It's interesting because one of the things that's most significant about having children is that you take up some of the strongest obligations possible. — Echarmion

It's not about what the parent incurs. Even if it makes someone have to work harder, that doesn't negate the principle of not causing an imposition on someone else, even with the intention to benefit. Having to work harder doesn't make a principle more moral.

Yes, obviously. Of course people tend to underestimate the problems they do cause. — Echarmion

Boy, that can be said of procreating itself! Sorry... life's well-trodden harms are just such an unknown, because everyone has that much of an individualized experience, we cannot generalize the known harms that almost everyone incurs :roll:.

To establish that you are not obligated to have kids because of the good it will do. In the same sense that you’re not obligated to help others with problems you didn’t cause. For the people saying “You are denying life” — khaled

Got it. If I reformulate that, let me know if this is similar:

It may be the case you are obligated to prevent unnecessary harm.
It may be the case you are not obligated to provide benefit for someone else.

It certainly is the case that causing unnecessary harm is wrong, especially if one is doing so to promote a benefit to that same person(s) in doing so.

Would that be another way to put it?

See, I think the case of AN is unique here because it is trying to benefit someone while at the same time providing impositions and harms for that person as well. That is a little different, even than the drowning person. But maybe you can make a case they are all connected.

I tend not to aggregate harms and benefits to any net. I think that is using individuals for some weird aggregated principle. Rather, individuals are the ones bearing the brunt of the harms and benefits. They are living it out as individuals, not as an aggregated mass. Thus, that is the locus of ethics. However, I think you are on the same page as that too, so it really is just a matter of connecting the very unique case of AN where the intention to benefit someone else, is also causing harm/impositions.

Benkei, do you have an answer to the objections I had earler? Specifically:

The problem I see with your argument is you don't give enough account for what we know about the impositions of life. We can generalize what they are without knowing each particular case. We know these would be impositions. The Big Bang and other non-deliberative things cannot evaluate this and prevent these impositions but we can. I think this is a case of ignoring what doesn't fit your case. We know the impositions that occur, both structurally, and even contingently what is in range of what people often have to deal with. There is even the case that because we don't know all the contingent harms, this is even more evidence that it is best to prevent those unknown harms from occurring. But, even if you think unknown harms are not enough reason, even if you don't believe in necessary harms, even the known contingent harms should be enough evidence to prevent it. — schopenhauer1

@khaled Would you be able to put your theory in context of antinatalism? I get what you're saying but now it has gone in the weeds and I think it would be good to put it back into context.

For example, how would not being obligated to help the drowning person be applied for AN?

I can see not interfering with someone else of course, so that part makes sense in the context.

The universe guarantees life. The big bang did it! That would be the bs. — Benkei

The problem I see with your argument is you don't give enough account for what we know about the impositions of life. We can generalize what they are without knowing each particular case. We know these would be impositions. The Big Bang and other non-deliberative things cannot evaluate this and prevent these impositions but we can. I think this is a case of ignoring what doesn't fit your case. We know the impositions that occur, both structurally, and even contingently what is in range of what people often have to deal with. There is even the case that because we don't know all the contingent harms, this is even more evidence that it is best to prevent those unknown harms from occurring. But, even if you think unknown harms are not enough reason, even if you don't believe in necessary harms, even the known contingent harms should be enough evidence to prevent it.

I've answered all this in the OP already. Either suffering is intrinsic or it isn't. When it's intrinsic it's irrelevant, if it's not intrinsic it's not a sufficient condition. Simple. — Benkei

I'd like to get back to this, because perhaps I just don't understand your point with intrinsic suffering being irrelevant.

However, I think I have addressed your issue with contingent suffering, which you did not address here. See my last post.

As far as contingent/proximate reasons for suffering, even these things are well known. Because we are debating whether it is good to impose things on other people, especially negative states that one must deal with, if we know that X general cases are dealt with by almost everyone (as if it was inherent to existence) why would we not assume that indeed, this will be just one more thing that this particular instance will also have to deal with?

See, I think you know this. You know that we all can generalize what basic categories of suffering, necessary or contingent can befall the future person. The real question is not "Will these generally recognized forms of suffering occur" (because we know with almost certainty it will) but whether causing impositions itself is something one should not do. — schopenhauer1

So the unavoidable suffering of life that you're so hung up on such a death, boredom and whatnot, are morally irrelevant. — Benkei

How so?? Those are structural to life itself, and are known knowns, if you will. That should be the most morally relevant because of how structural they are to life itself. And if suffering is intrinsic or equated with life somehow, then there is a cause, and that would be what starts life, which is birth. So there is a cause here, which is being born. We can at least say that if it is true that there is inherent suffering to life, that being born is where this starts. So we can compare a state of affairs where no inherent suffering is taking place for a future individual and where it is. Being born is the demarcation between these states of affairs. I also want to put out there that capacity is a large underlying factor here. Where one has a capacity to cause the future suffering one can also have the capacity to prevent the suffering which will by default of inherent suffering be imposed on the future individual.

As far as contingent/proximate reasons for suffering, even these things are well known. Because we are debating whether it is good to impose things on other people, especially negative states that one must deal with, if we know that X general cases are dealt with by almost everyone (as if it was inherent to existence) why would we not assume that indeed, this will be just one more thing that this particular instance will also have to deal with?

See, I think you know this. You know that we all can generalize what basic categories of suffering, necessary or contingent can befall the future person. The real question is not "Will these generally recognized forms of suffering occur" (because we know with almost certainty it will) but whether causing impositions itself is something one should not do.

The only scenario where this is acceptable is the following:

I sell you a gun knowing you will use it to murder someone. You murder someone. In that case I'm almost as morally culpable as you except for the agency you exercised by actually pulling the trigger. But I can certainly be blamed for that death. — Benkei

Ok, so you go the point right here though. We know what life's impositions are. It is not something that is unknown. You keep making it seem like we cannot fathom what things befall people who are born. Of course we know. If anything, one of the themes of my posts are to recount what those are.

Again. I'm not imposing anything unless I know there are particular circumstances that will cause harm. Since living in and of itself does not cause suffering I have no obligation to avoid every life (only specific ones). — Benkei

So if you've been reading my last posts, I perplexed how natalists/optimists think that we do not know the general impositions/conditions imposed on a person and we also know that all life has some form of known and unknown forms of suffering. You don't seem to be reading my posts.

This is clear about not having babies under specific circumstances. — Benkei

Okay, so we can gain common ground here at least that we can recognize future states of people who will be born and compare that to not having future people.

This is clear that the point is to improve circumstances. — Benkei

Yes, but again, I don't think these are mutually exclusive. You can try to improve circumstances while at the same time recognizing that the conditions of life are not something to impose on the person that will be born. Hence, my emphasis on the idea that we know generally what conditions will be imposed, and we even know that there is unforeseen suffering that usually happens too to that individual. The known impositions are known and even the fact that there are unknown impositions are known as well. Imposing these things on someone else is where the problem lies here. Now that we have the common ground of being able to compare a state of affairs where someone is born and thus imposed or a state affairs where no one is imposed, we can move forward with this.

1. Although it is not logically required that every life have suffering, every life ever lived has had suffering.
2. Suffering is required for happiness.
3. Life is intrinsically good and worth living even if one experiences no happiness or only suffering because life is the end, not the means for anything higher. — Hanover

What does that even mean? There is so much metaphysical weirdness here. Even if you were to prove the Nietzschean notion that there is "higher meaning" in suffering, what kind of paternalistic BS is this to impose known suffering on another person because you think there's higher meaning?

It's like natalists/optimists think that we have gained no understanding of life since the dawn of man and that these are not sufficient to know what we can be preventing. "OH, we never know what can happen.. Ya never know!!" It's like people who rely on arguments that have no sense of history. We do have a notion of the impositions that will be imposed on the future person.

We don't need to know the avenue of all causal chains because it's obvious that living is not a sufficient condition. Just being alive doesn't cause suffering. If your point is it does, then suffering is intrinsic to life
and therefore an ethical moot point because living doesn't cause suffering if it's intrinsic. We should be dealing with the proximate and sufficient conditions for suffering to resolve it. — Benkei

Okay, what does that change if it is inherent in living?

You'll just get stuck on the causality issue any way so it doesn't matter how you formulate it. The main point of the metaphysical part is that we need to be sure we are comparing something with something and not nothing with something, to avoid the contradiction that something exists that doesn't exist, etc.

There's also some issues with the loaded language of "force" and "impositions" which are assumptions but since it doesn't matter for the end result I'll leave that as it is. — Benkei

I believe this to be the crux of your argument. I believe I answered these when I said that your idea here seems to indicate that if a baby was born into torture, then it would not be a legitimate move to prevent that birth for the sake of the future child. Its the same with impositions. You don't need someone born at x time present, for y time future to make a difference for a person that will be born.

I find philosophical pessimism totally irrelevant to this discussion as pointed out before. If suffering is intrinsic to life than living doesn't cause suffering. It reveals a misunderstanding of what causality is. — Benkei

That's fine, being born causes it then.

I don't ask for consent of animals to breed them, to kill them or to eat them. Ethically totally fine. Yet the idea of killing every animal on the face of the earth seems to be an issue. — Benkei

I mean vegans would say otherwise to that first part. I'm not as concerned with the animal part. I think that once an animal has the ability to deliberate about its own existence, this becomes more relevant. I don't really want this to be a debate between human-centric and sentient-centric antinatalism. That would just become a side debate that wouldn't add to your main point.

Quite obvious this is not what I said nor does it follow from what I said. — Benkei

But yet it seems to be what your talking about with comparing nothing with something. It directly contradicts that.

But your "no suffering the world means no people who suffer" actually means "nothing who suffer". You're just camouflaging bad metaphysics and bad language. Of course we need moral actors to exist. Without moral actors to experience "good" there is no good or bad. If we are in a position where we cannot ascribe propositions such as "people are suffering" or "people are not suffering" then the absence of suffering is not a moral good because it's not enjoyed by anyone. — Benkei

So how is this not about the baby being tortured argument? There is a state of affairs where no being is suffering. Once the capacity exists for a state of affairs where there could be suffering, then one should prevent the conditions for which suffering occurs.

Even if we grant that there is only contingent suffering, as I stated earlier, there is not sufficient ability to prevent the causes of suffering. It would be like building the airplane as you are flying it, since we have not prevented it beforehand, and people just have to deal with the consequences after-the-fact.

Also, you seem to not account for not agreeing with the conditions for life. There can be no possibility that the person born can agree to the impositions that life presents. Why should we say, "Well people should accept life's impositions (DWS) because they must exist in order to realize they don't like aspects of the imposition". Again, we are back to that argument.. It seems to go back to that.

It seems Benkei, you want to drop the idea of future states. It's like the future tense "Will happen" means nothing here. You keep thinking that is an illegitimate move when it isn't. We do it all the time. It matters not, if no actual human exists, as long as we know that a future human can exist. That would be denying cause and effect in itself, the very thing you are accusing antinatalists of doing.

This only makes sense if you presume there exists some divine logos which is the source of morality and also capable of recognising possible states of "good" and "evil".

Otherwise, the phrase "You do not need people to exist in order to recognize that the "good" of not existing is taking place" just doesn't make any sense. — Echarmion

But it does. Only in situations where someone is capable of suffering, does the position become valid.

Anti-natalism, on the other hand, doesn't have any such basis. There is nothing here to give the supposed imperative any weight. There are no subjects to benefit, and the actual addressee doesn't even feature in the consideration. It could only possibly be grounded in some divine principle, and that is in effect how the argument treats it. Which is also the reason why the anti-natalist position can imagine a world without moral subjects to nevertheless be a moral good. — Echarmion

But I don't see a problem here. See what I said to Benkei here:

1) Let's say it is almost 100% certain a baby that would be born would get tortured. Your reasoning would conclude, "Well, the baby would have to be born in order for there to be a person in the world to be tortured, so considerations of the baby being born don't matter until they are born". Clearly, that is faulty reasoning to say that the baby needs to be born so that torture exists so that we can say torture should not exist.

2) No suffering in the world means no people who suffer, nor people deprived of happiness. The instant a person is put into the world, the antinatalist position becomes valid. You do not need people to exist in order to recognize that the "good" of not existing is taking place. All you need is the fact that if someone does exist, the position becomes valid at that point. We can have millions of years of nothingness, and then this position would be sort of "activated". Once something exists where suffering would take place, then it becomes valid. — schopenhauer1

that any possible persons, who will suffer more than is outweighed by the good they will experience, outnumber people who will suffer less than is outweighed by the good they will experience. Or in short form "unhappy persons outnumber happy persons". — Benkei

I am not sure I can agree on that formulation. For possibly some types of utilitarian-based antinatalists, this might be acceptable. Rather, they would say, it is best to maximize the minimum amount of harm (negative utilitarianism) which might default to antinatalist conclusion. However, one doesn't need this formulation. Rather, one that is closer to my stance is that it is wrong to force unnecessary impositions on people. Recently, I have been using the term "dealing with" situations (I'll just call DWS for short since I'll probably bring it up a lot). To force someone absolutely into DWS, is wrong to do. Absolutely here is defined as not needing to experience a DWS instrumentally to get a more desired state, but simply put people in DWS unnecessarily and by force.

An example would be if I forced you into a game that you just had to play with no escape. The game lasted a lifetime, you cannot escape except through death, and you have to overcome minor and major challenges in the game. The game is also complex enough that it allows for unexpected contingencies to befall you. So, on top of the known struggles to overcome in the game, there are unknown probabilistic contingencies that could befall you that you would have to deal with as well. I may paternalistically say, "This game is good because you get to experience overcoming challenges and experience positive experiences". Of course, the person before this game did not need it in the first place (in the case of life, there was no life before life to need to live as you point out).

If living entails suffering (e.g. philosophical pessimism) then living doesn't cause suffering. Much in the same way that me killing a person doesn't cause his death, killing entails death. Or if I enter a room at noon, I don't cause someone to enter the room at noon. And water, by its mere existence, doesn't cause itself to be wet.

So if the position is, suffering is intrinsic to life then it must necessarily fail as an argument because living then does not cause suffering and the ethical question becomes moot.

If the argument is that it is not intrinsic to life , then it becomes necessary to examine the causal chain. And then you run into problems because living is never a sufficient condition for suffering, merely a necessary condition.

The fact that all living things suffer at some point in time, is not a valid argument to conclude that living is a sufficient condition for suffering so this does not resolve the causal chain. A disease causes suffering, being run over by a car causes suffering, a break up causes suffering etc. etc. Suffering is unique and particular and for an important part based on how a person experiences it and remembers it. — Benkei

There are several ways to answer this. The easiest way is to simply say that until all causal chains of suffering are worked out, it is not worth risking that suffering onto someone else. If we knew the world was a utopia without suffering, then we are in the clear. Otherwise, as you point out, we don't know every avenue of the causal chain, so precisely the reason to not impose the causes onto someone else. One need not know which cause to know that all causes are not resolved. Even if we are to weight some causes as "not as bad as others", there are some really bad causes out there that are indeed bad.

However, that's not even a main argument. My main argument against this reasoning is in regards to the idea that suffering is unique. While I agree, each instance of a particular brand of suffering is suffered individually by humans, certainly there are categories that can be distilled down that are well known sources of suffering. Further, I do agree with philosopher's like Schopenhauer that life isn't just instances of contingent harms (that is to say situational, probabilistic, contextual, etc.) but rather there are necessary forms of suffering as well. Necessary here meaning, sort of "baked into life". These baked in forms of sufferings are overlooked for the more immediate (I'd characterize as Western) ideas of suffering (physical torture, hunger, disasters, disease, illness, emotional anguish, etc.). However, I do take seriously that we are imposed upon to "deal with" survival, finding comfort, and existence itself (overcoming one's own boredom). These are forms of suffering in the form of deprivation. There is always a lack of something to be overcome. Now add the usual (Western) forms of contingent harm that we must deal with and overcome and the bigger picture of an existence of both necessary and contingent harms comes into focus. All of these are DWS imposed upon the person born.

However, now that we know that these circumstances are not intrinsic to life, it follows that we have some measure of control over them. We imagine that poorer people are unhappier, so we alleviate poverty. We imagine disease causes suffering, we treat diseases. Even if unhappy persons currently outnumber happy persons, it appears to me that we can control for circumstances to maximise happy persons over unhappy persons. It is, after all, not a lottery when we choose to have a child. See also Nordic exceptionalism with respect to happiness. — Benkei

Again, since it is not my position that contingent harms are the only harms, and further, even without the belief in necessary harm, we have not even been able to untangle the causes of contingent harms (even the worst of them), it would still be an imposition.

So the solution is not to retreat from society but to engage it by taking care of our fellow man. Give to charity, get a job helping others, etc. In short, the only moral act here is to support the creation of societies that brings forth happy persons as opposed to unhappy ones. — Benkei

Of course, I do not think this is an either or. You can be both an antinatalist and do these things you mention. But certainly doing these things does not negate the imposition caused by being born in the first place.

Finally, two unexamined points that occured to me.

If living causes suffering we should be killing everything on the planet and murder would be a just act.

If the anti-natalist plan is succesful, there would be no moral actors around to judge the world to be a better place, leading to another metaphysical nonsense comparison between what we have now and nothing - or at least a world where there are no moral actors to experience anything and have an opinion on the matter. Saying such a world is better than this one is meaningless. — Benkei

As far as the first part, one of the main reasons antinatalists are against birth is the idea that there is no possible consent, so this is an important part of most antinatalist claims. Certainly if consent is a factor for birth, it is also a factor for death.

Now, as far as your idea bout no moral actors, this I find not a good argument. There's two ways to address this..

1) Let's say it is almost 100% certain a baby that would be born would get tortured. Your reasoning would conclude, "Well, the baby would have to be born in order for there to be a person in the world to be tortured, so considerations of the baby being born don't matter until they are born". Clearly, that is faulty reasoning to say that the baby needs to be born so that torture exists so that we can say torture should not exist.

2) No suffering in the world means no people who suffer, nor people deprived of happiness. The instant a person is put into the world, the antinatalist position becomes valid. You do not need people to exist in order to recognize that the "good" of not existing is taking place. All you need is the fact that if someone does exist, the position becomes valid at that point. We can have millions of years of nothingness, and then this position would be sort of "activated". Once something exists where suffering would take place, then it becomes valid.

This isn't really on the topic, but as an antinatalist how do you feel about nature/animal rights groups who wish to re-populate animals to help with biodiversity or revive extinct animals or something. Some antinatalists think abstaining from procreation ought to apply to all life. Your arguments seem to be more deontological and human-centric, so I was wondering your thoughts on the matter. — Albero

Yeah I would say I'm more in line with the human-centric. Suffering takes on different characteristics in our distinct species, involving linguistically-adapted minds, high levels of deliberation, self-awareness and the like.

I think the general idea on the Nietzschean parent is something like: “life is valuable and I desire a parent-child relationship; though their lives may be filled with hardship and struggle, I will guide my child and help them any way I can. They are likely to enjoy their lives, but I will aid them in a journey to establish meaningful and productive lives through their hardship.” — Albero

Yes that is a good summary of the standard Nietzschean parent stance.

Because Schopenhauer1 supports a non aggression idea for ethics, it’s pretty clear why this wouldn’t be okay. Nobody needed to come into existence, but some would-be parents have a strong interest in procreating and I don’t think it’s clear that just because something didn’t have to be it’s always impermissible. I don’t think this idea renders procreation 100% impermissible for those who don’t support a non-aggression pact — Albero

Sure, if the don't believe the reasoning, then they wouldn't follow it. But the point is to go back to the reasoning and see it as sound. Creating situations of harm, negative states, deprivations for someone else, so that they can POSSIBLY feel the benefits of overcoming those very hardships, and even if just to purely benefit (in other words, maybe not to just overcome hardships to gain more meaning in life, but to simply enjoy things), is still wrong, because indeed, you are making negatives, hardships, deprivations for someone else in the first place. It is hubris to think that you are doing something grand on someone else's behalf by creating a situation of negative states for them. It is post-facto reasoning to then say, "Well, these negative states can provide meaning". I mean, yes anyone can rationalize anything at that point. Without X bad thing, this good thing wouldn't come about.

The paternalistic idea that YOU have a notion that life is good, therefore other people should live through life is hubristic in many ways. At the least, can you admit that this should be questioned? Just because you can do it, should you?

I think there is an illusion that if a society is one with sufficient choices, people can't complain that life is an imposition on someone else. But if anything, my constant theme is that life really isn't as free as we think. We have necessary forms of suffering and contingent harms that befall everyone. This is all well known.

I've talked with schopenhauer1 about this topic a bit, and I think his position is more accurately categorized as one that is anti-being than anti-suffering. I remember I asked schopenhauer if he'd still be a pessimist even if the world was basically perfect, and he said that he would be. Even in a perfect world you'd have to deal with the deaths of your grandparents or parents - otherwise you're the tragedy. If life inevitably involves some tragedy, which it always will to some degree or another, then according to schopenhauer we should do away with it. Even if the vast majority of one's life is amazing, no one can consent pre-birth to being born into a world where tragedy inevitably lives.

For the record I don't agree with schop. I just wanted to sketch out the position here. — BitconnectCarlos

Fair enough. I will add that a world that is complete or nothing would be akin to perfection. This is getting a bit Platonic and Buddhist but if we take as a template Schopenhauer's idea of striving Will, it represents an incompletion in our needs and wants. Thus, a complete or nothing existence would be the opposite. My guess is, this is akin to his idea of the saint's Enlightenment, Nirvana, Moksha, or the like. It is some state of being/non-being.

I've also stated that perhaps another version of a utopian-world would be being able to dial in as much pain as one wants. Of course that doesn't exist. The reality is we live in a variable world of varying amounts of pain, both known and unknown. Recently, my argument has emphasized that it is wrong to make others have to overcome burdens. Certainly, it is wrong to make them overcome burdens and then to poor salt on the wound say, "But you see, it is good for you to experience the hardship so you have a more meaningful life". Yes, I know that is the traditional narrative, but is wrong in that if it is known, then it is simply creating a negative situation in order for people to overcome it for someone else. If it is unknown then it is a post-facto rationalization of why the person had to deal with the pain in the first place. Either way, preventing people from having to live a life of dealing with one thing after the next is the right thing to do. There IS an ideology behind having children. It is promoting the idea that we want people to deal with situations. Just because people don't commit suicide at all times, doesn't mean it is thus right to go ahead and put people in the dealing with situations.

They perceive it as important because we can do it and there is no difficulty in doing so. Much, much more difficult is seeing beyond the obvious to perceive the real situation, which is not at all as it seems. — Whickwithy

But they in a way are optimists in their devotion to the technology, capital investments, and economic system. They call it "good".

I consider myself an optimist, but that doesn't mean I deny reality and insist there is no suffering. The position is that through suffering much is gained and that the wisdom and accomplishment you gain through struggle are the things of most value to you. The optimism lies in the fact that there is a higher level you will be elevated to as the result of the struggle. That is not to say there aren't things that have occurred that have caused more suffering and evil than they've created good, but an optimist would still be inclined to find the good in what had occurred. — Hanover

Yes, this is a perfect example of the common Nietzschean narrative optimists tell each other. In a world where suffering is inescapable, the only way to make it okay is to co-opt suffering as "good", "necessary for meaning" and the like. It is a predictable move. However, creating known and unknown burdens to overcome, what I call "dealing with situations" for another person, and letting this continue is wrong. If I throw you into a pit with obstacles I know you must overcome and then say, "You'll appreciate the suffering later", that is wrong. Now broaden that to the necessary situations of overcoming survival, comfort, and entertainment needs in a cultural milieu (socio-economic setting). Now add in the contingent sufferings of all the harms that befall someone. These are just more dealing with situations. No amount of post-facto rationalizing of the "good" of suffering mitigates actually creating conditions for the suffering that do not have to take place.

Then the conversation turns to humanity as a whole rather than the individual. This will end humanity! Cries the optimist. And? What of the human enterprise besides your thought-projection of accomplishments and future endeavors matters to itself? In other words, its an abstract thing, not a real person with identity. It is the individual who suffers, not an abstract concept. It is the person who deals with, not humanity. Individuals shouldn't be created so you can shed a sentimental tear at the greatness of human achievement and all the other romantic waxing.

You seem to be isolating your inquiry to whether one should decide to have children or not, which I really don't see central to this inquiry. I would agree that an optimist would likely not be an anti-natalist, but I don't think there is anything inconsistent with an optimist choosing not to have children for any number of reasons. — Hanover

Optimists don't have to have children themselves. They just have to think that it is worth it for people to be born in a world with suffering, as you seem to hold yourself.

Is there a kind of life that wouldn't be pessimistic and was worth living? Can you define that? Some of the stuff you listed can feel worth it at times, and make life seem enjoyable. Whether it adds up to a meaningful life worth living depends on the individual. Antinatalists seem to think people are fooling themselves.

I see it both ways, just depending on my mood. — Marchesk

I'd like to change the focus of the question. A life where one is dealing with overcoming the next thing. Is this right to give on behalf of someone else? I'd say no. It is not escapable. So a life where one can escape from any burden, any overcoming of the next thing at any time, maybe. But that is not the case. One must always be dealing with, whether one likes it or not. There is no escape from it.

So I'm just reframing your question. I am not denying there are "good experiences", just that providing someone with dealing with situations, is not worth good experiences. While good experiences are a good thing, being given a sort of "default mode" of having to overcome, deal with, reckon with, etc. is the focus here. Is that right, good, correct, necessary, worth it to bring about on behalf of someone else? Is it necessary to continue? Why? What is the justification other than sometimes good experiences happen too. Surely, that can't be it as to why it is okay. An ideology is perpetuated that people must continue with the survival, comfort, entertainment game and of course the contingent harms that befall everyone.

To demonstrate the political nature of this, let's look at this pandemic. Here we are with a pandemic that kills people at various rates. It is unpredictable whether it will be mild or cause havoc for certain individuals. This is just but ONE thing that people are burdened with and must overcome. Just one example. But the current political idea is that humans must carry forward, continue to breed more people who will experience things similar to this. That is an example of a contingent harm. You can make a clear argument it is also about the necessary component of survival as well. Either way, it is an overcoming. It is a burden. It is having to deal with a situation and get by. Maneuvering around the social, physical, mental aspects of life. But why must people be thrown into this game in the first place? Why must the dealing with game be continued? Clearly an ideology of sorts wins out every time more people are thrown into the game. It is not just an individual thing either. It is institutionalized, culturally encouraged, strengthened.

We are not doing a sufficient job debating the real political ideological underpinnings of throwing more people into existence. That is the political divide, as the other thread is about. Left/right political debates bypass the optimist/pessimist debate of whether this enterprise of living as an embodied person is good, necessary, and moral to provide to another person. Rather, this pandemic should be a major reason to start veering towards upheaving the current default mode of continuing the enterprise. We can stop the dealing with for other people but we don't. We want to make ourselves these heroes or beacons of some sort of mission of humanity. I am going to be reviled for defending the other side of this idea. For providing the pessimistic reasons otherwise. People are going to cast aspersions. Don't be fooled. This is a political debate. The more traction philosophical pessimism gets in any way, the more the optimists will deride the other side with angry, forceful personal attacks and the like. It is human nature to ignore, sublimate, distract, and deny what is the case.

We are thrown here. You cannot rhetoric your way out of this stste of affairs.

Too limiting — MondoR

Indeed life is. From the outside its survival, comfort seeking, and finding entertainment. From the first person its dealing with situations. Dealing with getting through the manueverings of a society and existence itself. Doesnt matter if its an office, driving on a slippery highway, a coal mine, overcoming boredom, finding meaning in something, reading, hunting,gathering, hut building, dancing around the tribal fire, natural disasters,pandemics, other peoples actions, drinking, mental illness, getting warmer, cooler, finding the best product for your needs, debating metaphysics, watching a mo ie,playing a game, looking up information on the internet, eating, shitting, wiping, flushing, sewers, journals, cities, buildings, farming, war, religion, one upsmanship, laundry, chores, relationships, articles cleaning tour dwelling and living area...

Agreed. Nor does it have to be about survival — Possibility

I beg to differ. By default living requires survival, usually in a cultural milieu. Unless you practice suicide by asceticism (pace Schopenhauer)..thats what youre doing, along with seeking comfort, and forms of entertainment (which religion and studying philosophy as a hobby fall into). People dont like to hear this reduction, but its true.

You should read Incomplete Nature by Terrence Deacon. It perhaps fleshes out themes this physicist brings up.

Would antinatalism, as a practice, therefore be considered a boycott? Or perhaps a political protest? — Inyenzi

Yes both. Good analogies.

idea of suffering in a meaningless way. — Jack Cummins

With no explanation why, youre just saying meaningless things yourself. I've argued my point plenty. Just because you say something, doesnt make it true. Its just rhetoric.

It is a personal decision whether or not people bring people into the world and you are constantly coming up with reasons against it, and ultimately this indicates that the matter is your problem. — Jack Cummins

You make your case as if it is benefiting others, while in an actual fact it benefits no one, including yourself. What you have said is empty rhetoric, playing with the idea that emotions, but not in any real sense at all. As such, I am afraid that it does not deal with the problem of of suffering in any real, genuine way. — Jack Cummins

It is benefitting others. Just not in the ways you find valid. So be it. It is about an evaluation of life, and the forced ideology when procreating someone else.

But you are trying to enforce the position by coming up with endless reasons for your antinatalist stance. — Jack Cummins

Maybe our definitions of force are different, but arguing for a position and enforcing something are two very different things and a misuse of language for emotional appeal in argumentation.

It is a personal decision whether or not people bring people into the world — Jack Cummins

Actually it is not. It is affecting another person's life, not just your own. Granted, I agree it is a decision that only one can make on one's own. Other people can have a strong stance on the decision though.

who cares about what you believe about your concerns about suffering, as none of your posts convey any empathy regarding suffering or any compassion whatsoever. — Jack Cummins

Um, the whole point of not procreating is to prevent suffering. The world is full of it. The question is, is it okay to continue it. You clearly have an opinion on the matter. You cannot stand on the sidelines.

In this respect, I would argue that your most extreme pessimism and antinatalist stance represents an extreme example of a wish for control, with absolute lack of any creativity and scope for freedom of the human spirit. — Jack Cummins

Its not a wish for control. I am not forcing the stance, for the umpteenth time. It is up to the parents to decide to not have the child. Decide is the key word. And that requires a certain point of view. It is I am arguing a political view. One that says living is good, and it is good to make the decision on another's behalf to be begetted into life. The other is that life is not worth living and it is would be better not to be begetted. It is also the best decision not to make that on behalf of another person.

Basically, I wouldn't say being an optimist or pessimist dictates you have to hold a single, static attitude toward literally every single aspect of life and existence. Does it? — Outlander

I'm using the definition of Philosophical Pessimism which means that life has an inherent suffering or negative aspect to it. Further, that these aspects are not worth bringing more people into it. It is not the common notion of something like "half is glass empty". It should also not be confused with misanthropy which says that humans are inherently corrupt. Though they are often seen together, they are not always the same. By contrast, I suppose, is a sort of optimism, though the term isn't used as much in a philosophical sense, probably cause its the default, is that there is something inherently good or possibly could be good about living that would be worth the human enterprise and bringing more people into it.

Your premise makes sense to me. It helps explain the deepening divide between the right and the left that started, at least as far back as the industrialists and romanticists. As things get worse, the optimistic have a more difficult time holding on and the pessimists revel in accelerating insanity. — Whickwithy

Good points. I like the reference to industrialists and romanticists. In a way, that is a good analogy. The industrialists being those perpetual optimists, but their optimism is like the soot that blows out of their smokestacks.. toxically moving things forward. I discussed something called minutia-mongering. The minutia of understanding the details of a given part of nature or a given technology. Optimists give proof of the greatness of the human because of our ability to investigate and gather more information and create more technology from this. The engineering, etc. They will say that the fact we have heating, bungee jumping, televisions, cars, electric cars even, bullet trains, jets, phones, underwater video cameras, and name any technology you like.. look this is OPTIMISM showing proof of the ideology of life being good. Look at it!!! Our own survival, comfort, entertainment via the cultural institutions that sustain/perpetuate it has given us THIS.. We should CONTINUE IT!!

The pessimists will claim that this is in fact an ideology. There is no meaning in the fact that we can create technology. Rather, the onus of the balance of life's worth is in the individual and how they must deal with. You are not providing opportunities to participate in the technology-sphere. You are giving opportunities to be FORCED to DEAL WITH situations big and small. This forcing of dealing with one thing after another, is what should give pause to creating more people. Forcing other people to go through burdens and overcome them, for whatever reasons you think (the greatness of technology, cultural reasons of family expectations, the supposed "fun" "happy" experiences) is not worth it to cause burdens in the first place that never had to be overcome in the first place.

The difference is that you (or at least schopenhauer1) seem to perceive what we don’t understand as conditions we’re forced to ‘deal with’, whereas I see it as aspects of reality that we relate to in ways which can inform our understanding long before these conditions are determined. It’s not something we need to fight or compete with - if we’re willing to learn from prediction error, to contribute our resources, capacity and value towards understanding mutually beneficial methods of relating, and to accept our individual existence as fundamentally unnecessary. — Possibility

This all comes from a view that the individual doesn't "count" in some way. But as I stated earlier, whether or not there is really such thing as "individuals" metaphysically, we live our lives as if we are individuals, which is effectively the same thing. You cannot be taught to not be an individual, I'm sorry. Identity comes with the linguistic minds we operate from. So, that being the epistemic reality, it goes back to dealing with life for each individual.

The West perceives life differently. It doesn’t accept our condition or any sense of fatalism, it resists that sense of futility.
It’s the response, negative/ positive, that determines our culture and how and why it’s constructed in the way it is. — Brett

Interesting.

Politics is the pushing and shoving that goes on within each culture but on the basis that the idea of negative/positive has already been decided. — Brett

My claim was it is decided in the form of "Yes, it is worth it". But the pessimist might say, "Whoa, whoa.. hold on here. You've bypassed the most important debate. Should we even 'be' in the first place?"

The political debate in the latter is about whether forcing the ideology of existence is right. Life is assumed to be the default ideology. It is a given that people should be born, to some people, to perpetuate the cycles of survival, comfort, entertainment, and institutions of the culture that bring this about. That is a massive assumption that is not, in fact, the given that most optimists claim it is.

This then is the fundamental political question because it determines what sort of institutions we build or hold onto, what sort of communities we want to live in. The left/right divide ignores the implications, and then addresses that original political question by how best we should live now that we are here. — Brett

You'd have to explain that.

But the second part of your statement about the religious only supports the point I made about the right and left disagreeing on different issues and feeding back into the pessimism/optimism politics. I don't think that the pessimism/optimism political divide is required to make the right/left politics coherent. — ToothyMaw

I am not saying it has to be valid for left/right. Rather, whether life is even worth starting for someone else is the more fundamental political question. People will have a general attitude and belief that yes it is, but this is the question at hand in the optimist/pessimist debate.

Delete

Oh forreal? My mate had a few drinks and the last thing he remembered was not being a father. Needless to say, when he came to he was cheerfully informed. — Outlander

There's a few ways to answer that.
1) Almost every adult knows the consequences of sex.
2) Abortion is an option, though people may not believe it is right so may not see that as an option
3) My bet is generally speaking, the person thinks it was not a tragedy but a mistake and thus the person born, they think (like so many others) will be better off for it. It will be seen as a good thing, the right thing, etc.

If not then, the friend is a pessimist who made a mistake. That doesn't negate the divide.

Would you consider them pessimists even if they believe that people with valuable futures should be brought into the world? — ToothyMaw

No because they think that existence is generally worth existing for most people. They don't advocate abortion at all times. Something about existence is good for some people to them.

This, while not optimistic, doesn't seem to fit neatly into the category of pessimism; it doesn't express a negative valuation, but rather an acceptance of reality; some lives, in many people's opinions, are not worth living. This loops around to the earlier issue of abortion/infanticide. These same people, mostly leftists, believe that it is at least passable to bring someone who will not suffer unduly into existence. Thus, on specific issues, there are fundamental differences between the left and right when it comes to the valuation of life and all its potential suffering and joy. — ToothyMaw

I am not sure we can say it is due to optimism/pessimism really. Rather, this has to do with rights of people to do what they want with their life. They may think life is great and that the people are making a terrible mistake but believe it is okay to end one's life when one wants easily. Also, often religionists are very pessimistic even though they are anti-abortion/assisted suicide. Rather, they want everyone to live so they can see the End of Times. Some also believe suffering is a virtue and all that.