How do you know that you know? — Banno
because if something we thought we knew turned out to be false, we only thought we knew it. — Banno
SO do you have a different scheme? — Banno
but there can't be things we know that are not true. — Banno
Only because if something we thought we knew turned out to be false, we only thought we knew it. — Banno
there can't be things we know that are not true. — Banno
I can make sense of a hierarchy of believe, or of justification. — Banno
but there can't be things we know that are not true. — Banno
If only there wouldn't be so many schools of psychology, so many different theories about the same thing!
— baker
This says it all. And they cannot all be correct. Science is about figuring out which of competing theories is the right one, psychology just enjoys them all. — tim wood
But non-eucledian triangles are still called triangles. — Isaac
It's not similar enough for their current purpose to the definitions the rest of their language community are using. — Isaac
No, not at all. I've demonstrated above that there is no such idea. Just several ideas which share common features. — Isaac
You shouldn’t care what others think and believe. — SteveMinjares
So it's being on a plane is not a property of your ideal triangle? — Isaac
Would a non-euclidean object with those properties still be a triangle? — Isaac
What about shapes matching that description but in non-standard topologies? — Isaac
They could not simply derive the answers by comparing their new objects to some ideal form — Isaac
So are we mis-naming the things we commonly call triangles? — Isaac
There's only yours, mine, everyone else's. — Isaac
All, no doubt very similar to your ideas, since we share a culture, language community, biology etc. — Isaac
and plenty of evidence from developmental psychology that we use our own personal models to identity objects, not ethereal universal ones. — Isaac
Maybe it would help if you could tell me some properties of this ideal triangle. — Isaac
so we clearly need a bit more than merely talking about X as if it existed for us to conclude that X exists, yes? — Isaac
We can come up with imaginary triangles, yes. — Isaac
I'm not seeing how this proves that they are the 'ideal' triangle against which all shapes are compared to determine the correct name. — Isaac
I've never heard anyone in day-to-day language talk about the ideal mental concept of the letter 'A'. — Isaac
Why not? You think it is only if the past is necessary that we can know about it? — Bartricks
I am able to take the glass in front of me and smash it into my face. That is something I can do. — Bartricks
Look, I don't have a limitless supply of glasses to smash into my face. — Bartricks
God can change the past. That doesn't mean he does or has. — Bartricks
Are they physical? I’d say, of course they’re not, they’re principles or observed regularities, discovered by the application of mathematical reason to phenomena. — Wayfarer
Not 'entirely'? It's a moving target, it changes all the time. — Wayfarer
mind is a substance in the philosophical sense, that is, it has properties (such as knowing) — Wayfarer
Sound waves are physical for sure. But what about the probability wave? Are those waves physical? — Wayfarer
No, I’m arguing for substance dualism — Wayfarer
Physicalism believes that mind is a result of matter, the product of the material brain, whereas dualism believes that mind is the cause as much as the result. — Wayfarer
Material stuff which could not exist without those forms. — Wayfarer
So they’re prior to matter — Wayfarer
and they’re not physical in nature. — Wayfarer
They don’t have to exist - things do the hard work of existing - but things depend on them for existence. — Wayfarer
I would agree, with the caveat that these structures and patterns are not material. — Wayfarer
But they're not physical - they exist as bounds, limits, principles, and regularities. — Wayfarer
You're trying to locate ideas in the physical world, but I think they're real in a different sense to existent phenomena. They're real as principles, as ideas although not simply the casual thoughts that occupy our minds moment to moment. But the domain of ideas is not dependent on the physical domain, rather they are the organising principles which underlie and inform the physical domain. — Wayfarer
That's the form-substance distinction again, which as stated already is not something anybody is denying: you can have multiple things of the same form. The question at hand is whether there's more than one kind of underlying substance — Pfhorrest
We casually accept that this is something that 'evolved', as if that amounts to an explanation for it. — Wayfarer
Devices and beings are ontologically distinct. — Wayfarer
You don't murder a camera, and you can't repair a human being. — Wayfarer
What I'm saying that we don't see is the way in which the mind, the subject, constructs or creates what we understand as the real world. We constantly interpret what we see to make our worldview. Heck even neuroscientists see that, although they don't always grasp the philosophical implications. — Wayfarer
The other point you haven't addressed is the dualism of symbols on the one hand, and physical matter, on the other. — Wayfarer
And what is my argument that breaks down exactly?
— khaled
I have no idea, it just breaks down — Noble Dust
and your entire argument breaks down — Noble Dust
No, the mind of the camera-user is what puts the photo together. They do this first and then take the photo. It's a shitty metaphor until you acknowledge this. — Noble Dust
But within the analogy, the person taking the photo/video is ontologically different from both the image and the camera. — Noble Dust
You don't see mind, because you are it. Everything you know empirically is presented to you as an object or relation of objects or a force. But the very thing which weaves all that together into a world is mind, which is not amongst those objects. — Wayfarer
A literal map of a geographic territory and the literal territory itself are both made of the same kind of stuff — Pfhorrest
The other point is, cameras are built and operated by humans. They have no ability to decide or intend, nor is there anything about them that is even analogous to those abilities, which are intrinsic to human beings. How can that not count as an ontological difference? — Wayfarer
Er, no, I did not say 'Reason is a faculty'. I said 'our reason' is a faculty. Christ, you people are soooo sloppy. — Bartricks
YOu seem to be able to comprehend this with sight, so what's your problem? — Bartricks
Explaining the omnipotence of God is 'not' the issue. Can't you see this? — Bartricks
What is a justification made of? Well, a justification is made of God's attitudes. That is, to be 'justified' in believing something is for God to favour you believing it.
— Bartricks
Where’d you get this? — khaled
Ratiocination.
It follows from being omnipotent. — Bartricks
I can explain the mechanics of omnipotence, but here is not the place. — Bartricks
What you're doing is focussing on normative reasons - which Reason will also be the source of and by dint of which she has colossal power - and not on the rational landscape more generally, all of which is a creature of her will — Bartricks
And do you have reason to believe that, or no reason to believe it? — Bartricks
3 is clearly false. Even if rocks are not affected by normative reasons, it doesn't follow that the mind whose attitudes constitute such reasons is unable to affect rocks. — Bartricks
My case requires only that we acknowledge that being omniscient involves possessing all items of knowledge, and that knowledge has at least two components: justification and true belief. — Bartricks
But note too that my main case does not depend upon identifying Reason and God. — Bartricks
Dog shit post. — Protagoras
Head out of the scientists ass and in the real world. — Protagoras
I've explained enough in my posts for you to get what I'm saying. — Protagoras
If you can't see it, then perhaps try to be less scientismistic and apply your own perception. — Protagoras
What of all the numerous meditators and religious people who experience this? — Protagoras
He finally admitted he couldn't square how life actually started from matter,or how DNA replicates. — Protagoras
If you want to know what non material but physical is raise your hand and observe. — Protagoras
If minds matter, then mental events are important and potentially effective. They are not necessarily illusions or mere noise. — Olivier5
The role of neuroscience is therefore to use mental events as a way to investigate how come mental events are so useful and powerful, and how we can make them even more so. The role of neuroscience is not and can never be to replace minds with another "realer" reality — Olivier5
Therefore, all scientists actually trust the human mind quite a lot, even those who are not consciously aware that they do. — Olivier5
'the experience of pain and the knowledge of the physiology of pain are different'. If you say they're not different, how could any argument prevail? How could it ever be proven that 'an idea of pain' and 'a pain' are different things, to one prepared to deny it? — Wayfarer