But the suggestion is, it was changed by an act of thought. — Wayfarer

But you haven’t shown that. It could also be the case that the thought coincided with the neural change. Not that it caused it. For it to have caused it:

we should expect to see some movement or other in the brain that has no detectable cause (because it was caused by the mind). This is an empirical claim not a philosophical one. One that I haven’t found any evidence for and plenty of evidence against. — khaled

What makes sense’ is an idea, not anything physical. — Wayfarer

When did I say otherwise?

I’m not disagreeing that we have non physical ideas. I’m disagreeing that they can have physical effects. That they can be part of the causal chain.

Well you’re saying that mind affects matter above and beyond matter affecting matter. In other words, the conscious thought to raise my arm is what causes me to raise my arm. If this is the case, we should expect that in the human brain there would be some movement or other that has no detectable cause (since it was caused by the mind, not merely the brain) that results in the arm raising. This goes against conservation of energy.

It’s as weird as throwing an astronaut into space, watching him move at a uniform speed for a while, then watching him suddenly.... stop. For no detectable reason. Then saying “That was his mind doing it”.

In other words, minds affecting brains is nothing short of telekinesis.

The brain as an object is an entirely different thing to an embodied brain. Neuroscience and philosophy are different disciplines. — Wayfarer

But the claim was that the mind alters the brain above and beyond the brain altering the brain. If so we should expect to see some movement or other in the brain that has no detectable cause (because it was caused by the mind). This is an empirical claim not a philosophical one. One that I haven’t found any evidence for and plenty of evidence against.

Of course, you might then say that ideas are neuroconfigurations, — Wayfarer

No, I would say that the idea of the piano did nothing. It was the brain doing things, which resulted in the idea of the piano. The idea of the piano itself is a side effect not a part of the causal chain.

We look at all such questions through ideas, we have to have an idea to even decide what is ‘physical’. That is the sense in which the ideal precedes the physical, although I don’t expect you would agree. — Wayfarer

Sure. But yes I don’t agree. I don’t think the ideal precedes the physical. The ideal results from the physical but doesn’t affect it. Just coincides with it. That makes the most sense to me. What’s the problem with that?

Well, first, in response to 'intentional actions changing neural configurations', that was a reference to a famous experiment whereby measurable changes were observed in subjects brains, due to their imagining that they were practicing piano scales. No actual piano! But the field of research in neuroplasticity has many such examples. A popular books on it (one I'm meaning to read!) is Train your Mind, Change your Brain. — Wayfarer

Sure but even that doesn’t prove that it was “mind altering matter” so much as “mind being altered as a side effect to matter altering matter”. I don’t see how the lack of piano helps.

Scientific method works where it can objectify, quantify, and predict. Those are the fundamental elements of the method, which are universal in scope - they can be applied to anything. Correction - to any object, or collections of objects, or observable systems. Phenomena generally, let's say, with which we have a subject-object relatonship. — Wayfarer

Sure but the brain is an object. And saying the mind alters the brain, above and beyond the brain altering the brain, would be contradicting the theories we found work everywhere else. As it would suggest that the conservation laws break down in the brain. If they don’t break down in the brain, then the mind isn’t doing anything is it?

ps//and, yes, magic might indeed be part of it :gasp: // — Wayfarer

When I see matter work differently within the human body than literally everywhere else in the universe, I’ll believe it.

It’s not that I want to eliminate minds or that I like the thought that my mind is just a side effect, no, I want to be convinced otherwise but I can’t. Makes no sense to me.

Well, obviously; as Searle pointed out, I decide to raise my arm, and the darn thing goes up. — Banno

But maybe it’s: You brain, in the process of raising the arm, creates the intent that you are raising the arm, and the impression that the intent caused the raising.

Just because A always precedes B doesn’t mean A caused B. In this case A being the intent and B being the arm raising. Maybe it’s more like: X causes A and shortly after B.

physical events effect mental events — Banno

Is clear.

and vice versa — Banno

But how does this work exactly? How does it square with our understanding of physics, such as conservation laws?

They're not in doubt — Wayfarer

intentional actions can change neural configuration — Wayfarer

Are contradictory statements. I’m interested in where you get the second. Because I’m not so sure that it’s “intentional actions change neural configuration” as much as “neural reconfiguration comes with the sense of intent” and I’m curious how your source would show that it’s not simply the second.

And what does “limited explanatory scope” mean? They work sometimes and other times not?

Also isn’t this a form of strong emergence that you’re suggesting here? A bunch of atoms come together and somehow that form a “mind” which cannot be reduced to or explained by the atoms and has the ability to change them “top down”.

I’m fine with the “forming the mind” bit, it’s the bit about how that mind can then go back and change the atoms that bugs me. I just can’t conceive of it. It would be like mixing a bunch of gases in a balloon and then noticing that at the right concentrations, for some reason, the conservation laws start to break down. The gas moves randomly then just.... stops for a second.... then resumes. And this is explained by “The mixture created a mind which can then go back and alter the mixture”. Just seems like nothing short of magic.

According to materialism, this ought not to happen, all of the causation should be from matter up to mind, not from mind down to matter. — Wayfarer

Shouldn't it? Otherwise how would you square it with the conservation laws (energy, momentum, torque, etc). Or are those in doubt for you? Genuine question, not rhetorical.

I think this is a perfect illustration of what Isaac was saying. For me, I didn't detect any hostility in GLEN's comments or post. Body language is missing and crucial it seems.

If you have a feeling, you have a feeling. Materialism just argues all those feelings are creations of neurons interacting. They are still feelings. — GLEN willows

Not just materialism. Everyone can agree that feelings are the creations of neurons firing. Because when the neurons don't fire you don't have the feelings. That can't be coincidence.

If a feeling isn't a part of the brain, what is it? If it's a separate thing, NOT part of the brain, but can affect the brain, how does that occur? — GLEN willows

How about: A separate thing that does not affect the brain only appears to?

But instead, you want to make it so that feelings ARE a material. Then I'd have to ask you what you mean by "matter". More specifically, what is NOT matter? If you cannot answer that question that means that you simply defined everything as matter from the get-go. So of course you will reach the conclusion that.... everything is matter (materialism).

This is the position I call "thingism". It's materialism which is reached by making it so that "matter" is such a widely applicable word, that you might as well have just said "thing". Hence, thingism.

Well, no. It's the fact that we can all talk about the same thing. It's the fact that we all share a public world which is the basis of commonality. — Banno

I know I’m repeating myself but I’m more so saying this hoping to resolve disagreement with others. And seeing how others would disagree with me.

I think the main disagreement is in saying this “public world” is set in stone. That it is the same for all of us. It doesn’t need to be so for communication to take place.

We each have a private world. Some parts of that private world are isomorphisms of each other. Those parts are the public world. This “public world” is inter subjective. Because it is the isomorphic part (inter) of each person’s private world (subjective).

“Isomorphism” is a technical term that is part of introductory set theory. It means that two groups share the same “structure”. It would probably be easier to look it up but I’ll try my best to explain it.

So if I have a group of objects, and their colors. Let’s say for me, objects A, B and C have the colors X, X, Y respectively. And for you, object A, B, C have the colors Y, Y, X. Those two would be isomorphisms.

What will happen is, I will see A and say “This is red” for example. And you will see A and ALSO call it red. Same will happen for B. And for C we will both call it green.

So communication is possible, even though the private experience is different. That is because our experiences have the same “structure” in this case. And it is in these cases only where communication is possible. Note, A does not have to have the color X for both of us for communication to be possible. As long as every object that, for me, has the color X has the color Y for you, and every object that for me has the color Y has the color X for you, we can talk. Because the private experience itself is not what we’re talking about. We’re talking about the structure. And that’s all we can talk about.

On the other hand, say someone sees, A, B, C as Z,Z,Z. We call that person “colorblind”. NOT because Z is different from X and Y. But because the structure is different. In their world, there is no distinction between C and A/B. So if they learn to call A “red” because they’ll see others calling it red, they will also end up calling C “red”. That’s how we know they’re colorblind.

The Xs, Ys and Zs are Qualia.

Groups have a much better chance of survival than individuals. Moral conduct by the majority is necessary for those groups to form. Therefore moral conduct is evolutionarily advantageous on a whole.

Or the simpler proof is: If it wasn’t advantageous it would’ve been phased out of us by now.

If everyone was like your neighbors you wouldn’t have groups forming in the first place. And groups are incredibly advantageous.

Morality is a sense, like a sense of humour. Expression of this sense is opinion, but that doesn't mean morality is just glorified opinion. If you hear and joke and you laugh; you didn't decide to laugh. It's not merely your opinion that it's funny. It's the same with the moral sense. If you see something that's wrong, you don't decide that it's wrong. You feel it. You give expression to that feeling it becomes an opinion - but the feeling that something is wrong, isn't you forming an opinion. — counterpunch

:up:

I would furthermore add that most disagreements about morality aren't about opinions but are factual. We have similar, if not the same moral intuitions, the question becomes which ones to apply to the situation at hand. Is having children a benign or innocent act, or is it an unfair imposition as the ANs would have it? This is not a question of opinion. Everybody, including ANs would say there is nothing wrong with doing benign or innocent acts. And everybody would say that unfair impositions are wrong. The question then is, which is happening here?

I rarely see anyone have genuinely different moral intuitions. Most morality debates are about arguing about which moral intuition applies to the situation at hand, not about the intuitions themselves.

I’m curious, what’s your view on all this? Do you think mental events cause physical change? Does the feeling of anger have some real world causal power? Or is it just a byproduct?

So causal interactions can take place between material and immaterial entities. — Bartricks

Not safe to assume both ways.

If a physical event can cause a non-physical event, why can't a non-physical event cause a physical one? — Bartricks

Metaphysically seems possible. Actually was never seen. Despite looking for it. So good reason to think it is impossible.

Seems entirely arbitrary to believe that — Bartricks

Of course it does to you, since you would sooner overthrow centuries of confirmed science because "things don't seem to me that way". Just like a flat earther would.

The reason to believe that is, as just stated: No such interactions have ever been shown. Despite effort looking for them. For centuries. So good reason to assume they are impossible.

On the other hand, physical changes causing mental changes is easy to see.

Sure when you raise your hand it SEEMS like your mind is causing the movement. However, that is consistent with both of our theories. But only one requires overthrowing centuries of science in favor of how things seem to us.

Doors can only be pushed. They can't be pulled. Dammit. I'm stuck in my study. — Bartricks

Some doors CAN only be pushed. And even if it was a 1 way door, you’d still not be stuck....

Even your attempts at analogies are subpar.

Anyway, must go to bed now — Bartricks

Make sure not to move too much. Your mind might fall off the bed since apparently immaterial things are subject to material laws! Maybe it already has... Sweet dreams.

given we have equally strong evidence for the latter as for the former. — Bartricks

"It seems that way to me" is not evidence. Not next to centuries of futile search.

That would be.....Question Begging. — Bartricks

What you call question begging is called "Using technical terms correctly"

But you can replace every instance of "energy" with "energy in the purely physical sense" if you insist on misusing the word energy.

So, if your brain....material thing....causes a 'mental event'...an 'event of the mind'.......then.......wait for it......wait.......you have a material thing, causally interacting with an immaterial thing.

Which you think doesn't happen. — Bartricks

Yikes.

When did I say that?

I said an immaterial thing cannot cause material movement. The other way is fine.

Must be good being able to do that - being able to just think all these contradictory things at once. I spend ages trying to avoid doing that. — Bartricks

No, it's just that you're mistaken as usual... I explained above.

Must be good being able to do that. Being so sure of yourself despite being wrong so often.

Right. So when I decided - a mental event - to raise my arm, and my arm raised, what happened there? — Bartricks

Your brain caused the mental event. And your brain also caused the arm to move.

Your view must be that it was pure coincidence that my decision to raise my arm was followed by my arm raising. — Bartricks

When was that implied? No the brain does it in pairs. The thought, and the action. And also the thought that the thought led to the action. So I guess it does it in threes.

I would be willing to give that whatever the brain does to move the arm also results in the thought. That the thought is necessarily caused alongside the movement. But that's it. Not that it is causing the movement.

And when I eat food and feel satisfied, that feeling was just coincidental. — Bartricks

Nope.

Or do you, perhaps, believe there was causal interaction after all? — Bartricks

False dichotomy. I explained what happens. The brain does it in threes.

No new energy coming in. — Bartricks

False. Energy disappeared in the first step. Then new energy came in.

You cannot say it was the "same energy" as that would be attributing energy to minds. Which makes as little sense as attributing color to minds. That was your whole argument (among others) that the mind is immaterial.

You're getting it for free. — Bartricks

You get what you pay for. Bad scorn and worse ideas.


But regardless, critiquing my position (badly) doesn't make yours any better. Yours requires a violation of the laws of conservation. You have not been able to show this statement to be false.

Scorn, not refutations is all you have offered. You have much to learn. — Bartricks

Precious coming from you :rofl:

Well, you just stipulated that the laws apply to physical things alone. — Bartricks

This is pure unadulterated handwaving.

All of the properties they conserve are ONLY defined for physical things. That is literally what the laws are defined for.... They're PHYSICAL laws. It's not begging the question.

You'd have to propose some new "spiritual conservation laws" to push for what you want. But they are not the same in any way. Whatever this "spiritual energy" is you'd have to point out exactly how it can be translated to kinetic energy.

And if you were to pose those, then you still have the fact that your view requires two violations of the original physical laws. Which are, again, PHYSICAL laws. Therefore are clearly not defined for minds.

Your view requires energy, in the purely physical sense (which is the only sense it was defined for) to disappear and reappear. And energy, again in the purely physical sense, is conserved. Therefore your view contradicts the law of conservation of energy in the purely physical sense (which is just the law of conservation of energy)

I'll repeat again for good measure: Your view requires energy to disappear momentarily. This has never ever been detected. And is a violation of long standing laws.

What's your position - are you a materialist or an immaterialist about the mind? — Bartricks

Minds are immaterial, yes, for like the 4th time.

If you're not, then you're with me. — Bartricks

Sure but I'm not with you in saying that mind interacts with brain. I've given you an argument for it. You've claimed it begs the question. Where does it beg the question, specifically.

The quote you provided is literally a definition. I do not see how that can be begging the question.

Where is the physicalist assumption? Lay it out.

The above quote states, factually, that energy has a very specific meaning in physics. It is with that meaning that I use it. And it is by that meaning that the laws make sense.

Our colloquial use of "energy" (like in "I'm just so low energy") is not what's being referred to in "conservation of energy".

Yes — Bartricks

Does your mind gain weight too if you don't exercise? Ridiculous. You are literally going against your own argument about why the mind is non sensible. Again:

Well one of the things that it does not make sense to ask of the mind is "How much kinetic energy does it have"? Because "energy" applies only to physical things. Just like shape and color. It makes no sense to say anything non physical gained energy.

It's exactly like saying "Fear weighs 20 pounds" — khaled

"Energy" has a very specific meaning in physics, you can't just randomly apply it to something that is by definition outside of the scope of physics.

Note, this is also what would happen if the mind is your brain, right? So, either way the answer is 'yes'. — Bartricks

Except that's not my position. My position is that they do not interact. Not that the mind is sensible.

But you haven't shown a violation of the laws of conversation. There's no violation. — Bartricks

Correct, there is no violation. There is two.

Energy, which I repeat, is something only defined for physical things, firstly disappears, then reappears.

That's one... two violations.

Two violations don't make a right.

And furthermore you claim that energy, which disappears and reappears, does so because it is being taken by a non physical thing. Which is just as ridiculous as saying that "fear gains 20 joules of energy". It makes no sense. Just a confused application of a very specific term.

energy transferring from A to B — Bartricks

Your mind gains energy? :rofl:

Wasn't your argument for why the mind is not sensible this:

1. If one's mind is a sensible object, then it makes sense to wonder what colour, shape, smell, texture or taste it might have.
2. It does not make sense to wonder what colour, shape, smell, texture, or taste one's mind has
3. Therefore, one's mind is not a sensible object. — Bartricks

Well one of the things that it does not make sense to ask of the mind is "How much kinetic energy does it have"? Because "energy" applies only to physical things. Just like shape and color. It makes no sense to say anything non physical gained energy.

It's exactly like saying "Fear weighs 20 pounds"

It's just that B isn't sensibly detectable. — Bartricks

Ah, so you're suggesting that energy not only disappears into the ether momentarily, but that it then magically reappears conserved...

This is breaking the laws twice over, not abiding by them.

check out Jose Gusmao Rodriguez's article "There are no good objections to substance dualism" in the journal "Philosophy". — Bartricks

I would if it wasn't behind a paywall. But not right now in either case, you should be able to argue for your position yourself.

and this causes your brain to signal you finger to push the button on the remote? — GLEN willows

No. It is not the thought that does it. Though it certainly seems to me like it is the thought that does it.

My brain does everything. Including the thought. And the seeming.

Now, what in that picture is inconsistent with the laws you mention? — Bartricks

That mental event B causes brain event C.

Let's say brain event C is that neurotransmitter X is pushed by some force Y. And that results in you raising your arm. Stupidly simply but it will do.

This would be a case of net momentum increase. Since neurotransmitter X suddenly gained momentum, without colliding with anything (without anything else losing momentum).

That cannot happen per the laws of conservation.

No? Where do I suggest that?

My thinking of switching the TV channel is done by my brain. So is the switching. So is the sense that I switched due to the desire to switch.

mind is a nonphysical substance with no connection to the brain, because a non physical thing couldn't have a connection to anything physical? — GLEN willows

Wouldn't say "no connection" but no interaction.

The mind relies on the brain. But doesn't affect it.

Your mind is immaterial yes?

Therefore if it interacts with the brain (IE causes some movement) there would be no detectable physical source of that movement yes?

That would be an example where net momentum increased.

Something gained momentum, and nothing else lost it or gained momentum in the opposite direction.

That contradicts the law of conservation of momentum.

I don't dispute the laws you mention. I want you to show me that they are inconsistent with a premise in my argument. — Bartricks

They are consistent with the conclusion that your mind appears to interact with your brain.

They are inconsistent with the conclusion that your mind interacts with your brain.

You frequently confuse the two. Or claim that in the absence of a reason to doubt what things seem like, things are what they seem like. Agreed. Except in this case there is plenty of reason to doubt what things seem like.

If you were to say "Caused by the brain" I would agree but "reside in the brain" already assumes they're physical. Or else they wouldn't "reside" anywhere.

Where's your argument for this? — Bartricks

Argument? That momentum and energy are conserved? I have none, because it's not a conclusion arrived at by argument. It's a conclusion arrived at by observation. Centuries of it.

And you for some reason think that that makes it more reasonable to doubt than doubting what things seem like to us?

That's not my argument. That's just a question. — Bartricks

The purpose of the question is to demonstrate that asking for physical properties of minds makes no sense, and the reader is expected to fill in that "Thus the mind cannot be a physical object" from the premise "If the mind is a physical objects it would make sense to ask for its physical properties". Don't be obtuse just for the purpose of being obtuse.

Or did you seriously not get it? If so you'd be the only one.

No, that's just you being confused and begging the question. It's what you do. — Bartricks

You would rather doubt the conservation of energy and momentum than doubt what things seem like. That would put you in the same boat as flat earthers.

If "it seems like this" is all your evidence, not sure there is much more to say.

Yes, well on your scheme no matter how many times I give an argument for immaterialism about the mind it will never constitute evidence in support of the thesis. — Bartricks

False. Minds are immaterial. I agree with that bit. I disagree with the bit that says that they interact with the brain. On the grounds that that would violate conservation of energy and momentum. Which I think are principles that supersede how things seem to us in terms of reliability. Because they haven't been false for centuries.

1. If one's mind is a sensible object, then it makes sense to wonder what colour, shape, smell, texture or taste it might have.
2. It does not make sense to wonder what colour, shape, smell, texture, or taste one's mind has
3. Therefore, one's mind is not a sensible object. — Bartricks

Sure, and that's the first argument I gave on the thread. I asked "What's the relative molar mass of Love"

and appears causally to interact with sensible objects. — Bartricks

But you said you had some evidence for this. By "evidence" did you simply mean that it seems so?

I was expecting some study or something showing that when people raise their arms, the causal chain leading to the movement starts arbitrarily, suddenly, without any detectable material causer. That's what we would expect to see if immaterial minds really did interact with material brains.

That would constitute evidence.

I'm not sure I want to get into an argument with you again but you're saying some interesting stuff.

But it just as clearly interacts with the brain. — Bartricks

and good evidence that the mind interacts with radically different objects such as the brain — Bartricks

What makes this so clear? Where is this evidence?

Sure but I don't see what that has to do with anything. The emotion of love is represented differently in the brain from the concept of love. Ok.... Now what?

You seem to think that's a bad word Lol! — GLEN willows

Not really. Just want to know how you use it.

We already discussed what material substance means. — GLEN willows

No we haven't which is why I'm asking. Does we have to be able to see and touch the thing for it to be "material substance"? What are the exact properties of a "material substance"?

But regardless, you said love is real like a TABLE, which you can touch. Can I touch love? — GLEN willows

The options you gave me were: Table, Unicorn, or Fictional Character.

I didn't pick table because of touchability, I picked it because the other two don't exist (aka aren't real).

There are plenty of things that are real that you cannot touch. For example: Quantum wave functions. And emotions.

And if love is real like a table, then it must have material substance, right? — GLEN willows

No. Though that's exactly what a materialist would say!

But first off, what do you mean by "material substance". Because as I said all the way at the beginning the category seems to just keep widening and widening. Must we be able to touch and see the thing for it to be a material substance?

Why? We didn't understand science back then, let alone neuroscience, so we made up words to describe what we were feeling. — GLEN willows

So the words describe feelings correct? Not chemicals? And those cannot be the same thing. Or else we would not have made words that refer to one and not the other. "Love" refers to a feeling, not a chemical, by virtue of the fact that we came up with the word without knowing what chemicals are.

If "Love" referred to a neurotransmitter, we would have needed to know what neurotransmitters were before coming up with the word correct? But since that's not the case "Love" must not refer to a neurotransmitter.

Saying we know qualia are part of the neurochemicals of the brain (which I think is clearly proven by the fact that altering the chemicals. or operating the brain, changes the qualia) — GLEN willows

That doesn't follow. If I have a machine that makes ice-cream, and I change the settings of the machine to make different ice cream, that doesn't mean the ice cream is part of the machine. Now replace "Machine" with "Brain" and "Ice-cream" with "Qualia". Terrible example probably but I'm about to have lunch so I don't wanna spend too much time on this.

doesn;t mean we know exactly how it works. — GLEN willows

But if qualia are no more than chemicals, then we do know exactly how they work no?

When you say something is real, what do you mean? Real like a table? Real like a unicorn? Real like a character from a book? — GLEN willows

Real like a table.

What more can be said? — GLEN willows

Whether or not these feelings/qualia are different from the chemicals correlated with them. You think they aren't. I think that's ridiculous. For one, if what you're saying is true, we would have needed to have a good grasp of neurology before we even came up with words like "love" or "anger". But clearly that's not the case. So clearly the words are not referring to the chemicals.

I feel like we're repeating ourselves here. I've admitted that there are feelings, qualia, that we experience. I've admitted no one knows quite how it works, including you. — GLEN willows

But if you want to say that the qualia are not different from the chemicals causing them then we DO know how they work pretty well.

Do you believe words like "hope" and love" describe real things? — GLEN willows

What else would they describe? "Not real things"? You admit they exist so I think the word "real" in "real things" here is redundant.

Nonetheless, any materialist would admit we don't know exactly how qualia work. — GLEN willows

Materialists would say Qualia don’t exist. Not that we don’t understand how they work. They would say that the feeling of sight or taste is an “illusion” somehow (whatever that means).

There is no direct proof of where they are in the brain. But they are in the brain. — GLEN willows

How, exactly? Let’s take vision for example. Are you suggesting a “vision chemical” in the brain? Well, we understand vision pretty well and there is no such thing. Are you maybe suggesting a “vision center”? Again, no such thing. There is no one part of the brain responsible for processing vision. Nor is there any pert of the brain that connects all our senses. But in waking life they seem connected. It feels as if you’re a little guy sitting behind your eyes getting fed sights sounds and tastes. There is no location like that in the brain.