I mean by well-ordered — tim wood

You know, when you repeatedly encounter what looks like a special term in a largely unfamiliar area, the smart thing to do is to look it up, instead of making up your own definition.


To those who wish to engage Tim in a mathematical discussion it may help to know that he is firmly convinced that "all mathematics is counting." This hangup may help to explain the difficulties that he is having with rationals and reals.

I'm just wondering the exact methodology — MountainDwarf

There isn't any exact or even approximate methodology. There isn't even a definition of what philosophy is that would match most paradigmatic examples while still managing some nontrivial specificity. If you take Socrates, Nietzsche and, say, Henry Allison (a contemporary Kant scholar), you will find little in common between these philosophers.

If you are not in a forced choice situation and just doing this for fun, then don't overthink the question. Just look at what goes by the name of "philosophy" and see what interests you most.

I'm not exactly making a formal logical argument, I'm stating some weird facts about quantum mechanics and conjecturing that a theoretical accounting of these phenomena might revolutionize atomic theory. — Enrique

Like I said, atomic theory is already quantum. If memory serves, we have analytical fully quantum solutions for the hydrogen atom in special cases, and numerical solutions for more complex systems. However, these quantum analyses treat the nucleus semi-classically, and even outside of the nucleus, more complex systems are also usually treated with semi-classical and even semi-empirical models - not because we don't have the theory (we do), and not only because it is hard to pull off, but because there isn't much need for a fully quantum treatment. The analyses, such as they are, already agree with experiments, so there would be nothing to gain from further refinements of the model. You have to smash atoms in colliders in order to get beyond the comfort zone of those approximate models. And that's my point: revolutions happen where we haven't looked before or where we have outstanding problems. They don't happen where we already have adequate solutions.

I will venture to claim that perceptual patchiness is probably an artifact of laboratory tinkering or lesions. — Enrique

We learn about the psychology of perception not just from brain pathologies, but from non-intrusive measurements and even rather simple psychological experiments, such as those involving perceptual illusions and illusions of attention. Our visual field, for example, is not at all what it seems: a wide, almost 180 degree window that we perceive all at once. It is instead a narrow patch that darts hither and thither, painting a partial, time-lagged and sometimes not entirely accurate picture. The feeling of instantaneous integrated perception is created by the analytical machinery of your brain that fills in the gaps with interpolation and prediction and cleverly directs the actual visual attention only where it is needed most. (Much of your brain's impressive capacity is allocated not on contemplating Kant but on such mundane unconscious tasks.)

Natural perception is at its core a fully integrated multiplicity, and in the context of biochemistry alone, what exists to be interpolated? All simultaneous synapsing of neurons consists of time-lagged relationships between cells, but perception is not time-lagged. — Enrique

How could you possibly know this? Your visual time resolution is on the order of tens of milliseconds (hence the 24 frames per second movie looks like a continuous image stream - a perceptual illusion). Audio resolution is a little better, sensory resolution - much worse.

Perception can be inaccurate, variable, and damaged, but it isn't fundamentally an illusion, its real. — Enrique

It is tautologically true that your experiences, your qualia are not illusory, in the sense that you cannot be mistaken about having experiences at the time when they occur, but it is also demonstrably true that your interpretation of experiences can be mistaken (e.g. mistaking a discreet sequence of images for a continuous stream).

Like I touched upon, subatomic particles, ions, and small atoms have weird properties under many conditions — Enrique

I'm conjecturing that the synthetic fluidity of perception can only be explained with quantum entanglement or some kind of quantum mechanism. — Enrique

It appears that the reasoning for your conjecture is summed up by the following flawed but rather common line:

• X (in this case consciousness) is mysterious,
• Quantum mechanics is mysterious,
• Therefore, X has something to do with quantum mechanics.

Please correct me if I got the wrong impression, but I don't see much more than that in what you have written. You name-check various counterintuitive or just interesting-sounding QM tidbits, like entanglement and "higher dimensions" (I am still not sure what that is about), but you don't suggest how they may be related to consciousness.

I imagine scientists finding instances of quantum behavior to be so pervasive that atomic theory will be completely transformed — Enrique

Considering that modern atomic theory is already built on quantum foundations, I don't see how it could be completely transformed with the current quantum theory. Generally, as more fundamental theories are worked out, existing higher-level theories are not so much overturned or transformed as complemented, fine-grained, and corrected in a few places. But by and large, they remain functional and far more practicable in most cases.

I'm conjecturing that the synthetic fluidity of perception can only be explained with quantum entanglement or some kind of quantum mechanism. If chemical reactions are the totality of mental processes, this lack of real integration would be mirrored by experience, but qualia in essence contrast with the time-lagged efficient causality of thermodynamic chemistry distributed in three-dimensional space. — Enrique

As cognitive experiments show, our conscious awareness is actually quite sluggish (even by classical neurochemical standards) and patchy, heavily leaning on prediction and interpolation to create the perception of a continuous real-time flow.

But I don't think biochemistry alone is ever going to be more than correlated with for instance a qualitative mental image, its going to require a comprehension of quantum effects in both cells and the natural environment to model perception directly — Enrique

I am not sure what you think the role of quantum effects are going to be in modeling perception "directly." I mean, quantum fields aren't qualitatively different from, say, classical fields, nor is quantum mechanics that much more complex or information-dense than classical mechanics. There is no mystery stuff there, it's the same kind physics.

What? The claim that the universe is infinite/sufficiently large? He's not referring to that. He's saying that the devil summoning thing, "like all existential statements", "in an infinite (or sufficiently large) universe" is "almost logically true". — Ying

Yes, and I don't see how this is a modal argument (the size of the universe wouldn't be relevant for that). His language here is sloppy, but he is, I think, alluding to something like a Boltzmann Brain situation, where through a random fluctuation of particles it could happen that certain words are spoken, immediately followed by something like a "devil" materializing in the vicinity. In a large enough universe, so the argument goes, this is almost certain to happen somewhere, some time, thus providing a specious verification for the existential claim. As it happens, though this wasn't what Popper had in mind, a multiverse (the actual, not the modal kind) would have served just as well for his argument.

Moreover, it can be easily shown to be highly probable: like all existential statements, it is in an infinite (or sufficiently large) universe almost logically true, to use an expression of Carnap's. — Popper

Yeah I got that. Popper was talking about "possible worlds" in the context of modal logic though. — Ying

The whole talk about "possible worlds" isn't an ontic claim, here — Ying

I think it's pretty clear that he is making an ontic claim - he says so himself (it's a "purely existential" statement). He is tilting against the windmill of probabilistic confirmation, and I don't see how modal logic could possibly help him in that.

If it is accurate that perception is modulated by a higher-dimensional quantum interfacing of electromagnetic fields and biochemical matter, perhaps one facet of a total revision in our picture of the physical world, qualia will be no less ineffable subjectively because language is a separate module from perception, but we can expect models in which a physical process isn't merely correlated with for instance the sight of a particular color, but actually is the sight of that color. — Enrique

I wonder what you mean by "higher-dimensional quantum interfacing of electromagnetic fields and biochemical matter" here? Space in mathematical modeling does not necessarily represent space in the usual sense (the physical space in quantum mechanics is still the 3+1-dimensional Minkowski space of Special Relativity). Often it is a phase space constructed out of independent state variables, or it can represent other things. Quantum mechanics in its vector formulation employs infinite-dimensional function spaces (Hilbert spaces). But other theories, including classical mechanics and thermodynamics, also make use of higher-dimensional spaces, so this is not something uniquely quantum.

More to the point, there are something like 10¹⁰ neurons and 10¹⁴ synapses in the cortex, and as you probably know, this isn't just a network of simple binary switches and connectors either: each of these neurons and synapses is a complex analog system, and the entire network constantly mutates and rewires itself. This is an enormous amount of dynamical structural complexity, located many orders of magnitude closer to the scale of interest than quantum fields, and we have barely even scratched its surface. So I think that before we start speculating about what we will discover when we drill down all the way to the quantum scale - and barring a few sketchy results here and there, these are mostly wild speculations at this point - we should start with this lower hanging fruit (I won't say low, because even this "fruit" may prove to be out of our intellectual and technological reach).

Arguments of this sort stand or fall on the elaboration and defense of their premises. Are you familiar with any such works? Are you prepared to discuss them? Without a familiarity with specific positive cases, discussing these arguments is like judging a book by its chapter headings.

Very nice guidelines. The only thing I would contest is that I think one doesn't have to have a position on an issue and defend it in an OP; instead, one could ask an open-ended question or suggest a topic for discussion. But motivation, background, focus, etc. - all that is important.

The most obvious flaw of your OP is that you don't even try to address the stated topic. The title question is about God, but the post talks about animals? WTF? It's like you had one question in mind, then while writing out your thoughts you digressed into related issues, and finally you just said to yourself: "Fuck it, this is hard work!" And just hit the Post button.

This might allow us to fashion a working model of the mind/matter complex, whether it be biochemical "hardware" running EMF "software", or some multifarious variation on this theme. — Enrique

You are putting the cart before the horse. Before we can speculate about how future "quantum biology" is going to solve the mind-body problem, we have to precicify and operationalize such folk psychology notions as "mind" and "qualia," making them into subjects of an empirical study. To this date, we seem to be nowhere near that goal, and it is not even clear that the goal is achievable.

Most of the time, we don't have to worry about quantum mechanics at scales much larger than subatomic: we use more coarse-grained, classical models, such as Newtonian particle or continuous mechanics, chemistry, cell biology, etc. The only times when QM is relevant at larger scales is (a) instrumentation developed specifically to amplify quantum-scale phenomena to human scale, so that we can detect and measure them (e.g. Geiger counter, cloud chamber), or (b) when coarse-grained models prove to be inadequate and the only way to address the problem is to fine-grain all the way to the quantum scale.

The two examples that you cite - the physiological magnetic compass in birds and (hypothesized) quantum effects in neurobiology - are of the latter variety: they are fine-grained mechanisms that would better explain coarse-grained phenomena. What I don't see though is a straight link to "qualia," which is just a fancy label for a fuzzy folk intuition. I think that before we can hypothesize QM explanations for qualia, we need to better analyze and instrumentalize this notion - if that is at all possible, which remains a contentious question as of today.

And everyone has been at pains to explain to you that sets with the same cardinality are just that - sets with the same cardinality. They are not (necessarily) equal. They are not "equivalent" - that's not a set theory term. They have the same number of elements only in the special case of finite sets (cardinality is a generalization of set size).

It's like as if someone told you that Sarah and Anil are the same age, and you objected that Sarah is a woman and Anil is a man, Sarah is American and Anil is Indian, Sarah is smaller than Anil, so how could they be equivalent?! Cardinality is just one measure of sets, nothing less, nothing more. Get over this already.

I’m not assuming its negation, rather I am saying it’s a meaningless proposition. — PessimisticIdealism

No, that's not how your argument is structured. You don't argue that the proposition is meaningless.Your argument says that the realist proposition is impossible to justify, but in order to be able to determine the requirements for justification, a proposition has to be meaningful in the first place - otherwise all of your argument becomes meaningless.

I think I will contribute with a listing of existent animals:

• Those that belong to the emperor
• Embalmed ones
• Those that are trained
• Suckling pigs
• Mermaids (or Sirens)
• Fabulous ones
• Stray dogs
• Those that are included in this classification
• Those that tremble as if they were mad
• Innumerable ones
• Those drawn with a very fine camel hair brush
• Et cetera
• Those that have just broken the flower vase
• Those that, at a distance, resemble flies

P3) It is neither self-evident nor certain that “the being of X is independent of its being known.”
C2) Therefore, philosophy should not begin with the assumption that “the being of X is independent of its being known.” — PessimisticIdealism

Again you are making the same mistake. That a proposition isn't certain is not a reason to assume its negation.

That sentiment might have had some plausibility twenty years and six months ago.

I basically agree. Practicality and efficiency render skepticism unhelpful in terms of getting on with our daily lives; however, this wouldn't by any means render the initial argument null and void. — PessimisticIdealism

The initial argument is null and void because, as others have pointed out, the realist does not have to accept your burden of proof. All you did was formulate a basic skeptical argument, and most people, realists included, already accept that skepticism cannot be rigorously eliminated. But that doesn't make it the default position. Why should it be the default position?

Yes. — TheMadFool

No, you still don't understand. Suppose the die already landed and came to rest, but you can't see it - it rolled under a couch. The outcome is not just deterministic - it's already determined. Does that fact help you with guessing the answer? It doesn't, and you still don't have anything better than probability. So would you say that a die lying on the floor under your couch "exhibits probabilistic properties?" That would be stupid (but what else is new?)

Probability is about what you don't know. Whether what you don't know is inherently indeterministic or whether it is a matter of fact doesn't make a difference to you. You still don't know what you don't know. So what do you do? You could say "I don't know," but if you have to make decisions based on incomplete knowledge, you use probability.

You are attempting to explain why people have consciousness from the evolutionary psychology standpoint. That's not the "hard problem of consciousness" - that's one of the "easy" problems.

And of course this question has already been taken up and developed long before you ever thought of it, so you might want to start by reading up on what's already been done in this area.

What causes an unequivocally deterministic system to exhibit probabilistic behavior? — TheMadFool

Exhibit is the keyword here. What is exhibited is in the eye of the beholder - it is not just an objective property of a system. A system may hypothetically be perfectly deterministic (although how could you know that with certainty?), but if you don't know enough about its behavior, then you can, at best, predict it probabilistically. Typically, when a die is thrown, there is no practical way to predict its exact trajectory (even if there was a fact of the matter about what that trajectory would be), nor even which side it is more likely to land on. Lacking such information, the prudent bet is to distribute probability equally between each of the six sides. (If you systematically fail to do this, then a competing player could exploit your bias to gain an advantage.)

1. Is probability an illusion? — TheMadFool

Calling it an "illusion" implies that you know better. But you don't - hence probability. Probability is a function of our uncertainty.

To me, if a thread is generating discussion it has merit even if the topic or OP is of low quality. — DingoJones

My observation is that the only threads that may not generate discussion are those with a very narrow focus, such as concerning a specific philosophical work - and those can actually be high-quality posts. Low quality threads tend to generate discussion, if only for people to comment on their low quality or to post easy takedowns.

But my point is that what is done there, in my relatively long experience, never rises to the level of philosophy, that is, a discussion of ideas with a reasoned and reasonable back-and-forth. — tim wood

You could say the same thing about discussions elsewhere on the forum, with the same justification.

Not least bcause even any discussion towards an agreement on terms seems impossible, never mind reasonable argument. — tim wood

Oh right, just as I thought. Your own recent thread in that forum didn't go to your liking, so you are lashing out against the forum. (I didn't look at it much, TBH - the premise for the discussion didn't look promising.)

Make up your mind: are you talking about physics or mathematics? Physics, even mathematical physics, is about something - something over which we have no control and of which we can only judge on the basis of past observations - hence the problem of induction. Pure mathematics is not about anything, at least not about anything over which we don't have ultimate control - such as our own definitions and postulates.

Which gives logic and math a kind of atemporal, aspatial quality. Which is odd, given that we inhabit temporal, spatial universe of change. — Marchesk

There's nothing mysterious here. Logic and math are our constructs, and as ideas that we entertain our minds, write down and communicate to each other, they originate in time, change and disappear - same as with our ideas about the world. But there is a fundamental disanalogy here between purely abstract ideas and ideas about the world: abstract ideas are not about anything, so they don't answer to the challenge of observation, which is what the problem of induction is all about.

ETA Or what said.

What are these destructive conclusions of which you speak? — A Seagull

I just said, didn't I? (Assuming you are replying to me.)

Hume's problem of induction is not just about certainty. It's about plausibility as well - any kind of empirical inference. And it's a problem, if Hume's or similar arguments have force, because we clearly don't believe their conclusion. So you can oppose the argument (that we have no warrant for empirical inferences) or you can bite the bullet and accept its destructive conclusion, but you can't deny that there is a problem here.

Assuming we can adequately define reason, did rational thinking make human beings more ethical in the past, perhaps in Plato's era, and is this still the case? — Enrique

That's an interesting question, but I suppose that the answer will depend on one's thinking about ethics. A lot, probably most people, think of ethics as a system with a more-or-less objective existence, not unlike the laws of nature. It is then up to us to discover and work out that system and its implications, similar to the way we conduct scientific research and work out logical and mathematical problems. If so, then it is reasonable to think that rationality is a sine qua non for coming to the right ethical conclusions, at least if you work them out on your own, rather than just following someone's lead or complying with established norms.

Personally, I am skeptical about ethical systems. I don't see how it would even be reasonable to suppose that ethics is anything like science or logic. I lean more towards emotivist and related views. So I would think that while rationality is important for decision-making, ethical motivations themselves do not owe much to reason.

Ignore the troll. Why is it so hard?

So it seems as though ethics are in a degenerate or inadequate state. — Enrique

Why does it seem so to you? And by ethics do you mean people's actual moral/ethical outlooks, or the study of ethics, or what?

You and the other responders are right to pick on the first premise, but I think before or instead of trying to correct it with what we think is a more accurate prediction of the traits that evolution is likely to produce, the ignorance and hubris of presuming such knowledge just from a general idea of biological evolution (whether accurate or not) needs to be pointed out. Evolution is not "survival of the most vicious," nor is it "survival of the most cooperative" - it can't be summed up by a slogan or caricature. Evolution is messy and complicated, which shouldn't be a surprise to anyone who is paying attention to the world around them. Evolution is messy and complicated because nature is messy and complicated.

You can find just about every conceivable example of adaptation in nature. There are relatively innocuous symbiotic parasites, but there are also really odious ones who still do pretty well for themselves. There are social organisms, but there are antisocial loners as well. Evolution follows no general principles: it is opportunistic. If there is a viable niche, it will probably be filled, for as long as it stays viable.

Let’s look at the premises. It seems to be true that the slightest variation beyond certain physical constants would not result in the universe as we understand it. Thus premise 2 appears to be correct. — ModernPAS

No, from the fact that the universe is in some way* sensitive to variations in certain physical constants doesn't follow that the universe "is an extremely unlikely event." For the universe to be such an event, it has to be embedded in some kind of causal event flow. The argument makes an implicit assumption that on naturalism, something gave rise to the universe with its known laws of constants. Not only that, but it also assumes that on naturalism, the process that led to the creation of the universe as we know it resulted in a random selection of its known fundamental constants. Neither of these assumptions are justified. While one can imagine such a naturalistic scenario, naturalism in general is not beholden to it.

* It is actually not easy to articulate just what that sensitivity means. Most physical constants are real numbers that could hypothetically vary within an infinite range. If so, then there is no distinction between fine-tuning and coarse-tuning: any finite interval you care to choose would represent an infinitely small fraction of the full range. This consideration nullifies the intuitively impressive numerology that presenters of the fine-tuning argument usually bring to bear.

writing this post for credit in a “Philosophy of Religion” class — ModernPAS

Oh, that's where the sudden influx of phil. of religion posts comes from? Are you guys all taking the same class?

The origin and development of language is a subject that has been extensively studied by linguists. Do you have any familiarity with that field, or are you trying to develop your own theory of scratch?

But what are you abstracting from? Scientists abstract from observations or from more fine-grained models. What is the basis for your proposal?

Logic. — Zelebg

Logic, as pure reason or as a mathematical theory, says literally nothing about free will or any empirical matters. But if you mean to say that your proposal "makes sense" to you, then you are confirming my impression that you are just making shit up. And as I said, with all the research into volition and decision-making that we already have, there is no value in such uninformed speculation. If you are interested in this topic, then do yourself a favor and read up on it.

And you still have not said anything about the philosophy of free will. After some fantasy neuroscience, you just bluntly state that this is what free will is, and leave it at that. Oh, and throw in "downward causation" for good measure, without saying anything else.

It is an abstraction. I am talking in terms of logic not in terms of any other particular science. It seems you are not aware of the problem I am proposing to solve, otherwise I would expect far more appreciation for even a bare possibility such causal mechanics could exist in principle. — Zelebg

It seems that you are not aware that causal mechanisms behind decision-making have been an active area of cognitive science research for decades. You are not exactly blazing new paths here with your speculations. And all of it is an abstraction, of course - such is the nature of scientific modeling. But what are you abstracting from? Scientists abstract from observations or from more fine-grained models. What is the basis for your proposal?

The connection with free will is in that it describes possible causal algorithm for choice process and example of true downward causation.

Then this is what you should be focusing on if you want to talk philosophy. Leave causal mechanisms to scientists (or acquire some expertise yourself before diving in). What connection is there between "free will" and causal mechanisms of choice processes? How is this an example of downward causation?

And no, asking choanic rhetorical questions to deflect criticism won't do. Since this is a topic that interests you, you owe it to yourself, fist of all, to ask and to answer such questions.

If this is not free will, then what exactly is it I am not free from, in this case? — Zelebg

What you have here is an attempt to guess the neurochemical mechanism of decision-making, made by someone with no knowledge of neuroscience. We can do a lot better than that, as far as the neurochemical mechanism of decision-making is concerned. What this has to do with free will though is anyone's guess.

We believe that making even a small change in the past, would drastically alter the present. — Mark Dennis

No, we don't.

So is the Optimism butterfly the one we should be collectively stepping on? — Mark Dennis

Um, I think you got lost in your metaphors here. Stomping on an optimism butterfly is supposed to accomplish what? Extinguish optimism?

Yes, I have read the Bradbury story when I was a kid. But it's just a story, an entertaining thought experiment; besides, if you remember, the effect, as described in the story, was rather subtle, was felt tens of millions of years after the event, and was completely unpredictable - so no drastic changes from small disturbances and no apparent connection between cause and its distant effect. There are some chaotic systems in the world, but lucky for us, they are few and far between, otherwise any sort of stable, structured existence would have been impossible. For the most part, nature seems to be quite robust.

Philosophy (as the imfamous badinage goes) really is the history of who said what when, and people who haven't learnt it aren't going to have a clue no matter what their native skill. — Isaac

As an outsider, I get a perhaps distorted impression that much of academic philosophy is indeed more of a philology - a study, interpretation and analysis - sometimes apologetic, rarely critical - of texts, as well as a history of ideas, or as you said, who said what when.

I am open to possibilities, but possibilities are endless, and without a shred of justification there is no reason to take any particular possibility seriously.