The problem is that physical states are always reducible to just another mental state. There is nothing necessary about a physical state, it is merely a notion that mind projects upon the raw substance of experience...if we call it "matter", it is the mind doing so. — Merkwurdichliebe

Certainly this is the idealist and pansychist's view of things.

One can be one's own original context. Of course that means in many cases reinventing the wheel. But it must be that was the original condition. Now it's codified - for better or worse.

But you're talking about judgment. And to be sure you're correct, in any legal sense. But the legal sense is derivative of a primordial sense of right and wrong. In that sense there is always a context. — tim wood

Certainly judgement on its own yes, but this thread was about Christianity and its relation to judgement.

A better context would be found in something like this: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zPq0N-_hPyY

Just something to think about.. Judgement of sin divorced from its original context means nothing. Sin has to do with not following some of the commandments in the Books of the Law (Torah). Anything outside of this is some reconstruction done by various Romanizing forces that took the little Jesus Movement and reworked it into the Greco-Roman world where ancestral laws of a specific tribe of people didn't matter.

Another way to look at is that your idea of morality does not allow for procreating new people as part of the equation. You are claiming that my focus on procreation doesn't allow for what happens after procreation. However, you can have morality consider both. Procreation happens to be one of THE most important decisions as it is affecting another person's whole state of being (they are now alive). However, morality of course then takes on the intra-wordly affairs morality that ensues once this has already occurred to someone. So it is more like inter-wordly ethics (the more important one to me) vs. intra-wordly ethics (what happens after the decision has been made and someone is born already).

The true nature of things being apparently inaccessible, let's focus on how we perceive mental phenomena, and perhaps how we can explain our perceptions of them. — Olivier5

But this has been the problem with people like Dennett- it's always switching the hard problem for easy problems. But the heart of the matter is the hard problem. What are mental states, and what are they in relation to physical states? Anything else is just putting a "Do not disturb" sign up and pushing the Cartesian theater to another area of focus.

that such a sense is necessary for self preservation, self affirmation and self reproduction, which are characteristics of life. — Olivier5

No one is disputing this. The physical causes are not disputed, but that there is a mental aspect is at question. What is the nature of this.

The presuppositions of moral claims, viz. the existence of human beings interacting with each other. — Srap Tasmaner

That isn't being violated with how that is phrased. If there are humans, then this principle applies. You are putting another presupposition that there has to be humans in order to have this principle in the first place. That last part is not necessary for morality.

But that's not what you're talking about. You want a person who does not exist to be spared existence in order to be spared suffering. They do not benefit. Their non-life is no better than it was before by being kept at the non- stage. So why do it? — Srap Tasmaner

That no one is suffering is what matters.

To repeat: there is a commonly accepted justification for the idea that we should avoid causing suffering to others and to relieve suffering when we can. We do it because it is better for that person. And we can be pretty specific about this: if I catch a brick that was about to land on your foot, I know a lot about what you were going to suffer and when, and I know in what way your life is better than it would have been if I had not caught the brick. If your shoulder aches and I get you an ice-pack and an ibuprofen, I know exactly what you were suffering and when your life became a little better than it was.

What justification is there for preventing a person's suffering by making sure they don't exist? — Srap Tasmaner

Because life inevitably contains the whole set of Suffering. You do not need to know the specific instances of suffering to know that there are instances of suffering, known or unknown that will occur. Procreation = creating capacity to suffer.

There is another aspect here, and that is forcing onto someone burdens. Creating someone entails that person must play the game of life. Forcing a game on someone, is not justified.

A large part of my objection to qualia is that they have fallen into being no more than neologised sense-data — Banno

So if qualia is equivalent to sense-data.. what is the objection of sense-data that you hold? If it is equivalent, what Dennett holds about qualia, is what he holds about sense-data. If this is so, then he thinks sense-data is an "illusion". However, how he uses illusions might be misleading. Rather, it is an illusion of origins, not the actual phenomenon itself. If it is about the thing-itself, then Dennett's illusions are nothing more than another name for mental states, which bring us back to square one: What ARE mental states?

My view is that reality is constituted by qualities and relations between them. — litewave

Can you explain what it means to be constituted by qualities? Is that like a sort of pansychism?

I'll just say what we agree on to see where the interesting debate lies:

A certain kind of complexity seems necessary for our consciousness; from neuroscience it seems to be a dynamic (causal-spatio-temporal) kind of organized complexity (rich differentiation and integration). It seems that an object needs to be complex in this way in order to be "conscious". — litewave

Agreed

A single neuron is probably not conscious but a complex collection of neurons may be; but it's difficult to describe how because while we may be conscious of the quality of a collection of neurons we don't know the qualities of the neurons themselves and we don't know how the qualities of neurons compose the quality of a collection of neurons. The quality of the collection is not identical to the qualities of the constituent neurons because the collection is not identical to any of the constituent neurons; it is an object in its own right, with its own intrinsic/non-structural identity (quality). — litewave

It seems like non-structural identity (quality) needs to be explained. What is this such that a collection of neurons would instantiate it? Its pushing the Cartesian Theater to a different location it seems.

It's difficult to imagine how the qualities of parts compose the quality of their collection (beyond perhaps some vague sense of "blending"), let alone if it is a highly complex collection and due to the significance of its dynamic nature the collection is not just a 3-dimensional spatial object but a 4-dimensional spatio-temporal object. — litewave

Yes, so why would a collection of neurons be qualitative, first-person experience without simply positing a dualism somewhere in there already?

No, I'm just saying a prescriptive claim that would, if followed, lead to the presuppositions of moral claims being unfulfilled and unfulfillable cannot itself be a moral prescription.

The parody theory I posted is a rejection of morality that is indistinguishable from anti-natalism, despite having a different motivation. — Srap Tasmaner

So why would moral claims be unfulfilled? If a person exists, do not cause harm or force a situation of burdens onto a future person. If a person does not exist, then yes, a moral claim doesn't matter. What is wrong with that?

There are no moral issues without people; eliminating people undercuts what is presupposed in any moral position. You're cutting off the branch you're sitting on and insisting it's the same thing everyone else does, but it is not. — Srap Tasmaner

Do people exist in order for moral theory to exist though? Yes, I agree people need to exist for moral theory to be a thing at all, but there is some hidden thing you are presuming when you say "undercuts".

Hence the "hard problem". And yet, mental events must be underwritten by physical events. There’s no information without some material support. Genes need DNA, a poem needs paper. — Olivier5

Yes, the hard problem, agreed. I think most hard problemers would agree with the physical events part. As for information, I agree that information is instantiated in physical events, but is this not a case of Cartesian Theater yet again? Whence the first person aspect from information itself? What makes information experiential or have a subjective "what it feels like" aspect?

An answer that leads to there being nobody to treat anybody any way at all is not the right kind of answer. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, you keep reiterating. I keep giving an answer that answers this question. The answer is, do not harm or force burdens onto others unnecessarily, and without the ability to ask (that's kind of the more full version than the just no harm). Please give me why the right kind of answer is for people to have to exist. That's the part I don't get. It's got to have something to do with preserving society or something, but I don't know cause there hasn't been an answer. I know that no one will exist, and therefore morality won't be necessary, but how is this somehow not the right kind of answer other than again, somehow preserving society or something like that. But that would have to be justified for why that is indeed moral and then moral above and beyond not causing unnecessary harm or forcing burdens and sufferings onto someone else?

we can more easily describe experienced shapes and their numbers in relation to configurations and numbers of neurons, than we can describe the quality of "blue" in relation to the qualities of neurons when we don't even know their qualities (we don't have a conscious experience of them, probably). — litewave

I would still say, how is it that one is equivalent to the other. We keep moving the goal posts, aka the Cartesian Theater fallacy. That's a fallacy I think was coined by Dennett, but ironically I think he himself violates. It's neurons encoding for this or that.. but then encoding itself has to be explained as for why it is mental states. The problem lies in positing a hidden dualism. Mental states exist, yes or no? If yes, whence mental states? We keep referencing another complexity of physical states. It's not like if you pile on more physical explanations, "poof" mental states appear.

Bringing about a world in which no one is harmed because no one exists is not what we were looking for in a morality. — Srap Tasmaner

Again, why? What are we "looking for"? No one is throwing anyone away. Rather it's more like:

"If I bring these cards out, they will cause harm. I am not going to bring these cards out".

That is not a possible result for a "moral argument" if there is such a thing. Morality is for people dealing with each other — Srap Tasmaner

I just don't get why this sentiment in any way negates antinatalism's claims.

I'm not looking yet, makes me want to respond. First you have to stop muddying the waters with "too the man" shit... Agree to the terms and argue civilly or don't and we just won't debate.

Dennett is trying to say earlier, I think Dennett is mixing causation with metaphysics. The core problem seems to be, not that people can have different quale, but that quale even exist and their nature. To say its an "illusion" doesn't negate their existence. Rather, it is saying something about their causation. We refute the very fact that something isn't happening by saying "We think it's happening, but it doesn't" Well what is this persistent "thinking it is happening"? Even if it is socially constructed, a dual, mental event is indeed happening to that person, so what of it? Why? Dennett does not say anything about the nature. I am not sure what trying to show differences in people's quale would prove that there is no quale.

The effort it takes to change a societal practice is neither here nor there. The 'morality' of both those practices clearly had nothing to do with avoiding harm. They had everything to do with (screwed up) ideas about how to perpetuate the communities from which they arose. Fortunately for all, better ideas prevailed. Veganism may well be the next societal change. Antinatalism is unlike any of these because it seeks to annihilate that which it benefits. The campaigns for all those changes were made for the good of the community, they all had a similar goal in common (a better society). — Isaac

Ugh, I do have to respond to this.. How could slavery and mass murder not be a harm to those individuals done to? Of course it is about harm. And I will clarify as I was using too much brevity. Harm and force, and their relation is more in the realm of ethics. But I have said that in many of my arguments if not in that direct post, which I admit was trying to be brief (too brief as there are a lot of nuances for whether we are judging a future person or someone who already exists.. such is the case in CPR to unconscious or something where the harm to the person would be to not do CPR cause they already exist.. Forcing unnecessary harm is the matter here). Antinatalism, does NOT SEEK too annihilate humanity. Rather it seeks the prevention of forcing unnecessary conditions of harm on a future person. If that ends in annihilation of humanity, that is a resultant not what is sought. If you want to conflate the two, that is a different matter.

@Isaac
I actually do really want to respond to some of what you said, but my point is you have to be more gracious and charitable. You are trying to negate the whole argument while you are arguing. Do you see how I am frustrated with that? You could simply not say anything if you don't like the argument or even think it reasonable to respond to. Instead, to the man.. to the man.. posturing.

Are you under the impression I'm defending the existence of the abstract object "set of all persons" rather than the existence of the individual members of that set? — Srap Tasmaner

I'm trying to figure this out ;).

And I'm not actually doing either; I'm saying if your vision morality requires there to be no individual persons, or collections of them, then that's not what we mean by "morality". — Srap Tasmaner

Again, why? The vision is not to create no people, but not to harm individuals. The outcome is no people.

The paradox is immediate: the only way to make sure others are treated as they should be is to make sure there are no people at all. (As I said a very long time ago, this is to prefer the vacuous truth: no balloons are popped if there are no balloons.) That cannot be a moral claim because it leads directly to the end of the circumstances in which moral claims make sense. (But if we allow the vacuous truth any force, we have paradox at best.) — Srap Tasmaner

Yep, the paradox isn't really one though. If there's no person, there is no suffering. The logic entails, if there is no person, there is no people, but then so what in that last part. I don't get why that last part matters.

It's always to the man. Anyone pretending otherwise is just kidding themselves. Morality makes claims about what we ought and ought not do, it constrains us and judges us. It's entirely personal and always has been. — Isaac

I didn't see that until now.. Yes, certainly this is your debating style and it just makes this all unpleasant rather than interesting. I rather not keep this unpleasant debate going with you, if that's your style.

we haven't had that yet either. — Isaac

I am not answering now. I have tried to debate, but you have not in tried in good faith. You have not tried to debate with respect. I can go on and on, as I have with you and others, but until you are more respectful in the debate itself, I am not debating you.

Leaving all that aside, the result is that what engages our moral sentiments is other people, moral behavior is behavior that involves other people in some way, and that it doesn't even make sense to talk about morality outside the context of people interacting with each other. — Srap Tasmaner

Agreed here.

Thus while you seem to take the admirable moral position of standing up for not mistreating certain individuals, something is clearly wrong because your position calls for there to be no individuals. — Srap Tasmaner

Just because morality entails other people doesn't mean that thus we need to create other people so we can have morality. Do you see the difference?

I do not have to pinpoint what's wrong with a paradoxical argument to know that its conclusion is absurd; figuring out how you got there is interesting, but we know something is wrong somewhere, because we know from the start that the conclusion is absurd. That's why it's a paradox. — Srap Tasmaner

I'm not sure the absurdity. I am not sure why there needs to be the social groups, other then in the actually absurd conclusion that we need people so that we can have morality.

And I claim that the substance of morality is how we must treat each other if we're going to live together in social groups, and nothing else. I don't know what else it could possibly be -- well, short of it being your duty to God or something I assumed is not on the table here. I don't see how ethical questions arise at all if not among groups of individuals. I don't claim morality is your duty to some abstract thing, but to the others you live with and among.

And that's why I conclude that whatever anti-natalism is, it cannot be a moral claim at all, because its only possible result is for there to be no people let alone groups of them. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't understand why social groups have to be in the equation, and not just how we treat each other. Why is preserving social groups a part of morality and not something like "Do not force conditions of harm on another" not? Social groups aren't living out suffering, people are. Social groups aren't the locus of what is doing what, people are. Social groups are a byproduct of how humans survive, sure. Thus, to survive well, it is probably a good idea to keep institutions going that promote the welfare of people. However, that doesn't negate the concepts at hand. One doesn't need to make people exist SO THAT we can now live in social groups. Why? And further, one doesn't need to make people exist SO THAT people can now live in social groups, IF THAT MEANS that people will be forced with harms, burdens, "dealing with", etc.

2. The terms 'moral', and 'ethical' are not soley used to mean only 'harm avoidance'.

Limiting a discussion about what is moral to what causes harm is just a misuse of language. — Isaac

No, you assume that I don't know ethics can be based on other premises. However, I indeed do think harm is the basis for most parts of morality, so you are right on that. If harm/suffering is not involved, it seems to be rather outside morality and into preferences. Again, great debate to have.. but to pretend we are now having a fun romp of it now with mutual respect is a bit disingenuous. You have already tried to characterize this as a horribly unworthy, unrespectable claim masking as a theory of ethics, and due to its unusual nature, is unlike anything else in the philosophy world, because in the philosophy world, there has never been any (seemingly) unusual claims :roll:. You see, by characterizing as such.. everything is muddied and fucked. Can't just debate.. have to make it to the man,, right?

You simply restating what you consider immoral doesn't get us anywhere. We all know what you consider immoral, we've established that such a limited view is not widely shared, why are we going over this again as if it were a debate? You repeatedly telling us what you think regardless of what anyone else has said is not a discussion. — Isaac

No, here you are doing a debate tactic of turning substance into rhetoric (when honestly, that is what you do with the "this is what we think vs. you think thing").

I claimed that morality is done to the individual. If you want to debate that, go ahead, STOP POSTURING.. That is all that is. If you have a substantive issue with it, say it. Shit or get off the pot, as I said earlier.

Where have I claimed anything like this? — Isaac

Deriving it from things you said like this:

A community needs members to carry out it's functions (and those functions are important to the existing members). We each play our part in those (as we each benefit from them being done), we know that one day we'll die, yet the part we play is still going to need playing, so we have children, to carry on that role. — Isaac

. You say it as a natural fact, as if this is how humans have developed. I mean it is true, humans need community to survive through cultural transmission of information. That is essentially what that quote is getting at. However, just because that is how we function, doesn't mean people must be born to carry it out. Circular reasoning.

Naming it a fallacy is an insufficient argument. You'd have to show how morality is something other than feelings which are, in part, biological. — Isaac

You just claimed above you were not doing this.. now you are doubling down and then saying that a fallacy isn't one just because I named it as so. First I am claiming that you are recognizing that humans need a community/society to function and carry out survival. That we can even agree upon. However, your next move to then enshrine it as moral or good because of it being the way humans survive, is the appeal to nature fallacy. Something isn't good or moral just because it is natural or the way humans survive. You would then have to prove that this is indeed the case, other than pointing to the fact that it is the way people survive. That would be again, circular reasoning.

Unusual and repugnant are two very different categories. As I was very careful to say, ethical theories can sometimes be useful when they highlight a solution to an ethical dilemma, or perhaps motivate us to do what we, deep down, knew was right. — Isaac

Just a lot of assumptions made by Isaac about things that Isaac agrees with regarding how Isaac thinks. You do a lot to explain Isaac not moral theory.

This is an order of magnitude away from reaching the conclusion that we should end the human race and, rather than doubting one's route there, doubling down and insisting it's right. — Isaac

Again, allusions to the appeals to nature I was referring to earlier, so not going to reiterate it. So why is "the human race" a locus of morality and not individuals? The human race is not being harmed, individual humans are being harmed.

Notwithstanding that. If Kant's conclusions are truly that unusual then there is little point in discussing them either. — Isaac

Fair enough. This is more then about what should be doing. We can discuss that, but then realize were are veering into meta-ethics in order to elucidate the topics at hand. So you have to at least consider that this is one of many moral theories doing what moral theories often do. Drop the indignant act about this particular one, and we can play for once on mutually respecting terms, even if we disagree. I don't care and expect people to disagree on weighty matters.. It's the indignant only at this philosophy when philosophy is full of unusual ideas, that makes me think it is some sort of odd bias and thus debating out of bad faith. If you put it in the same terms as other moral theories that can be debated and disagreed with, fine, that is okay. But then let us look at the theory itself rather than how unusual it is.

Now that (maybe finally?) can get past that, if you want to debate the meta-ethical claim that ethical theories have to follow some "common notions", fine. I will simply point out that there are many instances where what we thought of as "unusual" is not as unusual. For example, I can see veganism being something that is embraced by more people in the future. The American Civil War technically abolished slavery. There was/is still much racism, but at what point could society then say, "slavery is definitely wrong"? At one point much less than 50% of America believed that. There are turning points which then make "common notions" change. Slavery was always wrong, whether common notions held a certain way or not. Who knows, historical trajectories can swing a certain way. Obviously a notion that no one has ever fathomed cannot even be recognized as moral because it doesn't exist. It's an impossibility. However, even if just one human holds it, it is in the realm of possibility. Something can now be considered. Perhaps they are right, but it hasn't been worked out yet. Slavery only became the reality as "right" through a Civil War- a violent act. It took many years and still more forceful legislation to make it a part of reality and a "given". WWII, you would have thought that the German society would have appealed to common notions of morality.. Apparently between 1933-1945 a (not so small) segment of the population gave sway to other ones, until they were utterly defeated in a total war, and then realized their error. There are moral intuitions, sure, and I believe we agree on this.

So yeah slavery and mass murder are obviously bad, and you would think as intuitions even, but those concepts took violent wars to become as mainstream as it has become. If those more obvious things took so long to take hold as mainstream, well I can see why something that might be considered very little (like the morality of procreation) is almost completely overlooked. As I stated, veganism is a good middle ground on this, where it is not so obvious but may be moral. Antinatalism is even that less common (and seemingly "obvious"), but may be moral.

No you can't. You can provide me with examples of things some people find satisfying which others don't. The search to prove anything is objectively 'ethical' has been ongoing for two thousand years and has come up with absolutely nothing. — Isaac

So Vikings and Genghis Khan and his men didn't find utterly annihilating and sometimes torturing their enemies satisfying? How about dog fights? A lot of people find them satisfying but dogs get injured. I mean you are saying that you cannot find any instances where what people find satisfying is wrong? Now whose being the odd one.

You've just repeated the same unsupported assertion I called you out on before (which you just ignored). Why is what I find repugnant (like ending the human race) labelled as pearl-clutching 'indignation' and not worthy of consideration, but what you find repugnant (like causing harm without consent) is somehow raised to an objective law? — Isaac

I don't you see. I recognize we have differences on this. The difference is I am trying to put out a line of reasoning and moral theory and not framing it as pearl clutching. If I provide different perspectives it has not been in the manner the personal manner you are doing. I am laying out ideas that chip away at commonly held notions, but that isn't indignant pearl clutching. You are trying to equivocate this your righteous indignation whereby my theory shouldn't even be considered in a philosophy forum. Then in that case, either is Kant for his unusual conclusions. Either is utilitarianism. Either is virtue theory. Let' just take all speculative theories that have any unusual ideas out. But no no.. I am different. Mine somehow has some personal cache that the others don't because its about procreation. Oh dear. What's ironic is that procreation being such a large, impersonal topic is almost the definition of something that is impersonal. If I said.. These specific kinds of people procreating, you would have a point. But you don't.

Seems to me that there is nothing that talk of qualia is about. In so far as talk of qualia is usable and useful, it is no different to talk of colours or tastes or what have you. In so far as something is added to the conversation by the addition of qualia, seems to me that Dennett is correct in showing that there is nothing here to see. — Banno

I think Dennett might be confusing the origins of quale with its existence. Based on contexts clues from his thought experiments, is seems to be arguing for a socially constructed version of qualia. That is debatable, but one idea. He talks a lot about how it is a public event, that is shared. It needs context of language, inputs from environment, etc. However, to deny that indeed, we have first-person content, would be to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Rather, there is something "sticky" about actual sensations, if you will. The point of the hard-questioners is that for all the third-person representation of phenomena, it never gets at why it is accompanied by or is "the same thing as" the sensation. Why is "green" the same thing as a certain frequency on wavelength hitting rods and cones, etc. We can keep heaping on more stuff, but then this is the "Cartesian Theater" or similarly the "Homunculus" fallacy. It is simply pushing the problem back to another spot.

Under what circumstances are they 'not considered' for these sufferings. Why do you think people are so worked up about climate change, biodiversity loss, soil degradation, pollution...literally every social and environmental movement of that last hundred years has been out of concern to reduce the suffering of future generations. — Isaac

That's exactly the problem and the difference between our thinking. The benefits, while better than nothing to an individual who is born are NOT a moral consideration for something that does not exist yet. By moral here, I mean, no one is obliged to make happy people exist. Rather, affecting someone else by causing them to have the conditions for suffering, burdens, "dealing with", et al. is of moral consideration. If no one existed to be benefited, NO ONE is harmed. Humanity may not exist as a consequence, but humanity not existing is not about any ONE where the locus of ethics does take place. Humanity does not suffer- you, I, him, and her do/does. You can play the indignity card all you want, and this will not change. Actual suffering and benefits takes place for individuals.. even if it is in the context of a whole society with institutions, historical contingency, technology, ideas, and the like. Again, institutions et al. do not suffer. They don't carry out 0-100 years of life of actually living it out. To then go a step beyond and to say that individuals NEED to be born so that these institutions et al. can be carried forth is also immoral because individuals are thus used by society to keep it going- disregarding or foregoing the individual that is being affected (which did not have to be unnecessarily) for the cause of something outside that individual.

You can claim that this is just how it is, and because it exists, it must be good, but that is simply not the case. As @darthbarracuda pointed out, even if that is indeed how humans operate due to evolutionary circumstances (humans survive through cultural memes and institutions), that doesn't make it "good" for people. What is the case, is not always what is right. Yeah, lions tear the living flesh off zebras, while the zebra writhes in agony, zebras stomp out rival zebra babies.. In this case, since there is no deliberation, morals aren't involved, but I would not call it "good" for the zebra being eaten at that time, and the baby being stomped on by the other zebra. That's classic appeal to nature or the naturalistic fallacy.

No-one has said that this is not the case. The argument has been entirely (I even wrote the damn thing out in a single paragraph a few posts ago) that the premises are unusual, and that the conclusions are repugnant to many. This is quite significantly not the same as merely pointing out that your conclusion relies on your premises. — Isaac

And again @khaled brought up that Kant had some what some might characterize as "unusual" conclusions. Kantian ethics is a major ethical theory discussed, and the practical implications are written about in thousands of pages of journals. This just seems like a case of you being biased.

Antinatalism does not do what most ethical theories do. Most ethical theories attempt to formalise that which we find ethical, and to thus help resolve dilemmas which we find difficult to otherwise see the right course of action in a way we find satisfying. They do not attempt to use some sketchy logic based on selectively filtered premises to reach a conclusion no-one finds in the least bit satisfying. — Isaac

Again, the same thing can be said of Kantian ethics. As far as "we find satisfying" that is quite dubious as I can give plenty of examples of things that "we find satisfying" that might not be "ethical". So the way you characterize ethics leads you to only conclusions that YOU Isaac find satisfying. Argument from indignity is not an argument, it is a preference is wielded to try to exasperate the interlocutor. It's like you think you are this pragmatic Cicero clutching your robe appealing to the "decent sensibilities" of your crowd rather than actually engaging in the topic. Its posturing. Ditch it, and engage in the reasoning. I will not argue with you further if you use the "appeal to indignity" fallacy. I will ignore it, as its not even worth typing words over. I will engage more with you if you want to go the individual vs. society route, as that is actually relating to the topic and not about your personal indignation and clutching of robes/pearl, appeals to crowd over decency schtick.

These inverted quale experiments and such, are not the core problem in my opinion. Rather, that we have quale at all is the core problem. It is not why your quale might be different than mine. That is akin to easy problems vs. the hard problem. Odd dualisms of brain states and mental states like quale are pretty thorny it seems to me.

Whose fault is everything really? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, see my last post that kind of addresses this. I find it interesting that the individual is considered for blame, accountability, going to work to keep themselves alive/comfortable/entertained (via consumption), punishment for not obeying the laws, and then are to be overlooked for rather a "social" reason locus whereby procreation should be considered.

@Isaac@Srap Tasmaner@khaled

Based on the last series of posts the main thing I see here is a debate between humanity vs. individual. Some thoughts on this:

1) I find it interesting that often the individual is indeed the locus of blame/responsibility/accountability when it comes to making bad decisions, working a job, obeying laws (like paying that speeding ticket let's say), but this same individual that will be born (such as myself and you and him and her and any one) cannot (in decisions surrounding procreation) be considered (apparently to some) for the suffering, burdens, general "dealing with life" that will incur to them, except as lumped in as a vague part of continuing the goals of "humanity" in general. Well, shit, then I guess it's humanity that should be going to work, obeying the laws, and paying that speeding ticket, not me, you, him, her or any individual! But of course, we are not the Borg and are not coalesced into one entity of "humanity". Rather this goal of continuing this abstract cause (humanity) is instantiated in individuals who are the locus for whom this burden will be carried out. It is the individual which should be considered in this crucial of decisions that will affect that person, not an abstract cause, where the locus or carrying out of the burden is actually carried out.

2) As I (and I believe khaled) have reiterated over and over, moral theories at some point rely on one's intuitions and premises. Thus at some point, there is no going past the initial premises. To not recognize that we have stated thus and laid that out from the beginning is willful ignoring of what was said (to score rhetorical points perhaps?). As khaled rightly pointed out, this is the case with famous (standard discussed) moral theories like Kant's ethics, and also applies to utilitarianism, virtue theory, etc. At some point there is a logical premise. We can debate meta-ethics to go a step beyond, but if we are doing so, then that would be on a different topic and should delineate that this is happening. The point is not to castigate ONE moral theory for doing what most (normative and applied level) ethical theories do.

just wondering schop, but I’ve seen glimpses of your many long comment chains on this forum regarding AN. Out of everyone you’ve debated, do you think anyone here has ever presented a compelling challenge against your beliefs ? These threads always seem to collapse into people attacking you so I never really know how you feel after — Albero

That's a good question. Honestly, I can't recall, but I am sure I have had some pretty good debates that I actually enjoyed, and wasn't like pulling teeth.. I'd have to get back to you on that one. I will say, I enjoy posters like @Bitter Crank.. I don't mean to impugn him in the more respectable circles of PF who wouldn't not want him associated with me. His style is humor, and even in disagreement has some fun things to say which make the dialogue interesting. There are also people like @Badenand @Benkei who I've debated or discussed with, which I totally think had respectable styles and some interesting ideas that made me think and analyze my position for more. So yes, I think there have been respectable and interesting interlocutors here.

So what's up with that? — Srap Tasmaner

This was my full response..

And again, not disputing accountability, just that suffering from bad decisions, when looking at the bigger picture, is a part of the overall suffering and can lead to bad consequences. As far as being a part of the whole suffering ecology, it is just one more facet that humans face. Suffering can be brought about from contingent external forces or our own detrimental decisions. The origin of the suffering doesn't negate the suffering and certainly doesn't make one more justified. Again, not saying people aren't responsible for their moral actions, just that if those actions lead to detrimental outcomes, it is bad in the same way as other bads. It's just one more negative part of life that humans face.

It's like if I threw you in a game and you didn't ask to play it, can't escape, and aren't particularly good at it. In fact, you have a defect that can prevent you from playing well in many ways. Then I say, "Well, it's justified that you are suffering based on your poor ability to play this game". Yeah, no. — schopenhauer1

So we were talking about accountability in regards to decision-making:
I was trying to get at:
1) Though I recognize that the locus of accountability is at the individual level
1a) Decision-making itself is part of the ecology of harm, similar to natural disasters in that it is part of the human experience. It's a call to be more empathetic to this fact.. We all make bad decisions, and it is part of being a deliberative animal... much more deliberative than other animals. Bad decisions for other animals are more instinctual "If/then" responses (not saying that is all it is, but more akin to that). We have pathologies, habits of mind, bad information, etc..

Antinatalists do it to a point but then seem to reach "end the human race" as a conclusion and instead of adding another caveat to avoid such an obviously wrong conclusion, they just accept it. We didn't do that with any previous counter-intuitive conclusions, why this one? — Isaac

This assumption isn't a conclusion that needs to be there. It's not obvious. It's exasperated Isaac desperately trying to say so.. It's the Village Green Preservation Society trying to clutch its pearls and scream of the indeceny. LITERALLY screaming.."But what about the children!".

The title of the thread is "Is our "common sense" notion of justified suffering/pain wrong?" - not "Here's another way of looking at our notion of justified suffering" - it sets, right at the outset, the idea that our position might be actually wrong. — Isaac

That's simply your (bad) mischaracterization of what I stated. I stated this in the OP:

So the common sense notion of suffering I am going to posit as this: — schopenhauer1

I just see this split in justified and unjustified pain/suffering as not seeing the bigger picture. — schopenhauer1

Clearly stated is a viewpoint from a different perspective.. There is nothing chastising strongly or admonishing anyone as your whole characterization seems to indicate. This was very mild. I stated what I thought the common notion of justified suffering was, and why I think it is not the way. I simply stated another view of the situation presented. This is a case of YOU reading into it in some bizarre way that makes it very personal to you.

Oddly enough, YOU yourself said you were not even criticizing my intentions, as you stated early on here:

As I've said, it's not what you intent, it's what's implied — Isaac

But here you are clearly trying to put a very negative spin on my intent.. That I am somehow highly admonishing people.. when I did nothing of the sort.. I simply posited a different view of a common notion.

I agree it's not directly about antinatalism at first, but that's the main reason why I responded in such an exasperated fashion, because we all knew it was going to end up that way. Virtually all of the other similar threads have done so, it's part of this whole insidious approach which I find obnoxious. The issue is sidled up to quite deliberately (I suspect) because we've had the actual antinatalism discussions a dozen times before and it didn't end well. There's a bunch of posters who do this on various pet subjects (nuclear weapons comes to mind) and it annoys me. I was on a long train journey at the time, so I picked up on it to pass the time. I might have chosen another, but didn't. As to whether I was right, I don't think the ensuing discussion with Srap was initiated by my comment, but before the first page was even done it had become about antinatalism. — Isaac

So many of my posts are rather themes/topics on philosophical pessimism, not necessarily antinatalism. For example, this thread is intended as more just a general pessimism theme, yet you took this for an immediate defense of AN proper.. All of this goes back to some grudge against this poster (me) in general. This amounts to a large AD HOM in disguise. You aren't attacking the topics at hand as much as characterizing a poster. In fact, you yourself are hijacking the topic by not actually posting much about it, but rather taking this as a chance to vent your feelings about my posts in general.. That itself is uncharitable, and goes against the spirit of dialogue. So either go F off and write about other topics, or have something meaningful to say about the topic itself. Don't just crowd out the space with uncharitable spewing of hatred towards me and the posts I like to discuss.

You seem to have avoided the issue of how antinatalism atttacks natalists simply by positing a moral harm. It's not like two different positions on the trolley dilemma which no-one will ever find themsleves directly in. Claiming that creating conditions for harm without consent is always and in all cases morally unjustified makes everyone abusers of their own children. Having just established that this is not an inescapable conclusion but rather just a preferred set of axioms surely you can see how repeatedly announcing this opinion might come across as antagonistic? — Isaac

This is even crazier stuff. So now, anytime a fuckn' person posits a moral normative theory, they are ATTACKING some group of people? That is just nuts man. So Kant was ATTACKING people because he had a normative theory that people violated? He wasn't positing a theory? Or maybe you think he is. If so, then at least you're consistent. Honestly man, you are gaslighting, crazy-making right now. You are literally ginning up controversy and strife in this thread to make people angry because you yourself are angry (uncharitably and unreasonably).

The position' as it comes across is that antinatalism results from moral intuitions we all agree on, that it's a surprising but inescapable conclusion from widely shared premises. Otherwise it's entirely unremarkable and just odd. — Isaac

If its unremarkable and just odd.. cool.. then all this strife for nothing. I did say that the intuition to not cause unnecessary suffering towards another (conditions of or capacity of in this case), and violation of consent will take place (but only if the person is born). This is indeed interesting I think.. But I have ALWAYS maintained in these threads that if we don't agree on certain premises than indeed, there's not much else to argue. For example, if you stated that you thought harm was acceptable to place upon other people unnecessarily.. Then I could not go much further except explore that idea with you on why you thought suffering was acceptable. However, if we do agree on that, then that is where it does indeed get interesting as implications.

Yes. But my personal view is not the point. The point was that there's no logical method of deriving antinatalism. It's not the conclusion of a Modus Tollens or something, it's just a moral feeling (or set thereof). I raised this in opposition to the frequent assertions that there was some 'conclusion' which I just didn't like so I was denying the logic. Nothing like that is happening here. — Isaac

I don't know, I don't usually use symbolic logic. If that's your jam, you haven't even tried to post anything about.. Either shit or get off the pot.. Make a logical argument showing this.. and perhaps someone who like symbolic logic can counter it.. I will be honest and say probably not me.. but I can try. Anyways, this posturing is exhausting and shows more about you than your thoughts. So it is about your personal view actually, cause you aren't doing anything...

The only thing you have posted of value here was this:

1. That it is morally acceptable to end the human race
2. That the rights of the individual trump the pursuit of other social objectives.
3. That absence of harm is a moral good, but absence of pleasure is not a moral bad
4. That absence of harm continues to be a moral good even in the absence of any humans to experience that absence.
5. That we ought obtain consent from others whenever our actions might affect them in any negative way even if they don't yet exist. — Isaac

If you JUST posted that.. we could have had some lucrative discussions.. Instead..posturing, ad hom, posturing, ad hom.. just not necessary. Even if all the AN discussion would have been tangential to the point of this thread (as khaled brought up), at least those more clear statements could have been debating points.

But this is exactly my problem. An actual person could have any sort of life, but for your argument you need to talk about it this way: — Srap Tasmaner

Yes I get your problem. However, you didn't address the argument itself which is not about whether someone MIGHT enjoy it (or even if they are likely to).

Is "immediate torture upon birth" one of the marbles in the jar you imagine me drawing from? You're not talking about an actual person, but about a very definite though hypothetical person. — Srap Tasmaner

No no, you are taking this out of context, ugh. IF this was the case, would you not consider the circumstances? ANs are essentially considering all suffering over a life time rather than just immediate torture, but same sentiment.

This continual flipping between empirical claims about human life and bizarre thought experiments leaves me wondering if you might have an airtight argument that happens not to apply to real life, like one of those old models in economics with perfect competition and utility-maximizing agents who have perfect knowledge, etc. etc. — Srap Tasmaner

Ha, interesting analogy. However, the mentality that says, "What's a little causing of suffering, there's happiness. too! Am I right?! Ami I right?! (elbow poke to ribs)" Doesn't really hold. Indeed, just because life is a variety of circumstances, doesn't mean "Thus AN reasoning is wrong". You still have the major normative ethical claim to contend with.

Maybe we should just leave it there. The formalism of the argument, which is crucial, just doesn't resonate with me, but you've given me some things to think about. — Srap Tasmaner

That's fair enough. As I said, just because life is a panalopy of various circumstances, doesn't override the claim that unnecessary causing for the conditions of suffering is taking place for another person. I've stated it many times.. you know it.