Yes, I see what you mean. Newtonian absolute space/time was the view prior to relativistic spacetime. — Mww

That is, through experience, Einstein's Relativity has replaced Newtonian Physics. Doesn't that contradict the Kantian view?
— Andrew M

I’m not understanding what in Einstein would contradict Kant. Where did Einstein prove Kant wrong, in as much as they each operated from two distinct technological and scientific domains? Kant had no significant velocities other than a horse, and there were no trains, which together negate even the very notion of time differential reference frames, so there wouldn’t appear to be any reason for Kant to notice measurable discrepancies in rest/motion velocities. — Mww

What problem is there, that the natural distinction above solves? — Mww

Appearance in Kantian terminology can’t be artificial in any sense, because it is a representation of sensation. If there is a sensation, there will be an appearance, period. And it is necessarily a one-to-one correspondence between sensation and appearance, otherwise there is no ground for the subsequent cognitive procedures, which falsifies the entire system. Appearance in Kant is like making the scene, as in “...that which appears...”, not what a thing looks like, because the advent of appearance in the system is long before cognition, which means there is nothing known whatsoever about the appearance except that one has occurred, been presented, to the system. Thus, it shouldn’t be said that that which is unknown at a certain time is thereby artificial. — Mww

'First philosophy' or metaphysics is concerned with the ultimate nature of reality. In a theistic metaphysics, then God is understood as being the source or ground of being. A naturalistic philosophy doesn't countenance such an idea as God is (by definition) super-natural, 'above' or transcendent to nature. So the attitude generally is, whatever hypothesis you want to consider, it can't include something which is by definition above and beyond the naturalist framework- which is what I'm calling 'metaphysical naturalism'. You see in many atheist arguments (including many posted here) that science proves or at least suggests that the world has a naturalistic explanation or can be thoroughly understood in naturalistic terms and that there is nothing outside or above or transcendent to nature in terms of which understanding ought to be sought. — Wayfarer

René Descartes' metaphysical system of mind–body dualism describes two kinds of substance: matter and mind. According to this system, everything that is "matter" is deterministic and natural—and so belongs to natural philosophy—and everything that is "mind" is volitional and non-natural, and falls outside the domain of philosophy of nature. — Natural philosophy - scope

This is where Kant is relevant - recall that he said that a central goal of his critical philosophy is to 'discover the limit to knowledge so as to make room for faith'.

I'm arguing that is that it is possible to pursue a naturalist account while still understanding that it has limits in principle - that the naturalist account is not all there is (which is what I understand Kant to be saying.) That is what I mean by distinguishing methodological from metaphysical naturalism - the former sets aside or brackets out metaphysics in pursuit of the naturalist account. But it doesn't necessarily say anything about what if anything might be beyond that. It's close in meaning to Huxley's agnosticism. — Wayfarer

If we see a straight stick partly submerged in water, we notice that it appears bent. This gives rise to the natural distinction between what something is (e.g., a straight stick) and how it appears under different conditions (e.g., the stick appears bent when partly submerged in water and it's possible to mistakenly think that the stick is bent).
— Andrew M

Even Bishop Berkeley had an answer for that! — Wayfarer

It really isn't so simple. Again, in physics, the question has been suggested by the conundrums sorrounding 'wave-particle' duality, for example.

I think the key point is that if you accept naturalism simply as a methodological assumption, then there's no problem to solve (which is I think what you are suggesting.) — Wayfarer

I think Kant's argument comes into play when metaphysical conclusions are drawn on the basis of methodological axioms - in other words, when arguments are made about first philosophy on the basis of scientific naturalism. — Wayfarer

the (contingently) prior background
— Andrew M

...is categorically opposed to the Kantian a priori meaning, for any contingently prior background is merely another way to say “experience”.

“....By the term "knowledge a priori," therefore, we shall in the sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience. Opposed to this is empirical knowledge, or that which is possible only a posteriori, that is, through experience...”

Thus,.......consider the geocentrists whose a priori view was that Earth was the center of the universe, might better be said.....whose prior view. — Mww

An implication of the Kantian view is that two events that are simultaneous for one observer are simultaneous for all observers.
— Andrew M

Two events for a guy and guy standing right beside him, will be simultaneous to both, yes. The difference between the observations will be immeasurable. — Mww

On sticks in water....

“.....It is not at present our business to treat of empirical illusory appearance (for example, optical illusion), which occurs in the empirical application of otherwise correct rules of the understanding, and in which the judgement is misled by the influence of imagination...” — Mww

On naturalism, there is no "reality of appearances". We're not trapped in Plato's cave.
— Andrew M

with the caveat that:

Naturalism doesn't confer certainty.
— Andrew M

The natural claim is that we can know things as they are (from our perspective as human beings).
— Andrew M

If we have to qualify it in this way, then does it really constitute 'knowing things as they are'? By conceding the perspectival nature of knowledge, you're more or less conceding Kant's point. — Wayfarer

And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something. — Prolegomena, § 32

I'm wary of the use of the word 'creation' in this context. But thinking about it some more, it's close in meaning to what Andrei Linde says in the Closer to Truth interview that I linked to. Of course it seems obviously absurd when we think of it in terms of 'the world being in the mind' - but the problem is that when we're saying this, we're trying to envisage 'the world' and 'the mind' from the outside. There's the vast universe, the whole Earth is just a minute speck in relation to that. But we can't see it 'from the outside', we can't make an object of 'me knowing that'. It's a false perspective. — Wayfarer

Consider the geocentrists whose a priori view was that Earth was the center of the universe and that the Sun moved across the sky. The heliocentrists replaced that with their own a priori view that it was the Earth that moved around the Sun.
— Andrew M

What is it about those views that make them a priori? — Mww

Even in Einstein, the observer in his own reference frame is in the Kantian view of Euclidean space and time. — Mww

Put differently, mind is an abstraction over a concrete particular, in this case a human being.
— Andrew M

An electromagnetic dynamo is an abstraction. It's still a powerful thing. We smart humans can navigate these kinds of situations without straying into category errors. — frank

Use of the word "mind" is a convenient façon de parler (Bennett & Hacker, 2003). — Galuchat

Talk of the mind, one might say, is merely a convenient facon de parler, a way of speaking about certain human faculties and their exercise. Of course that does not mean that people do not have minds of their own, which would be true only if they were pathologically indecisive. Nor does it mean that people are mindless, which would be true only if they were stupid or thoughtless. For a creature to have a mind is for it to have a distinctive range of capacities of intellect and will, in particular the conceptual powers of a language-user that make self-awareness and self-reflection possible. — Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience - Bennett and Hacker

But the Curry statement does terminate. It is self-referential but doesn't result in an infinite loop. — TheMadFool

Kant's idea, which I assume, is that the a priori is something like a template that we apply to the world.
— David Mo

Common interpretation, that. A template impressed on the world to which it must conform. I would rather think a priori reason is the mold into which the world is poured. The only difference, which is more semantic than necessary perhaps, is that template implies projection of the mind onto the world, and mold implies receptivity of the world into the mind. Just depends on one’s choice in understanding of the relationship between mind and world. — Mww

Which is to say, the Earth's orbiting of the Sun in the early universe doesn't presuppose an experiencer and an object of experience.
— Andrew M

I dont think Descartes suggested that it does, did he? — frank

I dont really see what work substance dualism does beyond saying that mind is irreducible.

Irreducibility is compatible with science. It's been argued that it's more compatible than the alternative. — frank

As the passage I quoted acknowledged, the reality of the early universe is no more being rejected than that of the 'pen with which these words are written'; but that it remains the reality of appearances. — Wayfarer

Empirically speaking, I agree with you. But philosophically, it remains possible that we're all denizens of the Matrix, or projections of a grand simulation. So the purported 'facts of natural science' do not constitute the slam-dunk argument that you seem to believe they do. They're certain, given that .... . — Wayfarer

Kant never said that 'the world is completely unknowable'. Kant said that we know the world as appearance; it's not simply non-existent or unreal or a phantasm. I don't know if he would have used the expression that the world is a 'product of the mind' (and in this respect, that passage from Magee that I quoted might be misleading); it's that we know the world as it appears to beings with minds of the kind we have. On that basis, we project what we understand as 'the real world'. This is the activity of the most complex organ known to science, namely, the human brain. — Wayfarer

Kindly explain the difference between terminating and non-terminating self-reference in re to Curry's paradox. — TheMadFool

The Curry sentence is this P1 := P1 > P2. How is it not well-defined. There are no syntactical or semantic errors as far as I can see. — TheMadFool

The issue with subject/object dualism is that it affects (or infects, depending on one's perspective) the way people look at everything such that it is difficult to conceive of any alternative.
— Andrew M

Yes, I suppose. We talk usually in the form, “We think....”, “You know...”, “I am....”, and so on, which makes explicit a subject/object dualism in general intersubjective communications. But I wouldn’t call that an issue as much as I’d call it linguistic convention. Nature of the beast, so to speak, and definitely makes it difficult to conceive an alternative. — Mww

As I see it, Descartes was confused by mind idioms that lead to him positing his mind/body distinction.
— Andrew M

I don't agree. In stripping away everything we can doubt, he was denying the Church a place at the foundations of our thinking, and understood in the way I think he intended, his conclusion is correct. — frank

If you subsequently realize that the experiencer and the object of experience (subject and object) are inextricably bound together logically, IOW, subject and object fall out of an analysis of experience or they're the product of reflection on experience, that doesn't undermine the value of the concepts. — frank

Modern science wants to imagines a world without 'the subject' in it, as if from no viewpoint at all. — Wayfarer

The point is, the whole of the empirical world in space and time is the creation of our understanding, which apprehends all the objects of empirical knowledge within it as being in some part of that space and at some part of that time: and this is as true of the earth before there was life as it is of the pen I am now holding a few inches in front of my face and seeing slightly out of focus as it moves across the paper.

[i.e. we have to learn to look at our naturalistic spectacles rather than just through them, which takes a kind of cognitive shift.]

Now this explains how Kant can be both an empirical realist AND at the same time, a transcendental idealist. Many people - I suspect you also! - will think that Kant (and I) are saying that 'the world exists only in the mind of the observer'. He's not saying that - but he's also questioning the (generally implicit) view that most of us have, that the world exists completely independently of our perception of it (as per scientific realism). However, he's pointing out that there is an implicitly subjective element in every statement, every perception, even objective statements (which are to all intents, true to all observers, but only because of the kinds of observers that we are). — Wayfarer

To give a stock example, the Earth orbited the Sun long before humans came on the scene to construct a theory of heliocentrism. It seems that we can talk about that in ordinary language (introducing scientific or mathematical language where relevant). What does Kant's system, or subject/object dualism generally, contribute here?
— Andrew M

transcendental realism...regards space and time as something given in themselves (independent of our sensiblity). The transcendental realist therefore represents outer appearances (if their reality is conceded) as things in themselves, which would exist independently of us and our sensibility and thus would also be outside us according to pure concepts of the understanding.

CPR, A369 — Wayfarer

What you're not seeing is the way the mind - not just your mind, or my mind - constructs the entire stage within which perspective and judgements of the age of the Universe exist.

"The problem of including the observer in our description of physical reality arises most insistently when it comes to the subject of quantum cosmology - the application of quantum mechanics to the universe as a whole - because, by definition, 'the universe' must include any observers. Andrei Linde has given a deep reason for why observers enter into quantum cosmology in a fundamental way. It has to do with the nature of time. The passage of time is not absolute; it always involves a change of one physical system relative to another, for example, how many times the hands of the clock go around relative to the rotation of the Earth. When it comes to the Universe as a whole, time loses its meaning, for there is nothing else relative to which the universe may be said to change. This 'vanishing' of time for the entire universe becomes very explicit in quantum cosmology, where the time variable simply drops out of the quantum description. It may readily be restored by considering the Universe to be separated into two subsystems: an observer with a clock, and the rest of the Universe. So the observer plays an absolutely crucial role in this respect. Linde expresses it graphically: 'thus we see that without introducing an observer, we have a dead universe, which does not evolve in time', and, 'we are together, the Universe and us. The moment you say the Universe exists without any observers, I cannot make any sense out of that. I cannot imagine a consistent theory of everything that ignores consciousness...in the absence of observers, our universe is dead'."
(Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why is the Universe Just Right for Life, p 271) — Wayfarer

It would seem that the theory is exclusively concerned with ‘results of measurements’ and has nothing to say about anything else. When the ‘system’ in question is the whole world where is the ‘measurer’ to be found? Inside, rather than outside, presumably. What exactly qualifies some subsystems to play this role? Was the world wave function waiting to jump for thousands of millions of years until a single-celled living creature appeared? Or did it have to wait a little longer for some more highly qualified measurer — with a Ph.D.? If the theory is to apply to anything but idealized laboratory operations, are we not obliged to admit that more or less ‘measurement-like’ processes are going on more or less all the time more or less everywhere? Is there ever then a moment when there is no jumping and the Schrödinger equation applies? — John S. Bell - Quantum mechanics for cosmologists

Linguistic convention says there are basketballs out there; transcendental idealism says there are objects out there only called basketballs because the human represents the object to himself as such. — Mww

Well, the paradox rests on self-reference and I don't have a clue why computers can't handle self-reference. However, humans fare better at it, hence the paradox. — TheMadFool

if (germanyBordersChina() is true)
— Andrew M

There shouldn't be "if" in the above statement. — TheMadFool

bool result = theCurrySentence() is true

bool theCurrySentence()
{
  if (theCurrySentence() is true)
  then
    return (germanyBordersChina() is true)
  else
    return true
}

Yes. But in quantum mechanics (not philosophy) the subjective means the problem of measurement, that is to say, the fact that some objects cannot be known -or even exist- independently of the fact to be measured. May be "intersubjective" would be more accurate, but usually they are called "subjective". In any case not "objective". — David Mo

Because it asserts that a wave function becomes 'real' only when the system is observed, the term 'subjective' is sometimes proposed for the Copenhagen interpretation. This term is rejected by many Copenhagenists[24] because the process of observation is mechanical and does not depend on the individuality of the observer. — Copenhagen interpretation - Metaphysics of the wave function

What it seems important as principle in Kant is the regulative use of the reason. That is to say: physics principles are a priori because they come from a priori conditions of our knowledge, not being things in themselves. This links with Kuhnian concept of paradigm and with quantum paradoxes of measurement, relativity, etc. We live a world mediated by the categories of our way of thinking. — David Mo

How would you evaluate a conditional sentence in a way different to the way I did the Curry's sentence? — TheMadFool

bool result = theCurrySentence() is true

bool theCurrySentence()
{
  if (theCurrySentence() is true)
  then
    {
    if (germanyBordersChina() is true)
    then
      return true
    else
      return false
    }
  else
    return true
}

Truth tables can be used to explore all possibilities. — TheMadFool

And subjectivity does not only mean consciousness, but also relativity with respect to measurement, something that nobody or almost nobody denies in quantum mechanics: the collapse of the wave function. — David Mo

A subject is a being who has a unique consciousness and/or unique personal experiences, or an entity that has a relationship with another entity that exists outside itself (called an "object").

A subject is an observer and an object is a thing observed. This concept is especially important in Continental philosophy, where 'the subject' is a central term in debates over the nature of the self.[1] The nature of the subject is also central in debates over the nature of subjective experience within the Anglo-American tradition of analytical philosophy.

The sharp distinction between subject and object corresponds to the distinction, in the philosophy of René Descartes, between thought and extension. Descartes believed that thought (subjectivity) was the essence of the mind, and that extension (the occupation of space) was the essence of matter.[2] — Subject (philosophy)

This is the closest anyone has come to providing an answer:
It is quite clear Kant thought science to be the direction metaphysics should follow, which is pure reason applied to something, not that pure reason should be the direction science should follow.
— Mww

I've not read anything in this thread since that comment which convinces me that Kant has anything to do with Science generally. — Galuchat

I have not understand what symmetry you refer. — David Mo

Anyway, Bohr, Einstein, Heisenberg et alia thought that quantum mechanics posed a problem of subjectivity to science. — David Mo

Of course the introduction of the observer must not be misunderstood to imply that some kind of subjective features are to be brought into the description of nature. The observer has, rather, only the function of registering decisions, i.e., processes in space and time, and it does not matter whether the observer is an apparatus or a human being; but the registration, i.e., the transition from the "possible" to the "actual," is absolutely necessary here and cannot be omitted from the interpretation of quantum theory. — Werner Heisenberg - Physics and Philosophy

Bernard d'Espagnat (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernard_d%27Espagnat) devoted an article to the importance of Kant to understand quantum mechanics. — David Mo

The main statement is: If this sentence is true, then P2 — TheMadFool

The most spectacular reference is quantum mechanics, where the act of measuring creates the measured. — David Mo

But even in relativity, there is still an objective truth. Space and time may distort relative to an observer, but a spacetime interval is the same for all observers. Simultaneity may be relative to an observer, but cause and effect are still the same for all observers. And the impetus behind all of that, the speed of light is the same for all observers: all the things that are relative are reasoned to be so because they must be in order to account for the speed of light being an objective, non-relative value. — Pfhorrest

The view from nowhere exists because science has to abstract from human perceptual relativity to get at the way things are, and not just as they appear to us. Otherwise, we're left with ancient skepticism or some form of idealism. — Marchesk

That's nice and all, but one still has to deal with intentionality, consciousness and epistemology. — Marchesk

Can you be more specific? How does falsifiability and paradigm shift, for example, imply a subject/object dualism?
— Andrew M

Both deal with scientific theories, and a knowing subject is thus assumed.

And again, I’m not necessarily talking about mind/body dualism. I’m talking more about Kant’s variation- that we as subjects have representations of the outside world (the phenomenon, the object). — Xtrix

Science is still a human enterprise, and looks at the cosmos through the human perspective, even if it is highly abstracted and methodologically rigourous. — Wayfarer

But both 'ghost' and 'machine' are abstractions or intellectual models; organisms are not machines, and the mind is not a ghost. But having developed that model, or is it metaphor, then scientifically-inclined philosophers sought to eliminate the ghost, leaving only the machine, which is just the kind of thing that lends itself to study and improvement. — Wayfarer

The way I approach a definition of 'mind' is 'that which grasps meaning'. But mind itself always eludes objective analysis, as it not objectively existent. — Wayfarer

Substance dualism? On your view, how do Popper and Kuhn presuppose it?
— Andrew M

Because while they may not themselves explicitly refer to the res cogitans or the res extensa, they both discuss knowledge and theory from the subject/object formulation. — Xtrix

But perhaps you have a specific thesis with respect to subject/object that you think is basic to (or assumed by) modern science? Perhaps you could give some examples of how it applies.
— Andrew M

In psychology, particularly in studies of perception. It permeates the philosophy of language (Quine's "Word and Object"), cognitive sciences, etc. This way of talking about the "outside world" of objects and the "inner world" of thoughts, perceptions and emotions is literally everywhere. It'd be hard not to find examples. — Xtrix

I have an interest in Husserl ... ‘Crisis’ maybe? — I like sushi

Popper and Kuhn are interesting, but themselves presuppose Descartes' ontology. — Xtrix

As I see it, the process of 'objectifying' is specific to the modern outlook. — Wayfarer

Even in your apparently simple construction, there's something unstated, which is that 'Bob' is an object for Alice, whereas Alice is an object for Bob. Whether there are objects without subjects, or subjects without objects, is left open. — Wayfarer

Yes, that's a linguistic distinction. That's not what I was getting at, as I feel I've made clear already. — Xtrix

I see the as relational antonyms because they’re relational antonyms. Many mistaken them for complimentary antonyms. — I like sushi

I still don’t really understand what is being asked for. — I like sushi

Have I slayed the dragon my quest? — I like sushi

Actually in that reference you give, Pauli says, ironically, that one should no more rack one’s brains about whether something one cannot know exists at all times, than with the ancient question of how many angels might dance on the head of a needle. — Wayfarer

Particles with an integer spin, or bosons, are not subject to the Pauli exclusion principle: any number of identical bosons can occupy the same quantum state, as with, for instance, photons produced by a laser or atoms in a Bose–Einstein condensate. — Pauli exclusion principle

Thanks. That was the rhetorical point I was working towards. — Wayfarer