All the arguments basically boil down to - no-one should be able to impose anything at all on me, I owe no-one anything etc. The basic individualism which drives modern capitalism. — Isaac
That's something I noticed in khaled's reasons not to help someone too. That morality is somehow transactional, something I must owe someone else. It's an interesting divide that I don't think can actually be bridged. — Benkei
I believe this to be the crux of your argument. I believe I answered these when I said that your idea here seems to indicate that if a baby was born into torture, then it would not be a legitimate move to prevent that birth for the sake of the future child. Its the same with impositions. You don't need someone born at x time present, for y time future to make a difference for a person that will be born. — schopenhauer1
We cannot imagine a person's suffering "as if" they don't exist because that is to assign properties to "nothing" (it's akin to saying something exists that doesn't exist, which is a contradiction). We can imagine a person's suffering "as if" they do exist. And if they would be born into a situation of abject poverty, where the good does not outweigh their suffering or because of a biological defect that cannot be treated, we understand that "poverty" or that "defect" would cause unacceptable suffering and we should not have a child under those circumstances. What we are comparing then is a possibility of existence with other examples of possible lives lived and we find that possibility unacceptable. But this is fundamentally different from saying this "non-existent" child is better off never having been born because when we talk that way, it is neither a child nor a person nor capable of having any properties, because it is nothing. — Benkei
However, now that we know that these circumstances are not intrinsic to life, it follows that we have some measure of control over them. We imagine that poorer people are unhappier, so we alleviate poverty. We imagine disease causes suffering, we treat diseases. Even if unhappy persons currently outnumber happy persons, it appears to me that we can control for circumstances to maximise happy persons over unhappy persons. It is, after all, not a lottery when we choose to have a child. See also Nordic exceptionalism with respect to happiness. — Benkei
You would help them but don't think you should. — Benkei
I still think that's a transactional interpretation of morality though. — Benkei
am not sure how to understand "owing someone" as a basis to accept a moral duty. I have moral duties because I want to be a type of person. They're self-imposed most of the time. — Benkei
What do you mean "transactional"? — khaled
This is clear about not having babies under specific circumstances. — Benkei
This is clear that the point is to improve circumstances. — Benkei
Generally, this refers to a view of society that is comprised of individuals meeting each other on a level playing field with no previous obligations, and where the goal of social interaction is ultimately to restore that state of no obligations.
It's called "transactional" because it treats all human interactions as market transactions between strangers. For historical reasons, this view of society underpins the idea of rights and freedoms which traces back to classical liberalism. It also lends itself to a moral philosophy which is fundamentally based around what you should not do, where positive moral duties are exceptions that arise if you have in some sense an outstanding debt. Hence again this is a transactional view where moral subjects have no standing connections to each other, and any interaction is concluded with reinstating that status quo. — Echarmion
The alternative would be either I must not help them (which we can agree is ridiculous) or I must help them. But if we look at other scenarios such as charity or volunteer work, we don't feel morally obligated to do those do we? Or are you saying charity and volunteering are also obligatory and if so, how much must one donate to who? — khaled
I think not saving a person who's drowning would make you a bad person and therefore you should do it, not because you owe him but because it's the right thing to do. While it's laudable to give to charity or to help others through volunteer work and you'd be a better person for it, it doesn't follow that if you don't you'd be a bad person. — Benkei
Okay, so we can gain common ground here at least that we can recognize future states of people who will be born and compare that to not having future people. — schopenhauer1
But this is fundamentally different from saying this "non-existent" child is better off never having been born because when we talk that way, it is neither a child nor a person nor capable of having any properties, because it is nothing. — Benkei
Yes, but again, I don't think these are mutually exclusive. You can try to improve circumstances while at the same time recognizing that the conditions of life are not something to impose on the person that will be born. — schopenhauer1
It also lends itself to a moral philosophy which is fundamentally based around what you should not do, where positive moral duties are exceptions that arise if you have in some sense an outstanding debt. — Echarmion
Because there's a difference between a moral act and a moral obligation. — Benkei
Again. I'm not imposing anything unless I know there are particular circumstances that will cause harm. Since living in and of itself does not cause suffering I have no obligation to avoid every life (only specific ones). — Benkei
The only scenario where this is acceptable is the following:
I sell you a gun knowing you will use it to murder someone. You murder someone. In that case I'm almost as morally culpable as you except for the agency you exercised by actually pulling the trigger. But I can certainly be blamed for that death. — Benkei
Why is charity a moral act but saving a drowning person is a moral obligation? You sound like you're just dodging the question by rephrasing the things I'm asking about over and over. What properties make charity optional but make saving a drowning person mandatory? — khaled
I hold they're both optional because I cannot find such a morally relevant property. — khaled
Should you stuff your face with cake everyday because you can? Or is it better to refrain from doing so? Is there an obligation to refrain? — Benkei
There is no moral property to be found — Benkei
Because I think people should make an effort to search for answers themselves. — Benkei
Ok, so you go the point right here though. We know what life's impositions are. It is not something that is unknown. You keep making it seem like we cannot fathom what things befall people who are born. Of course we know. If anything, one of the themes of my posts are to recount what those are. — schopenhauer1
Right. So one is better but there's no obligation. Not that hard was it? — Benkei
I think not saving a person who's drowning would make you a bad person and therefore you should do it, not because you owe him but because it's the right thing to do. — Benkei
So the unavoidable suffering of life that you're so hung up on such a death, boredom and whatnot, are morally irrelevant. — Benkei
the second are not caused by because it's not a sufficient condition without proximate causes. — Benkei
I've answered all this in the OP already. Either suffering is intrinsic or it isn't. When it's intrinsic it's irrelevant, if it's not intrinsic it's not a sufficient condition. Simple. — Benkei
As far as contingent/proximate reasons for suffering, even these things are well known. Because we are debating whether it is good to impose things on other people, especially negative states that one must deal with, if we know that X general cases are dealt with by almost everyone (as if it was inherent to existence) why would we not assume that indeed, this will be just one more thing that this particular instance will also have to deal with?
See, I think you know this. You know that we all can generalize what basic categories of suffering, necessary or contingent can befall the future person. The real question is not "Will these generally recognized forms of suffering occur" (because we know with almost certainty it will) but whether causing impositions itself is something one should not do. — schopenhauer1
You seem to graps the concept of doing something because it's better without an obligation as well. So that explains the difference between a moral act and a moral obligation, doesn't it? — Benkei
I see helping others with problems you didn't cause the same way I see charity. Good but optional. — khaled
Right. So one is better but there's no obligation. Not that hard was it? — Benkei
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.