The language is always tricky around ontology and I want to say that horizons, like mirages, like like individuality, like desire, are not social constructs, not fantasies, and not material objects, but objective features of perception. — unenlightened

You can't even get a 'you' from an 'is' — unenlightened

But whether these things are deemed to be material or not (I don't much care), the boundaries of perception are still ises, they are facts about the physical world. It's just that when discussing the physical world we are more used to the perspectiveless view from nowhere, whereas perceptions are centered on an individual, they are indexical. This distinction doesn't counter the naturalistic fallacy though: you are still attempting to derive normative from non-normative.

I am obliged to use the language we have. Clearly we can and we do get a self and a sense of self from our sensual experiences and in describing how it happens, my intention was to convey that the distinction and identification we get is a feature of perception, not of reality as such. — unenlightened

There is a kind of materialistic presupposition here (for lack of a better word) that draws a hard boundary between impersonal physical facts like skin and light and neurons on the one side, and on the other - psychological and social facts that are sort of pretend, unreal. But are they, really?

Perhaps ontology is the wrong tool here, because the argument in question is epistemological. It says that reason cannot straightforwardly derive one set of facts from the other.

The normal version is 'you can't get an ought from an is', and it is usually used to deny the 'reality' of moral claims. My radical extension is to deny also the 'reality of identity claims:- — unenlightened

You make it sound like there is a dichotomy between the naturalistic fallacy on the one hand and moral skepticism (denying the reality of moral facts) on the other. But the naturalistic fallacy thesis is more narrow: whatever the status of moral claims, they cannot be justified by or reduced to non-moral facts alone. This leads to two possibilities: either moral facts do not exist, or they are epistemically autonomous.

You can't even get a 'you' from an 'is' - the self is a naturalistic fallacy constructed from the limitations of the senses, which do not make any real boundary or change in the world. This means that there is no difference in substance between what one ought to do and what one wants to do, because the 'one' is fictional in both cases. — unenlightened

Same thing here. The natural extension of the naturalistic fallacy thesis would be to claim that personal identity is essentially normative: it cannot be derived from or reduced to non-normative (material) facts about the world without recourse to some normative postulates. But that doesn't make the self a fallacy. Accepting the above thesis, one can still say that the self is a psycho-social construct. It is as real as such constructs are - which I think are plenty real.

I considered doing that and then deleted it. I knew if I wrote a summary then people would read that and jump to conclusions without reading the whole paper. — Malcolm Lett

Well, that's the point of summaries, in a way: to enable readers to jump to the conclusion of whether to commit to reading a largish text or to pass. But I know what you mean.

Different categories of science have different procedures and protocols and requirements to say that something is proved to be so. Technically they have not proven that smoking causes cancer because you can't ethically take nonsmokers with no tendency towards cancer and have them start smoking. — TiredThinker

Technically, they have, according to the very criterion of proof that you give in the first sentence - that is to say, the epistemic standards of proof have been met to the satisfaction of most practitioners in the field (of epidemiology).

Are you just concerned about (not) making metaphysical commitments when we write formulas? — SophistiCat

Yes. — Pfhorrest

I don't think that's an issue above and beyond the old realist/non-realist divide. Non-realists simply mean something different than realists when they say "there exists x such that..." - or so they say. I am not even convinced that there is a substantive difference between these positions.

That use is not contrary to what I’m saying at all. In fact it’s a great illustration of the alternative reading of the “existential” operator I’m suggesting: instead of “there exists some x such that [formula involving x] is true”, I suggest “for some value of x, [formula involving x] is true”. — Pfhorrest

I fail to see the difference. We are expressing a commitment to the existence of something from the variable's domain. So in what sense are we not making an existential commitment?

Reading your other comments, it seems like in my example ∃x∈R ( f(x) = 0 ) you would want to say that if there were such things as reals (and all the other things that are tacitly assumed by the usual interpretation of that formula), then some real would satisfy the formula f(x) = 0. Is that all? Are you just concerned about (not) making metaphysical commitments when we write formulas?

This reading is inconsistent with how ∃ is actually used in mathematical texts, at least the ones I am familiar with (which would be math textbooks mostly). — SophistiCat

Can you elaborate? — Pfhorrest

The way ∃ would typically be used would be to say things like "∃x (x∈R, f(x) = 0)", that is to say, "equation f(x) = 0 has a real solution." The way you would have it, that formula would say "equation f(x) = 0 may or may not have a real solution," which is trivially true. What would be the point of such an operator?

All existential operator does is assert existence. If you remove that, you have nothing left.

Both quantification functions, ∃ and ∀, only specify how many values of the variable they quantify make the statement that follows true, and the statement doesn't necessarily have to be asserting the existence of anything, so saying that there exists some thing goes beyond what this function really does. — Pfhorrest

This reading is inconsistent with how ∃ is actually used in mathematical texts, at least the ones I am familiar with (which would be math textbooks mostly).

Hexagrams are arrangements of six Yin/Yang lines, making for 2⁶ = 64 possible hexagrams .

DNA codons are arrangements of three bases, and there are four different bases, making for 4³ = 64 possible codons.

No deep mystery here, just a very simple structural property.

I know fuck-all about I Ching, but I suspect that the similarities don't go much deeper than that (without some very creative interpretation). Do some of the I Ching hexagrams mean the same thing? Because DNA "language" is highly redundant, with 61 codons specifying only 20 different amino acids. And the other three codons denote start and stop sequences - the equivalent of punctuation. Do I Ching hexagrams include punctuation?

Anyway, I think such numerology is very silly. As is this perpetual canard about "ancient wisdom" somehow prefiguring modern science. Despite numerous alleged connections, I can't think of a single instance in the entire history of human civilization where some "ancient wisdom" led to a scientific insight. The connection is invariably discovered in retrospect by some amateur numerologist with a book to sell.

Towards the end, Peterson did propose a very interesting view on an evolutionary mechanism behind the belief in God, and that proposition itself has some very interesting outtakes that the pair unfortunately failed to stumble upon themselves.

In my own summary of Peterson's explanation, the belief in god is an evolutionary stable strategy that codifies a heuristic for living life in a way that is beneficial to the community in general. — Malcolm Lett

Meh, that idea is at least a hundred years old, and has been the subject of a body of evolutionary, anthropological and cognitive research (some in support and some in opposition). Abstract ponderings from dilettantes like Harris and Peterson are of little value at this point.

Interesting, thanks!

You may be interested to know that at the time of declaring the end of the communist system at the end of 1991, what was known in liberal countries as "poverty" (i.e. having a lifestyle that would cost about $180 a month in a developed country, or less) was not even 5% of the Soviet population, and that because it had grown in the last five years. In the best moment of the Union it was less than 2%. The "misery" (people without housing, in street situation, without basic access to food and minimum means, etc.) practically did not exist. — David Mo

I don't know how these numbers were calculated. It would be impossible to do a comparison with other countries based on money income, because Soviet currency was nonconvertible and incomes and living expenses were not distributed as they would be in a market economy. No direct comparison with US or Western Europe would be accurate because of how different life was in the Soviet Union.

That disparity went both ways. Some basic foodstuffs like bread were heavily subsidized and distributed, so that as long as you were not institutionalized and had even a tiny income, you were unlikely to literally starve to death. But for all that, most people spent most of their income on food, clothing and other necessities. A Russian-made TV set could cost more than a month's wages.

Cars were not affordable for most people, but then people were not very mobile (in part due to artificial restrictions), and public infrastructure was built with the lack of personal transportation in mind. And if you were determined to buy a car, you would have to wait for years to get one, giving you time to save.

Average savings were just a few percent, but most people in the later period were guaranteed a pension at retirement. Medicine was nominally free, but gratuities in the form of presents or cash payments were common.

State-provided housing - for those who had it - was cheap. But if you were in a situation where you had to rent privately (and illegally), housing would be very expensive. Homelessness "did not exist" officially - indeed, it was criminalized. That doesn't mean it didn't exist in reality though, it just wasn't obvious to outsiders (not in the closing decades of the regime, when it was more image-conscious). And those who were not technically homeless sometimes lived all their lives in cramped, barely livable barracks and hostels.

What interested me about this was not the paper, nor the fact that a retired comp. sci. prof would start writing such papers, but the journal that published it. Journal of Mind and Behavior looks like a small, obscure journal, but it doesn't look like a predatory open-access publication that will publish any drek for a fee: it is indexed, it is associated with the University of Main and it is edited by respectable academics. Its content, however, is an odd mix of some psychology papers and some pretty random, nominally philosophical stuff (some of which may be OK - I haven't looked that deep).

I don't have that much experience with academic publishing, and none in this area. If anyone knows more about this - what's the deal here? How common are such journals?

I was going to respond, but as I was thinking about what I was going to say, I remembered that I already made similar points in this thread, which you largely ignored, as you also ignore most other objections, in favor of recycling the same talking points or digressing on various bits of pop-science. So I'll leave you to it.

So the problem that you identify is that scientific and engineering communication requires a common language. But whatever lingua franca happens to be used (nowadays it is most often English), it won't be native to all speakers. And when people are forced to use a foreign language for communication, that often leads to miscommunication and associated problems.

And your solution to this problem is to invent an entirely new language (never mind that a number of such languages have already been invented over the years) that won't be native to anyone and that no one today speaks at any level of proficiency?

Um, how is this going to help again?...

This group and this artist are amazing!

Roomful of Teeth perform Caroline Shaw's 'Partita for 8 Voices'


Roomful Of Teeth: NPR Music Tiny Desk Concert

Framing utilitarianism as an imperative to promote human flourishing is actually quite common. — SophistiCat

I've been looking around to find anyone making the same arguments I am making here. If you can direct me to a source you are familiar with I'd be grateful. — Thomas Quine

Geoffrey Scarre's writes in "Utilitarianism" (Routledge, 1996) that "most forms of utilitarianism are welfarist, concerned that lives should flourish or prosper according to some specified criterion of well-being" (noting along the way that not all utilitarians are hedonists).

Or coming at the question from the other side, Gilbert Harman asks in "Human Flourishing, Ethics, and Liberty" (1983):

What kind of ethics do we get, if we begin with a conception of human flourishing and attempt to derive the rest of ethics from that conception? A number of writers have expressed sympathy for such an approach to ethics, although they disagree about details: Henry Veatch, Robert Nozick, Alasdair Maclntyre, John Finnis, David Norton, Philippa Foot, Tibor Machan, Elizabeth Anscombe, Ayn Rand, and Abraham Maslow. — Gilbert Harman

Harman critically assesses various approaches to ethics that fit this criterion, utilitarianism being one of them:

A second feature of this approach to ethics [after relativism - SC] is that it tends toward utilitarianism or consequentialism. The basic value is human flourishing. Actions, character traits, laws, and so on are to be assessed with reference to their contribution to human flourishing.

Hi András - this is an original approach of mine inspired by Aristotle and Darwin. It has no resemblance to utilitarianism apart from being consequentialist. — Thomas Quine

It is, of course, utilitarian in a general sense - not quite in the way Bentham and other classical utilitarians framed it, but then few modern proponents of utilitarianism would own its classical formulation. Framing utilitarianism as an imperative to promote human flourishing is actually quite common.

But yes, I neglected to mention the naturalistic fallacy used as a justification (good = adaptive = flourishing), which again is quite common. (Just as a note, Social Darwinism followed the same justificatory logic. I don't mean this as a smear by association, but I think the only reason you don't follow the same track is that you are unwilling to pursue the less appealing implications of your theory to their logical conclusions, which betrays extraneous moral considerations at play.)

It is a variant of utilitarianism, with some pop-science thrown in. The general approach was formulated by Jeremy Bentham in the 18th century, and since then the idea has waxed and waned, but never gone out of circulation. It has its proponents among modern philosophers, including pop-philosophers like Sam Harris - and of course it is regularly being put forward by non-professionals who may or may not be aware of the history.

you-all — tim wood

I am not "you-all." I don't care for Biden. But I am not of an opinion that if I can't get what I want right fucking now, then let the world burn and I'll roast the marshmallows. Unlike X, to me the lives of 1,000 children are not a trifle.

A degenerate ratfuck is one who doesn't care if 1,000 children get bombed.

Really?

Translation: where reality is negative there I bury my head in the sand. — JerseyFlight

What reality? For all I know, those "intellectuals" are strawmen, a figment of your imagination. You ranted a bunch, but didn't identify the target of your rant. Why should I care?

Such general wisdom as "there are terrible, horrible, no good, very bad people" I can easily do without.

Nearly all of them are Elitist. — JerseyFlight

Who are them? "Intellectuals" is a vague concept. If you don't indentify the target of your invective, it loses whatever bite you think it has.

On the other hand, the Liar is introduced as a premise, but then behaves like an inference rule. ('Given me, you may introduce not-me.') You have to understand the inference rule to use it, that is true. But that's understanding-how, not understanding-that. Inference rules are deliberately empty, have no 'that' content. They don't say anything themselves; it's premises that actually say stuff. — Srap Tasmaner

Well, exactly, there is nothing wrong with the syntax of the sentence, it is only its semantic content that seems to be a problem. But in order to come to this conclusion you have to parse and interpret the sentence, which means that the sentence is ipso facto meaningful, at least on some level.

It isn't often that practically every OP that someone posts is either jaw-droppingly stupid or nauseatingly disgusting or both.

Also, '... is meaningful' feels like a weasel-predicate. That is, '... is meaningful' deliberately avoids asking, for instance, 'What does it mean?' or 'What does it say?' Ask an average person about the Liar, and you can expect them to reply, 'Well that's stupid. It doesn't say anything.' — Srap Tasmaner

I don't think so. On the surface, the meaning is clear: First, the sentence asserts that something (presumably a proposition) is false. That's not a problem, we generally understand such assertions. The proposition, rather than being quoted, is instead indicated - also not necessarily a problem. For example, "The second sentence on page 23 is false" would be a perfectly meaningful thing to say (but what if the sentence indicated happens to be that very sentence?) It is only once we trace the logical implications that we realize that something is wrong, but in order to be able to do that, didn't we have to first understand what the sentence is saying?

If you refer to some other sentence P, then there is the assumption that P can be either true, or false. For it to have that possibility, it must make a claim against reality. If you say, "That sentence is false," and "that" sentence is, "This sentence is false", its still just nonsense. — Philosophim

Why not? You are just restating your position, but you are not giving reasons for it. What the liar sentence claims is the truth value of a sentence, which all natural and many formal languages are equipped to do.

This sentence is false, does not make any sense. False in what way? — Philosophim

You can state, seemingly unproblematically, "X is false" for any number of X, including X that are sentences of a language. Why does it not make sense in this case? Again, I understand why you want to reach this conclusion, but you are not giving any reasons.

how I long for sweet death — Maw

Komm, süßer Tod

I honestly find them to be useless and outdated words. I have never used them, nor ever had need to use them in constructing a philosophical paper, or argument. I am not saying they did not have a use centuries ago, but when speaking in modern day English with people, I find them unnecessary. Often times people new to philosophy will attempt to use these words to sound like they are making a meaningful statement. I don't hold anything against them, you have to start somewhere after all, and a good place to start is usually using terms that seem to keep popping up. — Philosophim

Try these terms on Google Scholar search (or whatever citation index that is available to you). Here are works just from the last 1.5 years:

https://scholar.google.com/scholar?as_ylo=2019&q=metaphysics

Granted, these include many works on historical philosophy, but not only.

(Ontology is a little trickier, because it turns up as a specialist term outside of philosophy.)

Don't get hung up on this; there's more than one way to present data, depending on what you want to highlight. Posters are a distinct category, because they are who you actually see and interact with on the forum, so it made sense to me to split that category, instead of the overall number of registered users. under 10 posts seemed to me like representative group before I did the actual count - and so it turned out to be. 95% is kind of a magic number that statisticians like to use. And single-posters are an interesting outlier in themselves; I expected to see a lot of these, but not quite as many.

Shouldn't try to cheat Google :) Added links instead.

Would It help to put it this way?

2/3 registered users have never posted
Of those who have posted, 2/3 have under 10 posts

Or if you like pies (who doesn't?) Edit: added to the OP

The brain is the most calorie rich organ, doesn't matter much now, but it did in our past. It's simply more efficient to trust someone else to have worked a thing out than it is to work it out yourself, the majority are unlikely to be wrong. so long as one or two people in a tribe don't act this way, the tribe prospers as most of them have not had to commit to the calorie intensive work of calculating everything from scratch. — Isaac

Correct me if I am wrong, but my impression was that much of our brain's processing power is dedicated to mundane subconscious tasks like visual processing and motion control. Even when it comes to more conscious activity, much of it would be common to all people: language, social interactions. The more intellectually rarefied activities that we value so much don't occupy a proportionate place in the brain's architecture and power budget.

The second would be that there would have to be groups of evaluating behaviours, not one. I referred to it as such above, but I don't think you did, so I'm not sure what your thinking is here. Neurologically, it's getting increasingly difficult to make the argument that moral evaluation is a single process, it's almost certainly composed of several processes involving different parts of the brain in different contexts. This matters because if you want to argue that the groups we evaluate these behaviours into are themselves natural kinds, you have to have a different pair of natural kinds corresponding to 'good' and 'bad' for each process because the results are different in each case.

Say for example processing in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex will be the emotional response to options (patients with severe damage to this region consistently give purely utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas, no emotional content even though they might be emotional in other ways). The result, therefore will be some emotional content which we will have to sort (say feel warm and cosy about it='good', feel sickened by it='bad'). But then another dilemma might involve more some area like the superior temporal sulcus which is involved in processing social perception. That might output - will be perceived negatively by my social group='bad', will be perceived positively by my social group='good'. I won't go on, but other areas might produce paired results like disgusting/attractive, salient to me/not salient to me, affects a valued member of my group/affects an outsider, conflicts with a learnt rule/complies with a learnt rule...

I don't think there's necessarily a problem with saying there are natural kinds for each of these groupings, just that it would be some job of work demonstrating the case. — Isaac

Well, this assumes that the determination of a "natural kind" is to be made by means of a reduction to the neurological framework and then checking whether the phenomenology can be accounted for by a single process or by a number of heterogeneous processes. There is some attraction in this approach, but it is debatable. I was actually thinking more in terms of phenomenology and its "folk" classification, which is more vague and squishy. But that's OK, I am not making an argument for some sharp Platonic ontology of moral phenomena.

Interesting research though.

The conclusion I draw, might be different though. My feeling is that as soon as we introduce a large quantity of biological function into the picture, then it becomes more proper to say of the extremes (say someone thinking hitting old ladies is morally 'right') that they are either damaged, or mistaken about the language. There's either something wrong with their brain - it's not assigning behaviours to the usual 'natural kind' (ie not working properly), or there's something wrong with their understanding of the language - they're describing what they get a kick out of doing and that's not the group of things we call 'moral', we call that group something else). — Isaac

If someone says that he gets a kick out of hitting old ladies, but by "getting a kick out of smth" he actually means moral aversion (in the usual sense), then that is a language issue. If he is actually getting a kick out of it (in the usual sense), and no moral aversion, then I am still not sure what language has got to do with it.

This is what riles me about moral objectivism too. It takes an incredibly complex process involving an almost impossible to disentangle web of emotion, socialisation, indoctrination, theory of mind, tribalism and self-identity and claims that some simple process can deliver the 'correct' answer better than the ones we already use. It's like throwing away most of the world fastest and most complex supercomputer (the human brain) and saying "we don't need all that, we can do this just with one small section at the front that deals with predicate logic". Why would anyone want to do that?... Rhetorical gain to help push an agenda. — Isaac

You make it sound like there is a 'correct' answer to be found, and our natural moral sense is just better at figuring it out than a rationally constructed ethical system. For that to be the case, there has to be an independently defined problem and an independent means of evaluating the fitness of the solution to the problem. But here is the thing: if you reject moral objectivism, then it follows that moral problems are framed by the very moral agent that has to solve them, and the same agent then has to evaluate the fitness of the solution. Is the answer actually 'correct'? Such question doesn't even make sense in the absence of an objective standard. Whatever answer you converge upon has to be the right answer (as far as you know), because rightness and wrongness are normative metrics, and a normative evaluation is exactly what you do when you answer moral questions.

I look at it from a somewhat different angle. If you are a naturalist about morality: no God's laws or other supernatural impositions - and many proponents of objective morality are naturalists - then why would you even suppose that for something as complex and messy as natural moral landscape appears to be, the Enlightenment-age paradigm of a simple, rational, law-driven system would be a good fit? A much better paradigm would be something equally complex and messy and organic - biology, neurology, psychology, sociology.

Corrected one figure: 95% of posters have < 626 posts (was 130). Added stat drive-bys.

Note that "posters" are a subset of "users," and posters with < 10 posts are a subset of posters with < 626 posts.

I'll take issue here. The request was for my thoughts, which I provided. — tim wood

Their intellectual temper is (as everyone remarks) the reverse of dogmatic, in fact pleasingly modest. They are quick to acknowledge that their own opinion, on any matter whatsoever, is only their opinion; and they will candidly tell you, too, the reason why it is only their opinion. This reason is, that it is their opinion. — David Stove

I've been on TPF and its predecessor for a middling long time, and it seems to me that we're awash at this time with an unusual number of posts from people who are confused about what philosophy is. This includes the ignorant and the stupid - I plead guilty to both, ignorance all the time and occasional stupidity. And these, ignorance and being stupid, our human condition, redeemed in the willingness to be corrected and the effort to learn. But here also many who are not willing, those who just want to rant and are oblivious or hostile to argument or even sense. Those agenda-driven whose methods are mainly Prucrustean; Trumpian who insist their nonsense is sense and have zero interest in real sense; woo-mongers interested in nothing but their own woo, impervious to reason. And those who do not understand, and aren't willing to. These appearing in every one of the main TPF categories. — tim wood

And then there are the bigots...

My thoughts on the middle east is that it is one of the places on the planet where civilization "as we know it" first appeared. But middle-easterners have been fucking it up from day one to the present. I've met middle-easterners; I've known middle-easterners; and it seems to me that being one is just a disease of intellect and spirit. — tim wood

I imagine that two people being in love is a rather vague thing involving the dispositions, acts, social context... It'd be hard to draw a line around a bunch of phenomena and go "Yep, that is the truth condition for X and Y are in love". Are you suggesting that dispositions aren't included in that blurry-at-the-edges web? — fdrake

Sure, both the disposition of being in love and the associated behaviors and social context are blurry. But so are all things psychological and social.

Whether or not one's conduct is adequate to one's beliefs and attitudes (when there even is a conduct to speak of) is a separate question from whether beliefs and attitudes are right or wrong. — SophistiCat

I don't think it's separate; if we separate an action's pragmatic consequences on stakeholders its agent's disposition from evaluations of rights and wrongs, it isn't clear that we're still talking about the same thing. All I'm trying to say are that statements like "You're right, I shouldn't've treated you like that" can be true! — fdrake

I agree that acting or failing to act in accordance with one's moral dispositions is itself subject to moral valuation. ("I did as I thought should have done - Hooray!" "That which I should have done I did not do") But that comes in addition to the original disposition.