Following a hint from Plato in the Sophist, I take existence as convertible with the capacity to act. Anything that can act in any way exists, and anything that exists can act in some way. Thus, existence is an unspecified capacity to act. What makes a thing the kind of thing it is how it can act. What can do everything a duck can do and nothing a duck can't do is a duck, So, we can understand essence as the specification of a being's possible acts. — Dfpolis

I guess one could say the essence of an object or a substance is its identity particular dispositional powers. And identity particular would refer to the "type" of power an object has, rather than a token specific dispositional power i.e. "what can do everything that duck can do and nothing other ducks can't do is that duck" to use your example. But, let us leave the premise of type specific dispositional powers for objects to the side for now.

Physical objects are intelligible because they can act on our senses in specific ways that we can be aware of. In acting on us in the way that they do, they reveal some of their possible modes of action and so inform us about their existence (since they are acting) and essence (since they are acting in this specific way). — Dfpolis

In other words, this seems to pertain a view similar to the "causal theory of perception". And something similar to what Kant and many others have said regarding the passivity of the senses and objects being in a causal relation to us, where things become intelligible and we are "acquainted" with objects that causally affect us (acquainted being a more Russellian term of course)

In the same way, physical objects are valuable because they can stand as actually valued objects to a valuing subject. Valued objects have an intrinsic potential to be valued (are intrinsically valuable), for nothing can be actual unless it is possible. In other words, an object is valuable if it is capable of being valued. — Dfpolis

Now, here I fall somewhat out. First of all, what I do not quite get is this value relation between the valuer and the valued. Is the relation a form of projected value from the valuer onto the valued object? or is the relation the other way around, that the object itself - having the intrinsic disposition to be potentially valued by affecting our senses and perception causally - is what makes itself be valued by the subject it affects?

Call the first type of relation Type 1 valuing and the second Type 2.

The problem with Type 1 valuing is that if value is simply projected from the valuer on to the object, then there is little need to invoke the idea of dispositional intrinsic potential of value in the objects themselves. Because the value gets projected on to it, it may have the intrinsic potential to have value be projected on it in virtue of being an object, but it doesn't thereby have the intrinsic potential to merely be intrinsically valuable. Worse still, without a valuer, the objects are devoid of having any value at all. I take that this is probably not what you meant.

But, if it is Type 2 valuing you may be after, then value in objects is necessarily dependent on there being subjects that can value them, value them insofar as these objects causally affect them. But, given value is yet again being based from an anthropocentric starting point, without the anthropocene, no object has any value. It will be merely left with the dispositional power to be valued insofar as it can affect a subject valuer, without them, this dispotional power is mute, and again we are devoid of any value in the universe.

So, both types of valuing here give a relativist type of notion, or at least relative to the anthropocene. There is nothing inherently or intrinsically preexisting in the objects that in virtue of its reality has any value according to what has been concluded by what you say.

The next question is, if intelligibility is based on the capacity to inform, what is ontological basis of value? Let me suggest that the answer is fundamentally teleological. Things are valuable insofar as they are capable of advancing our ends -- and that is consequent on what they are capable of doing (their essence). To a reasonable approximation, human ends are reflected in Maslow's hierarchy of needs. So, things capable of meeting our needs are objectively valuable, even if they are not actually valued. — Dfpolis

This seems to imply an instrumentalist view on value, or simply the view of instrumental value. Now, if it was the case that value was teleological i.e. instrumental, that something has value for us insofar of how it advances our needs and helps us achieve something or a goal, then this would also apply to other subjects as well. our kin as objects, given that a relation between two human valuers between eachother would be something like: Valuer 1 has a value relation to Valuer 2 as an object O2, while Valuer 2 has a value relation to Valuer 1 as an object O1. We can shorten Valuer 1 and 2 with V1 and V2. If what you say follows, then V1 values O2 instrumentally, and so has no value to V1 unless it fulfills its instrumental needs, and vice versa for V2. If that is the case, then an ethical system based on this framework of instrumental value clearly makes us hold humans as mere means to an end. As you say yourself "Things are valuable insofar as they are capable of advancing our ends" and that would seem to offer us a morality that wouldn't be regarded as morally right or good by many by their subjective and non-subjective standards. But, I do not deny that there are people who hold this view, and defend this view

What is worse is that if we go further and consider God as a subject and a valuer, then clearly God itself becomes object to our instrumental valuing, and so God itself may be a means to some end. God need not necessarily be actual or real either, the mere idea itself can be objectified, as can any ideological idea or ideas in general. I do sympathize more with the notion of instrumental value for ideas, however, for the ontological, and the physical objects, instrumental value seems to imply that the universe is devoid of intrinsic value, there is no value in objects in virtue of their being. And so, there is no value in anything inherently or intrinsically, and that may be somewhat worrying for a moral framework that builds on this idea of value. If value is as such, then morality is followingly just as relative and subjective. So, someone valuing for instance Plato's four virtues may not be something another subject has in mind as being valuable to them, and perhaps vices such as greed may be on their list of properties and attributes that are more valuable to them. Given that two distinctly different individuals would clearly have different telos.

Either way, I simply wanted to grasp whether this is what you intended to mean with what you said regarding value, and the consequences that follow from the type of "teleological" valuing that you propose, or if this is a consequence you do not intend to have?

Really? Surely you jest! Science is going to tell me if I should be a Moron, a Jew, a Moselim, a Catholic or a Buddhist? Philosophy is?? Science does not even consider most matters of faith. Sure, science tells us that the Fundamentalist take on the age of the earth and the origin of species is, shall we say, "peculiar," but it is logically possible, and more so than as the equally peculiar belief, popular with some philosophers, that we are simulants.

So, how would science and/or philosophy deal with the claim that God, though one being, is a trinity of persons? Or the claim that after death we merge into the Transcendent as a drop into the sea? — Dfpolis

I assure you I do not jest, why must one assume there is a necessity in having to pick any one of these religions? If science tells us the physical world has no intrinsic value, there is no evidence for God and meaning is merely projected by moral agents, does that seem so unpalatable if it were true? The type of escapism is all too common, trying to "create" or "construct" meaning out of natural incidents has been a part of human nature clearly, and we surely have not gotten out of our habit of doing so to this date.

The question regarding the age of the earth, the universe and the origin of our species and others in general is not for a man-made logical system to determine. It is just as logically possible for the earth to be flat or have a geo-centric view on the solar system. However, these questions are regarding physical objects, and only physics gives us credible knowledge regarding the physical universe, not dogmas from holy scriptures providing "a priori" knowledge.

Science and philosophy will be the tools from which you may rationalize and determine through argumentation which view should be accepted regarding metaphysics, cosmology and ethics. I do not claim there are blueprint answers in any of these fields. However, arbitrarily choosing between pre-existing dogmas is surely epistemically incredible.

How would science deal with the claim of God? The same way it would deal with any other claim regarding the physical world. If the claim is that God is part of the physical world, then it would demand evidence for such a being to exist in the physical world. Any claim of transcendence after death would require the same from science, however, it is an impossibility to gain any evidence from a dead person, it is not like we can ask their ghosts. If there are no evidence supporting the claim or "hypothesis" of the Judeo-Christain God, then the conclusion follows that there is no reason to be holding that claim. I do not see what necessitates the idea of having to believe in a definition of God from a particular religion, given all the different religions one could choose to believe from.

I'm suggesting that the choice of religion or spiritual path is not an epistemic problem, but results from a judgement of which is most worthy of our commitment, which is a judgement of value, not of truth. In other words, it is an act of will, which can only be distorted by casting it as an act of intellect. — Dfpolis

If the commitment to a religion is choosing by judging its value, we only change it from being an epistemic problem to it being a problem of value judgment. The abritrariness of value judgment in the decision regarding which religion one resonates to becomes to an extent random. When the criteriea of worthiness and its value has its basis on an arbitrary presupposed notion. If we ignore the teachings of the religion as the basis for determining its "value of worthiness", what reason do we have to pick a religion in the first instance? When all the other dimensions it has to offer can be had by cultural traditions and social groups in general? If it is solely the spiritual dimension one seeks, then that's clearly going to be an arbitrary choice as that's solely dependent on subjective needs and aspects. However, religion is institutional, and has more than a spiritual dimension to it to be classified and regarded as a religion in the first place, so if one seeks only a spiritual connection, religion is no necessary choice, much less a good choice if that was one's sole criteria and reason to choose a religion.

But, it is not being sold as "knowledge." Perhaps you are misreading this because you have accepted the peculiar doctrine that knowledge is a species of belief. It is not. Knowledge is awareness of present intelligibility and so an act of intellect. Belief is commitment to the truth of some proposition and so an act of will. Thus, Descartes tells us he was in his chamber (showing he knew he was) while he was methodically doubting that fact. His doubt was not an act of intellect. (It did not make him unaware that he was in his room.) It was an act of will: the willing suspension of belief. If knowledge were a species of belief, one could not know something without believing it -- yet that is exactly what Descartes did with his methodological doubt. — Dfpolis

It may not be sold as knowledge, however, it is being sold as "truth". And having a belief in a truth that one cannot determine whether the truth-claim is false or not seems like an unecessary belief to hold. I agree knowledge doesn't necessarily entail belief and I not subscribe to the view of justified true belief as knowledge. However, let me try and clarify on the term belief. I doubt most people in the sense of "knowing" actually know that the earth is round. Though, almost everyone hold the belief that the earth is round of course, and the belief they hold is based on the fact provided by science, or more so by mathematics from the middle ages and prior. I do not know in the sense of perceptual knowledge, but I do know the proposition "the earth is round" is a true proposition. However, we know the truth value in this proposition to be true because we have countless empirical data and evidence to back the truth value of this claim through science. We may have seen images of earth from space, and that may strenghten our belief in the earth being round for instance.

But what is there to back up the truth in the claims that Jesus walked on water, or Moses split the sea in half to lead his people through, or that Hanuman threw boulders from the tip of India to create a bridge across to Sri Lanka? The holy texts themselves are no evidence, they are simply the claimholders, so what would then justify someone to believe in the truth of one religious text over another? We come back to the same problem, just with different terminology instead.

However, if you say that faith is distinct from belief again, then what would faith essentially be? A type of blind belief perhaps? I subscribe to the idea that just as rationality is a human faculty, so is the faculty of belief or non-rational belief. They are both human faculties, and faculties that only we have. Yet, the posed problem is how one can justifiably believe in one religion over another. And I do not see how any justification can be made on part of the person deciding on the religion they follow. If there can be no justification, the consequences seem quite uncanny given the vast majority of religious devouts are strongly entrenched to their unjustified blind beliefs then.

I don't think we subscribe to moral relativism, do we? Isn't it closer to the truth to say that we observe moral relativism in our populations? Couldn't further observations see that this doesn't always work, as your exemplary intolerant society doesn't. Here it is societies that you are using as an example, so let's stick with them.

No society that I can think of would ever declare subscription to moral relativism. They would act at a much more detailed level, I think. For example, rather than declare loyalty to moral relativism, a society might pass a law making murder punishable by imprisonment. And that society would soon discover that the law mainly worked, but that the occasional murder still took place. It might subsequently recognise that there are circumstances where society requires its members to murder other humans, probably members of some other society. And so on. — Pattern-chaser

Well, I think it is more individuals of a society that subscribe to the conventions of that society. For instance, if one goes to Japan, their conventions and traditions are subscribed to by their citizens, otherwise, breaking those norms and conventions may get them excluded from being part of the society. And these conventions do not have any relations to the laws of the country either of course, these are more personal social norms that are played out by the members as a habit more than anything. And so, if the habit of a society was to be intolerant, then when a member of that society travelled to another country and met their society, they would not be subscribing to moral relativism or conventionalism, given that they would be intolerant of the society they were visiting. The predicament would be that they would in essence have a morality that may be seen as "objective or universal" since they are intolerant of conventions of all other countries, yet they are still subscribed to their own conventions, and therein lies the problem of moral relativism.

Besides, even though legal matters may be somewhat guided by ethical frameworks, the two are mutually exclusive of each other and bear no necessities towards one another. And the problem I find is only with the ethical framework of moral relativism, not the legal. Clearly any person who travels to another country has to abide by that country's laws, however, no one is inclined to abide by their conventions or social norms.

That is actually not true. For example the question - "What does it mean to mean?" Already speaks from a perspective from which the answer is knowable at least in the form of "That's what it is". — Perdidi Corpus

Yes, I agree to the fact that we may know what type of answer we may come to have from asking our question. However, it is the token content of the answer I was aiming at in particular. I guess it would be something like an epistemic humility view. We can ask the question, we may even know that the answer posits something about that there is something to know out there, yet, the content of the individual objects in question remain in principle beyond us having epistemic access to them. the algorithm may provide us with knowing the type of thing that is in question and give us an answer to what type of thing we are trying to get at. But, no algorithm may capture the contents of the individual objects that are in question, the contents of which we are not in any position to know. Parallel to how no mathematical formula captures the contents of the objects it represents, only its structure.

I agree that one can answer parts of the question as you show in the example that way. But, answering through pointing out "that's what X is" doesn't give us knowledge about the content of X in any way. I do not perceive or introspect the contents of X. If I asked the question "how does the water in Omaha beach feel like?", then I would know once I experienced it myself. I could get second-hand knowledge or know that it feels like the water in some other beach or something similar, or simply know that it feels "watery". But the knowledge of the content of what the question asks us would elude me unless I had the capacity to experience it myself and acquire knowledge of it that way. Knowledge regarding more fundamental properties perhaps may be such that they do in fact escape us this way.

What is the relationship between a question and its answer? - That is: Where do we have to be so that the answer is seeable — Perdidi Corpus

I think, we are in principle never going to be in a position to see the answer to our question. The question is asked from a position that demands an answer that does not and cannot exist in the same position the question was asked from. Insofar the answer is seeable, we would perhaps need to be an entity capable of having epistemic access to reality non-subjectively i.e. without restraints or distortions from our perceptual and introspective faculties. But, I think the relationship between a question and its answer is that of limiting the questioner itself. What eventually comes out of it is the limit of what seeable answers the questioner can know before the limit is reached and the answers to our questions are no longer visible.

The commitment is made because framework for living provided is judged to be worthy. To be worthy, it can't be contradicted by what we know for a fact, It's teachings must resonates with one's nature (what Maritain calls knowledge by connaturality), and it must lead to a way of life that is fully human. Hopefully the commitment will result in both self-realization and the realization of others' unique natures. — Dfpolis

If the commitment is made because the framework for living that is provided is judged to be worthy, then how does on justifiably judge one framework for living over the other from the vast array of options at our disposal? Even if we exclude candidates that as you say "make us look down on others". I still fail to see why one necessarily needs to pick a religion to resonate with some presupposed notions one already has about certain aspects of life in general? when all these questions can be answered through philosophy and science alone?

I think we first need to understand what the concept of a religion actually entails. There are clearly several dimensions to a religion for something to be called a religion to begin with. my critique is on the dogmatic scriptural dimension i.e. its teachings from some holy text. And the main proponent for the criticism is in the arbitrariness of choosing to follow a religion's dogmatic teachings for arbitrary reasons, since these teachings make epistemological claims regarding metaphysics, cosmology, ethics and other fields as such ( e.g. how some muslims claim the Quran implied the existence of the embryo and such before anyone even knew what it was apparently, or the Vedic texts' claim of the seven centers of energy in our body, in a sense explaining physiology through some theory of energy of some sort)

Regarding connatural knowledge, I do not think knowledge by connaturality would provide any better reason to decide which religion one can justifiably pick over another. Given that the epistemic problem one has here lies directly in the truth of the teachings of the various religions themselves. How can I justifiably follow the teachings of religion A over religion B, and claim to have knowledge, be it connatural or any other type of knowledge, when the truth in the teachings of religion A must either be correct and false in religion B, or vice versa. Because, keep in mind here, I do not know whether the teachings in religion A are true, or whether the teachings in religion B are true. How can I justify my choice and pick one and follow its teaching as if it granted me knowledge about something, if I cannot know whether it is true or not? (I expect we all assume that having knowledge entails truth, otherwise we have no knowledge if what we have knowledge of is not true)

I am aware this is a crude way of showing the epistemic dilemma, and religions are more complex as such, but all 5 major religions are quite incompatible with each other regarding their metaphysics, cosmology and ethics to varirous degrees. The Judeo-Christian religions are perhaps closer to each other, yet still miles apart in their ethical framework and metaphysics, even if their cosmological view with the Genesis and Adam and Eve story may be similar all across.

It seems to me that you are making an error in assuming that acts of will, such as the choice of religion, are based solely on the perception of truth. The very idea of faith is that of making a commitment when the data are inconclusive. Let me suggest that the criterion of faith commitments is not knowledge, but worthiness. I believe what I believe, not because I know it is true, but because I have decided that it is worthy of my commitment. — Dfpolis

But why make a commitment when something is inconclusive? and how do we then justify that commitment to the particular faith in the second instance anyway? If the criterion to choose is worthiness of the religion, how do I justify the worthiness of one over the other? The problem doesn't have to necessarily apply to the epistemic relation to the three categories of metaphysics, cosmology and ethics. The problem still stands on how one can say, I choose this religion because it is worthy to me. Then it begs the question: "well why is this religion worthy to you and not some other religion?".

I have great respect for religion (not just because it played a part in my upbringing, but it also has value to impart). However, the methods religions use are outdated and whatever values are present in religions are more readily extracted in the study of sciences and philosophy. — BrianW

I agree completely, I do not claim there aren't other aspects of religion that may be in some way fruitful perhaps, but to enforce it to hold any epistemological value regarding metaphysics, cosmology or ethics or any other scientific field for that matter is quite baffling.

1. Do you believe there is a God ? ( Title for most perfect being, the three o’s, etc)
Yes – go to question 2
No - Find a list of non – God based religions and pick one – but really why bother. Or if you are not Asian or Indian - pick one of the eastern ones and act real cool and all — Rank Amateur

I do not see why one has to go to question 2 at all if one simply believes in a God though? Why assume believing in a God or a being like that with the possibility of the "three O's" necessitates following a particular religion? One could believe in a silent God, a God that we may know nothing about, yet a God we may believe in being the first cause of everything and the keeper of the harmony in the universe.

Interesting. :up: You subscribe, then, to an Objectivist viewpoint (in general), and also to objective ethics/morality too. My own view is more open to uncertainty, as I believe Objectivity to be unattainable (for humans). But how to relate this to religion, and the topic here? If you seek universally-applicable truths, as you seem to be, I can't see how religion could benefit you at all. :chin: Not because it can't provide - or claim to provide :smile: - universal truths. There are a few religions that claim to provide exactly this, I think, but the foundation of these truths does not meet your standards or needs, I suspect? — Pattern-chaser

Well in some way, there are certain a priori truths that are clearly objective truths, truths that exist independently of our being. However, these truths aren't truths that may be part of ultimate reality as such "out there". Mathematical truths for instance are normative truths within the formal system, but they are of course objective, there is no relativity or contextual value to its truth, there is a rigid truth value to 1+1=2 being true. However, an objective truth in for instance the actual world would perhaps be some type of truth à la Descartes "cogito, ergo sum" or perhaps the more logical correct "I think, therefore something necessarily is".

As for moral relativism, I'm not sure it can be avoided, in practice. There is no universally-accepted morality. People think/believe all kinds of things, so many kinds that it is difficult even to imagine how we could agree on one morality. That's not that there is no morality, or that all moralities must be considered equal. I can't abide silliness like that. But judging one morality superior to another is problematic, maybe impossible. How to compare such things as morality? :smile: It would be more convenient if you were right, and morality is objective, but I don't think that's so, despite the convenience. :smile: The same goes for "understanding the true nature of the universe". :wink: — Pattern-chaser

But regarding morality I do think there are certain common properties that apply to every human agent, if not rational agent. I mean, how else would we all agree that murdering innocents is wrong? despite some people who are emotionally unable to comprehend why it is wrong, they know it is wrong, or they to some degree understand the abnormality of their action I would suppose. If we consider the viewpoint from any religion more or less, or especially the judeo-christian religions, their claim against an atheistic morality is the attack against the lack of "universality" or "absolutism" in their ethical framework. "How can we be moral when there is no universal guideline?" is often their question and argument against atheists regarding morality. I do sympathize and think that morality itself doesn't necessarily have to be universal at all. And I personally doubt there being any single axiom, property or sentence that may apply to every single human being. Even rationality as a common feature to apply to all agents of the moral society fails when we have certain agents lacking the capicity of rational thinking, especially underdeveloped rational thinking i.e. children and other mentally handicapped people.

Nonetheless, subscribing to moral relativism as such seems like a loss, and it is a losing battle itself, given the paradoxes it may create through conventionalism. If one subscribes to conventionalism, then one is tolerant to the conventions of other societies. One follows the rules and moral code of the society you are a part of. However, if one society's convention is to be intolerant, one comes in the dilemma of following the convention of the society of being intolerant, meaning you no longer subscribe to a moral relativism. This is one of several other problems relativism may face, such as being part of more than one societies and having to follow conflicting conventions and such.

However, I do not think morality itself is objective, but we may bend our personal morality to the framework of an ethical system that may prove to be the best system to follow for a society of autonomous moral actors. But, the problem lies in determining which ethical framework is the best, which essentially boils down to the old arguments between the deontologists, utilitarians and social contract theorists and so on.

1. If you have a religious faith, then it erodes compassion.
2. In view of tragedies, your religious faith spurs you to say, “this might be all part of God’s plan”, “there are no accidents in life,” or “everyone on some level gets what he or she deserves” (Which are not only stupid but extraordinarily callous).
C Thus, your religious faith erodes compassion. (1,2 MP) — flight747

I do not think this only applies to religions. It would also apply to any type of deterministic view where one may claim that "whatever happened, happened for a reason, and so we need not show compassion to that person" in that sense. Even a causally deterministic world view would simply argue that certain events lead up to whatever happened, "it was bound to happen", "nothing to be done about it".

However, what I fail to see is the necessarily link between showing compassion and being religious or believing in causal determinism. how does thinking that "it was all God's plan" stop one from showing compassion to someone who's innocent experiencing something bad? One can still show compassion and think it was bound to happen, or it was part of some grandiose plan of God itself. compassion and religious belief seem to be mutually exclusive of each other, you may have both, or one or the other, or none at all. But, neither necessitates the non-existence of the other.

For myself, I do not equate religion with "knowledge" about anything. I look at religion, and God, differently from that. — Pattern-chaser

I can sympathize with that of course, but most people would propagate a religious view that has epistemological value regarding the three fields I mentioned. And I think at least regarding those three areas, religion in its plurality cannot offer objective epistemic content the way philosophy and science in general may. Of course on an individual level, religion may offer something else to people who do not seek cosmological, metaphysical or ethical knowledge from it, but rather the spiritual, traditional and cultural aspects of it.

Truth and knowledge are problematic. No, they aren't arbitrary, but they can - how can I say this? :chin: - take on different guises in different circumstances/contexts, or for different people. Scientific knowledge is far from arbitrary. In other areas of human thought and understanding, knowledge is less well defined, and less rigidly confined, perhaps? :chin: — Pattern-chaser

I agree that in non-a priori and non-normative systems knowledge can be less rigid and to some extent contextual, especially in everyday life. However, certain "ultimate" truths or "objective" truths that we consider science to offer cannot be arbitrary, at the very least, the data cannot be arbitrary, only our interpretation of that data is. However, in regards to understanding the true nature of the universe, and also an ethics that may be applicable to every human being, we would need certain non-arbitrary truths or axioms as a foundation to build on I think. Otherwise, moral relativism reigns true, and I don't think that's desirable.

I think the Hindus claim that all 'Gods' recognised by humans reflect one or more aspects of God, who is so far above us that we cannot understand Her directly. So we use these avatars to make it easier for ourselves. — Pattern-chaser

There is a part of Hinduism that does make that claim yes, and coming from an Indian family myself, I have some minimal knowledge on this to verify that claim. And the statement really is this: "only a fool thinks there is only one God" or something like it. This seems to me to imply the plurality of interpretations regarding the one "true" being that no one epistemically has access to, only our constructed image and understanding of that being, whatever it may be. However, to me, being an agnostic, I would go even further and say that "only a fool would try to make claims about God". I mean no disrespect of course, but it would seem pointless to make epistemic claims or create different images of the "one true God" when we as humans are in principle never going to be in an epistemic position to have access to "It".

- Empty space has vacuum or dark energy associated with it. Total energy content of universe has to be finite. Space is finite.
- If time reaches back infinitely then it’s impossible to reach today. Time is finite. — Devans99

But if one removed all phyiscal mass and energy, both the visible and dark, wouldn't empty space simply be infinite vacuum? Would you then believe that if space is finite, expansion of the universe will hit the "edges" of space one day? Or do you believe that the expansion of the physical universe determines the size of the space it's in, which is finite?

If time reached back infinitely, it would reach the future infinitely as well? I'd assume being infinite would imply a two way relation, past and future? otherwise you'd make the infinite time finite by assuming that it reaches back infinitely, it cannot reach today. Understanding time as a simple line, the line would be clearly infinite pointing left as it would be pointing right. If one marked a point P on the line, then the line going from point P and left would be infinite paralell to "if time reaches back infinitely". However, we already made ourselves a starting point and hence we've already made finite what is infinite. An infinite timeline would have no starting point nor finishing point. you could mark a point P anywhere on the time line, and it would have to be infinitely long on both ends.

However, I do not believe there is anything physical that is quantifiably infinite in actuality/reality.

But do you think you might as well have been a Zoroastrian, Wickan, or Shinto for instance if influences from these religions came into your life and affected your way of thinking about the knowledge regarding metaphysical, cosmological and ethical truths?

Because my question is to point to the problem regarding the epistemological credibility the religions have to offer, if in the thought experiment, the choice one makes is arbitrary, then the truth one has about cosmology, metaphysics and ethics is arbitrary. However, I think we all agree that truth and knowledge is non-arbitrary. So, it must be that choosing a religion i.e. having a religion is pointless regarding the questions of metaphysics, cosmology and ethics. By having I mean sticking with the one religion you were brought up in, or to convert to some other religion or really any type of spiritual view that may claim to explain "God's being" and cosmology, metaphysics and ethics.

I would argue that one does not need to justify their belief in a religion. There are a few type of people in general that believe in religions. There is the person that was born into a religion and continues to practice it due to faith. There is the religious person who has had an experience that allows them to fully believe in their God/gods. There is also the person who realizes that their beliefs match the beliefs of a certain religion and decide to follow that religion. None of these people are doing something that needs justifying. — Questionall

But that's is my point to begin with, all these people have arbitrary reasons to choose the religion they choose. They may choose to stay in the religion they were brought up in, or they may have an arbitrary experience that makes them pick a religion that aligns with that experience. If these people are merely choosing a religion for its cosmological, metaphysical and moral truth on the basis of arbitrary choice, then wouldn't it render these religions pointless? Why not simply seek those truths from areas of philsophy and science that offer reflection, reason and evidence to justify ones views in cosmology, metaphysics and ethics/morality?

I would also say that religions are just as argued over as science is. There are things in science that are dogmatic as well. If you are a scientist you cannot say that climate change isn't real because that is just something they are told to accept as a fact. It is the same in certain religions. There are some people who will tell you you have to believe something, but there will be just as many people that disagree. — Questionall

Science isn't dogmatic, it is the opposite. The whole point of science is to observe, experiment, revise and progress. And the more or less "universal" acceptance of a scientific truth isn't because it is a dogma in the first place, it is because of its truth value and explanative power that makes it widely accepted in the scientific field. Also, scientists do not believe that climate change is real because they are told by certain meteorologists, they accept it based on its evidence, historical data, and predicted future based on mathematical calculations. If global warming was false, then mathematics would be false as well, because the conclusion of global warming can only come from the mathematical calculations being correct. There is no comparative between "science" and religion. The two are mutually exclusive of each other, and are incompatible as well for the most part, at the very least in the actual lab where one does scientific research.

If one non religious person were given information on all of the religions in the world and told that they must choose one, I believe they would simply choose one that most closely reflects their personal values. — Questionall

But why would they need to choose a religion in the first place, If they already have personal values? if the choice makes one simply try to align one's own values to a dogmatic religious explanation to cosmology, metaphysics and morality, then why make such an arbitrary choice when you can simply choose philosophy and science to explain those same things? And explain those things through non-arbitrary reasoning unlike the dogmatic views of religion would force us to do.