You lack enough information to determine whether the concept is one worthy of consideration. You need to wait until my exchange with Andrew M gives you more clues because you are too far away from what I mean. — Nelson E Garcia
There is a large difference between logical schemes and materiality. Talking about materiality does not board, penetrate, or even significantly reach it. So if you have a prejudice against dualities, if you think all things are set in a single plane, the plane of language, or the plane of nuclear elements, or the plane of logic, or mathematics, you are somehow handicapped for the totality of reality. — Nelson E Garcia
Hence the reason hesitancy is rational on an individual level. But, taking the individual risk or perceived risk was what I thought I owed the people I live around. We know the long term effects of not vaccinating and that is mutating an already easily spread virus; that seems to wipe out the elderly fairly well.We do not know the long term effects of this vaccine, this virus, or the technology of the vaccine. It's all pretty new stuff, perhaps mild caution is in order. — Book273
My point is that, if someone believes in miracles, there are many who do, but numbers do not matter, then it is reasonable that Creation itself could have been a miracle. — FreeEmotion
Again, actuality (pre-existence) is no negation of unobserved facts, but those facts are logical facts, not perceptive facts. — Nelson E Garcia
↪Cheshire It is a controversial feature of my metaphysical persuasion to only rate as reality what is perceived, while anything else pre-existing out of mind’s sense-targeting I rate as actuality, not reality. The controversy is large because I claim science in its totality operates within actuality. Only perception (directly and in close proximity) reaches realness and if that was not enough a controversy, human cognition I divide between reception and perception. — Nelson E Garcia
Interesting how folk want to jump to the end. — Banno
By misrepresenting one's certainty regarding a belief versus the belief itself produces a type of misrepresentation that falls short of lying, unless certainty is implied by the context.He's trying to make sense of how one could be said to be deliberately misrepresenting one's own thought and belief but somehow fall short of lying... — creativesoul
Well, why not? Why shouldn't a cause happen after the event? — Banno
To refresh a previous argument of mine, operational knowledge can well be, ontically, not erroneous. Nevertheless, this is not currently possible to prove epistemically.
Are we not somehow agreeing to this? My only issue here is that infallibility to me is an epistemic property. My bad if I didn’t make that explicit previously. Maybe this facet makes a notable difference? If not, then we indeed disagree. Call it a day? — javra
To sum the just stated, one has to be omniscient to have infallible knowledge. — javra
“All my beliefs—including this one—are not perfectly secure from all possible error.” — javra
In laconic review of what you have yet to reply to: Operational knowledge cannot be demonstrated to be devoid of all possible error; ideal knowledge is devoid of all possible error, but it is only a conceptual ideal and not that which can be utilized in practice. I've argued why this is so at length in previous posts. — javra
Hence, I view your quoted statement as category error, for infallible knowledge would need to be proven in practice in order to be obtained. And to prove it in practice requires infallible justifications for the given belief in fact being true. Explain why it is not the case if you disagree. — javra
Are you ready to prove how the law of noncontradiction is perfectly secure from all possible error? If yes, please do so. If you can’t then (1) is not infallible (this as per the aforementioned definitions). — javra
If I haven’t mentioned it in a super-explicit form before, I will now: my stated affirmation is itself fallible; i.e., not perfectly secure form all possible error. Here is not addressed “infallible for all practical purposes” or “so close to being infallible that it makes no difference in everyday life”—but, again, technically infallible in its being perfectly secure form all possible error. And again: A fallibilist will fallibly know that he/she holds no infallible knowledge (not even in this affirmation).
Hence, no contradiction, not for the fallibilist. Contradictions only appear when an infallibilist account of knowledge is taken into consideration. — javra
And, as previously discussed by me, just become X is liable to error (i.e., less than perfectly secure from all possible error) does not in any way signify that it is therefore erroneous. — javra
But in short, you believe that infallible knowledge is possible to obtain; I don’t. We might be at a standstill on account of this disagreement. — javra
Again, I’m one of those fallibilists / philosophical global skeptics that uphold the following: any belief that we can obtain infallible knowledge will be baseless and, thereby, untenable. — javra
which fallacy of relevance it makes? — 0cards0
to know absolutely elephants can't fly one must have infinite knowledge.
but to have infinite knowledge one would have to be god.
it is impossible to be god & a wizard at the same time.
wizards cannot prove that elephants can't fly . — 0cards0
to know absolutely one must have infinite knowledge.
but to have infinite knowledge one would have to be god.
it is impossible to be god
[a subject] can not prove [a statement] . — 0cards0
atheists cannot prove [absolutely] that god doesnt exists. — 0cards0
In other words, your use of knowledge here is that of an absolute, or infallible, knowledge. That "we may not ever know if it is actually ontic"—for example—is only a problem when one believes such infallible knowledge can be had. Come to believe that we cannot hold infallible knowledge in practice for anything, and this problem fully dissolves, for we then can and do fallibly know "if its actually ontic"--and no other form of knowledge is possible. — javra
I found your statement somewhat ambiguous and was doing my best to cover all the bases, just in case. — javra
Implicit in this sentence, hence proposition, hence thought is an assumption of held ideal knowledge. If it weren’t, I don't see how this would be an issue. — javra
We do operationally know when we are in possession of objective (which I interpret to mean what I previously specified as “ontic”) truth. This, again, because our beliefs of what is ontically true are well justified to us and, in the process, not falsified as in fact so being objectively true. But as to holding an ideal knowledge of this, this cannot be had till infallible truths and infallible justifications can be provided — javra
The conversation has gotten of the OP. It still applies. None of us are applying it.
1h — creativesoul