Two concepts of 'Goodness' I can't tell what half of that is saying. Need an example. — zookeeper
Okay. Say I'm an anti-natalist environmentalist. I assert that you shouldn't have children and that it is good to remain childless. I have a vague (not explicitly articulated) theory about why this is so, including utilitarian intuitions and principles of moral equality among all animals. My first-order conception of what is good excludes having children.
You assert that having children is good. You have a vague theory about why this is so, appealing to individual rights or a duty to populate the nation. Your first-order conception of what is good includes having children.
When we enter into dialogue, if we are using 'good' in these contrasting ways, it seems to me that there can be no disagreement. In using that word, we are referring to different things. Instead, whether we realize it or not, I am suggesting that we are referring to something else - something at a 'higher level' of abstraction. Something like 'whatever
really is good (and by the way, my conception is the right one)'*. That way, we are both talking about the same thing. One of us will be right (that having children is good or not).
* That might be another, slightly different attempt to articulate the second-order concept of good: the moral opinion that we would converge on if we were fully rational and informed, or perhaps that we will converge on at the limit of inquiry (as Pierce might have said). But again, that might be too substantive. I could say that I didn't think that that would constitute good, and so we are again failing to connect.