"Wait, if I do not like doing this, why would I want this to be a way of life for other people?" — schopenhauer1

Well first off, most people like doing this. And second: For these reasons:

the belief that the project is worth continuing somehow. Or the belief that not continuing the project is somehow harmful. Among a slew of other justifications(orders from God and such) — khaled

That this way of life needs (somehow) to take place? — schopenhauer1

That's justification #1. There are plenty of others that people use.

And if this is a political choice, what is wrong with the contrarian view of this? — schopenhauer1

Objectively? Nothing.

Why is one praised be default? — schopenhauer1

Because it is intuitive and the majority believe it.

So my premises are on why we create ANY socio-economic-cultural arrangements — schopenhauer1

Because those who didn't create them died out. And the ones that are left were the ones that felt the need to create such arrangements. So their children will also probably feel the same need due to either genetics or culture or both (probably both).

If you're asking for why, that's why. If you're asking for justification: That would require the belief that the project is worth continuing somehow. Or the belief that not continuing the project is somehow harmful. Among a slew of other justifications(orders from God and such)

Except determinism makes enormous claims, like the idea that this post I am now writing was predetermined since the Big Bang. — Olivier5

And indeterminism makes enormous claims. Like the idea that things can happen for no reason.

What is or isn’t a “gigantic claim” is a matter of personal preference. Burden of proof already assumes that your position is the “default”. There is no such thing.

Let's start over. I don't understand what you're not getting. Or what I'm not getting.

First, let's establish whether or not people having different contents of epiphenomena is possible theoretically. Is there any theory or law that breaks by me having a different experience of red from you?

It's how we're identifying what the epiphenomenon is of. Otherwise, how are you claiming that the aspect of your whole epiphenomenological experience at the time is in any way 'of red'? — Isaac

In other words, it's the structure determining physical difference.

The content could still be different.

So when I see that table, the light reflecting from it hits my retina which causes a cascade of signals to travel through my brain, one of which (combined with other signals identifying your request and an appropriate type of response), causes me to form the word 'red'. — Isaac

And this happens every time you see a red object correct?

So the physical conditions are the same? So shouldn't the epiphenomena be the same? In other words, there will be a similarity between experiences of "red".

If there is no similarity, despite the fact that the physical conditions are the same then how do you explain the difference, causally?

By that definition, it can't be defined by being caused by wavelengths of light can it — Isaac

It can't be defined by being caused by wavelengths of light alone.

There are no signals running from your cone cells to your big toe in response to the wavelength of light, so how can a signal from your big toe be causally related to the signal from your cone cells if there's no physical connection? — Isaac

What makes you think there needs to be a physical connection for a physical difference to have an effect on the epiphenomena?

The only way we're carving out some aspect of a person's holistic experience as being of red is that it is caused by the same physical components as are stimulated by the 600nm wavelength (or that they are associated with the word 'red' - therefore publicly learnt). — Isaac

Agreed.

Now let's call this person's experience of red X.

Let's call mine Y.

On what basis do you conclude that X and Y are the same?

I'm following your line of thinking. — Isaac

So you don't actually think it's the case. Let me follow that line of thinking.

By your estimation the commonality between things we call "red" is purely that we agreed to call them "red". I now ask how did you obtain the knowledge that blood is to be called "red"? Did you obtain it when someone else told you "blood is called red"? Presumably yes.

If so, then how do you explain the fact when people see new objects they can easily tell what color they are?

To demonstrate:

https://www.ikea.com/jp/en/p/ekedalen-extendable-table-dark-brown-90340806/

What color is this table?

You have never seen this table before correct? So how did you guess the answer?

they’ll produce a similar experience in exposure to similar wavelengths.
— khaled

Yep. — Isaac

But a second ago when I asked you whether or not there is something common between experiences of red you replied with a staunch “No”. So what happened?

So the content of that experience (the one just caused by your cone cells responding to 600nm wavelengths) can't have anything whatsoever to do with your big toe can it? — Isaac

False.

the only way we're dividing the experience of 'red' from everything else going on at the time is by restricting it to that which is caused by your cone cells responding to 600nm wavelengths. — Isaac

Agreed. Except the experience of red need not be the same for different people does it? Even if they have similar V4 areas, there is plenty of other physical differences between them that can account for them having different experiences.

How could I possibly guess it's colour if I didn't know the name of it's colour? What would my answer consist of? — Isaac

That’s not what I said. You know what each color word means. You know what “blue” and “red” and “purple”.... mean. You are shown a new object. How do you know which word to apply?

Your answer seems to be “because the cone cells can tell”. I’m not disagreeing with that. The point is: When the cone cells process the same wavelength don’t they produce the same epiphenomena? Can’t that be the commonality between red things?

That was one of your oldest points wasn’t it? If the physical conditions are the same then how do you explain having different epiphenomena? If a 600nm wavelength light hits your eye, you’d expect to have a similar experience. Otherwise you’d have to introduce another cause for epiphenomena that is not physical to account for the dissimilarity.

You're undermining your own position on epiphenomenology. Just because the experience accompanies the physical activity in the brain, doesn't mean it is the cause of it. — Isaac

Nor did I claim it did. But I wasn’t being clear.

The fact that we have a similar epiphenomena when looking at red things is caused by the fact that the physical reaction to red things is similar (same wavelength getting processed). And I don’t understand why you push the ridiculous claim that experiences of red have nothing in similar. If the physical conditions are similar, why would the epiphenomena not be similar?

I was asking you about the nature of that content, but you seem to have avoided the question. — Isaac

If that’s what you were asking then it’s the same as unenlightened’s question: “What does red look like”. I can’t answer that. Neither can you.

Just look at a bunch of red things and find the commonality. There definitely is one. And it’s not just you wanting to use the same word.

If that was the ONLY commonality, again, you wouldn’t be able to tell the color of new things. But if I show you a chair you’ve never seen before you would definitely be able to guess its color. Because the cone cells would be able to tell. Which is also to say that they’ll produce a similar experience in exposure to similar wavelengths.

One chooses what one wishes to believe. — MondoR

......

There is zero evidence that physics is deterministic — MondoR

False.

It is just a personal, spiritual decision that one makes on how they wish to think of their life. — MondoR

Or it could only feel that way while not being a decision at all. That is the matter in question in this thread. Repeatedly saying “it is a choice” does not make it so.

Some picture themselves as bowling balls, others as marionettes, and others as personal creators. — MondoR

All of these picture are compatible with determinism. They’re just attitudes.

Yes, I feel like I am choosing as does pretty much every human being. So why the mythology of determinism? — MondoR

“It feels that way therefore it must be that way”

There is no substantiation for it. It's just a story. — MondoR

There is plenty of substantiation for it. Physics for one is deterministic. Or can be at least

No reason to believe otherwise. — MondoR

Maybe. But notice how your argument changed from “The world is not deterministic” to “No reason to believe the world is deterministic”

The latter is much easier to make.

And regardless, even if this were true and the world was indeterministic, how does that result in free will? How does adding some randomness help? You seem to think that establishing indeterminism is equivalent to establishing that we have free will.

You choose to be a balling ball thrown by the Maker. — MondoR

When have I said that? I don’t know if the world is deterministic or not. Again, unsubstantiated claims and oversimplification.

And in either case, what makes you think either of those leads to freedom?

Of course. One can choose to believe any story they wish. — MondoR

Again, unsubstantiated claim. You could merely be feeling like you’re choosing. You can’t dodge the problem by saying “Why yes I have a choice” over and over.

In the meantime, you'd agree with me that many other people think of their mind as a kind of captain of their body. Hence they assume minds have causal force. — Olivier5

Sure. Problem is when they also think that the mind is completely divorced from physical systems. That it’s entirely non-physical.

Yes, I haven't been arguing that the mind is non-physical in any substantive sense — Janus

Oh. My bad then.

If you were not a dualist just say so sooner.

The insight is the result of a choice by the mind to explore, to learn something new, to create a new idea, and with whom to share it. — MondoR

Evidence? It could just be that the insight is a result of atoms bumping into each other.

As usual you make unsubstantiated claims. You’ve been doing it since the start of the thread. The answer to “Do we have free will” can’t simply be an unsubstantiated “Yes”. You need to support your argument.

Otherwise one is just a bowling ball colliding with pins because the Maker [the Big Bang] made all of the decisions at that point in time — MondoR

Possible.

The Big Bang gets credit for everything. — MondoR

Why would it? You are willing to give credit to a literal explosion than to give it to the group of atoms that is most influential to the insight (the scientists)?

The alternative is a decision that is not determined by anything other than the self, with the self not being (wholly) determined by anything and the decision being purposeful. — Janus

So the requirements seem to be: Some randomness + deliberation + decision is being made by the self (whatever that is)

Well, we can get deliberation out of the way. Determinism or not, our choices can be deliberate.

And we can get decision is being made by the self out of the way too. Who else would make the decision? Determinism or no determinism, the self will always be the source of decisions. Then again, I suspect we have different definitions of “self”

Finally, the last requirement is ontological randomness. I don’t think this is actually a requirement. Let’s assume for a second that the world is fundamentally indeterministic:

Say you’re a prisoner in a jail cell that you cannot break out of. One day the guard removed the door and says “You’re free to leave but you will be shot if you step foot outside, and our snipers never miss”. Have you just become more free? I don’t think so. I don’t think gaining the ability to do something you would never do is an increase in freedom.

Before the door was removed, you had no choice. You could not have chosen to leave if you wanted to. That’s determinism. After it was removed you had a choice, IE indeterminism, but you would never want to leave anyways. And yet you were no more free. So the variable that seems to matter is not whether or not you can ACTUALLY choose differently. As here is an example where you are just as free being unable to choose as when having a choice.

Point is: I don’t think freedom is incompatible with determinism. What matters is whether or not you’re doing what you want to do. Not whether or not you can actually do otherwise.

Exactly. It is new insight — MondoR

And new insight does not classify as “outcome”? Outcome of years of research and dedication maybe?

Your life is totally meaningless. — MondoR

Why do you think so? I certainly don’t think so.

Do you actually plan on engaging with new ideas or do you want to spout unsubstantiated nonsense like this?

Yes, if 'physical' means 'non-mental', as is often conceived including by Khaled. — Olivier5

I usually hear it the other way around. That the mental is non physical. Physical is whatever physicists study. People don’t want to associate with their own brains for some reason.

But if one considers the mind itself as a cause, as a force in the world, then I think it follows that mental events ought to be regarded as 'physical'. They must have some materiality. The mind maters. — Olivier5

This is one way to reconcile them. But people say this is “reductive”. Something about minds being described as forces makes people cringe for some reason.

The other, keeping the “mental is not physical” premise would force one to admit that the mental runs parallel to the physical but doesn’t interfere with it.

Usually people try to sit somewhere in the middle. The mind matters but also the mind has nothing to do with “mere physical processes”. Which just makes no sense.

A model which does not predict individual events, but instead predicts the aggregate outcome of many events in a statistical manner, is not a determinist model. Period. — Olivier5

False.

That cannot be reconciled with the idea that our decisions are wholly determined by physical processes — Janus

Is exactly where I'd disagree with you. It just requires a definition of freedom and moral responsibility that makes any sense.

So I accept that the two paradigms are correct in their own contexts, and make no demand that the irreconcilable be reconciled. — Janus

The way you defined freedom doesn't just make them irreconcilable. It makes them contradictory. You are proposing that something mental can affect a physical system. That's an empirical claim. That telekinesis is possible.

If it isn't then what exactly do you mean by "My decision caused me to go to the candy store" or whatever your first example was?

Yes, they're both objects I can refer to the colour of with the word 'red'. — Isaac

The experience of seeing a red postbox seems very distinct from the one of seeing a red letter 'A', but no distinguishable components. — Isaac

And all objects you can refer to with the word "red" do not share anything at all in your experience? Not even a vague resemblance? I find that hard to believe.

To demonstrate: If I were to show a completely new object. Something you've never seen before. Would you be able to guess its color? I find that likely. Even though you never heard the color of that object being uttered before.

So there must be something common to red things other than the word use. Or else we would never be able to guess the colors of things without knowing the answer previously. We would need to be told that each object is this or that color, if the only commonality is word use. Like studying a language. I can't guess what "Economics" means in German, I would have to be told the word.

Additionally, that something cannot simply be that they emit the same wavelength or any such scientific measure. Although those are also commonalities of red things, they are not the commonalities we use to distinguish them in everyday life. When I ask you what the color of something you've never seen before is, you don't pull out an optic wavelength meter. You can just tell by looking at it. You don't need to know the wavelength emitted.

So the thing common to red things that you use to tell them apart must be in the experience produced when we look at them. That is the only source which can account for our uncanny ability to guess the color of things for which we never heard the proper color said before and for which we lack a scientific measure of properties.

@Banno made the same argument and frankly I find it ridiculous. There is clearly more in common between a red letter "A" and a red post box other than the word use, as if that was the only commonality, we would have to be told what color each object is on a case by case basis and would never be able to guess the colors of new objects. And it is not merely the wavelength emitted, as if it was, we wouldn't be able to tell what color things are without an optic wavelength meter, and we wouldn't have come up with words such as "red" before discovering how lightwaves work, but that's clearly false.

One whose boundaries are created by public criteria. The reason for the 'slice' is public. — Isaac

Sure. And so the postbox and the red letter A would be such "public phenomena" no? The boundary of where the post box starts and ends is public. That is the common factor across all post boxes. They share a single purpose and a general shape of a container for one.

Knowing what the public criteria is, is precisely being able to recognize whether or not something is a post box, or red, or the letter A or what have you.

Point is the thing being cut up, the "raw material" need not be the same. As long as you can tell the difference between red and the other colors, that's all that's required for communication. And the way we tell is by finding common aspects in our experience as I show above. But the contents of the experience need not be the same.

Whether or not you can practically predict it is different from whether or not it is fundamentally deterministic or random. I doubt any of those theories state that active transport across a cell membrane is fundamentally random rather than pragmatically so.

If you ask someone what colour the word 'RED' is (when printed in blue ink), they'll usually say 'red'. — Isaac

No they won’t they’ll just be delayed in saying blue. I did some stroop test research 1st year undergrad. It’s very rare that participants straight up make a mistake.

but no distinguishable components. — Isaac

Hint: There may be something similar about the post box and the red letter “A”.

I’m more curious what you meant by this though:

With public epiphenomena we have the arbitrary (and loose) linguistic boundaries, with their 'props' of set membership. — Isaac

What is a public epiphenomena?

Regardless I have to go now. That’s enough philosophizing for me for a while.

There's no pre-identified slice that always precedes saying 'red'. — Isaac

That’s just false. No clue where you got that.

Is there nothing at all similar in your experience each time you want to describe something you see as red? You might want to get checked out for color blindness.

Experiences as epiphenomena can't 'make' us say red, only neural activity can do that. — Isaac

Sure but epiphenomena X is the one always preceding saying red. That’s what I meant.

public epiphenomena — Isaac

?

there's no way of distinguishing the 'slice' of epiphenomena associated with red — Isaac

If I hear “red” a hundred times I can deduce where the slice is. It’s the bit that’s always there every time someone uses the word “red” correctly. It’s vague but it’ll do.

And I responded to that explanation because it makes no sense. Pay attention.

Even if that were true, does adding randomness into the mix somehow make people more free?

I still don't see anything in there that's more than just saying there is such a distinction — Isaac

I’m not saying there is such a distinction. I’m saying there could be.

rather than explaining how it manifests. — Isaac

As I’ve said before, if there was such a distinction, we would never be able to narrow down what causes it.

what is the property being preserved over what sequence? — Isaac

Experience had over a sequence of perception events.

X is an experience that makes you communicate by saying “red”.

So it boils down to this:

the property being preserved is (for colour) relational retinal cone stimulation in a sequence of perception events - say red, red, red for the colourblind, as opposed to red, red, green for the normally sighted — Isaac

The point is, the experience that you communicate by saying “Red” need not be the same for everyone. If I have X and say “red” and you have Y and say “red” and when we look at an apple we have X and Y respectively each time, there will be no issue of communication.

that all physical, and more relevantly neural, processes must be deterministic. — Janus

I don’t have that presupposition. I don’t know if they’re deterministic or not. I know they’re either deterministic or random. And you define freedom so that it’s not either.

To be free is to be determined by the self — Janus

And what is this “self”? Could this be reworded to “To be free is to do what you want to do without external pressure to do otherwise”?

Decisions are not random because there is a purposeful intelligence in play. — Janus

Ah. So decisions are not deterministic. And also not random. How does that make sense? You’re proposing a 3rd way that things can happen. Not as a result of what happened before (aka not deterministic). And not NOT as a result of what happened before (aka not random). What the heck is that?

Something is either caused by what happened before it or it isn’t. The former is determinism. The latter is randomness. There is no in between. And when I say randomness I don’t mean a 50/50.

Essentially, utterances and discoveries have no meaning beyond being an outcome. — MondoR

And in your model someone discovering something is not an outcome?

So indeterminism is enough for freedom for you?

If I toss a dice and it lands on 3 did I choose 3? If we can prove that the movement of the dice was not wholly determined by its previous position is that really all it takes?

I'm treating indeterminism as the equivalent of randomness, or a mix of randomness and determinism.

whether or not minds can make free decisions. — Janus

For the mind to make a decision it must at least be capable of causing a physical change no? Or else "making a decision" would be completely outside the causal chain.

But I have no idea how you define your terms.

The question wasn't whether or not minds are reducible to brains. It was whether or not minds can cause physical changes. In other words, whether or not telekinesis is possible.

If you guys want to buy into misplaced scientistic dogma, be my guest. I'll trust my own experience any day. — Janus

I would expect something like this from a flat earther. Surprisingly I see it a lot on the forum. People trusting the way things seem over the way things have been found to be.

Why do you think it's misplaced?

a surprising number. Including me.

So (for tomorrow, as I have work today) could you explain again the difference between structure and content as you're using the terms in the context of experience? — Isaac

I think the best way to explain is this:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isomorphism

Specifically the bit around this: "Even though these two groups "look" different in that the sets contain different elements, they are indeed isomorphic: their structures are exactly the same."

I am saying that our experiences need only be isomorphisms, not identical, for us to be able to communicate. I'm treating experiences as a set. So you have the set of experiences XXY, and I have LLM. Same structure but different contents.

If you mess with the V4 area I might then suddenly have experiences LLL or MMM in response to the same stimuli. As in, I no longer can tell that the last object is different. Here I have a different structure AND different content from you (L/M is not X or Y). So changes in V4 area change the structure. They might ALSO change the content, but I'm assuming they only change structure for now.

Now if I mess with some physical property P of yours, I might be able to get you to experience TTN. In this case, the contents changed but the structure is preserved. P would be a structure preserving difference. A simple example: Color inverting glasses. You still have the ability to distinguish between the colors, but the contents have all changed. Your experiences in that case change from XXY to YYX.

You can adjust to color inverting glasses. Heck, you can put on color inverting glasses and practice a bit to "flip" your wording accordingly (so if you see something you used to call "red" you now call it "green") and no one in the world would be able to tell that you have them on except by seeing them. Eventually, you might forget you ever put them on, as you completely adjust. The structure of experience is preserved but the content changed, and that makes no difference to your behavior (after you adjust).

Glaucoma on the other hand is an example of a structural physical change. If you get Glaucoma, XXY becomes YYY. You now cannot distinguish between red and green. And we can easily tell when that happens. You can never adjust to it.

Content-determining differences preserve the isomorphism.

How does that tell us where to cut the continuous and unfiltered 'experience'. — Isaac

?

When you hear "apple" a thousand times you tend to understand what the common element in all those utterances is. Mainly, the observation of a sweet spherical object that is red, yellow or green.

then how can I know that the commonality is not our big toes (rather than the wavelengths of light)? — Isaac

Because people of all toe sizes can use color words accurately. So if toe size affects our experience it would be a content-determining difference.

The toe size could be a content-determining difference, not a structure determining one. The latter are what matter, and what we study. If it was a structure determining difference we would have discovered that above a certain toe size, (or below) people stop being able to distinguish colors. That is not the case.

How can we know where to cut then? — Isaac

By seeing how others use the words.

Finding the commonality between every instance of someone saying "red". The commonality is hazy, but usable.

Sometimes we can't do that. Colorblind people for instance, see the same common elements when people say "red" as when they say "green".

What's baffling to me, is how, having done so, having sieved and diced this thing, having taken it to the academy, shown it around and agreed where it should be cut and what elements belong in what category,... people then what to claim that the remaining diced and filtered sections are all-of-a-sudden ineffable again, private — Isaac

Their contents are ineffable and private. But the cuts aren't. The cuts are cultural, biological, and sometimes personal.

In the same way that if I have XXY and you have LLM, we can still communicate because we have the same cuts, but I cannot tell you what X is and you cannot tell me what L is. What matters is when X happens I say "red" and when L happens you say "red", and for X and L to happen respectively when we look at a red apple.