The unanswered question remains: How do learned beliefs become well-grounded? Are some learned beliefs well-grounded and others not solely due to happenstance? Or Is there a third alternative you have in mind that explains why some learned beliefs are well grounded and others are not? — javra
It strikes me as putting the cart before the horse. Else as tautological and hence as much ado about nothing: "everything this is an unreflective belief as per some definition qualifies as being an unreflective belief per stated definition
If not, explain. — javra
While I'm waiting, please remember to answer this issue:
The unanswered question remains: How do learned beliefs become well-grounded? Are some learned beliefs well-grounded and others not solely due to happenstance? Or Is there a third alternative you have in mind that explains why some learned beliefs are well grounded and others are not?
— javra — javra
Here's something that looks quite promising...
"Un-reflective belief"...
I believe that there is such a thing. I'll go first. As always, we look to set out a minimalist criterion, which when met by some candidate or other, serves as a measure of determination. All things that meet this criterion qualify as being an unreflective belief. That criterion is evidence of our knowledge about unreflective belief. That criterion needs to be properly accounted for. I say "accounted for" here quite intentionally. Because we are reporting upon thought and belief, we must keep in mind that our account can be wrong when it comes to that which is not existentially dependent upon our account. Un-reflective belief is one such thing.
We're reporting upon that which existed - in it's entirety - prior to our account/report.
Unreflective belief is a particular specifiable kind of belief. Our knowledge of it is existentially dependent upon written language. It is not. To be a kind of belief, is to be one of a plurality of different kinds of the same thing. This necessarily presupposes a universally applicable and/or extant set or group of common denominators. These can be thought of as individual elemental constituents. Perhaps "ingredients" is best? Each of these are an irrevocable element, for they all play their own role in all belief... statements thereof notwithstanding.
So again... as always, we look to set out a criterion...
What counts as belief? What is the criterion which, when satisfied by a candidate, offers us the strongest possible justificatory ground for saying that that candidate is belief? This criterion must be met by any and all sensible; consistent; coherent usage of the term "belief". I say that that criterion must set out the aforementioned group of common denominators that all belief share, and that none of these ingredients can be existentially dependent upon written language, for all reflection is to think about one's own thought/belief, and that is existentially dependent upon written language. — creativesoul
↪creativesoul
Are we of a sudden skipping back to the issue of pre-linguistic justification? — javra
The following bears repeating... — creativesoul
My former belief that this debate between us has been one of honestly reasoned enquiry has now eroded. — javra
But in short, you believe that infallible knowledge is possible to obtain; I don’t. We might be at a standstill on account of this disagreement. — javra
Again, I’m one of those fallibilists / philosophical global skeptics that uphold the following: any belief that we can obtain infallible knowledge will be baseless and, thereby, untenable. — javra
I am many things, but dishonest ain't wunuvem. — creativesoul
Again, I’m one of those fallibilists / philosophical global skeptics that uphold the following: any belief that we can obtain infallible knowledge will be baseless and, thereby, untenable. — javra
Isn't this being put forward as infallible knowledge, because its so well evidenced to render any counter argument baseless and untenable. If so, it proves itself wrong. — Cheshire
Glad to hear. Still, I have no interest in rereading the entire thread on a daily basis to see which newly lengthened posts require my re-reading due to me not being informed of the lengthy additions in a timely manner—and this after I’ve already taken time to reply to them. Ya know? I get it. It was a lack of ideal tact—something which I obviously lack as well. Nevertheless, that and a lot that I’ve addressed and/or asked which has not been addressed in turn presently leaves me wanting to leave our discussions as-is. — javra
And, as previously discussed by me, just become X is liable to error (i.e., less than perfectly secure from all possible error) does not in any way signify that it is therefore erroneous. — javra
If I haven’t mentioned it in a super-explicit form before, I will now: my stated affirmation is itself fallible; i.e., not perfectly secure form all possible error. Here is not addressed “infallible for all practical purposes” or “so close to being infallible that it makes no difference in everyday life”—but, again, technically infallible in its being perfectly secure form all possible error. And again: A fallibilist will fallibly know that he/she holds no infallible knowledge (not even in this affirmation).
Hence, no contradiction, not for the fallibilist. Contradictions only appear when an infallibilist account of knowledge is taken into consideration. — javra
Innate beliefs, learned beliefs, metacognitive beliefs, unreflective beliefs...
The number of different kinds of belief is growing quickly.
Remove all of the individual particulars(that which makes them all different from one another) and then set out what it is that they all have in common that makes them all what they are... beliefs... aside - that is - from our just calling them all by the same name... — creativesoul
Dogs are relatively good at deceiving. This, again, requires a belief about the beliefs of others when they are being deceived. For willful deception to be at all effective, the dog then must hold a certainty that engaging in behaviors X will (or at least is very likely to) create an erroneous belief in the other which—simultaneously—the deceiving dog apprehends to be an erroneous belief and, therefore, not a correct belief. Wikipedia gives the example of a dog that sits on a treat to hide it till the other leaves the room. I’ve got plenty of anecdotal accounts of my own (e.g., with a very intelligent shepherd dog I had as a kid), but let’s go with the Wikipedia example. The dog must be aware that the treat really is beneath its bum. It must also be aware that by concealing it this way the other will then hold an erroneous belief that there is no treat in the room. Here again, I argue, is required an awareness of error and non-error regarding that which is—an awareness that is not dependent on abstract thoughts/beliefs regarding the concepts of right/wrong, or true/false, or error/non-error, etc. A belief-endowed awareness that can well be non-reflective (though in this case likely does contain some inference and, hence, reflection regarding what's going on in the mind of the other). — javra
While I'm waiting, please remember to answer this issue:
The unanswered question remains: How do learned beliefs become well-grounded? Are some learned beliefs well-grounded and others not solely due to happenstance? Or Is there a third alternative you have in mind that explains why some learned beliefs are well grounded and others are not?
— javra — javra
What makes a "learned belief" different than other kinds of belief? More importantly what makes them similar enough to still qualify as belief?
What are you waiting for? — creativesoul
And I'm arguing this is the reason infallible knowledge must possibly exist. What is infallible knowledge, but knowledge without error? — Cheshire
You literally stated it was both perfectly and not perfectly secure. It's a direct contradiction, unless one just chooses to ignore it to maintain a position. — Cheshire
In a further argument:
1. Infallible knowledge is possible or not.
2. Premise 1 is infallibly correct.
3. Infallible knowledge is possible. — Cheshire
In laconic review of what you have yet to reply to: Operational knowledge cannot be demonstrated to be devoid of all possible error; ideal knowledge is devoid of all possible error, but it is only a conceptual ideal and not that which can be utilized in practice. I've argued why this is so at length in previous posts. — javra
Hence, I view your quoted statement as category error, for infallible knowledge would need to be proven in practice in order to be obtained. And to prove it in practice requires infallible justifications for the given belief in fact being true. Explain why it is not the case if you disagree. — javra
Are you ready to prove how the law of noncontradiction is perfectly secure from all possible error? If yes, please do so. If you can’t then (1) is not infallible (this as per the aforementioned definitions). — javra
To sum the just stated, one has to be omniscient to have infallible knowledge. — javra
I mostly nearly agree. I just prefer to leave the door cracked instead of closed. True, no demonstration may be possible, but this doesn't mean ideal knowledge is impossible - only not demonstrable. — Cheshire
Gladly, you don't have to prove you have infallible knowledge in order for it to be obtained. I concede I can't prove when or if I obtained infallible knowledge and yet I maintain its possible that I do and do not know it. — Cheshire
If the strength of my argument rests on my ability to doubt the law of non-contradiction, then I would get a new argument. I'm sorry, my position presupposes logic. — Cheshire
OK, chap.
To first get this out of the way:
Innate beliefs, learned beliefs, metacognitive beliefs, unreflective beliefs...
The number of different kinds of belief is growing quickly.
Remove all of the individual particulars(that which makes them all different from one another) and then set out what it is that they all have in common that makes them all what they are... beliefs... aside - that is - from our just calling them all by the same name...
— creativesoul
I've provided definitions for all belief types I've utilized and support. As to defining belief in general, I’ve already done that as well: trust-that. If you have objections to any of my definitions then so state with reasons for your objection. Otherwise, this post of yours to me looks like an example of spin. — javra
Well, again, for me to believe is to trust that; and a belief is the contents of that which is trusted... — javra
However, we are talking about belief that is not existentially dependent upon language. Such belief can be reported upon. Our reports will have propositional content. The kind of belief that we're reporting upon cannot. Belief that is not existentially dependent upon language must consist of something other than propositional content, even though our report of it must. All this must be kept in mind when using the belief that approach as a means to take account of belief that is not existentially dependent upon language... — creativesoul
You've actually posited trust/belief at the genotype level of biological complexity. That would require that the content of what's being trusted(belief on your view) is something that exists in it's entirety at that level and can transcend the believer on a physical level through reproduction. That's a big problem for your notion of belief for all sorts of reasons. We could explicate those consequences if you'd like... — creativesoul
Trust requires a remarkable 'sense' of familiarity, and there is more than one kind of familiarity. All familiarity requires thought and belief. — creativesoul
Trust: (1) confidence in or reliance on some person or quality. — Wiktionary
Trusting the content of thought/belief cannot be had if innate fear takes hold of the creature. One cannot trust that which aggravates instinctual/innate fear, at least not one at a language less level. — creativesoul
However, we are talking about belief that is not existentially dependent upon language. Such belief can be reported upon. Our reports will have propositional content. The kind of belief that we're reporting upon cannot. Belief that is not existentially dependent upon language must consist of something other than propositional content, even though our report of it must. All this must be kept in mind when using the belief that approach as a means to take account of belief that is not existentially dependent upon language...
— creativesoul
Can you provide, or point to, a concrete example of such belief-that which is not propositional? — javra
You've actually posited trust/belief at the genotype level of biological complexity. That would require that the content of what's being trusted(belief on your view) is something that exists in it's entirety at that level and can transcend the believer on a physical level through reproduction. That's a big problem for your notion of belief for all sorts of reasons. We could explicate those consequences if you'd like...
— creativesoul
For the record, though I too hold an ego, I have no problem in being shown how my beliefs could be improved upon or else how they are wrong. — javra
Trust requires a remarkable 'sense' of familiarity, and there is more than one kind of familiarity. All familiarity requires thought and belief.
— creativesoul
On what grounds do you affirm this? — javra
Trust: (1) confidence in or reliance on some person or quality.
— Wiktionary
From this I extrapolate the following as a cogent facet of trust: To act and/ or react (either physically or mentally such as via intentions) to something being ontic devoid of rationality for the given something in fact being ontic is, in itself, a process of trust. The quality one here has confidence in or reliance on is property of being ontic.
On what grounds would one disagree with this extrapolation? — javra
If the extrapolation is valid, then trust can be non-linguistic, genetically inherited, and does at all times affirm (else, makes firm within the respective mind) that which is true—but this without a necessary conscious understanding of the relation implied by notions of truth as we linguistically express it. Trust's contents, then, form the given belief. — javra
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