Actual suffering and benefits takes place for individuals.. even if it is in the context of a whole society with institutions, historical contingency, technology, ideas, and the like. Again, institutions et al. do not suffer. They don't carry out 0-100 years of life of actually living it out. To then go a step beyond and to say that individuals NEED to be born so that these institutions et al. can be carried forth is also immoral because individuals are thus used by society to keep it going- disregarding or foregoing the individual that is being affected — schopenhauer1

You simply restating what you consider immoral doesn't get us anywhere. We all know what you consider immoral, we've established that such a limited view is not widely shared, why are we going over this again as if it were a debate? You repeatedly telling us what you think regardless of what anyone else has said is not a discussion.

You can claim that this is just how it is, and because it exists, it must be good, but that is simply not the case. — schopenhauer1

Where have I claimed anything like this?

That's classic appeal to nature or the naturalistic fallacy. — schopenhauer1

Naming it a fallacy is an insufficient argument. You'd have to show how morality is something other than feelings which are, in part, biological.

And again khaled brought up that Kant had some what some might characterize as "unusual" conclusions. — schopenhauer1

Unusual and repugnant are two very different categories. As I was very careful to say, ethical theories can sometimes be useful when they highlight a solution to an ethical dilemma, or perhaps motivate us to do what we, deep down, knew was right. This is an order of magnitude away from reaching the conclusion that we should end the human race and, rather than doubting one's route there, doubling down and insisting it's right.

Notwithstanding that. If Kant's conclusions are truly that unusual then there is little point in discussing them either.

I can give plenty of examples of things that "we find satisfying" that might not be "ethical". — schopenhauer1

No you can't. You can provide me with examples of things some people find satisfying which others don't. The search to prove anything is objectively 'ethical' has been ongoing for two thousand years and has come up with absolutely nothing.

Argument from indignity is not an argument — schopenhauer1

You've just repeated the same unsupported assertion I called you out on before (which you just ignored). Why is what I find repugnant (like ending the human race) labelled as pearl-clutching 'indignation' and not worthy of consideration, but what you find repugnant (like causing harm without consent) is somehow raised to an objective law?

Just want to add for clarity.

1. Private language argument - private meanings for terms don't make sense in the context of what a language is.
2. The terms 'moral', and 'ethical' are not soley used to mean only 'harm avoidance'.

Limiting a discussion about what is moral to what causes harm is just a misuse of language.

People have a right not to be harmed — khaled

How are we to understand this?

If it's an element of the social contract, then other parties to the contract have a corresponding duty not to harm you. Neither are absolute, though; we balance them and the other rights and duties that flow from the contract. If you're harming someone, they have the right to harm you to make you stop. If you violate our laws, we may take away your liberty for a time, or some of your possessions, harming you. Those decisions aren't easy, but working out those trade-offs is what we do in order to live together.

But does this right extend beyond that? Beyond, that is, a duty of others like you to respect it? Do you have a right not to have a tree fall on you? Surely not, else the tree would have a duty not to fall on you, and we don't think of trees as parties to the social contract.

I've never seen someone reject the "deal" that is society. But if someone says "I don't want to live in a society where I must work to survive after I become an adult" they're welcome to leave. I always thought there should be some service that does that, allow people to just leave and dump them in some random jungle somewhere since they hate society so much. — khaled

People do reject their duties under the social contract all too often; besides simple criminality, it's the source of the tragedy of the commons that you and @Isaac have been dancing around.

But what you want is a right to opt out of the social contract altogether, and best of all would be for society to recognize your right to opt out and have a State of Nature Zone set aside where they could dump you if you so choose.

But if this is somehow related to anti-natalism, I would think the argument is something like this:
1. Being born is all it takes to be a party to the social contract.
2. By coercing someone to be born, you coerce them into becoming a party to the social contract.
3. No one should be coerced into becoming a party to the social contract.
4. Therefore, no one should be coerced to be born.

humanity vs. individual — schopenhauer1

individual vs. society — schopenhauer1

And I claim that the substance of morality is how we must treat each other if we're going to live together in social groups, and nothing else. I don't know what else it could possibly be -- well, short of it being your duty to God or something I assumed is not on the table here. I don't see how ethical questions arise at all if not among groups of individuals. I don't claim morality is your duty to some abstract thing, but to the others you live with and among.

And that's why I conclude that whatever anti-natalism is, it cannot be a moral claim at all, because its only possible result is for there to be no people let alone groups of them.

And I claim that the substance of morality is how we must treat each other if we're going to live together in social groups — Srap Tasmaner

Here's a question: How are we to treat those that aren't in our group or even directly oppose our group?

You simply restating what you consider immoral doesn't get us anywhere. We all know what you consider immoral, we've established that such a limited view is not widely shared, why are we going over this again as if it were a debate? You repeatedly telling us what you think regardless of what anyone else has said is not a discussion. — Isaac

No, here you are doing a debate tactic of turning substance into rhetoric (when honestly, that is what you do with the "this is what we think vs. you think thing").

I claimed that morality is done to the individual. If you want to debate that, go ahead, STOP POSTURING.. That is all that is. If you have a substantive issue with it, say it. Shit or get off the pot, as I said earlier.

Where have I claimed anything like this? — Isaac

Deriving it from things you said like this:

A community needs members to carry out it's functions (and those functions are important to the existing members). We each play our part in those (as we each benefit from them being done), we know that one day we'll die, yet the part we play is still going to need playing, so we have children, to carry on that role. — Isaac

. You say it as a natural fact, as if this is how humans have developed. I mean it is true, humans need community to survive through cultural transmission of information. That is essentially what that quote is getting at. However, just because that is how we function, doesn't mean people must be born to carry it out. Circular reasoning.

Naming it a fallacy is an insufficient argument. You'd have to show how morality is something other than feelings which are, in part, biological. — Isaac

You just claimed above you were not doing this.. now you are doubling down and then saying that a fallacy isn't one just because I named it as so. First I am claiming that you are recognizing that humans need a community/society to function and carry out survival. That we can even agree upon. However, your next move to then enshrine it as moral or good because of it being the way humans survive, is the appeal to nature fallacy. Something isn't good or moral just because it is natural or the way humans survive. You would then have to prove that this is indeed the case, other than pointing to the fact that it is the way people survive. That would be again, circular reasoning.

Unusual and repugnant are two very different categories. As I was very careful to say, ethical theories can sometimes be useful when they highlight a solution to an ethical dilemma, or perhaps motivate us to do what we, deep down, knew was right. — Isaac

Just a lot of assumptions made by Isaac about things that Isaac agrees with regarding how Isaac thinks. You do a lot to explain Isaac not moral theory.

This is an order of magnitude away from reaching the conclusion that we should end the human race and, rather than doubting one's route there, doubling down and insisting it's right. — Isaac

Again, allusions to the appeals to nature I was referring to earlier, so not going to reiterate it. So why is "the human race" a locus of morality and not individuals? The human race is not being harmed, individual humans are being harmed.

Notwithstanding that. If Kant's conclusions are truly that unusual then there is little point in discussing them either. — Isaac

Fair enough. This is more then about what should be doing. We can discuss that, but then realize were are veering into meta-ethics in order to elucidate the topics at hand. So you have to at least consider that this is one of many moral theories doing what moral theories often do. Drop the indignant act about this particular one, and we can play for once on mutually respecting terms, even if we disagree. I don't care and expect people to disagree on weighty matters.. It's the indignant only at this philosophy when philosophy is full of unusual ideas, that makes me think it is some sort of odd bias and thus debating out of bad faith. If you put it in the same terms as other moral theories that can be debated and disagreed with, fine, that is okay. But then let us look at the theory itself rather than how unusual it is.

Now that (maybe finally?) can get past that, if you want to debate the meta-ethical claim that ethical theories have to follow some "common notions", fine. I will simply point out that there are many instances where what we thought of as "unusual" is not as unusual. For example, I can see veganism being something that is embraced by more people in the future. The American Civil War technically abolished slavery. There was/is still much racism, but at what point could society then say, "slavery is definitely wrong"? At one point much less than 50% of America believed that. There are turning points which then make "common notions" change. Slavery was always wrong, whether common notions held a certain way or not. Who knows, historical trajectories can swing a certain way. Obviously a notion that no one has ever fathomed cannot even be recognized as moral because it doesn't exist. It's an impossibility. However, even if just one human holds it, it is in the realm of possibility. Something can now be considered. Perhaps they are right, but it hasn't been worked out yet. Slavery only became the reality as "right" through a Civil War- a violent act. It took many years and still more forceful legislation to make it a part of reality and a "given". WWII, you would have thought that the German society would have appealed to common notions of morality.. Apparently between 1933-1945 a (not so small) segment of the population gave sway to other ones, until they were utterly defeated in a total war, and then realized their error. There are moral intuitions, sure, and I believe we agree on this.

So yeah slavery and mass murder are obviously bad, and you would think as intuitions even, but those concepts took violent wars to become as mainstream as it has become. If those more obvious things took so long to take hold as mainstream, well I can see why something that might be considered very little (like the morality of procreation) is almost completely overlooked. As I stated, veganism is a good middle ground on this, where it is not so obvious but may be moral. Antinatalism is even that less common (and seemingly "obvious"), but may be moral.

No you can't. You can provide me with examples of things some people find satisfying which others don't. The search to prove anything is objectively 'ethical' has been ongoing for two thousand years and has come up with absolutely nothing. — Isaac

So Vikings and Genghis Khan and his men didn't find utterly annihilating and sometimes torturing their enemies satisfying? How about dog fights? A lot of people find them satisfying but dogs get injured. I mean you are saying that you cannot find any instances where what people find satisfying is wrong? Now whose being the odd one.

You've just repeated the same unsupported assertion I called you out on before (which you just ignored). Why is what I find repugnant (like ending the human race) labelled as pearl-clutching 'indignation' and not worthy of consideration, but what you find repugnant (like causing harm without consent) is somehow raised to an objective law? — Isaac

I don't you see. I recognize we have differences on this. The difference is I am trying to put out a line of reasoning and moral theory and not framing it as pearl clutching. If I provide different perspectives it has not been in the manner the personal manner you are doing. I am laying out ideas that chip away at commonly held notions, but that isn't indignant pearl clutching. You are trying to equivocate this your righteous indignation whereby my theory shouldn't even be considered in a philosophy forum. Then in that case, either is Kant for his unusual conclusions. Either is utilitarianism. Either is virtue theory. Let' just take all speculative theories that have any unusual ideas out. But no no.. I am different. Mine somehow has some personal cache that the others don't because its about procreation. Oh dear. What's ironic is that procreation being such a large, impersonal topic is almost the definition of something that is impersonal. If I said.. These specific kinds of people procreating, you would have a point. But you don't.

2. The terms 'moral', and 'ethical' are not soley used to mean only 'harm avoidance'.

Limiting a discussion about what is moral to what causes harm is just a misuse of language. — Isaac

No, you assume that I don't know ethics can be based on other premises. However, I indeed do think harm is the basis for most parts of morality, so you are right on that. If harm/suffering is not involved, it seems to be rather outside morality and into preferences. Again, great debate to have.. but to pretend we are now having a fun romp of it now with mutual respect is a bit disingenuous. You have already tried to characterize this as a horribly unworthy, unrespectable claim masking as a theory of ethics, and due to its unusual nature, is unlike anything else in the philosophy world, because in the philosophy world, there has never been any (seemingly) unusual claims :roll:. You see, by characterizing as such.. everything is muddied and fucked. Can't just debate.. have to make it to the man,, right?

And I claim that the substance of morality is how we must treat each other if we're going to live together in social groups, and nothing else. I don't know what else it could possibly be -- well, short of it being your duty to God or something I assumed is not on the table here. I don't see how ethical questions arise at all if not among groups of individuals. I don't claim morality is your duty to some abstract thing, but to the others you live with and among.

And that's why I conclude that whatever anti-natalism is, it cannot be a moral claim at all, because its only possible result is for there to be no people let alone groups of them. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't understand why social groups have to be in the equation, and not just how we treat each other. Why is preserving social groups a part of morality and not something like "Do not force conditions of harm on another" not? Social groups aren't living out suffering, people are. Social groups aren't the locus of what is doing what, people are. Social groups are a byproduct of how humans survive, sure. Thus, to survive well, it is probably a good idea to keep institutions going that promote the welfare of people. However, that doesn't negate the concepts at hand. One doesn't need to make people exist SO THAT we can now live in social groups. Why? And further, one doesn't need to make people exist SO THAT people can now live in social groups, IF THAT MEANS that people will be forced with harms, burdens, "dealing with", etc.

I don't understand why social groups have to be in the equation, and not just how we treat each other. — schopenhauer1

Social groups are a byproduct of how humans survive, sure. — schopenhauer1

Many of us believe there is a pretty straightforward story that starts at kinship, which natural selection takes an interest in, to the great variety of human communities today, which are not products of evolution. This story gives us a basis for understanding the existence of moral sentiments and moral behavior. I do not believe morality is just ideas we have about right and wrong, and I believe the evidence supports this view.

Leaving all that aside, the result is that what engages our moral sentiments is other people, moral behavior is behavior that involves other people in some way, and that it doesn't even make sense to talk about morality outside the context of people interacting with each other.

Thus while you seem to take the admirable moral position of standing up for not mistreating certain individuals, something is clearly wrong because your position calls for there to be no individuals.

I do not have to pinpoint what's wrong with a paradoxical argument to know that its conclusion is absurd; figuring out how you got there is interesting, but we know something is wrong somewhere, because we know from the start that the conclusion is absurd. That's why it's a paradox.

Leaving all that aside, the result is that what engages our moral sentiments is other people, moral behavior is behavior that involves other people in some way, and that it doesn't even make sense to talk about morality outside the context of people interacting with each other. — Srap Tasmaner

Agreed here.

Thus while you seem to take the admirable moral position of standing up for not mistreating certain individuals, something is clearly wrong because your position calls for there to be no individuals. — Srap Tasmaner

Just because morality entails other people doesn't mean that thus we need to create other people so we can have morality. Do you see the difference?

I do not have to pinpoint what's wrong with a paradoxical argument to know that its conclusion is absurd; figuring out how you got there is interesting, but we know something is wrong somewhere, because we know from the start that the conclusion is absurd. That's why it's a paradox. — Srap Tasmaner

I'm not sure the absurdity. I am not sure why there needs to be the social groups, other then in the actually absurd conclusion that we need people so that we can have morality.

I claimed that morality is done to the individual. If you want to debate that, go ahead, STOP POSTURING.. That is all that is. If you have a substantive issue with it, say it. — schopenhauer1

How on earth would we 'debate' that. What arguments could we possibly bring to the table. You think 'morality' is done to the individual, it isn't. People use the term 'morality' to refer to a wider set of objectives than just individuals. If 'morality' is just what is done at an individual scale then how is it these people use the word in the way they do and are understood? The only possible way to debate the meaning of a word is by examples of it's use.

You say it as a natural fact, as if this is how humans have developed. I mean it is true, humans need community to survive through cultural transmission of information. That is essentially what that quote is getting at. However, just because that is how we function, doesn't mean people must be born to carry it out. — schopenhauer1

Of course people must be born to carry it out, how else would it get carried out? If you mean 'must' in the sense of morally, then yes. As I've said literally all the evidence we have on the matter suggests morals are feelings generated by our biology and our early post-natal experiences. If you think morality is some fact external to our basic feelings then lets see some evidence of that.

Something isn't good or moral just because it is natural or the way humans survive. You would then have to prove that this is indeed the case, — schopenhauer1

Why? Not that I'd have a great deal of trouble demonstrating the evolution of brain regions associated with moral decision-making, but I'm wondering why I have to prove this and yet we've not had a shred of evidence from you that morality is...well, whatever the hell you think it is, we haven't had that yet either.

It's the indignant only at this philosophy when philosophy is full of unusual ideas, that makes me think it is some sort of odd bias and thus debating out of bad faith. — schopenhauer1

Being repulsed at the thought of ending the entire human race is not an 'odd bias'. What fucking planet have you been living on?

So yeah slavery and mass murder are obviously bad, and you would think as intuitions even, but those concepts took violent wars to become as mainstream — schopenhauer1

The effort it takes to change a societal practice is neither here nor there. The 'morality' of both those practices clearly had nothing to do with avoiding harm. They had everything to do with (screwed up) ideas about how to perpetuate the communities from which they arose. Fortunately for all, better ideas prevailed. Veganism may well be the next societal change. Antinatalism is unlike any of these because it seeks to annihilate that which it benefits. The campaigns for all those changes were made for the good of the community, they all had a similar goal in common (a better society).

Mine somehow has some personal cache that the others don't because its about procreation. — schopenhauer1

Can you really not see it? Yours is advocating the end of humanity. About the weirdest thing Kant advocated was the we should never lie. The oddest thing to come out of utilitarianism is that we should all give everything away to charity. I'm flabergasted that you see ending the human race as being on a par with this level of oddity.

If harm/suffering is not involved, it seems to be rather outside morality — schopenhauer1

Then how do you explain divine command theory, Calvinism, virtue ethics...

Can't just debate.. have to make it to the man,, right? — schopenhauer1

It's always to the man. Anyone pretending otherwise is just kidding themselves. Morality makes claims about what we ought and ought not do, it constrains us and judges us. It's entirely personal and always has been.

The paradox is immediate: the only way to make sure others are treated as they should be is to make sure there are no people at all. (As I said a very long time ago, this is to prefer the vacuous truth: no balloons are popped if there are no balloons.) That cannot be a moral claim because it leads directly to the end of the circumstances in which moral claims make sense. (But if we allow the vacuous truth any force, we have paradox at best.)

we haven't had that yet either. — Isaac

I am not answering now. I have tried to debate, but you have not in tried in good faith. You have not tried to debate with respect. I can go on and on, as I have with you and others, but until you are more respectful in the debate itself, I am not debating you.

It's always to the man. Anyone pretending otherwise is just kidding themselves. Morality makes claims about what we ought and ought not do, it constrains us and judges us. It's entirely personal and always has been. — Isaac

I didn't see that until now.. Yes, certainly this is your debating style and it just makes this all unpleasant rather than interesting. I rather not keep this unpleasant debate going with you, if that's your style.

The paradox is immediate: the only way to make sure others are treated as they should be is to make sure there are no people at all. (As I said a very long time ago, this is to prefer the vacuous truth: no balloons are popped if there are no balloons.) That cannot be a moral claim because it leads directly to the end of the circumstances in which moral claims make sense. (But if we allow the vacuous truth any force, we have paradox at best.) — Srap Tasmaner

Yep, the paradox isn't really one though. If there's no person, there is no suffering. The logic entails, if there is no person, there is no people, but then so what in that last part. I don't get why that last part matters.

Are you under the impression I'm defending the existence of the abstract object "set of all persons" rather than the existence of the individual members of that set?

And I'm not actually doing either; I'm saying if your vision of morality requires there to be no individual persons, or collections of them, then that's not what we mean by "morality".

If you want to call it "advice", fine.

Are you under the impression I'm defending the existence of the abstract object "set of all persons" rather than the existence of the individual members of that set? — Srap Tasmaner

I'm trying to figure this out ;).

And I'm not actually doing either; I'm saying if your vision morality requires there to be no individual persons, or collections of them, then that's not what we mean by "morality". — Srap Tasmaner

Again, why? The vision is not to create no people, but not to harm individuals. The outcome is no people.

@Isaac
I actually do really want to respond to some of what you said, but my point is you have to be more gracious and charitable. You are trying to negate the whole argument while you are arguing. Do you see how I am frustrated with that? You could simply not say anything if you don't like the argument or even think it reasonable to respond to. Instead, to the man.. to the man.. posturing.

The effort it takes to change a societal practice is neither here nor there. The 'morality' of both those practices clearly had nothing to do with avoiding harm. They had everything to do with (screwed up) ideas about how to perpetuate the communities from which they arose. Fortunately for all, better ideas prevailed. Veganism may well be the next societal change. Antinatalism is unlike any of these because it seeks to annihilate that which it benefits. The campaigns for all those changes were made for the good of the community, they all had a similar goal in common (a better society). — Isaac

Ugh, I do have to respond to this.. How could slavery and mass murder not be a harm to those individuals done to? Of course it is about harm. And I will clarify as I was using too much brevity. Harm and force, and their relation is more in the realm of ethics. But I have said that in many of my arguments if not in that direct post, which I admit was trying to be brief (too brief as there are a lot of nuances for whether we are judging a future person or someone who already exists.. such is the case in CPR to unconscious or something where the harm to the person would be to not do CPR cause they already exist.. Forcing unnecessary harm is the matter here). Antinatalism, does NOT SEEK too annihilate humanity. Rather it seeks the prevention of forcing unnecessary conditions of harm on a future person. If that ends in annihilation of humanity, that is a resultant not what is sought. If you want to conflate the two, that is a different matter.

The outcome is no people. — schopenhauer1

Yeah. That is not a possible result for a "moral argument" if there is such a thing. Morality is for people dealing with each other; if you've got an argument that concludes with there being no people, either you've messed up somewhere or whatever that is, it's not morality.

How could slavery and mass murder not be a harm to those individuals done to? Of course it is about harm. — schopenhauer1

Where did I say it wasn't a harm? I said the 'morality' of it had nothing to do with harm. The extent to which the people carrying out these atrocities thought they were 'moral' was to do with protecting and perpetuating their community, or carrying out God's wishes, or creating a 'pure' society...whatever. The point is that whether these things cause harm didn't even enter into the moral justification.

So...

Antinatalism, does NOT SEEK too annihilate humanity. Rather it seeks forcing conditions of harm on a future person. If that ends in annihilation of humanity, that is a resultant not what is sought. — schopenhauer1

...is not a moral theory, it's just a 'plan'. The idea that what is moral is just that which causes least harm (with a few caveats) is just not what the word means. If you want to end this type of harm then yes, ending the human race will do that. Why you would have no other objective in life than eliminating this particular type of harm is a mystery to us, but if that's what you want to do...
I find planning to end the human race just to satisfy one idiosyncratic objective pretty difficult to see as anything other than borderline sociopathic.

I'm not looking yet, makes me want to respond. First you have to stop muddying the waters with "too the man" shit... Agree to the terms and argue civilly or don't and we just won't debate.

That is not a possible result for a "moral argument" if there is such a thing. Morality is for people dealing with each other — Srap Tasmaner

I just don't get why this sentiment in any way negates antinatalism's claims.

Suppose you're supposed to figure out how to sort a bunch of playing cards; the answer you come up with is throwing all the cards away, on the grounds that there are now no unsorted cards remaining.

See how that might be unsatisfactory? Even if other competing methods include phrases like, "So long as there are unsorted cards, ..." It's clearly not what we wanted.

Bringing about a world in which no one is harmed because no one exists is not what we were looking for in a morality.

Bringing about a world in which no one is harmed because no one exists is not what we were looking for in a morality. — Srap Tasmaner

Again, why? What are we "looking for"? No one is throwing anyone away. Rather it's more like:

"If I bring these cards out, they will cause harm. I am not going to bring these cards out".

But you don't end up with a sorted deck, which was the whole point. You've redefined the goal, and maybe the way you redefined it almost works, maybe not, but your redefinition left room for you to propose a solution that meets your criteria but is not a solution to the original challenge.

I have insisted that moral questions have the form: how should we treat each other?

An answer that leads to there being nobody to treat anybody any way at all is not the right kind of answer.

An answer that leads to there being nobody to treat anybody any way at all is not the right kind of answer. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, you keep reiterating. I keep giving an answer that answers this question. The answer is, do not harm or force burdens onto others unnecessarily, and without the ability to ask (that's kind of the more full version than the just no harm). Please give me why the right kind of answer is for people to have to exist. That's the part I don't get. It's got to have something to do with preserving society or something, but I don't know cause there hasn't been an answer. I know that no one will exist, and therefore morality won't be necessary, but how is this somehow not the right kind of answer other than again, somehow preserving society or something like that. But that would have to be justified for why that is indeed moral and then moral above and beyond not causing unnecessary harm or forcing burdens and sufferings onto someone else?

Please give me why the right kind of answer is for people to have to exist. — schopenhauer1

Morality is premised on people existing, presupposes them as the cards to be sorted are presupposed in asking for them to be sorted.

There are no moral issues without people; eliminating people undercuts what is presupposed in any moral position. You're cutting off the branch you're sitting on and insisting it's the same thing everyone else does, but it is not.

Here's a "moral theory":

Thou shalt not have children, but if there be no people then do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the law.

There are no moral issues without people; eliminating people undercuts what is presupposed in any moral position. You're cutting off the branch you're sitting on and insisting it's the same thing everyone else does, but it is not. — Srap Tasmaner

Do people exist in order for moral theory to exist though? Yes, I agree people need to exist for moral theory to be a thing at all, but there is some hidden thing you are presuming when you say "undercuts".