame and don't then go on to do the exact same thing to others. — khaled

Because we also debated for much longer before we got to that point and I did agree with him that at some point axioms are just opposed. There is no more debate. He just bypassed a lot of possible middle ground, which I am thinking is wise. I was making sure this wasn't too quick a move though. I think you should also note what he said about being convinced or not by the axioms. At that point where axioms are not convincing, than where can you go other than more appeal to someone's sensibilities. I could never and never claimed to point that THIS is the axiom, only that it makes sense if one agrees with them. My main question to @ChatteringMonkey would then be why wouldn't he be convinced by the premises? I feel there was more there that he agrees with than he thinks, but the discussion has abruptly stopped. Certainly causing unnecessary harms are something we deem as not wanting to put on another.. Certainly not using them.. And I would try to make the case that procreation meets this criteria despite our original assumptions that we are doing a good thing. I also want to point that this is not overcome with how you think you can "raise" the person in question.

Because it boils down to a basic premise that isn't particularly moved by reason or arguments... either you accept it or you don't. And yes a lot of political and ethical discussions are also like that, they disagree on basic premises, that's why they almost never get resolved... people just end up talking past each other. — ChatteringMonkey

I'll let you have that.. I think at some point it just comes down to this.

It's nothing like deontology. Harm is not specific enough a concept for that. — ChatteringMonkey

Dude, it's not causing harm onto another. It boils down to not overlooking the dignity of that person by creating harm unnecessarily for them which is similar to Kant's second formulation of not using people for other ends.. And in the case of procreation, I do think considering anything but the potential to cause negative states for them is overlooking dignity for another agenda (even if you think it's supposed to be benign or good).

Anyway there little use in continuing this discussion, I don't agree with your premise and I don't agree with your methodology, so not much to build on there... — ChatteringMonkey

So just don't debate anything? Why is this area so unique in that you can't debate if you disagree? Weird. Do you do this for everything else too? Politics, etc.?

1. Utilitarian calculus type ethics are crap. — ChatteringMonkey

I'm avidly NOT a utilitarian. My ethical premise is based more on deontological grounds.

It's like saying before every stroke one should consciously calculate velocity, spin and the angle of the tennis-ball and then calculate the necessary force and angle of the stroke before one hits a tennis-ball to play good tennis. — ChatteringMonkey

Ridiculous claim of what I'm doing. Is there non-trivial harm in life? Are you unnecessarily creating this harm for another person? Don't do it. I don't have to prove that life brings with it non-trivial harm, and that this harm was not necessary to create in the first place. Next. You can retort that maybe there is a life somewhere that never experienced non-trivial harm.. but I'd suspect you'd think twice about saying that.

2. Even if it would be feasible, people don't agree anyway that harm should be the only value that should be taken into consideration in ethical calculations. — ChatteringMonkey

But in the procreation decision, considerations of no happiness matter not, when you are creating harms for other people at the same time. I agree, harm is weighted more than happiness in this area and if you want to debate that, then we can.

Here's a wild idea, start will real people and what they actually value to reason effectively about ethics. — ChatteringMonkey

Yes, cause you are the arbiter of when it's okay to create harms for other people. If it's another person, as long as you get a popular "majority" opinion, everything is good. No considerations whatsoever.. move on, just don't think about it...Nothing to see here, just move on...

The thing that pisses people off concerning Efilism and Anti-natalism, and righly so, is that you try to re-package your subjective negative valuation of life into some kind of objective and logically inescapably conclusion about the value of life. You turned a personal opinion, not only into the logically only possible objective valuation, but also into a moral duty and a political project that people should follow... thereby dragging other people down with you in the process.

You'll get a lot more understanding and respect from people if you'd just own up to your opinion, instead of covering it up with these post-hoc philosophical rationalizations in an attempt to feel better at the expense of others. And I dare say, you'll give yourself a better chance to get out of that pernicious mind-set if you'd stop spinning an entire web of justification around it. — ChatteringMonkey

No not really. Rather, here is a case where someone A does something that affects person B. How is this NOT in the realm of philosophical ethical consideration? You are literally affecting a whole life for someone else. Then the question is, is this act wrong/approrpriate/negligent?

Well, is the act creating harm for someone else? Yes? Was it done to ameliorate a lesser harm for that person or was it completely unnecessary? Yes it was unnecessary? Do you take more care when the actions pertain to someone else? Yes, you do take care more to not unnecessarily create harm for others? Then why would you think it's okay and permissible to enact for someone else? Is creating happy people an obligation? No? Then why would that matter when one can prevent unnecessary harm?

Yes evaluations do have to be in the equation, but it only takes simply agreement on how harms are weighted for someone that could exist but does not yet.

Again, let's see your positive list that would establish the balance to say the least. Please, name 5-6 things that aren't petty and fleeting. — RAW

RAW DingoJones is just going to say things like "Creating art, love, relationships, persuing a project, delving into scientific and technological mysteries and inventions, writing, creativity, etc". You left yourself opened on the positive side as you only mentioned physical pains and not emotional/abstract (or at least more complex) pleasures/joys, or the (more abstract) idea of general "happiness" or equanimity. I don't disagree with you there, but the more advanced argument is simply going to say, "No pain, no gain" and essentially will retreat to things like, "Without struggle, there is no meaning, thus let's create other people who might have to struggle to give them meaning". They will also say that life's pleasures are worth it because of the other types of things I mentioned. I have many responses to this, but just wanted to let you know what they are going to say to this kind of comparison.

More examples of misguided utilitarianism. Sacrificing yourself so you can sacrifice your child on the alter of society, wasn’t morally considering the child as a person. Rather it was considering the child as worth. The fact still remains that a person should never be foisted into unnecessary harm because anything otherwise is using them and overlooking their dignity for some goal (whether that goal be socially popular/ respectable to hold or not). No good is missed by any nonexistent person. No obligation is present. Certainly better to never foist unnecessary harm on another. This is where moral consideration is in this case of procreation.

Then no. This would make literally any imposition wrong. Because literally anything can be a condition of unnecessary harm. I can't give someone a gift because by stopping them I could be resulting in them getting into a car accident. In that instance the gift was a condition for the accident, as the accident wouldn't have happened without it. — khaled

Ok, so you are bringing up this one again. You are bringing up a new topic now, right? The new topic is the old one we discussed in the last thread where Benkei said that birth doesn't cause harm, so can never be relevant in discussing causing harm for future people because it's not the "direct cause" for each case of harm after the child is born? And I am going to have to rehash the same answers as I gave? Should we just say for this whole topic "Refer to old thread"?

Can you please just write what you mean? Instead of arguing that this is better than that which is better than the latter which is worse than the former?

What exactly is it that I seem to agree to? — khaled

This:

Do we agree that foisting non-trivial, unnecessary impositions/burdens/harms on someone else is wrong?
— schopenhauer1

110% agreed in all situations ever. — khaled

And so now you ask what "trivial" means... And then I said, it doesn't matter to the argument.. All that matters is someone subjectively thinks that they are harmed non-trivially.. Like if you gave them the surprise party, and they said "I felt non-trivially harmed" if you asked them.. then that is non-trivially harmed. You brought up the unrealistic situation that everyone's non-trivial harm is not non-trivial, oddly defining it in an objective way, which you excoriated me for attempting to do (which I still haven't given a definition of yet).

I don't think it is possible to determine what a life worth living actually means except in the extreme. — Tom Storm

The main point was that if you can't know the good or bad of the future child, then don't create those conditions of bad for the child, if it's a possibility and not known. Not a hard premise. You are trivializing a perfectly understandable point.

No, it's just that we don't all see the world in simplistic 'worth living' or 'not worth living' arbitrary categories, nor do we all see a clear way in which to determine these ideas except by more extreme examples. — Tom Storm

But I just explained how it isn't "Worth living" but "worth starting" (on another person's) behalf.

I do agree about not arguing 2 threads.. but it seemed that something should have been learned on the last one and applied perhaps.. But you seem to think that our past arguments have no bearing on the current one.. Also DB did ask me my opinion so I was auditing this thread on request.. You happened to be in there responding as usual to AN stuff.. So there ya go.

"non trivial harm exists in life" = "Procreation is wrong"
— khaled — khaled

No that's not what the major premise.. You know it by now. Do we agree that foisting non-trivial, unnecessary impositions/burdens/harms on someone else is wrong? I'll add in conditions of unnecessary harms if you need it.. Now we are going back to really inane arguments from Benkei days of "causation" versus conditions for all causations of harm :roll:. Just widen the "container" of what creates the harms.. But please please let's not rehash this one, or at least we should re-read that whole line or argument from that Benkei AN thread from months ago...

By your system, it would be wrong to have children even in a utopia where suffering is a choice. Because you don't know whether or not the next person will choose to suffer a non-trivial harm or not, and so their life could contain non-trivial harm, so it's wrong to impose. Basically any imposition becomes wrong, no matter how benign, simply because there is a chance it contributes to a non-trivial harm. — khaled

Ok, I see a little bit where you are going here.. I don't think it's quite the same causation issue that Benkei argued..

This simply doesn't get around the idea of non-trivial harm that is subjectively experienced/evaluated. You seemed to agree, even if for the sake of argument, that this could be the case. Even if I don't give you a criteria for objective harm (because no one would "see" its validity), it works as long as all humans experience subjectively non-trivial harm.

1)I think what he is saying is that a parent would want his child to have a good life. You don't need to define a good or a bad life, all you need to accept is that there is a good life and there is a bad life, you only need to acknowledge their existence. As for what is a good life? The answer to that question is in a further point. — I love Chom-choms

I didn't read this first before I started making arguments.. I could have just said "read I love Chom-choms point 1!

2) Now he argues that one should only procreate if they can guarantee that their child will life a good life with certainty. — I love Chom-choms

Yep..

7) One should not procreate because he argued, above, that the only time one should procreate is when the parent is sure that his/her child will live a good life. Now he has shown that it is impossible to know whether your child will have a good live and even further that, "ones' offspring will not and in fact cannot have a good life." So now, we lose all our incentive to procreate and thus it is wrong to have children. — I love Chom-choms

Great analysis. You made a good point that I didn't emphasize, which is that @darthbarracuda was emphasizing the epistemological not knowing of what even a good or bad life even is.

1. See the problems that have been pointed out already. Good and bad are far too subjective to serve as a reasonable premise for a generalized statement. — Hermeticus

@darthbarracuda
Why would subjective/objective affect the argument? Either way it works for what bad entails.

2. Disagree. Of course it's in the best interest of a parent to give the best possible basis for their offsprings life - but ultimately having "a good life" lays in the responsibility of the child, just like I am responsible for having a good life for myself. — Hermeticus

But the ability not to even "play" the game of "living a good life" is not on the table (lest the painful prospect of suicide). And not all things are in the child's hands.. Genetics, cultural practices, contingent circumstances of disposition, disease, cause/effect, etc.. Either way, even IF it was ALL up to the child and they simply made bad decisions, the outcome is the same (bad life).

3. The good-life/bad-life problem applies here as well. Furthermore, the possibility of good life is not something determined by fate before birth. Circumstances dramatically affect us but ultimately it's our actions that lead to a good or bad life. — Hermeticus

Says you.. But again see response to 2.

So you want a percentage chance? Assume we can somehow do that. At what percentage change of having a good life does having kids become ok? 51%? 75%? 99%? 100%?

It’s not really uncommon in day to day life to be unsure of the chances something will hurt someone and to do it to them anyways. — khaled

But you know my response and probably something @darthbarracuda might say (not sure).. that starting a life is one of the only cases where amelioration doesn't come into play (ameliorating a greater harm/imposition/burden with a lesser harm/imposition/burden). Hence why I try to use the idea of "Not creating the conditions of "unnecessary" non-trivial harm on another's behalf."

I know. Premise 1 is vague, and that vagueness is what the rest of your argument depends on. Thats my point, this is an ambiguity fallacy that you are using in your argument. — DingoJones

Yeah... I can't get past premise one. What's a good life? What's a bad life? Also I'm not trying to be a dick but what does 'worth living' mean? Do you mean by this that if you have a bad life you may as well die (suicide, I presume)? I don't think it is possible to determine what a life worth living actually means except in the extreme. Some might think it would be superb to live as Mick Jagger, for instance. I'd rather be dead. :gasp: — Tom Storm

I think @darthbarracuda is saying that it can be subjectively defined. Whatever is bad to that person is bad. If that person thinks their life sucks, then it sucks. I am working on a definitional model for what an objective "harm" might look like, but for the sake of DB's argument, subjective definition would work. The container of what makes a "bad life" needn't be more than what is experienced or evaluated by the person with the "bad life".

As for Tom Storm's idea about "worth living".. It would seem that since DB is dealing with the idea of procreation he is really intending to say, "worth starting".. A bad life (one that is subjectively so let's say), was not worth starting for that person. So your critique is just a confusion on this or an intentional ignorance of sorts to derail the major point.

From the fact (if it is a fact) that a good life (however we might conceive of that) is necessarily worth living, it does not follow that a bad life is not worth living. Even if a bad life is defined as being completely devoid of any pleasure whatsoever for the one living it, and even if we accepted the stipulation that a life completely devoid of the slightest pleasure for the one living it is not, on that account alone, worth living, such a life may bring pleasure to others, making it worthwhile for other reasons. — Janus

@darthbarracuda

This would not work if you are not a utilitarian. Using people's suffering (by knowingly creating a life that could be bad) for this kind of ends would be wrong to a deontologist, period.

Sure!

6. Therefore, there is a possibility that ones' offspring will not and in fact cannot have a good life.
7. Therefore, one should not procreate. — darthbarracuda

So, I actually think this kind of argument has the broadest basis and appeal in terms of arguments for antinatalism. I'll make a distinction between AN arguments that are universally true (of all humans) and the statistical- those that are at least true some of the time (for some humans).

It is harder to prove the universal- that causing any amount of (unnecessary and non-trivial) harm for a future person is wrong (even though I think there is a very strong defense of this ethical premise). However, it is much easier to prove the statistical. At least SOME humans will have bad lives. Combining the fact that you can't know whether your child will be in the "bad lives" category, and the premise that it is not good to create unnecessary, non-trivial suffering on another's behalf, it would seem that the lack of knowledge of the conditions/circumstances/experiences/evaluation of the future child, should make one refrain from bringing this situation about for another person. I know Benatar is not loved in these parts, but his point about the asymmetry is pertinent. Even if a "majority" claimed to live good lives, the absence of their good lives doesn't matter, morally. The tragic is the activated "bad lives" not the prevented "good lives". Prevented harm seems to always be good while prevented good seems to matter not a penny since that seems to be only relevant when "that" person actually exists (and is deprived).

Hey RAW, I'm a long-standing philosophical pessimist and antinatalist myself, so you might find some of the more recent threads interesting to peruse and add to. There is one now that is still active:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11738/is-it-wrong-to-have-children/p1

Here are several more all having antinatalist/pessimist themes:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11540/is-never-having-the-option-for-no-option-just-what-are-the-implications/p1

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11469/the-most-people-defense/p1

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11441/why-humans-and-possibly-higher-cognition-animals-have-it-especially-bad/p1

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/10842/willy-wonkas-forced-game/p1

You can just look through my discussions page in general and find something that will probably interest you on AN.

Do you think that all life experiences subjective non-trivial harm? If so, why wouldn't that be an example of the former? You keep going to the objective when I have said from earlier that it works just as fine from subjective as long as you think at some point people experience non-trivial subjective harm.

That’s the criteria I want to know. Doubly so since supposedly it doesn’t rely on the subjective evaluation at all. — khaled

No, what I meant was, all we needed to agree on is that all life has subjectively non-trivial harm for it to be valid in this case.

I won't agree that having children is non-trivial, unnecessary imposition. You must show that using whatever your criteria is. — khaled

I thought we agreed that as long is all that was needed was subjective, non-trivial harm.

Are we agreed? I am not interested in arguing with someone who simply wants to argue in bad faith and non-productive ways. I am making sure of this from the beginning so as to prevent useless efforts.

As long as we agree that life is a non-trivial harm. Which is precisely what most people disagree with you on. — khaled

I'll answer you more fully later, but realize we are going to disagree on criterion. You will say that it's a summative report that only counts. I will say that the experiences in real time have to be considered.

Also keep in mind that no objective criterion is needed for the logic the axiom. Non-trivial can be subjective, but it would have to be understood that all human life will have subjectively non-trivial harm.

As long as we are understood that my more speculative ideas on objective harm are not even necessary for the claim to work, then I will entertain your question. The minute you try to use it as a cudgel against the primary argument, I will call bad faith debate as you are now crossing over as we agreed we would not do.

@Antinatalist and @I like sushi, just wanted to mention that it looks like you may be going down the same road I had previously in this thread and in my previous thread about "No options" and Most people". You are even mentioning degrees and such. That doesn't mean you don't have to go through the dialectic as I think it's important to work out, but just wanted to provide it for a reference. I'd like to add the idea of "trivial harm" vs. "non-trivial harm". Trivial harm would be things like getting a papercut from a friend giving you a five dollar bill. Non-trivial harm are burdens one would not want, even if one looked back and was okay later on. It's things to a degree of threshold that they are no longer practically negligent to consider anymore. I think the main argument that can made for AN here is that:

Creating conditions for unnecessary, non-trivial harms for others is wrong (or negligent). From here, as long as we agree on the terms, AN has good footing to stand on. Coupled with this idea is Benatar's argument that harm is indeed more important to consider in procreation decisions. He relies on our own intuitions. For example, we seem to care more if people are suffering on deserted planets than we would care that "No one exists to be happy!". It seems to be neutral, not really worthy of moral consideration, to have no happy people. It does seem to be "bad" to have unhappy or suffering people, however.

That's exactly what makes it a NO moral matter at all. Cause you expect a content from a Non existing creature! A 0!You just can't do that. Impossible. So it's totally parents choice. And not a moral issue at all. You just can't accept that simple thing. — dimosthenis9

We already covered this. If the parent was choosing to have a child in a known horrible condition, is this permissible? of course not. Not all morality is off the table because a person does not exist yet. What you can't accept is there is an asymmetry for that future child. A harm is prevented which is good, whether it exists or not. The fact that someone could have been harmed but was not, is the moral act. The fact that someone could have experienced happiness but did not, matters not. Harm is always what matters for the moral decision. We are not obligated to make happy people from scratch.

Not even letting kids experience life but to prefer not to start it at all IS bad in my eyes! You deprive them from an amazing experience! Even if you see only suffering in life. — dimosthenis9

You deprive no one from nothing. You don't get that? No one is deprived, that is the point. Deprived happiness seems to depend on someone existing to care. Prevented harms though seems to be universally a good thing. In other words, harm seems to be weighted more than happiness in procreative moral decisions. Not having happiness is NEITHER good nor bad (if a person is not around to be affected by the deprivation). Not having unnecessary, non-trivial harm is ALWAYS good (even if there is no person affected.. the very fact of prevented harm is good).

2.the harm you create into already living parents by depriving them the joy of having the kid for shake of the "potential" harm of a non existing creature. — dimosthenis9

Does it matter if someone gets happiness from something that unintentionally or ignorantly is creating harms for others? Happiness derived from (even ignorant understanding of) someone else's harm, is not an excuse to cause the harm.

.the irrational outcome of your theory that is to end humanity existence. — dimosthenis9

As someone else was saying, humanity is not a target for morality, other actual persons are.

.that the unborn kid has no choice! So it simply isn't a moral matter for parents!! — dimosthenis9

Creating situations of harm for others forces the situation to be a moral one. At least, if not "moral" than value-based.

that the unjust issue that you protest giving to someone life without asking him is equalized for me with the suicide option each individual has. — dimosthenis9

I am actually not presenting the consent theory though I support it too. So, I think your suicide idea is the worst excuse actually. It's like forcing someone into a game and then saying, "You can always kill yourself!" (cue maniacal laughter).

So now you say that there is no need for content in your case. But you need a "yes" as to bring someone in life?? So you want it all your way! Cool!
So it's OK to take a "no" answer granted but not OK to take a "yes" for granted. Nice whatever suits your arguments better. — dimosthenis9

You cannot GET content!! And that's the point of the Benatarian asymmetry (look it up if you have to).. When someone is not born, there is no one to be "deprived" of happiness. Only creating them would create this situation. But what is good is no person is suffering. Yay.

Cause that harm that you keep mention might be way less than happy moments. Who told you that the unborn kid wouldn't want to come to life as to even experience that?? You just suppose that it wouldn't cause that's what fit your arguments better. Well no it's not the case at all though. — dimosthenis9

The problem with your argument is no one would be around to be deprived if they weren't born. No one is sitting there feeling deprived in the realm of unborn. However, certainly it is good no one has been harmed, collateral or otherwise.

To recognize that?! That existing harms everyone!?!Are you serious really??
No way! I would never recognize such a lame statement. Cause you believe life is an endless suffering that doesn't mean that everyone thinks the same! — dimosthenis9

I didn't say "endless suffering" just that everyone experiences non-trivial harm. Though, yes, I also think (as a less evidentiary case) that burdens and impositions on people are always wrong, even if someone reports that they post-facto were okay with it. I actually consider that as part of the non-trivial harms as there is a force of limited choices which makes "going along with the game" the only option other than suicide or very sub-optimal choices (depredation and free riding). Anyways, that specific example is much more in depth than simply the need to not want to create conditions of unnecessary harm for others. That's all that's needed. That, and understanding that no ONE suffers by not experiencing happiness (if there is no "they" to be born in the first place).

And at the very end how the fuck you know that in all humanity existence there was not even one person who had that kind of charming life?!?! — dimosthenis9

Yep, so you are hanging your argument on this guy?

The most possible thing is that there have been more than one!! It is statistical impossible not even one to existed!
And I told you that I don't even support my arguments in that extreme cases(which STILL exist though)!! — dimosthenis9

Even Buddha suffered before Enlightenment :D.

It's only enough in your mind. — dimosthenis9

Anyone can agree or disagree with an ethical argument. As my meta-ethical statement said from the beginning... Ethics can never be evidently "right" from simply the course of logic or conclusion. It may be right, but I can never definitively point to it in the universe.

It's statistically impossible as not even one case(for sure not only one) to exist throughout humanity's history.
And guess what? Even that rare cases make your theory totally invalid!
Not only that of course, but one more reason that make your position irrational. — dimosthenis9

Ah, so looking for that diamond in the rough I see. As long as one case of a charmed life exists, all other unnecessary harm is permissible. Please. Rather this is more your burden in the argument. That is to say, unless every life is charmed, then it would not be permissible. Not even close to that, let alone all.

You explained and I didn't agree at all. So let's drop it. — dimosthenis9

You didn't explain why happiness is morally obligatory, more so than preventing harm is morally obligatory in this situation of procreation (not after born as that situation may change things). That's your core argument, is it not?

But come on my friend, we did had that conversation at previous pages. The "no happiness experience" values nothing to you compared to potential harm. And with antinatalism it's like you always take for granted that "the unborn kid's" answer would be always a "no" for life! I really can't accept that. — dimosthenis9

There is no need for someone's supposed "answer" to this question. Rather, not existing deprives no ONE of happiness. Someone was not harmed, THIS is what matters morally. Why am I obligated to bring happy experiences into the world? That would seem odd. Rather, the negative is usually what is morally relevant. I don't necessarily have to give someone my extra candy bar, though it would be nice, but I certainly would be obligated to not cause unnecessary harm like punching them in the gut as I walk by or shoving a candy bar down their throat cause, hey, I think people should like candy bars, and ya know, generally they do!

So don't make me change my mind about you. — dimosthenis9

Honestly, why should I care?

No kids should be born at whatever circumstance!
Mine is that you can NEVER apply such a rule in all cases! It's impossible and irrational! — dimosthenis9

Just saying it, doesn't make it so!

I just say that every case is different and you can never make a rule about it! — dimosthenis9

Besides the obvious (creating collateral damage for those who didn't want to be born), again, why would you think it's okay to inflict unnecessary, non-trivial harm on another person? And I can say the same to you, clearly you didn't read my threads where there were very long discussions of how self-reports saying "I like life" would not change the fact that it is wrong to inflict unnecessary, non-trivial harm on other people.. You STILL have not recognized that no one has a charmed life and lives 90+ years of non-trivial harm. Everyone is harmed by existing. That is enough to make AN case true if one agrees with the idea of not inflicting unnecessary non-trivial harm on others' behalf.

If your view sounds more fair and rational than mine. It's fine. I don't have anything to add. — dimosthenis9

Fair enough.

Again and for last time : I think very very possible a life with muchhhh happiness and little harm(not 0 harm) !
But even with the 0.001 possibility that someone's life harm is only death, your theory doesn't include it at all! A tiny possibility is still always a possibility! But I don't hang my arguments on it as you see. — dimosthenis9

You did previously claim people live charmed lives (their whole life they avoid non-trivial harm) and you seem to continue this, when empirically and anecdotally, I have never seen or heard such a thing.

You measure harm and suffering always heavier! And you see life as an "endless suffering field" as you mentioned.
Told you then that this seems to be the "root" of our disagreement. Cause I don't see life at all the way you do!
Again I repeated it for last time as not to think that I avoid your questions. — dimosthenis9

Yes and I explained how harms are morally relevant while bringing-happiness is really not. No one is obligated to make people happy, only not cause others unnecessary, non-trivial harm.

Striving is good. Striving requires ‘suffering’. Life requires suffering. Bringing life into the world is for gods/whatever, we merely exist and strive hoping for more tomorrow. Unfounded hope? Possibly … I’d rather not gamble when the stakes are so high (ie. the ‘value’ I habour in life). — I like sushi

Apparently you don't want to continue the debate with me, but I think this is misguided. If there is inherent suffering, and you have the power to prevent it, you always should when there is no collateral damage at stake (e.g. like not vaccinating someone because it would lead to worse outcomes). Let's say that I am a masochist and I really like pain... Way more than others... Should I be allowed to inflict pain because it's good for them? Of course not. If I want to put myself through pain that's one thing, but to decide that I am the one who decides this for others, is callously overlooking other people's dignity at best and highly cruel at worst. I don't think it even matters if pain is a stochastic phenomenon and some people will have more pain in life than others. I think as a rule, inflicting unnecessary, non-trivial pain on others is all that's needed to be a global antinatalist (no one should procreate, period).

Wait wait. I don't try to change anything here. Once again : Since something doesn't exist wrote so many times, that then it has absolutely no choice! So not being able to take his answer whether it wants to be born or not doesn't make immoral at all the parents decision to have it! It is totally on parents hands! Since it isn't alive has simply no say on that. What exactly I changed from my original view? Can't follow you here. — dimosthenis9

Because the debate isn't whether it is the parents choice or not. It is always the parents' choice, of course. The debate is what the parents should do in light of the fact that they would be creating unnecessary, non-trivial suffering. Hence why I asked if you think all life has non-trivial suffering.

Unnecessary here means that there is no greater harm that is being ameliorated with a lesser harm (like compulsory education, vaccines, and other decisions on someone's behalf because they already exist).

Non-trivial here means harms that are over the threshold of things like getting a papercut from someone giving you a $100 or something like that. It is harm or burdens so minimal as to practically not matter.

I wrote you there all my argument about suffering and happiness. And how I can't accept the way you measure them, and how we think so different that life is a field of suffering etc etc. So you want us to repeat all that again?? Cause it's a potential harm that you can't be sure and the happiness that will bring might be 10times more for example! I just write it again as you not to think that I avoid your question. — dimosthenis9

So this is an important point and why I'm debating! What does it matter if a person who doesn't exist doesn't experience happiness?! Are you not seeing this? What does seem to matter is that someone will not suffer non-trivial and unnecessary harms. This is the basic asymmetry between happiness and harm for something that does not (but could) exist.

You keep insisting on that cause you wanna make a certain outcome out of this! That harm in some lives might be only death (when they end) and nothing else! — dimosthenis9

If you think that there is no certainty that people will have non-trivial harm, indeed we can stop debating because I think you are being ridiculous. No one leads a charmed life, and if that is a possibility, and we are speaking of likelihoods, how likely is a charmed life .0001 or something like that. You would be intellectually dishonest if you were to hang your argument on the idea that almost all people born will most likely live a charmed life.

So what?? Your view is that in all circumstances that decision should be "no"! And I don't agree at all! It depends on the each circumstance individual and you can never make a" rule " that you always have to decide no in having kids. Sounds totally irrational to me! — dimosthenis9

It's applying an ethical rule to not foist unnecessary, non-trivial harms on people. Prima facie "shock" from it, doesn't affect its import or logic. This is rhetorical fluff and doesn't address any actual point.

You try to gain points here for your arguments jumping to irrelevant conclusions. You don't seem the type of person, as I read other posts you make in general, who would do that on purpose. — dimosthenis9

You just assert this but don't show how I'm doing this. The only thing close to you trying to justify this is that you think that there is a real possibility for a charmed life (a life without non-trivial harm).