Ethics of Vegetarianism/Meat Eating ↪DingoJones I see what you are driving at. So if we are to use pain and suffering as our moral benchmark, some organisms may be excluded from consideration. For example, if we are confident that wheat doesn't feel pain, we have no need to concern ourselves with any moral duty to any particular wheat plant (we might however, on a different basis, have some concerns about a wider ethical concern relating to the growing of wheat as a commodity). Similarly, the same should apply to any animal that does not experience pain (if we are sufficiently confident that an oyster for example isn't likely to suffer any more than a stalk of wheat). — Graeme M
Yes, as you say you see what Im getting at. I think we might disagree about what levels of pain and suffering matters though...i wouldnt say you couldn't eat anything that feels any pain or suffering. I would say it depends on how and what capacity the animal has for pain, suffering and/or consciousness compared to humans. (Presumably there are attributes to human suffering that make it wrong that we would want to see present in the animal we shouldn't eat (ethically speaking, and with suffering as our metric).
This seems to point in the right direction. Broadly then we could see an endorsement for vegan ethics in regard to animal farming - that is, those animals which can feel pain and suffer would be those we'd owe the greater duty to. Wouldn't the typical farmed animal fall within that scope? And as I mentioned earlier, we have some reasonably sound empirical grounds for excluding insects from that duty which would free us from particular concerns about insects as individuals. That would mean we can happily eat insects and kill them in crop farming (with the same caveat as earlier - for example, a broader ethical duty to insects as species and members of the ecosystem). — Graeme M
Well I wouldnt qualify the capacity for pain and suffering alone. I think it needs to be an experience of suffering/pain of a certain kind, a kind that fits the same criteria for why pain and suffering is wrong to inflict on humans.
Aside from that consideration, yes I think ethics (with preventing suffering as the moral metric) would demand we be more careful about what animals we eat.
Just as an aside, is there a particular objection to folk seeking the higher moral ground? I'm not sure I'd advocate for chasing the lower moral ground!! — Graeme M
No, my issue is with claiming the moral high ground when you dont actually have it. (And by “you” i mean people in general, not you personally).
Plus, and again not directed at you personally, claiming the moral high ground is far too often the cry of the self righteous.
Anyway, Im glad I was eventually able to articulate my view more clearly. You’ve given me food for thought so Im going to do some thinking on what youve said.