Comments
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On Antinatalism"If" there was a greater purpose as you suggest to be a possibility, you are compromising such a greater purpose based on an arbitrary moral call. — staticphoton
Yes I would be compromising such a purpose. Tell me exactly who that harms. I don’t think an act is wrong if it doesn’t actually harm anyone so who exactly is harmed if everyone decides never to have kids starting tomorrow?
On the other hand look at how many are harmed by people having kids today.
Who exactly does human extinction hurt other than yourself and your fellow believers in great purposes?
Me not thinking in terms of good and bad is something you just invented — staticphoton
No I didn’t, at least not purposefully
I don't think in those terms. Good and bad are far from being absolutely and universally defined values — staticphoton
I thought “those terms” was referring to good and bad
Exactly. You teach them what you believe in, and that becomes their belief. — staticphoton
Correction: you teach them what you believe in and sometimes that becomes their belief. I’d say most people have different beliefs from their parents. Take antinatalists as an example! -
On Antinatalismsuffering" thing is "bad". — staticphoton
Yes. Unless it is for some greater purpose. But you can’t guarantee your child will find such greater purpose.
and life should end. — staticphoton
No. Future life should not be introduced. Totally different things. -
On Antinatalism
I don't think in those terms — staticphoton
If you don’t think in terms of good and bad then how are you doing ethics right now?
What I consider a good reason, you don't. — staticphoton
What IS your good reason exactly? That you yourself believe in the value of a pain/happiness cycle and are thus entitled to bring into the world someone else knowing full well they might not share your comforting belief? If that is the case, then I should be allowed to force people to work my job if I like it right? After all, me liking an experience apparently gives me license to impose it on someone else.
Per your own reasoning, values are not genetically inherited, they are taught. And to assume that those reared by me are "strangers" is a belief I don't share either. — staticphoton
They are strangers until you educate them obviously.
If you are making a decision to contribute to the greater good by not having any children, — staticphoton
This is missing the point, the whole point of not having children is that it is a way to ensure no one is harmed but no one benefits either. Antinatalists don’t try to contribute to a greater good, they merely don’t want to risk contributing to greater evil -
On Antinatalismno matter what I say you will never accept the premise that there is merit in the balance of suffering/happiness, I don't see the point of continuing. — staticphoton
That is false first of all. I haven’t stated an opinion about “the balance of suffering/pleasure” because I don’t think it matters. Unlike most of the people here I don’t think my opinion of life is a factor in deciding whether or not I should introduce someone else into it for the simple reason that they might not share said opinion. It shouldn’t matter what you think of the balance of suffering/happiness when you know it’s possible your child won’t think the same. The point is: you take a risk of harming someone else for no good reason and in a way where they can’t appeal to some greater meaning or value in “the balance of suffering/happiness”. At least you haven’t shown me a good reason yet. That YOU find value in the balance of suffering/happiness that is no good reason to assume a stranger would find value in the same is it? You’d have to convince me that there is some moral good resulting from having children, as in, someone somewhere benefits from it so much that the suffering of the child is outweighed.
Let’s just get one thing clear: do you think that if someone had a child and provided them with an absolutely perfect life (as measured by the child) that that someone has done something good?
Because I think what he did was neutral at best.
If ending suffering by ending humanity is your ideal — staticphoton
Ending humanity is not my ideal. It’s a side effect. “Humanity” is not a person. I’m not actually harming anyone here whereas one can be harmed severely by being brought into a world where harm is possible. If you harm someone by NOT having children then I’d be arguing you’re a hypocrite for not having MORE children -
On AntinatalismBirth = bad makes sense to you and a very small minority. — staticphoton
True, and I believe you should be part of that minority if you want to avoid seeming like a hypocrite. Whether or not birth = bad is what I came here to debate, not whether or not one should outlaw birth. Because as I said before, an antinatalist leader is so incredibly unlikely that I find reasoning about whether or not he’d be right in imposing antinatalism on the population a waste of time.
There wasn't a point in which humans became "separate from nature" and began to create eyeglasses and vaccines, we do exactly what nature endowed us with to do — staticphoton
Nature also allowed us all to be antinatalists no? So I don’t see a problem here. Again, nature doesn’t have an agenda for us. Any agenda you ascribe to nature is just your own.
You also haven’t presented an alternative to “pain bad pleasure good” that we’ve been using, even though you conceded antinatalism makes sense under those hedonistic general principles. And yet you criticize it for beingA simplistic rationalization doesn't necessarily make it morally correct. — staticphoton
Please present a non simplistic moral valuation so we can see if it antinatalism still makes sense under more complex principles because I believe it does. It’s been simplistic SO FAR but David benetar for example went over much more complex moral principles in his book “better never to have been” that are popular nowadays and showed that antinatalism still makes sense under those as well. You can’t criticize the position for using simplistic rationalization when you’re the one that said “let’s assume pleasure good pain bad for the sake of argument” -
Is Misanthropy right?I don’t think it can be “right” or “wrong”. “Is liking vanilla ice cream right?”
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On AntinatalismImpossible and highly unlikely are far from being the same. For the sake of argument, if you erase the morally responsible all you have left is the morally irresponsible. — staticphoton
That’s exactly what I’m saying won’t happen. Because among the morally irresponsible some will learn to become morally responsible. Because moral responsibility is not genetic
Yes, but as I also stated, that reduces the argument to a depth nearing meaninglessness.
If the whole purpose of this thread is an exercise in argumentative skills then I'm bowing out. I was trying to understand the concept as a meaningful, implementable plan, but I'm finding it to be nothing but an exercise in idealism based on a dim view of the human experience. — staticphoton
Ok so we’re not using pleasure good pain bad anymore then. What’s the alternative you’re proposing? Also, antinatalism is not a plan. In the same way that “murder is wrong” is not a plan. Note that a world without murders is unimplementable and neither is a world where everyone is not an antinatalist. That doesn’t take away from whether or not they make sense does it?
I prefer to not pretend my personal moral judgment is above nature's design. — staticphoton
Nature doesn’t design. Also does that mean if you had bad vision you wouldn’t buy glasses to preserve “nature’s design”? What about vaccines? As I said, we have gone against nature’s design plenty of times already. Unless you mean something else by nature’s design and I’m talking past you -
On AntinatalismBasically, you're banking on the idea of reasoning about this stuff — Terrapin Station
Yes, because to most people different moral statements have certain connecting “themes” or “logic” behind them. Most people don’t randomly juggle words in a sentence such that it contains the word “should” and employ the generated moral statement as a result.
you're also trying to do that from the perspective of moral utterances needing to be maximally generalized — Terrapin Station
Not necessarily. It’s just better to start with general statements. If you want more specific ones I can do that but we haven’t even gotten over vague ones (not that I want to start arguing with you about this again)
Actually going to bed now -
On AntinatalismThey could just say, "I have no opinion on that; all I have an opinion on is that creating suffering people is morally neutral" — Terrapin Station
I would invite them to think about it. If they don’t want to then there’s not much I can do about that. -
On Antinatalism"suffering more than they would without modifications" then
but also it's 3:35 and I'm going to bed -
On AntinatalismOkay, but you'd realize that someone could just as well think "Creating suffering people is morally neutral" right? — Terrapin Station
They COULD. Then I'd ask them "Is genetically modifying a child to suffer as much as possible ok by you?" And if they say no then they were lying initially (or are idiots) and if they say yes then I'd say "fair enough"
The point is, no one actually think creating suffering people is morally neutral. At least, no one I've talked to so far -
On AntinatalismObviously one is not going to adopt a philosophical view about something that results in that thing making no sense, right? — Terrapin Station
Thank you for finally answering the question. Now. For me to pretend I am a subjectivist/emotivist I would have to say that I believed that me thinking antinatalism is the case is any more than me expressing a feeling I have. I have never said that. All I ever said was that most people would come to share this feeling if they did not make an exception for birth from other feelings they have about other acts. -
On AntinatalismSo obviously you're not a subjectivist or emotivist. Why pretend to be one? — Terrapin Station
I probably do misunderstand it but can you please answer the question? -
On AntinatalismIt depends on the individual in question and how they're thinking about them. — Terrapin Station
What does this actually mean though -
On AntinatalismYou wouldn't ask this if you really thought it was subjective. — Terrapin Station
So the answer is no? I'm just saying that not making sense from a subjectivist/emotivist standpoint isn't really a problem with antinatalism only -
On AntinatalismIs there a way to make sense of any ethical stance from a subjectivist/emotivist standpoint?
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On AntinatalismI think you're misunderstanding what I've been saying all along. I never said "Antinatalism is objectively the case" or "Antinatalism is true". All I ever told people was "If you agree with P1 and P2 you'd be a hypocrite not to agree with C".
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On AntinatalismLook, basically, you're not really a subjectivist on this stuff. Which is something I pointed out a long time ago. — Terrapin Station
No no no, I'd say I am. I just don't think a moral statement cannot have a truth value. On the other hand, I think "truth value" is context dependent. Something is only ever true for a certain person. -
On AntinatalismThe other two would only be the case for an individual if they feel that way. — Terrapin Station
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On AntinatalismNo. That has no truth value. — Terrapin Station
But wasn't that the same with
P1:Murder is wrong
P2:Hiring someone to kill someone else is murder
C:Hiring someone to kill someone else is wrong
And you said P2 and C would be the case for an individual who agrees with P1 -
On AntinatalismThe other two would only be the case for an individual if they feel that way. — Terrapin Station
Ok then. How about this
P1: Creating happy people is morally neutral
P2: Creating suffering people is morally bad
P3: Giving birth risks creating either happy or suffering people
C: One should not give birth
Wouldn't C be the case for people who agree with P1, P2? -
On AntinatalismFor you does this sound like an argument?
P1:Murder is wrong
P2:Hiring someone to kill someone else is murder
C:Hiring someone to kill someone else is wrong
Because if the first statement has no truth value then what exactly did I just say here? (I'm not asking whether or not you agree with it. Just, if it's not a syllogism then what is it) -
On AntinatalismYeah, it is. That's what they are ontologically. — Terrapin Station
So all thieves think theft is morally ok? Does that mean they wouldn't mind if someone robbed them? Just saying "emotivism is the case" doesn't make it the case.
Wait a second I don't think I'm making sense (it's 3 am) -
On AntinatalismBecause there's nothing to get correct or incorrect. It's simply an utterance re how an individual feels towards the behavior in question. You can't get that correct or incorrect. However one feels is how one feels. — Terrapin Station
A moral statement is not necessarily a statement of how one feels. I think moral statements arise from taking what many many people feel in common and trying to find the fewest possible principles to get you to that commonality -
On AntinatalismYou just said to forget about that. If you're not forgetting about it then we're back to trying to make sense of the initial comment. — Terrapin Station
Ok let's go back -
On AntinatalismWhy not? How do you know that if A = B and B= C that A = C is true?
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On AntinatalismYou're arguing that mathematical statements can't be true or false? — Terrapin Station
No. I'm saying that in every single reasoned argument about anything there is a starting premise taken to be true. Math was an example. This starting premise can be anything. Including moral statements -
On AntinatalismIn math how do you know that if A = B and B= C that A = C. That's a premise. And it's taken to be true because it's not provable. Same thing in reasoning with moral statements.
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On AntinatalismOkay, so one very standard example of that is sending a child to school. — Terrapin Station
If we were emplying the "doesn't benefit at all" limit then this would be a bad example because in every single instance of sending a child to school, they end up in a more beneficial situation.
But also asking the vast majority of children if they want to go to school or not will have them answer postively in the long term. So i don't think it's much of a forced decision anyway. -
On AntinatalismI can't agree or disagree because the key words on that sentence (happy people, morally neutral, suffering, morally bad) are ambiguous at best — staticphoton
but I thought we were reducing it to pleasure = good, pain = bad for the sake of argument?
Whether it is learned or not is of no consequence for my statement. — staticphoton
Yes it is. Because a world of the "morally irresponsible" is impossible. The chances of it are highly unlikely. -
On AntinatalismYou stipulated that we're talking about "where they do not benefit whatsoever from the shift," right? — Terrapin Station
Yes and by "benefit" I meant that the "mean value" of the situation goes up. Not that the maximum pleasure possible goes up. As I explained. I'm not sure why we're still talking about this when I already said "You can forget about the “and they don’t benefit from it whatsoever” bit. What about an example of taking someone from a less risky to a more risky position without their consent that is considered ok." -
On AntinatalismAccepting the premise and thinking it through the reality of implementation, it would be fair to assume that only those who are morally responsible would make the choice of not having children. The morally responsible would eventually disappear, leaving a world inhabited with the morally irresponsible. It would not be unreasonable to assume that suffering would increase in a world inhabited by morally irresponsible human beings. — staticphoton
That's not how it works because "morally responsible" isn't the same as "blood type O". It can be learned. You aren't born with it. That's why there has been an antinatalist in most societies you can think of. Even though antinatalism is at a strict disadvantage when it comes to propagating itself across time for obvious reasons
by somehow making the number of morally responsible to increase at the expense of the morally irresponsible. — staticphoton
That's impossible. Unless you're proposing killing the morally irresponsible
I suppose that A: Once the morally responsible have taken over the world, then B: They can stop having children and put an end to it. But I'm not seeing A happening anytime soon. — staticphoton
Me neiter. I never debated whether or not antinatalism is practical. I know it won't work. That doesn't mean it doesn't make logical sense from premises everyone employs. Again so far, you haven't disagreed with the two main premises of antinatalism the first being "making happy people is morally neutral" and the second being "making suffering people is morally bad". -
On AntinatalismI'm trying to understand how it makes sense to talk about any chance of pleasure if we're limited to talking about "where they do not benefit whatsoever." — Terrapin Station
There is benefit if the expected value of a situation goes up. Example:
Situation A: 5 points of pleasure, 50% chance. 5 points of suffering 50% chance
Situation B: 6 points of pleasure, 50% chance. 4 points of suffering 50% chance
Situation B is a benefit from situation A because the expected value of the whole thing positive ((6-4)/2 = 1) while the expected value of A is 0 ((5-5)/2 = 0)
Situation C: 10 points of pleasure, 50% chance. 10 points of suffering 50% chance
Situation C is not a benefit from situation A because the expected value is still 0 EVEN THOUGH the possible amount of pleasure increases
I'm saying it's morally good to take someone from situation A to B but not from situatoin A to C. Because C, overall, is no better than A because both pleasure and pain are amplified equally. The only time when if it's ok to take someone from situation X to Y (for me) is when Y has a higher expected value AND less or the same amount of possible suffering. If those two conditions aren't met then consent is required. -
On AntinatalismFor purely argumentative purposes I can go along with suffering = bad, and happiness = good — staticphoton
You don't need to but I agree let's start with that.
However I don't agree with the stance that personal interpretation and moral valuation of suffering/pleasure, despair/happiness, should dictate the outcome of 2 billion years of evolution — staticphoton
What else should dictate it? "2 billion years of evolution" is not a person with interests. So I don't see a reason why we shouldn't dictate what happens to it. We decide the course of our evolution. We already did so when we made societies, medicine, etc. Again, evolution doesn't have interests, humans do
I also don't agree with the unstated conclusion that human existence is a mistake of nature that needs to be corrected by eliminating the species through voluntary attrition or any other means. — staticphoton
That does not follow from the premises I laid out. I would like you to show me ho wit does.
In my personal view, the fact that the matter, energy, and space-time that originated in the big bang has evolved to become aware of itself, is astonishing feat far beyond my comprehension. Although I am not a religious mas, I see homo sapiens and consciousness as a miracle of nature. — staticphoton
Me too
Using a simple line of reasoning to deliberately end what I believe to be nature greatest achievement over the fact that pain exists, would be unacceptable on my part — staticphoton
Again. "Nature" is not a person. You're not harming anyone by not having children. Whereas you could harm someone by having children. That's what this boils down to -
On AntinatalismOne problem I see is implentation — staticphoton
That has no effect on whether or not antinatlism follows from the moral premises I mentioned. If, say a state had very few law enforcement officers and someone walked up to you and said "One problem I see with saying that murder is wrong is implementation. We don't have enough cops so it must be ok to murder right?" Whether or not a moral ideal is practical has nothing to say about whether or not it follows logically from its premises. You can disagree with the premises, but so far you haven't
Any kind of action against them would increase suffering. Would that be justifiable for the greater good? — staticphoton
I don't know, some say yes some say no. I don't care because an antinatalist would never become supreme ruler of the world for obvious reasons.
Also, i assume antinatalism proposes to eliminate only human suffering — staticphoton
Not necessarily. There is just no use reasoning with cows. There is use reasoning with humans (hopefully). Cows will continue to suffer because they don't see the logic of antinatlism. Not much we can do about that. If cows were intelligent enough I'd be arguing with them too
But other than that. Do you see any problem in the reasoning of the previous post?
khaled
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