Yes, you are refusing to discuss - refusing to acknowledge that your argument does not work. We are not agreeing to disagree, you are running away, ok? No agreement. You. Running. Away. — Bartricks

How you interpret your empirical experiences, is your responsibility. It is not my concern.

I refuse to agree with you. I don't see you as having a choice in this matter. This is why I suggested that we agree to disagree. If I choose to disagree with you and you do not choose to agree with me, then we either agree to disagree, or we continue to discuss. But I am refusing to continue to discuss.

ZF has not been shown to be inconsistent. And lack of comprehensiveness does not imply inconsistency. — TonesInDeepFreeze

ZF implies incompleteness in proof, theory or system. Perhaps some are happy with such standards, I am not.

In any case, your last reply to me suggests that it's a waste of time to continue this discussion with you. Also, the post that followed it suggests that you are upset, angry, or frustrated, which is not a good state to be in when discussing matters of logic or pure reason. I presented what I say is clear proof, you say that I have not. This has happened twice now, there's no point in there being a third time. I think we should just agree to disagree.

Doesn't follow. Again, you don't seem to understand what omnipotence involves. — Bartricks

We'll have to agree to disagree.

IF there is a set of all sets, then it has a subset that is the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Everyone recognises such a set is contradictory. What you and mainstream set theorists seem to think is that this logically entails that the set of all sets is contradictory, whereas it does not (and I have provided proof of this).

You see, right there, you skipped my point, posted at least three times now, that "member of itself twice" has no apparent set theoretic meaning. — TonesInDeepFreeze

It seems that you are not reading what I'm writing with enough attention to detail. You seem to have not understood why I have said "member of itself twice" (which is my proof of why a set of all sets that are members of themselves is as contradictory as a set of all sets that are not members of themselves).

By deriving a contradiction from the assumption that there does exist a set of all sets. — TonesInDeepFreeze

You've rightly recognised that a set of all sets that are not members of themselves that is itself not a member of itself is contradictory. What you've wrongly concluded is that this means the set of all sets is contradictory.

Only one set contains all sets that are not members of themselves (the set of all sets). Again, there is nothing contradictory about the set that encompasses all sets that are members of it (because they are sets), and it is a member of itself (because it is a set). There is nothing contradictory about the set of all sets. It's rejection is blatantly contradictory and all set theorists know this (including you). ZF is either inconsistent, or not comprehensive enough (which ultimately means it is inconsistent).

This fierce dogma needs to die.

You just keep repeating yourself without coming to grips with the key points that refute you. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I believe I've understood your point, but I don't think you have understood mine. So from my point of view, this is what you are doing.

You have not shown that x = {x y z} implies a contradiction. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I have shown that x = {x y z} results in a contradiction when we say:

1) x is not a member of itself (because x is in x along with y and z. Thus, x is a member of itself whilst y and z are not members of themselves).

2) x is a member of itself as well as y and z (because x is in x along with y and z. Thus x = {x y z} has to be interpreted as either meaning x is a member of itself twice with y and z being members of themselves once, or x is a member of itself, with y and z not being members of themselves).

Do you see that if I wrote p = {x y z}, then it is not contradictory for me to say x is a member of itself as well as y and z?

If there is a set of all sets, then it has the subset that is the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. — TonesInDeepFreeze

It does not have such a subset as evidenced by such a subset being clearly contradictory. However, it is the set that contains all sets (rejecting this is also clearly contradictory). So it contains all sets that are not members of themselves (because they are all members of it, precisely because they are all sets), and it is a member of itself (precisely because it is a set and is therefore a member of itself). You cannot show me a contradiction in this. But a contradiction is clear in the following two statements:

1) There is a set that contains all sets that are not members of themselves that is itself not a member of itself.

2) No set can logically encompass all sets.

How do you possibly allow yourself to reject the set of all sets? It's the last thing one should be doing.

In any case, I don't think you read my post with enough attention to detail, otherwise I reckon you would have seen where I was coming from. But as it stands, your belief system is contradictory precisely because it sees 2 as being rational/consistent, whereas 2 is clearly contradictory.

In conclusion:

There's no such thing as a set of all sets that are not members of themselves that is itself not a member of itself. But there is a set of all sets that are not members of themselves that is itself a member of itself. That set is the set of all sets. It encompasses all sets that are members of themselves, as well as itself (hence why it is a member of itself).

There is no subset of all sets that are not members of themselves, or all sets that are members of themselves.

is no reason for supposing that you can't have a set that contains itself as a member — Amalac

This is not what I suppose. I definitely believe in a set being a member of itself. I think it is a logical necessity.

well, you've given no reason to accept that yet, except that x would “contain itself twice” — Amalac

I understand why it looks as though I haven't. Again, I'm suggesting that this has been overlooked for more than a hundred years by the likes of Russell and Frege (amongst others). It's not immediately recognisable. But I've seen what's been overlooked/misunderstood clearly. if you can see it too, I believe you will see that that there is no alternative.

A set is only a member of itself if it contains itself as a member. So when I write x (x, y, z), I mean to say set x contains items x, y, and z. Set x is a member of itself purely because it contains x (itself). WIth this in mind, consider the following:

1) x (x, y, z). Here, when we say x is a set that is not a member of itself, we get a contradiction. (because x is in x).

2) x (x, y, z). Here, when we say x is a set that is a member of itself, we get no contradiction (because x is in x).

3) x (x, y, z). Here, when we say x is a set of three sets that are members of themselves, we get a contradiction (it amounts to saying one set can be a member of itself twice, compare again with 1 and 2. It amounts to x being a member of itself twice because x is in x and the context is sets that are members of themselves. Either y and z are not members of themselves (making x the only member of itself), or x is a member of itself twice whilst y and z are members of themselves once. It cannot be the case that x is a set of three sets that are members of themselves).

Suppose I wrote: x (p, q, y). Now, x can be a set of three sets that are members of themselves (precisely because it does not include itself for it to amount to being a member of itself twice). But try having a set of all sets that are members of themselves. You cannot avoid ending up with a set that is a member of itself twice (which is absurd).

Do you see how this is like the inversion of Russell's paradox?

Everyone recognises the impossibility of a set of all sets that are not members of themselves, but nobody seemed to have recognised the impossibility of a set of all sets that are members of themselves.

'member of itself twice' has no apparent mathematical meaning. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Yes I know. It's a contradiction for something to be a member of itself twice. I am saying that this is the logical consequence of a set of all sets that are members of themselves as proven here:

x, y and z, are sets that are not members of themselves. I am trying to form a set of these three sets that are not members of themselves.

A) It cannot be the case that x = {x, y, z} because that implies x is a member of itself, precisely because x is in x. But it can be the case that p = {x, y, z} precisely because x is not in x.

Now consider this: x, y, and z, are sets that are members of themselves. Consistency with A would be such that it cannot be the case that x = {x, y, z} precisely because x is in x. If we are to be consistent with A, then this either means that y and z are not members of themselves, or it means that y and z are members of themselves once, whilst x is a member of itself twice. Do you see my point?

A set of all sets that are not members of themselves is impossible precisely because one set will have to be a member of itself. In other words, x will have to be in x, but it can't.

A set of all sets that are members of themselves is impossible precisely because one set will have to be a member of itself twice. In other words, x will have to be in x, but it can't because that would either amount to x being a member of itself twice (with all other sets being members of themselves once), or it would amount to x being a member of itself once, with all other sets not being members of themselves.

Here you say they are members of themselves. If they are members of themselves, then x can be contained in x, right? — Amalac

That's the part I believe everyone has overlooked. I will try and show this clearly:

x, y and z, are sets that are not members of themselves. I am trying to form a set of these three sets that are not members of themselves.

A) It cannot be the case that x = {x, y, z} because that implies x is a member of itself, precisely because x is in x. But it can be the case that p = {x, y, z} precisely because x is not in x.

Now consider this: x, y, and z, are sets that are members of themselves. Consistency with A would have us say it cannot be the case that x = {x, y, z} precisely because x is in x. This either means that y and z are not members of themselves, or it means that y and z are members of themselves once, whilst x is a member of itself twice. Do you see my point with consistency? If I wrote p = {x, y, z} then you could say x, y, and z, are members of themselves precisely because x is not in x.

A set of all sets that are not members of themselves is impossible precisely because one set will have to be a member of itself. In other words, x will have to be in x, but it can't.

A set of all sets that are members of themselves is impossible precisely because one set will have to be a member of itself twice. In other words, x will have to be in x, but it can't because that would either amount to x being a member of itself twice (with all other sets being members of themselves once), or it would amount to x being a member of itself once, with all other sets not being members of themselves.

I am trying to bring consistency where I have seen inconsistency in mainstream set theory. Do you see the inconsistency in saying "you cannot have a set of all sets that are not members of themselves, but you can have a set of all sets that are members of themselves".

Once the above inconsistency is dealt with, we can see that the set of all sets is a member of itself, and it encompasses all sets that are not members of themselves (as well as itself). Note that this statement is not contradictory. Note that saying there can be no set that encompasses all sets is blatantly contradictory (and set theorists know this, they just haven't realised what they've overlooked). Again, the link in the OP covers this in more detail.

What if you view it this way:

The set of all sets encompasses all sets. It encompasses all sets that are not members of themselves, and it is a member of itself (because it encompasses itself). No contradictions here. See?

If interested, see the link in the OP for a more thorough discussion and solution of Russell's paradox.

I'm going back to the root of the matter. The problem occurred because there wasn't enough clarity with regards to what it is for a set to be a member of itself, and what it is for a set to not be a member of itself.

Consider the following:
Call any set that is not a member of itself a -V. Call any set that is not the set of all sets a V'. Call any set that's simply a set, a V (the V of all Vs = the set of all sets).

Is the V of all -Vs a member of itself? It is impossible to have a V of all -Vs that contains all -Vs and no other sets. You cannot have a set of all sets that are not members of themselves that is itself not a member of itself. You cannot have a -V as a V of all -Vs.

No V, or V’, or -V, can contain all -Vs and nothing more, but one V can contain all -Vs and something more.

Two Vs contain all V's:

One (which is a V') contains all V's and nothing more. The other (which is not a V') contains all V's and something more. The latter is the set of all sets (the V of all Vs), the former is the V' of all V's (the not-the-set-of-all-sets set of all not-the-set-of-all-sets sets). Thus, only one V can
contain all Vs and nothing more (the V of all Vs). Only one V' can contain all V's and nothing more (the V' of all V’s).

The above shows that whilst there can be no -V that contains all -Vs, there is a V that contains all -Vs. Whilst there can be two Vs that contain all -V’s, there can only be one V’ that contains all -V’s. -V and -V’ are semantically not the same. -V’ = any V’ set that is not a member of itself.

Rejecting the set of all sets is the last thing we should be doing, and it is a member of itself. See the link in the OP for a more detailed proof of this.

If y and z are members of x, then you actually can write it (if a set can be a member of itself). (I'm refering to the part where you say x is a member of itself). — Amalac

But my point is that x, y, and z are not members of themselves, whereas x = {x, y, z} means that x is a member of itself. Hence why I have to write something like p = {x, y, z} to represent x, y and z not being members of themselves.

But the key part of my post is that you cannot have a set of all sets that are members of themselves because it will result in at least one set being a member of itself twice. This is the overlooked part of Russell's paradox.

My argument is purely focused on semantics. If x is a contradictory (semantically inconsistent) belief/theory/statement, then x is certainly false and we are rationally obliged to recognise it as being false and treat it as such. Realism and plato take nothing away from this rational obligation of ours.

The jump from A) to B) is problematic. Because triangularity is a property, existence may not be one. — spirit-salamander

If x is existing, then it has the property of existing. Is it not contradictory to say x is existing, but it does not have the property of existing?

So your proof of God is based on a controversial premise. It is also based on a specific Platonism — spirit-salamander

Again, to me, if rejecting x results in a contradiction or inconsistency in semantics, then I'd see myself as being rationally obliged to acknowledge x as being true. Where you view existence as a property, the OP demonstrates that God certainly exists. I don't see how you can reject existence as being a property. Also, I'm not trying to advocate a theory of forms here. I'm trying to highlight that the following beliefs are contradictory:

1) God does not exist.
2) God is not at least as real as we are (there is nothing more real than that which perfectly exists because it encompasses and sustains all lesser realities/beings (imperfect beings/realities or non-God beings).

This phrasing could create misunderstandings. To be an imaginary human is to exist in the mind or imagination as a property of the mind or imagination. — spirit-salamander

To be an imaginary human is to exist at least as a hypothetical possibility in existence. Santa is a hypothetically possible being (as opposed to a necessary one). Whether he is in our world/universe or not, is another matter. He (or something that resembles him) may be in dreams that some people have.

That which perfectly exists sustains all hypothetical possibilities, realities, worlds/universes and so on. There is nothing more real than that which perfectly exists because it encompasses all realities and hypothetical possibilities.

We are not the sustainers of the items of thought we imagine, or the dreams/nightmares we have. A finite being or existence cannot sustain an infinite number of semantics or hypothetical possibilities. Only an infinite being/existence sustains an infinite number of semantics or hypothetically possibilities.

I'm not trying to discuss religion here (though I value religion). Just matters of pure reason.

We can doubt ourselves, but we cannot doubt God's existence. This is the only thing I'm trying to highlight here.

This is not a feeling, my only true friend. My remark was a reasoned opinion. There are no feelings involved in there at all. — god must be atheist

Then what I should have said is if that's what you call reasoning...

Since when? This you declare categorically, without any proof or attempt at it. — god must be atheist

Because it is semantically inconsistent for there to be two omnipresent beings. For there to be two omnipresent being, non-existence would have to separate them. In order for non-existence to separate them, non-existence would have to exist. Non-existence existing in contradictory. Hence why existence is infinite and omnipresent. This is why an infinite number of hypothetical possibilities or semantics are in existence. A finite existence cannot accommodate an infinite number of semantics.

But an omnipotent being can make a non-doable into a doable. — god must be atheist

See my reply here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/546051

Why not? You come out with these cockamamie declarations that 1. don't make sense 2. don't have any reference and 3. don't have any proof. — god must be atheist

If that's how you feel, then I don't think there's any point in you and me discussing the OP any further.

If you think creating round squares is "something" that an omnipotent being should be able to, then consistency would have you believe that geometry should encompass "shapes" like triangular pentagons or round-squares.

Anyway, you're profoundly confused about the nature of omnipotence and your proof of God does not work for reasons I have already explained to you. — Bartricks

We cannot have a meaningful/rational (semantically consistent) discussion if we accept contradictory statements (semantically inconsistent statements) as being meaningful (semantically consistent) objections.

Is it doable to move any amount of weight? Yes.

Is it doable to create a weight that is so heavy that it's not movable? Yes. — god must be atheist

Yes, but only for non-God beings.

Any weight that any non-God being can lift, God can lift that weight plus more. So God can create a rock so heavy that you cannot lift, but neither you nor God can create a rock so heavy that He cannot lift. A rock so heavy that God cannot lift is as absurd as an omnipresent rock. Here's a passage from one of my posts:

Omnipotence = being able to do all that is doable (completely perfect/absolute power/freedom). That which is Omnipotent cannot be expected to "create a round square" because creating a round square cannot be classified as a doable thing. Since it is not a doable thing, it is irrelevant to Omnipotence. For something to be meaningfully classed as being doable (and therefore expected of an Omnipotent being to be able to do), it must at least be meaningful (semantically consistent). If one absurdly insists that an Omnipotent being should be able to do absurd things like create something from nothing, or create a rock so heavy that he cannot lift, or move forwards and backwards at the same time, then the absurd answer of "yes he can", can be given. Maintaining such absurd standards, one can then go on to insist that they have made sense of "an Omnipresent rock", "a rock so heavy that an Omnipotent/Omnipresent being cannot lift", "round squares", "1 + 1 = 3" etc. and then use them in "rational" discourse as though they are meaningful objections.

Link:

http://philosophyneedsgods.com/2021/04/03/why-it-is-impossible-for-gods-attributes-to-be-contradictory/

You are confused. You do not understand omnipotence and thus do not grasp the concept of God.
God can do anything. A being who can create himself is more powerful than one who can't. So you are profoundly confused if you identify omnipotence with the latter and not the former. — Bartricks

I think you fail to treat contradictions as contradictions, and as a result of this, you present contradictory objections as though they are non-contradictory objections.

I suggest you consider the following:

http://philosophyneedsgods.com/2020/08/12/the-first-item-of-knowledge/

Yet in your definition perfection is that which is the greatest. Well, given two or more equally great systems, neither or none of them are greater than the others. — god must be atheist

You cannot have more than one perfect being because you cannot have more than one omnipresent being.

God cannot create himself. God cannot create an omnipotent being. God cannot create a round-square or a married-bachelor.

Omnipotence = being able to do all that is doable

Creating round-squares, or creating God is not something that is doable, therefore, it is irrelevant to omnipotence.

God does not have to be perfect. — Bartricks

If x is not perfect, then x is not the true/real God. You cannot be lacking in might and call yourself THE God. x might call himself a god if he thinks he is the most powerful person on the plant, but x would not be the true God because he lacks power.

God is that which no greater than in being/existence/existing can be conceived of (not unlike how a perfect triangle is that which no greater in triangularity than can be conceived of)

There may be a view that being omniscient and/or omnipotent is not a feature of the perfect being. — god must be atheist

If x is not omnipotent and omniscient, then x is not truly free. Nor is he able to ensure that everyone gets what they truly deserve. If x is not omnipotence and omniscient, then a truly perfect existence is impossible.

There is no way you can describe x as being really perfect without describing it as being really/truly omnipotent and omniscient. There is no way you can describe x as being a really perfect existence, without x being completely real. Real good is better than imaginary good. And imaginary evil is better than real evil (unless of course, one is evil. Only evil/irrational people would say real evil is better than imaginary evil. In that sense, real evil is better for evil/irrational people, because that is what they have sought. And even if they have not sought it, it is what they deserve.

My focus here is on what is rational and what is irrational. What is semantically consistent, and what is semantically inconsistent.

Where did you get that? It's simply not true. You certainly exist; I certainly exist; we are one and the same? Then how come we disagree? — god must be atheist

I get your instincts on this. But do you agree that it is not us who instantiate existence (as in do you agree that we are not our own sustainers and that we are contingent on a self sustaining thing/being/existent?). And do you agree that we can doubt ourselves as being who we think we are (we cannot say with certainty that our world is truly real. We cannot say with certainty we are who we think we are).

Consider following the link in the OP. Alternatively, look at the problems with Descartes' cogito (though I advise the former). At the very best, you can say that both you and I (whatever or whoever we may be) belong to that which perfectly/indubitably exists. You cannot doubt that the existence of that which perfectly exists (just as you cannot doubt that the triangularity of that which is perfectly triangular).

We do not instantiate existence (contrary to mainstream solipsism), and when we take an absolute approach, we are not that which indubitably exists (contrary to Descartes' cogito).

Perhaps you meant that they are possible.

But you haven't addressed the criticism from Kant, you've gone off on a tangent instead. Your notion of existence is at odds with the whole of mathematical logic. — Banno

I think I have addressed Kant. Again, what I am proposing is not what Descartes proposed.

I make a distinction between that which perfectly/truly exists and that which does not. Descartes did not do this. Descartes just assumed that it's better to exist. The first time I saw Descartes' ontological argument, I got could see something, but I could also see that his argument was not right. I liked his cosmological argument much more and I cannot believe how lazy western philosophers were in addressing that argument.

Given a truly perfect existence, it's better to not exist if one is evil because perfection entails that evil really suffers. But given our lack of omnipotence, it's not us who decide who lives and who dies and who dreams of what and who suffers what nightmare.

Also, if you are interested, have a look at my reply to Amalac here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/545714

or follow the link in the OP for a greater illustration of what it is to indubitably/truly exist.

if x is possible, then x exists as a hypothetical possibility. if x is perfect, then x exists perfectly. One cannot doubt the existence of that which perfectly exists. One cannot doubt that existence encompasses/sustains all realities (if we are to differentiate between realities). One cannot say x is independent of existence when x is not an absurdity (like a married-bachelor).

SO things are absurd because they do not exist? But that's not right, since three-dollar notes do not exist, but are surely not absurd. — Banno

Three dollar notes exist (not in your mind or my mind because we (or our minds) are not the sustainers of an infinite number of semantics or hypothetical possibilities. God is. We just have access to these semantics or hypothetical possibilities that existence (God) sustains or grants us access to, kind of like a computer having access to the internet, yet not being the sustainer of all the files available on the internet). Three dollar notes are hypothetically possible, which means they exist as hypothetical possibilities in existence). They do not physically (by our standards of physical) exist in the America of our what we call our waking reality or timeline or universe as far as I am aware. Round squares do not exist at all. Finally, existence/God is omnipresent. He sustains all realities/possibilities. His non-existence is as contradictory as a triangle's two-sidedness. He is necessarily at least as real as us (just a a perfect triangle is necessarily at least as triangular as an imperfect triangle), because that which perfectly exists (the omnipresent) is necessarily at least as real as us. We cannot say reality exists independently of existence (and only God can meaningfully/semantically qualify for the semantic of existence in an indubitable or absolute sense).

That way we can have things that are not contradictions but nevertheless do not exist. — Banno

That leads to contradictions when you take the non-absolute approach (many things exist). It will not lead to contradictions when you take the absolute approach (only that which perfectly exists, actually exists. That being God).

There's nothing contradictory about it (though the way Meinong expressed his ideas is peculiar) — Amalac

So you say:

I'd say a human that is merely imagined has being, but does not exist.

Going by the non-absolute standard:

You're saying the imagined human does not exist. Which means that the human I just imagined now does not exist as the human I just imagined now. Do you see the contradiction? If I imagined a unicorn, then the unicorn I imagined existed when I successfully imagined it. For you to say "no, that unicorn did not exist" is for you to say that there did not exist a unicorn that I imagined (which is contradictory given that I successfully imagined one).

What we are interested in here is existence outside the mind, right? — Amalac

I am interested in having a semantically consistent belief system or philosophical theory. Either one takes the absolute approach (only God truly/indubitably exists), or the non-absolute approach (many things exist). If I've understood you right, you seem to have opted for the latter, but somehow rejected God's necessary existence in the process, whilst acknowledging your own being as amounting to existence, or meaningfully/semantically qualifying as existence. This is the equivalent of accepting an imperfect triangle's triangularity, yet rejecting a perfect triangle's triangularity. Such a move is contradictory (semantically inconsistent).

If Descartes' cogito showed us anything, it's that we cannot be certain of our own existence. But reason/semantics dictate that we cannot reject the existence of existence. So whilst we recognise that we can doubt our own being-ness, we cannot doubt the being-ness or existence of that which perfectly exists. Semantics dictate that this is God (as demonstrated in the OP).

I believe the link in the OP illustrates this truth further with greater depth and breadth.

The mind is not independent of existence (or that which perfectly exists). The semantics that the mind has access to mean what they mean and they should be treated as such. That which perfectly exists, should be treated as that which perfectly exists. To say a perfect being/existence does not exist or is not real or the reality, is to contradict the semantics that the mind is aware of.

If we use Meinong's terminology, then yes, I do have existence. If you are not using that terminology, then clearly you are assuming here that existence is a predicate (“I have/ don't have existence”) and can therefore be refuted by Kant's objection. — Amalac

No it can't. If you can't meaningfully distinguish between a perfect being or existence and an imperfect being or existence, then you could say "existence is not a predicate". But you cannot do this.

That which is perfectly triangular is triangular.
That which is perfectly existing, is existing.

In the above two sentences, both existing and triangular are predicates. That which perfectly exists, and that which is perfectly triangular are both objectively meaningful.

...which seems to me to conflate the first order "triangles have three sides " with the second order "triangles exist". — Banno

Either we take an absolute approach with regards to existence, or we take a non-absolute approach. If we do the former, then only one thing truly exists: God (see the OP for this). If we do the latter, then any given meaningful thing exists (including Sherlock Holmes and unicorns). This is a predicate of all meaningful things because we can compare them to absurdities such as round-squares. Whilst absurd concepts exist, what they describe does not exist. On the other hand, meaningful concepts exist (as well as what they describe).

To say "existence is not a predicate" is to say what is contradictory. It implies that the semantic "existence" does not say anything about a particular concept. The concept of "round-square" is absurd. Why is it absurd? Because round-squares do not exist (or are not true of existence depending on how you want to word it). They do not take the predicate of existing in existence or being related or tied to existence.

in that case I'd say a human that is merely imagined has being, but does not exist. — Amalac

How is that not contradictory?

Does a Sherlock Holmes exist on this planet? Unknown (very unlikely).
Does a Sherlock Holmes at least exist as a character (perhaps in a story)? Yes.

Is Sherlock Holmes an imperfect being/existent? Yes.

Once again, if you are following Meinong, all you are saying is that unicorns have being but don't have existence, since they only exist in the mind, whereas I have existence since I exist both as an idea in the mind and also outside the mind. — Amalac

If we take the absolute approach (no degrees), then no, you don't have existence. Descartes' I think therefore I am established that something indubitably exists. It did not establish that that thing was him. (Hence why I have titled this thread God as the true cogito).

If we take the non-absolute approach (varying degrees), then imperfect triangles and perfect triangles are both triangles. But perfect triangles are maximally triangular. They cannot be any more perfect or complete in terms of triangularity. Here you do not reject the triangularity of any triangle.

Imperfect beings (Sherlock and Biden included) and God are both beings. But only God cannot be any more complete/perfect as a being. Here, you do not reject the existence of any meaningful thing/existent/being.

Yes, and I believe I addressed it.

What do you mean by “perfectly existing”? — Amalac

Do you agree with the following:

To be an imaginary human, is to exist an imaginary human?
To be a human on planet earth, it to exist as a human on planet earth?

Do you agree that to be imperfect as a triangle, is to exist imperfectly as a triangle?
Do you agree that to be imperfect as a being/existent, is to exist imperfectly as a being/existent?

Note that you cannot say to be a square-circle, is to exist as a square-circle. Such a thing is impossible. Absurdities and contradictions exist, but what they describe (round squares) does not. By definition that which is contradictory is absurd or not true of existence.

If you want to be absolute with your semantics, then the following is true:

Triangle = that which has three sides with its interior angles totalling 180 degrees.
Perfection = that which is perfect. The perfect being. That which perfectly exists.

It is not us who exist. We are sustained by existence (or that which completely/truly/perfectly/indubitably exists). We can doubt ourselves as being/existing perfectly, but we cannot doubt existence as being/existing perfectly.

If you don’t want to be absolute with your semantics, then the following is true:

An imperfect triangle is a triangle, it’s just not a perfect triangle. You cannot doubt the latter's triangularity.
A human is still a being, it’s just not a perfect being. You cannot doubt the latter's being/existence.
A contradiction is still a being/existent, it's just not a perfect being/existent. You cannot doubt the latter's being/existence.

It's the treating existence as a predicate that gets me; saying something exists is not like saying it has three sides. That's why existential quantifiers are not first-order predicates. — Banno

Triangularity and existence/being/existing are both meaningful, and I believe I have been sincere to those semantics.

If I asked you what's perfectly triangular, an objective answer can be given.

If I asked you what's perfectly existing/being, again an objective answer can be given.

1) Do you acknowledge that it's contradictory to say x exists perfectly when x is not God (or a truly/really perfect existence, or at least existing in a truly perfect existence)?

2) Do you acknowledge that whatever's perfectly x, is indubitably x? Thus, whatever's perfectly existing, is indubitably existing?

Again, Descartes' cogito showed that we cannot be sure of our own being/existence. Yet we cannot deny being/existence. I think the OP and the link provided sheds light on this issue.

See my other post you ignored here: — Amalac

The reason you can tell that x is better than y in terms of triangularity, is because x is greater in resembling perfect triangularity (or a perfect triangle).

The reason you can tell that x is better than y in being/existing, is because x is greater in resembling a perfect being.

It’s not random or magic that you can tell which is a better triangle
It’s not random or magic that you can tell which is a better being.
Good and evil is not a matter of randomness or magic. Evil is that which is insincere to truth, goodness, and God.

Any given theory or belief or statement that is contradictory (semantically-inconsistent), is contradictory or false by definition/semantics. It’s just the way existence is. Anyone who believes in that which is contradictory is absurd/contradictory/unreasonable/evil.

I strongly recommend the link in the OP. I believe it makes this matter (the difference between the true cogito and Descartes') more clearer.

I'm well aware of Kant and Descartes. But my argument is different. You are not addressing my argument directly. Quote something directly from the OP and show a problem with it if you are able.

1) Do you think it's better to be in a truly perfect existence or not?
2) Do you think it's better to be God or not?

You cannot say no to 1 and 2 without contradicting or being insincere to the semantics that you are aware of.

"existence is not a predicate" is not a refutation of what I have presented. When I say to you what perfectly exists or what is perfectly triangular? You can answer both. A perfect triangle regarding the latter, and a perfect being/existent regarding the former. To reject the latter or the former, is to contradict the semantics that you are aware of.

Descartes seemed to want to reject pantheism. So he did not equate God with Existence. And given the confusion of western philosophers with regards to the semantic of being and existence, they did not provide a complete ontological argument.

But it does not follow that a perfect being is omnipotent, omniscient — Bartricks

If x is not omnipotent and omnipresent, then x is not a perfect being (or perfectly existing), because better being/existents than it can be conceived of.

Either you recognise this semantically, or don't. If you don't recognise it, then I cannot convince you. But I don't understand how you can say x is truly perfect despite x lacking absolute freedom (omnipotence).

Only one thing is truly existing. The link has more info on the OP if you are interested.

There is also the devil corollary: — Amalac

We know what it is to be perfectly triangular. I then asked "what is it to perfectly exist?" and the answer is clear:

Real good/benefit is better than pretend good/benefit, and pretend evil/harm is better than real evil/harm, unless of course one wants Hell (it takes absurdity/irrationality/insanity/evil to want this). When existing is the standard, nothing is better than God. It is better to be the real God than to exist as just an illusion/image of God (the real God is better than all humans or image/imaginary/pretend gods). We are meaningfully/semantically aware that something perfectly/indubitably exists, semantics dictate that this is the real/true God

The only people who think being evil is perfection, are those who are absurd/evil/contradictory/inconsistent/incoherent. Only an idiot/fool would want to be pig-like as opposed to god-like. And only an idiot would favour an imperfect existence over a truly perfect existence.

Well said. There's an odd sort of self-deception needed to accept such arguments. — Banno

One just has to be sincere to the semantics that they are aware of without bias and prejudice.

If you think there is/exists something better than God or a truly perfect existence, then you should serve, commit or worship that. But you will not find such a thing.

You can doubt yourselves (check Descartes' cogito's flaws), but you cannot doubt that which perfectly exists. Semantics/reason dictate that this is God (or a truly perfect existence. God and a truly perfect existence amount to the same thing).

If one is sincere to the semantics that they are aware of, then they are not insincere to the truth. We are aware of the semantic of triangle. We are obliged to acknowledge that three-sidedness is a semantical component of the semantic of triangle. Similarly, we are obliged to acknowledge that reality and existence are semantical components of God, or a truly perfect existence.

We can compare how good something is in terms of triangularity by comparing it to a perfect triangle.
We can compare how good something is in terms of goodness by comparing it to God. Why else do you think semantics are such that true perfection = a truly perfect existence or God? Can you deny this? Can you say there are better things than a truly perfect existence or God? You cannot, just as you cannot deny the three-sidedness of a triangle.

These are the dictates of pure reason and semantics. We do not create semantics, we access them. It is nature of that which truly/perfectly exists (God) that allows us access to an infinite number of semantics.

This is neither Descartes' or Anselm's ontological argument. Their instincts and intentions may have been right, but their execution not through enough.

I think the argument presented in the OP is solid and clear. Its rejection leads to inconsistencies in semantics. Plus, the link adds more detail to this if you are at all interest in a truly perfect existence.

If you say exactly which specific part you disagree with, I believe I will show you that your disagreement will lead to a contradiction in semantics.