sure. Which was the counter argument that got me. — khaled
As to your question of whether I can see it, I have to say I really struggle. Perhaps in glimpses. But it's difficult for me to wrap my head around the framing. It's not so much that I can't see that, while you're alive, you're bound up in lots of relations which of course mean you have to compromise. But I don't see not existing as an alternative to compromising. Not existing is simply absence. It's not an alternative to anything, because it is not anything. And the decision to not have children happens in the sphere of existence, so it's itself part of the compromises. How could it be any other way? — Echarmion
Again, going back to compromise. Once born, survival, etc. becomes part of the game. We do have to make compromises to survive. It's not ideal.
— schopenhauer1
But "not ideal" is still better than nothing, is it not? I mean at least people that exist have some choices. They get to experience sone happiness and exercise some freedom. It's not like we're yanking them out of paradise to incarnate them on earth. They get something. Maybe what they get is nasty, brutish and short, but it cannot be said that this makes it worse than nothing. — Echarmion
But at least while alive, we can strive for the ideal. At least when alive, the ideal exists as an ideal. Without that, not only is the ideal unfulfilled, it's gone. Nothing there to have ideals in the first place. Isn't it better to strive constantly for the ideal, rather than fulfill it in some tiny way, only to destroy it utterly?
I actually don't think it's a problem to strive for unattainable ideals. I actually think it's one thing that possibly makes life worth living - to have this goal always to guide you. It's perhaps what people look for when they look for "spirituality". What I don't see is why giving the next person the chance to strive for the ideal is not worth something to you. — Echarmion
How convenient. This way you get to just avoid having to deal with any lines of argument you can't answer. — Isaac
I reject this. The opposite is true. If I make my decisions solely based on "negative outcomes", then all my decisions are dictated by other people. And this, if applied universally, turns everyone into a zombie only ever reacting to other people's emotions. — Echarmion
I think it is wrong to use individuals for some cause beyond the individual (which is my main contention).
— schopenhauer1
This is just a really weird thing to say as a justification for not allowing individuals to exist.
Like your argument is that we must respect the individual, and you express that respect by making sure no individual ever gets the chance to be. — Echarmion
Why is that such a bad situation, may I ask? — Olivier5
This not-replying-to-me-but-really replying-to-me just looks childish. Grow up. — Isaac
The fact is that nobody was technically 'put' in such position, because to exist is to be in that position, and no one even existed before they were in that position. It's not like you can summon the soul of your future child and ask him whether he wants to exist or not... — Olivier5
Life is often better than the alternative. That's my point and it is indeed a very simple point. — Olivier5
But to think that to give life is always inherently morally wrong, in any time and at any place, to me that's courting the kind of (admittedly flippant) response I gave you: if you hate life so much, you're welcome to quit. Will make room for the rest of us. — Olivier5
And the reason I don't buy it is what Isaac basically just said. — khaled
The point is not that having children is no longer harmful, or that there is some "greater cause" that justifies it, it is that the alternative, not having children is ALSO harmful. Not to the child, but to those the child would have helped.
In both cases, we cannot pinpoint the harm being done. I know my child will be harmed, but I don't know how. Point is, I also know that the people he would have helped would be harmed by him not being around but I don't know how, in the exact same way. So now EITHER option is risky. Either option harms people. — khaled
How would you respond to this?
The claim is that, by not having children, you are harming those they could have helped. And I don't really find "You couldn't know that having children will result in them helping people more than average" convincing but it was my first line of defense. Most people have a positive impact overall I'd say.
And if you want to commit to "It is not harming them since you were never responsible for them" then that would put you in a weird situation when it comes to saving drowning people. Because then it becomes wrong to save them. They could have been trying to commit suicide. And by saving them you risk harming them. However, if not being responsible for someone means you are not harming them, then by not saving the drowning person you are not harming them (since you can't really argue that you have a responsibility there, unless you're a life guard). So it becomes: Save(risk of harm) or Don't Save(No risk of harm) and by that logic you would be obligated to let them drown.
Point is that it becomes similar to the situation of finding someone drowning. I apply my system:
Would they have suffered if I hadn't been there? Yes. Ergo, I do not have to pick the least harmful option (because it's not my responsibility), but I still can
Now we consider alternatives:
1- Save the drowning person / Have children:
Likely to be good overall. Small chance of being bad overall.
2- Do not save the drowning person / Do not have children:
Likely to be bad overall. Small chance of being good overall.
The key is that option 2 is actually more risky. And is not 0 risk, if you consider the "system" as comprising of everyone not just the parent and child.
So the less risky option is clearly 1. But you do not have to pick this. — khaled
Which would seem a further argument against your position, since it makes it even harder to justify ever taking any action. Why single out childbirth? — Echarmion
However, would you willingly try to cause unnecessary harm (assuming you knew what you were doing was indeed harmful rather than something else like "just punishment" or corrective action)?
— schopenhauer1
This is essentially asking "are you evil"? — Echarmion
However, procreation is a situation where it is absolutely 100% known you can prevent future conditions for all other harm. This indeed is a case where it is perfectly known that all suffering can be prevented.
— schopenhauer1
Yeah, at the price of total destruction of everything else that has any value whatsoever. A weird trade to make. — Echarmion
And of course the slogan was cynical. It was nothing but a cruel joke. — Echarmion
I can say because it uses people or that it violates their dignity once born because it puts some reason above the person's pain affects them.. but you will just keep asking for why that is wrong.. so I will just leave it at that.
— schopenhauer1
Out dignity is our dignity as subjects, as ends in and of themselves, not subject to nature of outside forces. So it's subjecting ourselves to some seemingly objective measure of suffering that is against our dignity. — Echarmion
You see, the parent would be preventing these conditions of freedom and thus it is justified, as freedom (of choice?) needs to exist for some reason in the first place and is more important than the negative duty to not cause unnecessary harm somehow.
— schopenhauer1
There is no "justification", as there is no need to "justify" an action that is according to a maxim can be universalised. So long as people remain ends in themselves, rather than being subjugated to an outside force or another will, there is nothing that needs justifying. — Echarmion
And does this not entail some responsibility? It's not like you couldn't have predicted your child would be harmed, no you knew it would happen. And continued with the course of action that would lead to it anyways. Why? Normally we'd need some justification when doing something harmful to others. — khaled
So what's the point of saying that at all? — khaled
Why though? I mean what's the point? Why would I conceive my relationship towards other people as primarily negative, in the sense that any interaction basically requires justification because of the potential of some future condition of harm? Who benefits? — Echarmion
The solution you're suggesting amounts to protecting freedom by preventing any freedom, which is obviously self-defeating. — Echarmion
Here:I don't know what you're referring to here, can you quote it? — Echarmion
The responsibility to have prevented this unnecessary harm, in this case lies with the person who creates the conditions for all other harms (and impositions) to occur for the future person who will be born from the decision.
Note, this doesn't mean that the parent is the cause of all specific harms, simply that the parent is the cause of not preventing (and more accurately, enabling) the conditions for these unnecessary harms. There is a difference you are conflating
Edit: Also note, that the condition of being born, in order to "know" one is being harmed and imposed upon, doesn't compute in this argument. It is simply about not creating conditions of harm and impositions for someone else. Period. The person who would have been affected, does not need to be born to know that this was prevented. It is simply about that situation not occurring for someone else. It is about not creating a future condition. You certainly do not need someone to exist currently for this condition not to be created in the first place. The thing is, it really is not a hard ethic. It's certainly not the only one, but it's not a difficult one to put into practice. Just don't do something that is easy to prevent. — schopenhauer1
I have already explained that I think suffering is only relevant insofar as it affects people's ability to practice their freedom. It follows naturally from this that there wouldn't be a general responsibility to prevent all suffering altogether.
What point do you want me to expand on? — Echarmion
But then doesn't preventing harm here turn into preventing the conditions that allow harm to be assessed? — Echarmion
Also note, that the condition of being born, in order to "know" one is being harmed and imposed upon, doesn't compute in this argument. It is simply about not creating conditions of harm and impositions for someone else. Period. The person who would have been affected, does not need to be born to know that this was prevented. It is simply about that situation not occurring for someone else. It is about not creating a future condition. You certainly do not need someone to exist currently for this condition not to be created in the first place. The thing is, it really is not a hard ethic. It's certainly not the only one, but it's not a difficult one to put into practice. Just don't do something that is easy to prevent. — schopenhauer1
It was an analogy, to explain the principle. — Echarmion
Does the universe do that, in your opinion? — Echarmion
What's so hard to understand about the fact that I just don't agree with this principle? You keep repeating it like some sort of magic incantation, but I already stated outright that I disagree. — Echarmion
That's the disagreement again. I don't think it does. There is no general responsibility for all possible harm. Rather, there are specific responsibilities towards the people you interact with. — Echarmion
I'm not. I just disagree that the parent has that responsibility. — Echarmion
Yes. And it's predictable, too. But the responsibility for that harm doesn't lie with just anyone who causes it. It only attaches to specific acts, in the same way that in a legal system, only specific acts are illegal. — Echarmion
No, my beef is less on term limit statutes and more with the erroneous belief that a lack of experience is a plus for performing the job of legislator, unlike every other job. — LuckyR
First comes the question of what outcomes you should will, and only then can we look at what causal chains might be relevant with respect to that outcome. — Echarmion
Given your definition of harm, yes. — Echarmion
You're not reading it properly. I am not saying nested causation doesn't count. I am saying causation doesn't count, period. It's not enough to be merely part of a causal chain that led to a bad emotional response. That's morally irrelevant. — Echarmion
What I am saying is "harm", in a moral sense, isn't simply you having a negative emotional response to something. If you trip over your own feet and fall, that will hurt, and you won't like it, but that isn't relevant in any moral sense. Tons of people can be involved in the relevant causal chain that lead to you falling - not just your parents, but anyone who had any interaction with you whatsoever. That doesn't mean any of them harmed you.
But if someone does intentionally trip you for fun, that is harm. The difference is not that tripping you is somehow more causal, or that it hurts more to get intentionally tripped. It's that you don't want to be afraid of constantly being hurt by people for fun, and so hurting people for fun is wrong. — Echarmion
I'm disputing your definition of "harm", so I am not sure what to do with that question. — Echarmion
No, it won't. Or, more specifically, there is no capacity to harm people by making them exist. That's not harm. No moral subject is limited in it's ability to exercise it's choice by being created in the first place. — Echarmion
But then, as I said, if the focus is on protecting people's ability to make their own decisions, there is no reason to have a rule that no-one benefits from. — Echarmion
The proposal you make is like such a small step. It's as if we were in a battleship on the morning before a naval battle debating what to have for breakfast. You are part of the problem just for making such a suggestion.
I'm the kind of person who thinks even advocacy for gay rights or ending racism is a waste of time. If you really think something like the lack of term limits for some elected positions is a problem worth discussing I don't know where you've been sticking your head for the last 40 years. — Garth
Oh, I'm sorry, not trying to be cagey. POTUS 45 is the most obvious recent example, (for those who follow news). — LuckyR
The problem here is similar: when you say "harm", you mean an objective state of affairs, i.e. "the amount of harm in the universe has increased". I don't think "harm" or "suffering" can be meaningfully assessed from such a (imagined) objective vantage. Because to me, the moral relevance of "harm" or "suffering" is the effect it has on people's ability to make decisions. — Echarmion
I have an example worse than the current Congress... — LuckyR
This just goes back to my first point: I do literally believe that someone needs to exist in order for us to conclude that there was harm. — Echarmion
This is true in the literal sense that obviously if no-one was around at all, "harm" wouldn't exist, since it's a human concept.
It's also true in the sense that harm is something that happens to discrete, existing individuals, and so of course only exists when they do. — Echarmion
And it's also true when we consider the hypothetical future person, because to conclude that they will be harmed, we need to imagine a second counterfactual future where they exist but whatever harmful thing we imagine didn't happen to them. — Echarmion
That is wrong, I think, because this abstract position is fictional. But I can't think of a way to explain this in a way you're likely to find convincing. — Echarmion
In what way is someone dead in a different way if they are not born than if they have lived and died? — SolarWind
If I am against suffering due to torture, I must be against suffering due to being born. And I just am not. Weird, right? — Echarmion
I can tell you a hundred times that we can only compare situations of different existences (tortured child - not tortured child, seeing child - blind child), but never compare an existence with a nonexistence. — Echarmion
