Can we be held responsible for what we believe? It seems that there may be some meta problems with your view. If indirect doxastic voluntarism is true, then, as you define it, we have the “ability to pass judgement, doubt, or choose when and/or what kind of evidence we seek out on the basis of confirming or disconfirming beliefs”. What concerns me, is that even under this schema, one is still restricted by beliefs that they do not have control over, even in your own view. That is to say, how does one come to the beliefs about how we should pass judgement on beliefs, what evidence is worth seeking out, when is there enough counter evidence that I should consider seeking more evidence? Even questions like what sources are reliable seems to be based upon prior beliefs.
Thus, it would seem, even if our will plays some role in our belief forming, if our will is shaped based of of pre-existing beliefs, which are formed entirely involuntarily, and not through this indirect doxastic voluntarism, if we were to look at the causal chain of why you believe what you believe, it would all be rooted in forces outside of your own control. If the nature in which you will about the criterion above is shaped through no kind of voluntarism, it would still seem you are not morally culpable for your beliefs. It could very well be the case that you could not have the correct will in regards to how to go about acquiring beliefs, because you involuntarily formed the wrong beliefs about how that process should be approached.
It would seem that premise one (1) is wrong then. It is very much possible that indirect doxastic voluntarism is true, and yet one could still not have control over their beliefs. I do, of course, as is implicit in your argument, assume that if one lacks control of their beliefs, they are not responsible for them. I also assume that one cannot willfully change their beliefs, as you have said.
1. If one’s meta beliefs about belief forming are involuntary, one cannot be held responsible for their beliefs about belief forming.
2. If one cannot be held responsible for their beliefs about belief forming, then one cannot be held responsible for the beliefs which result from those beliefs beliefs about belief forming, i.e. the beliefs formed because of indirect doxastic voluntarism.
3. One’s meta beliefs about belief forming are involuntary.
4. Therefore, one cannot be held responsible for their beliefs, even those which result from indirect doxastic voluntarism.
If the only cases in which we can be held responsible for our beliefs are in the instances involving indirect doxastic voluntarism, then, it seems, three (3) is true, as those meta beliefs cannot be formed as a result of indirect doxastic voluntarism.