I also said:
I can see now, that fdrake was getting at a similar notion I am in terms of difference of philosophy and math. So I was just getting to your own point fdrake :D. Too many frameworks with radically different methodologies attacking similar problems. In math, the constraints of community are really just constraints on what math describes (numbers, relations, patterns, measurement etc.). Philosophy is way more open-ended and thus the consensus is little, quantifiable information can be manipulated in constrained ways (you can only do so much with quantifiable information) contra philosophical problems, and the kind of answers are open-ended in philosophy contra math. But this is because the very nature of philosophy is how unconstrained it tends to be.

Since consensus on mathematical principles is dependent on consensus of ontology, it is impossible that there could be a higher degree of consensus on mathematical principles than there is on philosophical principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

All that needs to occur is that a higher amount of constraints that needs to take place math than in philosophy. I'll even confine it to just an area like metaphysics/epistemology. In these realms of philosophy, the constraints are so wide that there is no consensus to justify which move is more valid than another. In math, there are at least some moves that are universally considered invalid. I could not solve a mathematical problem with a treatise on "being" for example. However, a metaphysical argument might be framed as a problem of "being", a problems of propositions/linguistics, problems of a priori synthetic knowledge, problems of empirical data gathering, etc. etc. It is framed too broadly for even a consensus on what a valid answer looks like (unless you fall within a camp with another philosopher who shares that point of view, but that doesn't negate that philosophy itself is much broader outside this compartmentalization). Thus I said earlier:

But my sentiment I'm trying to convey here is that the models and demonstrations you speak of have a lot of constraints as to what kind of methodology can be employed to solve a particular mathematical problem. Philosophy does not have these constraints (unless your philosophy is to put certain constraints on, but then the argument about what constraints to put on would still be contested and so on). There is a certain consensus in the math community about what counts as even in the realm of what is valid for an answer. From there, further proofs and demonstrations would be needed to justify the weight of one modeling claim over the other. Eventually, if it happens enough times in enough places, another consensus takes place (this time, not on the constraints of what a valid answer can look like, but on what is the better model). Examples of this being the use of irrationals, non-Euclidean geometry to solve problems of relativity, etc. etc.

Edit: Sure, a piece of music as an answer in philosophy would also be considered by most as outside the realm of philosophy, but the scope is very wide, to the point of it being negligible to speak of an "agreed upon" constraint in the philosophy world.

Hey Pseudoynm, thanks for bringing up that earlier reference to fdrake where he said this:

Positing things as irrelevant is pretty easy, but this might speak to my inexperience with philosophy institutionally. If you're doing philosophy within a research paradigm or quite constrained theoretical context then the problems you deal with are prefigured (but not necessarily circumscribed) by that theoretical milieu. PhD student X works in dialethic logic, PhD student Y works in feminist standpoint epistemology, PhD student Z works in mereology. They're dealing with stuff already in a little island of sense; equivalently a frame; with stable ideas of what the problems are. — fdrake

I can see now, that fdrake was getting at a similar notion I am in terms of difference of philosophy and math. So I was just getting to your own point fdrake :D. Too many frameworks with radically different methodologies attacking similar problems. In math, the constraints of community are really just constraints on what math describes (numbers, relations, patterns, measurement etc.). Philosophy is way more open-ended and thus the consensus is little, quantifiable information can be manipulated in constrained ways (you can only do so much with quantifiable information) contra philosophical problems, and the kind of answers are open-ended in philosophy contra math. But this is because the very nature of philosophy is how unconstrained it tends to be.

Haha, I hope to continue this at another point. Thank you for hearing this through.

I don't want to play the Socratic authority game and I'm tired. Say what you want to say and let it stand on its own merits. — fdrake

Ok, but I think you would say it better than me probably. But my sentiment I'm trying to convey here is that the models and demonstrations you speak of have a lot of constraints as to what kind of methodology can be employed to solve a particular mathematical problem. Philosophy does not have these constraints (unless your philosophy is to put certain constraints on, but then the argument about what constraints to put on would still be contested and so on). There is a certain consensus in the math community about what counts as even in the realm of what is valid for an answer. From there, further proofs and demonstrations would be needed to justify the weight of one modeling claim over the other. Eventually, if it happens enough times in enough places, another consensus takes place (this time, not on the constraints of what a valid answer can look like, but on what is the better model). Examples of this being the use of irrationals, non-Euclidean geometry to solve problems of relativity, etc. etc.

Edit: Sure, a piece of music as an answer in philosophy would also be considered by most as outside the realm of philosophy, but the scope is very wide, to the point of it being negligible to speak of an "agreed upon" constraint in the philosophy world.

Good answer. But let me take a different approach. Why would a poem or a piece of music or even a mathematical proof that models a different problem not be seen as a valid move? I’m not being cheeky here. I am going somewhere..

But why are Cauchy cuts and Dedekind Cuts both considered valid moves?

Yes, I'm leaving it open-ended for reason.. Socratic method and all..

How do you know if category or set theory is the best approach? How do we know if or how the math can capture the freak waves?

But, to be blunt - this is wrong. — StreetlightX

What's the best approach? Geometric? (qua Netwon?) Arithmetic? (Delta-Epsilon?) Non-Standard? (Leibnizian flavoured)? But there is no 'best' approach because 'best' is only ever relative to what you're trying to do with the calculations. — StreetlightX

I'm going to be more charitable. You are both right and wrong :p. You are right; there are different ways to solve problems based on what they are trying to do with the calculations. Do they work based on the problems they are trying to solve? Yep. Can it be demonstrated? Yep. You are wrong in that if it is demonstrable, then it can live alongside the other demonstrable methods. It allows for diversity, but this diversity, even if a method is not liked because of its angle of attack on the problem,cannot be denied to have solved the problem. If another angle is seen to solve this, that, AND the other problem, then slowly a consensus will build on that new method. However, the claim still remains- demonstrable results and consensus make mathematical creativity/novelty different than philosophical creativity.

These are all things that 'catch-on' on the basis of pragmatics; they're all 'machines' that are well-tailored to working with certain inputs, and not others. Tools, liable to be put down in favour of other, different tools if necessary. Philosophy is a tool-kit, just like that. — StreetlightX

But again, this "catching-on" in mathematics, eventually moves to consensus. Thus, even debates over axioms about infinities, etc. will eventually get to a point via demonstrable proofs that convince the community that this should be included in standard views of the problem, until someone else brings up an issue. This consensus and branching out of mathematics (what I call "step-wise" fashion) is not possible in philosophy where the constraints of the variables to be discussed are so open-ended. As someone previously brought up, that problems can be framed from a Derridaean or a Russelian perspective would negate this analogy to math. This isn't a matter of degree but completely different starting points. It's like one is using axioms and the other is using poetry. How is that commensurable for a consensus and step-wise branching out that occurs in the math world?

To dismiss philosophy as 'flights of fancy' is to not understand it. — StreetlightX

To this I'll admit, I should have used another word. Perhaps "thought-explorations" or "generalized theoretical-investigations".

I'm firmly of the belief that every philosophy worth its salt has the kind of internal consistency that characterizes mathematical concepts, and they derive that consistency from the particular problems that animate them. — StreetlightX

A particular line of reasoning can have internal consistency, but there are so many theories from so many avenues, that can aim at solving a certain question, there can be no consensus really except perhaps those who are specialized in that particular philosophical school of thought. So maybe Wittgensteinians agree on certain principles and can branch out from there, or Schopenhauerians can in their camp. But then, this just goes to my point that in math there is no "school of thought" in math-proper. It is consensus of concepts that are demonstrable in the results they produce and works in a step-wise fashion. I guess my two main terms to see the difference between math and philosophy are "demonstrable" (which leads to eventually) "consensus" (and onward it goes).

The difference, to the degree there is one, lies only in the fact that philosophy has a far wider range of inspiration than math: its problems are drawn from a more diverse array of sources. — StreetlightX

But this is a much larger difference than you seem to be implying. The implication with math is that its constrained world "dictates" its next move, where in philosophy the diverse array of resources makes it too open-ended.

I think you're missing the point though - what 'proves fruitful' is the choice made between two possible 'paths'. We're not talking about 'solving problems': we're talking about determining concepts: should number be treated in this way or that? Should infinity be thought of like this or like that? The point is that the normative force of this 'should' is provided by a concrete problem (with may be intra-mathematical or not) which any choice that is made is responsive to. Mutatis mutandis the way in which we form concepts in philosophy are similarly responsive to the problems they address: in neither case is it a matter of solving problems, but determining concepts. — StreetlightX

So from the B&C article itself it says:

We now take all this for granted, but if we go back to the origin of the
determination, we can see that it was by no means necessary. At the core of this
determination was a choice of conceptual aspect, and although we might find it hard
now to see things in any other way, it is important to recognize that the choice was
there and that our concept of number might have developed in another way. We
should also note that while the choice between the different ways of seeing – of
determining the concept – was, we might say, forced by mathematics itself (the proof
above), the outcome of the choice was not so determined. The choice between
criteria, whatever its motivation, does not answer uniquely to intra-mathematical
considerations; mathematics itself, we might say, allows either choice, while
eventually accepting the choice that is made. — B&C

Again, I don't discount that there is some sort of choice as to which criteria fits the picture better, but rather, I disagree with the move to equate it with philosophical creativity. In the math world (similar to the science world), eventually there will be a consensus (for a time being) of the criteria. This consensus is based on the fact that it can be used to solve a wide range of problems demonstrably. This demonstrable ability of math is lacking in philosophy. There is a sort of constraint or "dictate" going on here in math, moving it along to a more clear picture, that is not able to be had in philosophical problems. Philosophical problems are more like interesting flourishes of thought. Whether math has necessity or not, the problems are constrained enough to have its own dictates through demonstration. Philosophy does not. They are flights of fancy, if you will, that can be entertained or not entertained with no demonstrable constraints on the flights of fancy one chooses. It is too open-ended for any consensus. There is no "pairing off" of previous notions in a step-wise fashion.

Some other solutions: You could buy them some cheap carpet with a very thick carpet pad; you could have your local mob boss pay them a visit; you could let yourself into their apartment and put their game device in their oven, turn it on, and leave.

I solved the problem of noise-getting-under-my-skin on mass transit with noise-cancelling headphones. Helped tremendously. How well does the noise cancelation circuitry work? maybe 5% of steady noises are eliminated. Most of the sound "cancelation" is the result of good padding on the headphones. But it does help. — Bitter Crank

Oh how the imagination does ponder..

There is no escape from assholes. (It's one of the burdens of existence.) Be a greater asshole. — Bitter Crank

I am trying with apokrisis, so maybe it will work with the neighbor.

So what makes that the correct framing of the situation rather than life being continuously stimulating apart from the occasional interruptions? — apokrisis

Stimulating as in we experience stimuli, that's the right frame. We are literally forced to experience stimuli to survive, maintain, restlessly move about.

Dearly belovéd, you are a broken record. Well, not broken--you have something stuck in a groove that causes the needle to jump back in the groove it just completed. — Bitter Crank

Haha, I love the imagery :).

Still, fragment-of-macaroni-in groove or broken record, I think your plaintive posts about the burden of existence are better philosophy than "Germany receives Marx statue from China. Why?" or "Is objective morality imaginary?" and so on. Some threads generate tons of responses (like the current one on eating meat--I haven't read any of it, nothing new to say about that on either side. — Bitter Crank

Eating meat is a perennial philosophical issue that is acceptable but questioning existence itself is off the table. It's only allowed to bloom once, but it better not happen again!

Like life itself, the burden remains, and you keep asking what the point of it all is. Though I don't think you are really 'asking'. You are more 'telling', which is fine. That's how you see the world -- tell it like it is, as they used to say. — Bitter Crank

I do think the quantity is equal to the import of the message. It is THE central question of philosophy, and whereas other subjects are derivative, this one is the immediate ground from all other questioning.

Whether burden or opportunity, life will go on until it doesn't. If we work just slightly harder, I think we have a good chance of eliminating ourselves from the equation maybe in the next century. The fewer people then remaining will hail your "GIVE UP" sign that flashes on off in bright neon colors in the middle of the desert that used to be Iowa as THE TRUTH, WORLD JUST ABOUT OVER, AMEN. — Bitter Crank

So life will be a mess from the climate change we wreak on the planet..That probably will be catalyst for any stoppage, not a realization of burdens, sufferings, and the like.

Here is an analogy to what I am saying with burdens. It is a metaphor for systemic burden, even though I am using an instance of contingent suffering:

In my apartment, I have a noisy upstairs neighbor. I can hear his loud footsteps (and he seems to move a lot), I can also hear his loud video game console/tv/music, I can hear his loud friends too. Now, at this point I am forced to take several actions. 1) I can just do nothing and try to cultivate some inner peace that ignores it. 2) I can complain to him or the manager that this has to stop and there needs to at least be some compromise. 3) I can try to drowned out/dampen the noise with fans/noise machines/insulation barriers. 4) Decide to move out to another dwelling. 5) Stay away from my apartment as much as possible. There are probably some other options too. However, the point is something has to occur. My hand is forced in this situation. To me that is like life. You can drop out, you can try to achieve more, you can cultivate this or that, but something has to occur. Your hand is forced. There lies the continuous burden. It is not a choice really as much as a forced hand that moves you through (mainly involving the categories of survival/maintenance/boredom-fleeing). It's a subtle point, and easily mocked (pace apokrisis), but I think it is a large and relevant point to make as it is the core of what we humans face at all moments (except perhaps sleep, though even this can be its own thing to face if its not had in the right amounts, and this is quite a burden to be forced with for anyone in any culture).

Oh the burden of deciding what kind of fun to have today. It is truly unbearable!

LOL. You guys. — apokrisis

Not trolling at all. Entertainment here really equates to this sentiment:

Then again, how insatiable a creature is man! Every satisfaction he attains lays the seeds of some new desire, so that there is no end to the wishes of each individual will. And why is this? The real reason is simply that, taken in itself, Will is the lord of all worlds: everything belongs to it, and therefore no one single thing can ever give it satisfaction, but only the whole, which is endless. For all that, it must rouse our sympathy to think how very little the Will, this lord of the world, really gets when it takes the form of an individual; usually only just enough to keep the body together. This is why man is so very miserable.

Life presents itself chiefly as a task — the task, I mean, of subsisting at all, gagner sa vie. If this is accomplished, life is a burden, and then there comes the second task of doing something with that which has been won — of warding off boredom, which, like a bird of prey, hovers over us, ready to fall wherever it sees a life secure from need. The first task is to win something; the second, to banish the feeling that it has been won; otherwise it is a burden.

Human life must be some kind of mistake. The truth of this will be sufficiently obvious if we only remember that man is a compound of needs and necessities hard to satisfy; and that even when they are satisfied, all he obtains is a state of painlessness, where nothing remains to him but abandonment to boredom. This is direct proof that existence has no real value in itself; for what is boredom but the feeling of the emptiness of life? If life — the craving for which is the very essence of our being — were possessed of any positive intrinsic value, there would be no such thing as boredom at all: mere existence would satisfy us in itself, and we should want for nothing. But as it is, we take no delight in existence except when we are struggling for something; and then distance and difficulties to be overcome make our goal look as though it would satisfy us — an illusion which vanishes when we reach it; or else when we are occupied with some purely intellectual interest — when in reality we have stepped forth from life to look upon it from the outside, much after the manner of spectators at a play. And even sensual pleasure itself means nothing but a struggle and aspiration, ceasing the moment its aim is attained. Whenever we are not occupied in one of these ways, but cast upon existence itself, its vain and worthless nature is brought home to us; and this is what we mean by boredom. The hankering after what is strange and uncommon — an innate and ineradicable tendency of human nature — shows how glad we are at any interruption of that natural course of affairs which is so very tedious. — Schopenhauer

If you want to discuss the subtleties of will, the human restlessness at the root of things, profound boredom, absurd repetition, or any of those things, great. However, nothing you said touched on these subtleties, nor about the TOPIC AT HAND, which is to say that the goods of life do not make up for the continuous burdens of life.

indispensable for decimal notation - was first accomplished by Indian (or possibly Chinese) mathematicians, who had no such inhibitions. — Wayfarer

My point earlier to StreetlightX was that a difference between math and philosophy on new insights or "illuminations" is that math must eventually acquiesce to what works to get the results. Philosophy can keep going on open-ended infinitum. 0 was eventually incorporated because it worked and everyone could see the results when it was used. The results demands or "dictates" its eventual use- even if it is at first ignored or scorned. No one for example will say, "Hey we now all acknowledge the Age of Schopenhauerean Ethics" when solving ethical problems. As much as I'd like to see that, it ain't gonna happen.

Recognizing the banality and absurdity of our condition makes positive experiences that much more precious. It's ironic, I think: declaring life to be good makes its pleasures that much more ordinary. — darthbarracuda

I agree with this. To add, the burden is always present; as long as you are alive, it is placed on you. The goods do not negate the burden itself or is a justification for it. That was my main point.

But I'm not talking about the problems of math. At least, not exclusively. So there's no good reason to make any such change. — StreetlightX

But you compared the problems of math to the problems of philosophy, so I am just taking your cue.

Further, among the points that B&C stress is that it is not at all 'discovery' that is at stake, but what they call - following Wittgenstein - concept-determination: "what is going on here is best described neither as ‘discovery’ nor as ‘invention’ of something entirely new. There are facts to be revealed, and creativity to be exhibited, but what is crucial is the opening up of different aspects of something ... which prompts a choice that sooner or later ‘catches on’... and proves fruitful." — StreetlightX

And the point I am trying to make contra your comparison is that while both might have an "opening up of different aspects of something..which catches on", the "proves fruitful" part is what is different between the two. In philosophy, there can never be a set agreement that "this works" to solve a particular philosophical problem (at least perhaps outside of logic...something akin to math). However, in the math community "this works" can be agreed upon. So "proves fruitful" here is not just a difference of degree but quality. Fruitful in math really cannot be disputed- everytime one does the problem it works out. If this method is overtaken by a better one, then that one will be agreed upon to work out, in a step-wise fashion. If both methods work for the same problem, then it is preference perhaps. However, in philosophical problems, it is always open-ended. Fruitful here can be continuous, ongoing, etc. It is more invented, and not dictated by the rules of the game as much as math which is very much driven by the results that are calculated- what are the constricted givens of the math world.

Edit: So I guess, there is more "imposed" then is indicated from the OP about math. One can find a new math ugly, not to one's liking, but it cannot be argued that the results work. Eventually, this forces one's hand. Not so much in philosophy.

Yes, then change what I said to the "problems of math", I don't see how this counters the argument. If a problem requires a new method in math to solve a problem, it cannot be disputed that the math solves the problem if it "works". Pythagoras for example, didn't like irrationals, but it worked to solve problems that when worked out can clearly be seen by all. Philosophy has no clear-cut agreement whether the problem "works". If another method follows the same problem, then both can be said to "work", then it is preference for which is easier for that person to use. What cannot be contested is that a method(s) is agreed upon to work in a mathematical community. Philosophy can never really have this definitive satisfaction that their solutions "work". So one illumination is agreed upon, where in the other camp the illumination is a continuous dialogue. The discovery aspect to math is the difference. You cannot stretch this to philosophy no matter how you want it to be so.

Otherwise, we are free to keep it. What I want to add to this is that philosophical concepts are just like this. The concepts we employ are a function of what we aim to capture with them; to employ one concept rather than another is to bring out one aspect of the world rather than another. Moreover, the deployment of our concepts is not governed by truth, but by their ranged of illumination. — StreetlightX

I would say there is a difference here between math and philosophy then based on what you present. Math dictates (by discovery) that a different method be used to solve a problem. In philosophy, there are no clear-cut discoverable rules that can only be used to answer a particular problem. Rather, any number of worldviews/heuristics/logical constructs can be employed to answer the philosophical problem at hand. The math "dictates" that a particular rule must be used, philosophical problems have no demand. If the mathematician has a hang-up on a particular math that "works" for that problem, that is their decision, but they will probably fail to answer the question at hand based on a bias.

Moreover, the deployment of our concepts is not governed by truth, but by their ranged of illumination. This is not on account of their being arbitrary ('subjective'), but absolutely necessary. — StreetlightX

Math-games, eh? But is there one math-game to rule them all?

I'll just point out places I agree and disagree.

It is delusional to believe that some symbiosis is possible between two people and despite that sexual/physical bond, the ultimate reality is that it is just sex, we are just sharing our time together and why I say that philia is the best form of love. — TimeLine

Actually, I agree with this "deflationary" approach. Indeed, the the major difference between romantic love vs. philia friendship or other types is its basis in either sexual attraction or sexual bonding. It is funny, this point is missed for the sake of "decency". The sexual nature is assumed in our titles for romantic partners, but rarely explicit- titles like "girlfriend", "boyfriend", "partner", "wife/husband", "fiance", etc. This isn't just a fond friend.

The futility is real and we play "games" with ourselves and others by portraying socially engineered notions of "love" to pretend some validity to this symbiosis - that you are a part of me - but this type of union is nothing but an exposure of your own subjective vulnerability and loneliness. — TimeLine

The key word here is loneliness. At bottom, we form pair bonds with another because we are lonely creatures. What you speak of is one of the tragedies of the human animal. We are at bottom restless willing creatures (striving-but-for-nothing-in-particular..pace Schopenhauer). Loneliness is just a manifestation of this "well of restlessness".

Humans are social animals and manifestations of restless will. If done right, there is a "tamping down effect" of some of that restlessness (it will never go away though, and just moves on to different restless needs, as it is in our natures). This is the main benefit of a romantic partner though. You are emotionally invested in someone because you care for another and they care for you. You are also sharing physical affection with someone. At best, you can focus your restless will on other things. And I agree, much of this desire for (at least one) person to care about you (physically and emotionally) is simply out of our selfish, lonely wills. It really does not have any greater motivation behind it.

However, the difference between your view and mine, is mine doesn't discount it as unnecessary or to be abolished, but see it as a necessary phenomenon to desire this "tamping down" of the lonely/vulnerable will. Meditation, focus on a cause, work, hobbies, charity, and other (supposedly) higher end activities don't get rid of this very social animal/human/restless/lonely-motivated need for close physical and emotional affection with a close partner. The "tamping down" effect is desired from this relationship. I don't agree with Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs as being a good model for human motivation, however, I do agree with Maslow that finding a significant other is an important desire in the inventory of the restless/bored/lonely humans desires (for its "tamping down" effect), and makes a person "better off" if achieved with minimal frustration (which is rare).

In the end, it is a stale relationship between two actors mimicking socially constructed traits because they are too afraid to admit that separation is real. — TimeLine

Here you hit on an interesting point. Though a life would be better off with a (non-frustrating) romantic relationship, often people's relationships are actually just ways to provide some sort of status (look I am with someone and not alone). Really that relationship is nothing more than two people that get together sometimes and pretend to do the relationship-routine. The "tamping down" effect does not really take place, because the actual care and affection are not really had. You also bring up a point about separation. No matter how authentic the relationship, the "Other" (capital O) is always there. The significant other can never really know you completely. A person's full personality/character/motivations/thoughts/ticks are always hidden, even from the closest of people. No one can be fully understood and this can cause frustration and leftover loneliness (afterall, our wills are endless, and never satiated anyways).

If it is impossible to form that unity with another person, what is this feeling then? It is in you, love is something you feel, something you give. Not share. Give. If that is reciprocated, it is because your partner is giving it to you. The relationship is nothing more than two separate people that form a bond by equally expressing this love. — TimeLine

I agree mainly. Emotions are not in some ethereal realm of shared experience. Rather, you are having emotions, with another who might be roughly correlating the same experience in their umwelt. However, again, it is the effect of the emotion when properly achieved (and with little frustration) that is desired. That is to say, the tamping down effect, to care for and be cared for.

Again though, the problem I addressed is the tragedy that this isn't experienced more than a small number of people for various reasons I've mentioned. Our process for attaining this desired good is not great it seems and even if there were actually demonstrated improvements on it, the prisoner's dilemma would probably make any attempt towards this solution a non-starter.

I think it has less to do with who is right and who is wrong and more to do with who has the better rhetorical skills, who intimidates more, who has the capacity to change minds with symbols, who can dazzle the mind, etc. Pure, unadulterated truth is nowhere to be found. — darthbarracuda

Good points :up:

At a restaurant recently, I said to the bartender, "I would like to sign out" and he got me the bill. I gave him my card and then signed the receipt. The guy next to me said, "Did you ever sign in!?". He was trying to be funny of course. I meant to say (I guess) "I would like to cash out". But then I thought about it and should have said, "I paid with a card, why would I say "cash out" in that instance? No cash was exchanged. Rather, I really should have stuck to "sign out" because,it can be said that metaphorically, I "signed in" by agreeing to order a beer. I "signed out" when I literally signed the receipt. That would still be more accurate than "cash out". Anyways, people have a funny way of being too literal or too metaphorical/abstract with sense. Its not sensible. In many ways, sense is in the context of colloquial traditions as to its use.

The problem is you see love to be romantic love as though when I said love is the only thing worth living for that it is somehow meant for one person and so if you never find that one person than it is tragic. Love - like authenticity - is a state of mind, something that we give and if we only love one person and yet remain indifferent to all others, that is nothing but an enlarged ego or narcissism. You love only because you are loved. — TimeLine

This is very much perennial thinking there that most people can get on board with.

These delusions that people conform to are rooted in this vulnerability, this lack of self-esteem and so when I said that love is the only thing worth living for, I meant reaching a genuine understanding of the world around them because "love" is moral consciousness. — TimeLine

Okay, but here you are really stretching the word "love" to such a wide scope, you should probably use another word (even agape vs. eros would be fine). However, you knew, based on the confines of this thread which was started from a short story on dating/relationships/romantic love, that the definition I am using is about romantic love- that is to say that involving having an emotional and physical bond with one (or more?) particular person(s).

It is why some people can be physically alone but never feel lonely, whereas others are in relationships and have many people around them and yet feel anxious and lonely. It is that subjective, inner life that I speak of and working towards attaining this harmony with ourselves - love - is the only thing worth living for, because without it our understanding of the world around us is artificial at best. — TimeLine

Again, I think you are broadening the world "love" to such a degree that it no longer fits into the topic. It's like making a category error. You are applying a concept of "being at harmony with oneself and the universe" as equivalent to romantic love, and I think this creates a false sense that what you are saying is really addressing the scope of this argument.

It is not to say that authenticity in romance is impossible, the love between two people who have reached that subjective harmony and have overcome that narcissism and lack of self-esteem to see with their own eyes and not with socially constructed ideals. If they can "see" then they can see each other. The tragedy only exists in those that never attain that self-awareness. — TimeLine

I really think you are putting so much emphasis on people's self-actualized sense of themselves, it overshoots the issue at hand. Humans are social creatures. We have thrived on committing to intimate/romantic relationships since the beginning of the species, in all societies (whether polygamist or monogamist, tribal or post-industrial, etc.). This social reality is simply not experienced by many people, and the phenomena itself leads to frustration.

So, even if someone is fully self-actualized (a modern concept I find lacking but that's another thread), a big part of being human (intimate relationships) either a) leads to more frustration or b) is not even experienced, thus making a life worse off or not as good as it could have been compared to the rare others who may have this experience of a meaningful relationship.

It is really sad when people cannot see you for who you are, but it is a tragedy when you cannot see you for who you are. I don't see being alone as tragic unless there is an absence of authenticity (like the end of Brave New World) — TimeLine

Ah, then this is the crux of our current disagreement. Your quote there, seems at odds with what you said earlier: [Love is] "the only thing worth living for". Well, if real love, and relationships are so paramount, indeed so much so that it is "the only thing worth living for", then for MANY people not to experience this (I am talking specifically romantic love), would seem to be a tragedy. I don't see how you can vacillate between acknowledging it being such an important "good" of life, yet see the non-attainment of this paramount good as "not tragic", or "no big deal". Do you really think that the non-attainment of love/relationships/romantic love for many individuals (this very important good) is not bad? I don't see how this conclusion computes from your view. People are literally not experiencing of the greatest goods one can experience and can go a whole lifetime without it. Indeed, they may have other goods, but it cannot be denied that there is a major one that could have made that life better.

Women who possess such empowerment and control over their own bodies make choices because there is that subjective authenticity and as a consequence - since authenticity is a state of mind - are capable of wanting that love that I mentioned earlier to a point that they would prefer to be single and if they want children, are empowered enough to voice what they want. — TimeLine

I am not sure why this is going down the gender politics route. I see what you are saying in terms of the fact that much of this authentic choice for relationships can only take place in a culture that allows for all genders to experience authenticity (in other words the ability to have choice). My main point still stands- people can be alone their whole life and be comfortable with who they are and miss out on any meaningful romantic relationship. Further, truly authentic love can be unequally distributed, rare, and can possibly lead to more frustration down the line. The avenues to obtain authentic love are also frustrating, clunky, non-harmonious, and often drama-filled.

As I said earlier to someone else: However, the main point of my response here is how poorly this supposed "good" is attained and maintained. We haven't figured out the key to our own happiness in this seemingly important matter and so we fall into overanalysis, tropes, and other vague guidelines that simply make things worse. This story illustrated some of this. Overall, it is a tragedy and more proof of the negative character of human life (the basis for philosophy of pessimism).

I think the main differences for why we are talking past each other is that where you are seeing themes of authenticity, I'm seeing themes of the (very often) futile nature of love/relationships/dating. I have agreed with your point that authenticity is part of truly loving someone for who they are and having them love you for who you are, but you have not addressed my main point which is the tragedy at the heart of this phenomenon.

Hmm, I cannot help but think that is the tragedy of consciousness that may substantiate the reasons for why people to delude themselves in the first place (are we compelled to act because evolution dictates this, since without it we find it way too difficult to form bonds with others? — TimeLine

You'd have to explain the term "tragedy of consciousness" for me to comment on that. Are we compelled to act to find mates? I think it is not a matter of compelled but a matter of necessity. You cannot find a partner sitting by yourself, or not socializing in some way, so I see no other choice. But I could be misinterpreting what you mean by compelled to act.

When women found independence, they also began to have less children. The more conscious and honest we, the more incapable we are of bullshitting to ourselves that being alone is inevitable a choice. — TimeLine

Being an antinatalist, I am good with that outcome of less children :). I don't get your last sentence there. You'd have to explain. I don't correlate not having children with wanting to be alone. One can have a relationship and not have children. But I'd have to hear first what you are trying to convey about being alone to better comment.

Have you seen those relationships between people, despite not being able to sustain a decent conversation with one another and where they are completely unhappy, deliberately create events with the unrealistic hope that things will improve? What - other than the congratulations socially for adhering to the "normalcy"- would compel two people to remain together despite lacking compatibility? What would make the two in our short story remain together? — TimeLine

I don't know, doesn't sound too good. Again, tragic.

I am not saying it is common — TimeLine

That right there is part of the tragedy.

So yes, you do put yourself out there, that things take time and you still need to make an effort and make things work, but the motivations are different. This is the dichotomy between authenticity and unauthentic. — TimeLine

I agree with you about being authentic, but I think we must really emphasize the time and effort it takes to find a person and maintain a relationship with them. The fact that this is unequally distributed and rare, is a signal that something off about the phenomena of dating and relationships itself.

I believe you make your own luck or kismet. If you really love someone, you would make an effort. — TimeLine

Okay, but again this is still not addressing the main point (which doesn't really have to do acting or being inauthentic) the point is:
You can be yourself all you want, and fail at finding a companion, love, and all the rest. People can be alone their whole life and be comfortable with who they are and miss out on any meaningful romantic relationship. You seem to be overlooking that main point. And there is yet another part of the tragedy. That is really the crux of my argument. We agree- authenticity in relationships is essential.


To summarize: Dating, relationships, love are often a source of harm, unevenly distributed, and often not even experienced by many people in the world. The avenues to experience these things are clunky, leads to many other negative experiences along the way, and often lead to failure in many respects. Here we are with this very desired "good" but have very poor ways to achieve it. And that is part of the tragedy of it.

This is the whole point, how can we "put ourselves out there" if our self-esteem is vulnerable to criticism where we fear projecting that inner life because it betrays socially streamlined notions of happiness? People read books and think that there is somehow a way to behave - "play the game" - in order to reach some end and therefore act without ever sharing a bond; it becomes dependence whether emotionally or economically and they are fine keeping things going despite their unhappiness because it is the lesser of two evils, the other evil being loneliness. — TimeLine

I honestly cannot make out some of what you are trying to convey here. I think you are saying something along the lines that people play some sort of game to live up to an ideal and are not authentically themselves when dating. I guess, when first meeting another person, people usually tend to hide their most radical beliefs and most unique traits, because there is a notion that people expect some sort of "normalcy" standard- perhaps one a society has signaled through various cues as "socially acceptable". Sometimes, this leads to two people falsely living up to social standards but never being themselves.

But, there are people who are instantly compatible, they actually work well with one another and when the barriers of society are shattered like what my friend did and where we can openly be ourselves, that sharing is authentic, it is "real love" because she is herself and she admires the other person who is also himself and where they both - as independent people - share a bond with one another. — TimeLine

That's great, but again, most things don't work like in movies or fairy tales as "instantly compatible". In other words, it still takes work and putting yourself out there. You have to take the effort to meet, or go out into the world and be somewhere where this is possible. You have to show interest (usually the guy due to social expectations), and ask for a number, a date, a time to meet. The other person has to reciprocate interest by accepting. The date has to be actually followed through. A second date then has to be procured, etc. etc. This takes time, effort, work. Often, anywhere in this process, it is liable to fail, and often does. The chances to meet someone very compatible are slim. Again, we just chalk it up to "wasn't meant to be". But the process itself is rather clunky, which is rather tragic being that this is also something that is supposed to lead to a major good of life. As stated earlier, for something so important, we have some of the worst systems in place for its attainment. It is the lack of guidelines that could be a problem in this case. There is no defined procedure. It is all groping in the dark, and "putting oneself out there". Vulnerability. Showing interest in another in a vulnerable way, often repeatedly. Again, this dating process is where the anxiety, drama, and much of the painful part of the process occurs. It is not just instant, and it is not just fate, and it is not just kismet. It is a process that often leads to failure- failure to gain traction, failure to communicate, failure to be oneself, failure to fully find interest in the other or the other to find interest in you, etc. No amount of self-actualization will bypass the actual process. You can be yourself all you want, and fail at finding a companion, love, and all the rest. People can be alone their whole life and be comfortable with who they are and miss out on any meaningful romantic relationship. You seem to be overlooking that main point.

No, one must first learn to love themselves because only then can they ever "put themselves out there" authentically and see others for who they are as well. I needed to go through all those struggles that I faced with him to realise that I lacked the confidence or self-esteem and I learnt more about who I was because of it. People who are stuck in unhappy relationships, for me, is way worse than being alone. — TimeLine

Yes, and why I said that relationships often lead to more frustrations and harm, and thus makes it that much more tragic. What is supposed to be an absolute good, becomes just another negative experience- and again people sweep it under the rug in manic Nietzschean phrases like "pain makes life better", "pain makes us learn", and other such sentiments. And again, Schopenhauer shakes his head.

They are no longer prompted to make these attachments, where social cues and signalling attraction becomes natural. You don't need to do any of what you say because you are comfortable with yourself. It is that deeper lack of self esteem that impairs our capacity to hear our own voice and what compels us to blindly pursue relationships with people that we prolong and maintain for the sake of it, despite there being no feelings or genuine connection. — TimeLine

I think you are being a bit flippant with how relationships form. People aren't just self-actualized totally autonomous beings rolling around until they magically meet a significant other by way of pure attraction or kismet by way of their awesome self-actualized nature. Rather, people have to put themselves out there and work at trying to be with someone. This means, one has to initiate (whether that be a date, "hanging out", or offering to spend time together). This means that communication has to be kept open and flowing in a "natural way" (by phone, by text, by verbal communication). Initiating and communication can be frustrated at any moment and then chalked up to "it wasn't meant to be". Here is much of the anxiety and drama. To make such a flippant view of it, is to downplay the reality of the situation or ignoring of what is the case. Also, the person has to be mature enough to actually have the capacity to care for another person.

Love is the only thing worth living for but as I said earlier, you cannot give love until you learn to love yourself, which is basically overcoming that deeper lack of self-esteem and feeling comfortable with being alone and unloved. That sounds easy, but it is probably the most difficult thing we could ever do and the tragedy here is that many people never do. — TimeLine

Indeed, but as you mentioned, here is the tragedy. Perhaps many people can be comfortable being alone, and unloved. It is tragic nonetheless that they do not experience what you call "the only thing worth living for". As I said earlier, meaningful relationships don't just happen automatically because one is in some "self-actualized" state. This would be to attribute a false cause to how relationships form. Indeed, in any counterfactual situation, the person who is indeed alone and "comfortable being alone and unloved", can live this way until they die, missing out on a rather large "good" of life.

Doubting "how our observations come about" is "doubting the science of kinetic energy." We are not talking about past observations or future observations. Those topics have to do with induction. As I have already demonstrated, Hume's attack on induction depends upon his attack on the law of cause and effect, not the reverse. The law of cause and effect can be shown in one demonstration. — Ron Cram

It's tied together- the point being that there is no principle behind cause-and-effect. Yes, we will probably always think in terms of cause-and-effect, but the principle cannot explain itself (though Kant's answer was synthetic a priori truths).

If you want to know the nature and properties of solid objects, you don't ask a speculative metaphysician - which is exactly what Hume is in this argument. It is ironic to me that Hume has become exactly what he despises. — Ron Cram

Ugh, you are showing a lot of ignorance here on what metaphysics and epistemology are trying to investigate. It is the BASIS for which we know things, not the actual empirical observations themselves. You must go a step BEYOND the mere observations for what they are discussing. Here look up anything about metaphysics and epistemology: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/, https://www.iep.utm.edu/epistemo/ . By not questioning the basis for our own reasoning, you are simply relying on scientism. Science itself has its foundations, even if scientists don't know that they are participating in this. Usually, scientists that deal in more abstract matters do in fact know a bit of philosophy of science and epistemology (though probably some better than others).

Why would anyone believe Hume over Newton on this topic? Why would someone believe Hume over a modern condensed matter physicist? — Ron Cram

Hume didn't presume to be a physicist. He was investigating the nature of human understanding.

Again, his "custom or habit" belies a sort of a priori (cognitive feat) going on here:


However, as we both agree Kant and Hume are "internal" about causation as seen here:


However, Kant goes on to build a comprehensive cognitive-based metaphysics (Transcendental Idealism) that proves necessity that is derived from forms of intuition/categories of understanding combining with sense experience:

The “formal [or “general”] conditions of experience” include the forms of intuition (space and time), together with all the categories and principles of the understanding. The material conditions of experience include that which is given to us, through sensation, in perception. Kant is thus describing a three-stage procedure, in which we begin with the formal a priori conditions of the possibility of experience in general, perceive various actual events and processes by means of sensation, and then assemble these events and processes together—via necessary connections—by means of the general conditions of the possibility of experience with which we began. — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-hume-causality/

Indeed, Hume would never seem to idealize time/space/causality as a priori, but my point was that he is opening the door by pointing out our internal/psychological tendency for habit and custom. There is a hint of a priori truth, but he would never take it that far. He only went as far as skepticism and not an acknowledgement of synthetic a priori truths or conditions.

To me that is the question (in a nutshell, maybe not literally) to which Kant replied, but also leaving Hume open to the possibilities that Kant conceives.

Hume stated: "At least, it must be acknowledged that there is here a consequence drawn by the mind; that there is a certain step taken; a process of thought, and an inference, which wants to be explained. These two propositions are far from being the same. I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect, and I foresee, that other objects, which are, in appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects. I shall allow, if you please, that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other: I know, in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning. The connexion between these propositions is not intuitive. There is required a medium, which may enable the mind to draw such an inference, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. What that medium is, I must confess, passes my comprehension; and it is incumbent on those to produce it, who assert that it really exists, and is the origin of all our conclusions concerning matter of fact."

IN actual fact in that article, Kant also considers the early critics of Hume, some of whom echo exactly Ron Cram's argument. It's very similar to Johnson's argument against Berkeley, kicking a stone and saying 'I refute him thus'. The common-sense criticism of Hume simply says, 'common sense tells us that A causes B, and that's all there is to it.' Whereas, Kant really does understand what Hume has spotted, and then actually answers that. I won't try and abstract or summarise it, as it's virtually a semester's work to even read it. — Wayfarer

Good points.

Do you have any specific quotes on Hume's view of time and space? I think the point is more subtle than you suggest. Impressions are from sense data in Hume's view and these seem to come together into habits and customs.. shorthand for internal categories, in my opinion. I don't know how empirical Hume was when he constantly reiterates that it is simply custom and not an actual reasoning "out there".

Also, Kant views time and space as a priori synthetic which was his own spin on it. Hume did not use that vocabulary, but again, I can see the nascent idea there in the idea of customs and habits.

Hume is considered empiricist basically because of his notion of impressions being from sense data. He seems to build our understanding up through these impressions into some synthetic learning process that leads to more abstract ideas. However, I think there is other times when he does seem to invoke an idea that habits are instinctual and it is not derived purely from synthetic knowledge. Or at least, there is something beyond just experience going on in the mind.

I think if Hume was wrong in the way that Ron Cram is claiming, then nobody would remember his books. What he's casting doubt on is based on his radical empiricism i.e. we can observe that an effect is preceded by a cause, but we never actually perceive something called 'a cause'. What we perceive are invariant conjunctions of events, things that always happen in a certain sequence. But they're not bound by force of logical necessity, being of the same nature as inductive observation; there's no reason why the ball A might not simply stay still when struck by ball B instead of careening away. It's just that we never observe that happening, so we presume it won't ever happen; but again there's no logical reason why it can't happen. — Wayfarer

Excellent restatement of the point I was trying to make :). Indeed, great point about not perceiving something called "a cause".

That is why Russell remarked in his chapter on Hume that Hume's scepticism seems to undercut the veracity of science itself. But it's the also true that Kant more than adequately dealt with Hume's scepticism, in fact it was Hume's treatment of causality that famously 'awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumbers'. — Wayfarer

I think there is more nascent Kant than people think in Hume. At certain points Hume even refers to customs and habits as instinctual, which very much points to an innate synthetic a priori categorization. I don't know why that connection isn't made much as if they are opposed to each other.