For example, God must be omnibenevolent if he is the Christian God. — lupac

We should think about God as some plain Greatest Conceivable Being — lupac

Lupac, while I understand your desire to speak about God purely from rationality, it seems incredibly difficulty to imagine God without assigning to Him/Her some traits. I quoted you above to demonstrate how hard it is:
1. If God is the GCB, He/She has the maximum of all great-making Characteristic
2. Benevolence is a great-making Characteristic
3. God is the GCB
4. God is omnibenevolent (1,2,3 MP)
Even when you try and say we need to have a religion-neutral God, you speak of a God that possesses Omnibenevolence, and so he must be the Christian God. I highlight this example to object to your 1st premise. It seems that in defining God you have already spoken of God with "hindrance." Incorporating a certain religion is helpful when making claims about God, because each religion defines 'God' a little differently. There is no neutral definition, as your post displays, so using a specific religion's God allows the reader to associate a certain dossier of information about God with the post, providing necessary clarity. Any discussion with God involves necessary theology, and, be it Christian or otherwise, it can be simply neutral, or people will talk past one another

Hi Francesco, I appreciate your clarity. I'd like to disagreeing with the 1st premises and 9th premises.
you make:

If God is omnibenevolent, then He desires to save everyone — Francesco di Piertro

Therefore, all are condemned. — Francesco di Piertro

it seems that to be omnibenevolent doesn't oblige God to do anything for us, merely that God cannot do any evil thing. The passages you referenced, if they say some will be condemned, imply that at no point can they be saved, for if they are condemned they can have no part with God. And so if God condemns anyone, He could not have wanted to save everyone.
1. If God is omnibenevolent, He cannot do/be evil
2. God is omnibenevolent
3. God cannot do evil (1,2 MP)
4. If God cannot do evil, he cannot have part with sin
5. He cannot have part with sin (3,4 MP)
6. Humans have sinned
7. God cannot have part with humans (4,6 MT)
Now, this argument can be extended given a few other characteristics of God, the first is that God is eternal. This is common Christian theology so I won't prove it here (sorry).
8. If God is eternal, and He can have no part with humans, they are condemned eternally
9. Humans are condemned eternally (7,8 MP)
Granted, I am an annihilationist, so that death is the end and post-mortem redemption is not an option as God must sustain them.
God omnibenevelonce then, leads to the conclusion that humans are condemned eternally. Based on biblical evidence, this conclusion seems more likely than that no one is condemned. The condemnation brought up in your post must be eternal or else at any time God risks losing his omnibenevelonce.

Hi princessofdarkness, while I may be willing to accept your conclusion that we shouldn't do harm to robots, I have a problem with few of your premises. The first is

Harming conscious beings is not good — princessofdarkness

. It would seem that there are some situations in which harming a conscious being may well be good. For example: Telling a bully to stop what he/she is doing may cause them harm, but it seems that it is the right thing to do. Similarly, it would seem we have a duty to be honest to our friends, even if it occasionally does them harm.

The second premise I have a problem with is,

Therefore, harming created conscious beings would displease God — princessofdarkness

I have a hard time justifying this when there are times when the Bible testifies to God doing harm to created conscious beings. (Genesis 6, Exodus 14, Habakkuk, etc.) It seems that holding God to a principle of 'do no harm' is impossible, and would make a Problem of Evil argument devastating. I think it would be easier to define good differently than 'doing no harm.'

Let us say, for instance, somebody is starving in front of you, and you have the power to stop that suffering at no cost to you. It would seem that the moral landscape is fairly clearly defined, — FordFestivaPhilosophy

While it certainly seems we may have an obligation to help the person starving, our help may very well be rejected, as people often reject help offered to them for various reasons. If instead we had waited until they asked for help, our help would actually be 'help' because it would be utilized. To apply this observation to your scenario, it would seem that asking would not change God's vision of moral goodness, but rather our own reception to God's vision of moral goodness. If God were to offer help to someone who did not ask, that help may not mean anything, may be rejected, or may be abused in such a way that it would not be good for God to grant the request until it was explicitly asked for.

Now, to be clear, I personally believe God does not withhold help until asked, but the asking instead changes our receptiveness to His help. So in the example you offered God would be always willing to offer food but petitionary prayer would change the person's willingness to accept the food or not. When the person is willing, then Good will offer the food. To relate it to your argument, then, it would seem that premise 3 is false. God always does what is best, and that can include responding to petitions, for the petition has changed what is best.

Were sin reasonably avoidable, lots of people would go through their lives never sinning, right? But since we encounter temptation countless times in our lives, the probability of us never sinning is infinitesimal, right? Because of this, I still see God as being responsible for our sinning and subsequent damnation. — Empedocles

The specific idea of sin being reasonably avoidable is one of the first area's addressed in John Calvin's Institutes of the Christian Religion, in which he develops a doctrine of original sin that goes something like this
1. God is perfect
2. Man was created with free will to choose between sin and not sin
3. Man sinned
4. Man is imperfect (1,2,3, MP)
4. An imperfect creature can do nothing to restore himself/herself to perfection
5. Man can do nothing to restore himself/herself
6. Man will always continue to sin (4,5 MP)
Calvin's theology takes into account that man's life is spent in continual sin based on the free will given (and essentially forfeited) in the garden. Calvin attempts to answer the question about soteriology by claiming that no one's actions really matter in salvation, but rather that Jesus's work saved people by it's power, and nothing that they have to offer.
In this theology, man chains his will to sin by nature of the fall, because once one is corrupted there is nothing that he/she can do to restore perfection. Of course, this theology leads to a soteriology that revolves around God's work, so man's religious beliefs are of considerable less importance than in many other branches of Christianity. This soteriology also makes widely unpopular claims about the justification and damnation of people that holds a position of negligible free will, so the consequences most people are not willing to cede for a well developed doctrine of the fall, but his view seems to me most convincing.

So can your GCB make an object so big it can't lift it? — Jeremiah

I was mostly giving an example about how objective greatness exists, and mentioned nothing about God creating, but it seems that creation is also a great making property as you have so perceptively noted. The 'rock so heavy God can't lift it' is very easily solved by having a clear definition of what omnipotence is. The classic argument goes something like this:
1. Either God can create a stone so heavy that he cannot lift it or he cannot create it.
2. If God cannot the stone, he is not omnipotent
3. If God can create the stone, he is not omnipotent
4. Therefore, God is not omnipotent
I'm assuming that this argument serves as proof that

The omni traits carry a slew of inconsistencies, conflicts and for a conceptual being to have a rational form, that humans can actually convince, it is far better just to forget about them. — Jeremiah

Really, the problem here is just a misunderstanding of what omnipotence is. It would seem that God being omnipotent means He, by definition of being omnipotent, cannot fail. It would seem then, that God cannot create the stone not because he is limited in capacity, but because He is limited by the nature of being omnipotent. It seems at this point we are splitting hairs over definitional truths, but it is important to highlight that a GCB+1 who gains anything by being able to fail, is in no way greater than God described above. Even if you object to God being omnipotent in that scenario, it seems that a God who cannot fail then has some sort of great making property.
The basic point that people have been attempting to establish is that the 'Greatest' is objective. I am curious what you mean when you say

The moment you posted the word "greatest" you should realized that was an entirely subjective gradation. — Jeremiah

As it seems quite simple that any trait you identify, there is some maximization of that trait that makes greatest objective?

I think a conceptual being which does not possess any of traits is vastly superior concept, as it is far more practical conceptual form. — Jeremiah

I do not quite understand what you mean here, but it seems like you are saying that the Greatest Being you can conceive of would NOT be omnipotent, or omniscient, or omnipresent. That seems to beg the question of what makes that being 'great'?
Simply because you can conceive of a Being that is not omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient and label that being "the Greatest being" means nothing unless the Being conceived has some intrinsic qualities that make it, by definition, 'great'. There seems to be objective, great-making factors that the Greatest Conceivable Being must have, or else we should revise our concept to be a Being that has those great-making traits. For example, let us say that lifting objects is a great-making trait. Everyone agrees that to be great, you must be able to lift an object. If I say, "the greatest possible being can lift a car over his/head" and you say, "the greatest possible being can lift a skyscraper over his/head" clearly the being you have conceived of is greater than mine. However, the concept of the GCB+1 ends because, eventually, it becomes clear that truly the greatest conceivable being must be able to move any object, and so we can all agree that unless the being we are conceiving of can move any object, it is not the Greatest Conceivable Being.
If you object to the idea that power, presence, knowledge, and goodness are 'great making' qualities, I am curious as to what you believe makes one thing better than another. But, as it seems obvious that there are great making qualities that people can agree on, we must the ascribe the Greatest Conceivable Being to possess those qualities to the qualities' greatest extent, and so there can be no GCB+1, as the GCB is then objective.

You are asserting God knows, not showing how it can be possible — Relativist

My apologies, I assumed God's omniscience was true definitionally true based on the ontological argument, and that you were merely questioning how can omniscience and free will can go together. I fail to see how you have challenged the ontological arguments premises besides rejecting its conclusion? If the ontological argument is to be taken as true, it seems that the conclusion of an omniscient God is true, and so we can then assume based on the reasoning above that there is not a problem with omniscience and foreknowledge, which I believe was at the heart of your post:

I believe there is a tension between knowledge of the future (entailed by omniscience) and the notion of omniscience. I'd describe it thusly:future, freely willed acts are unknowable: — Relativist

If I qualified premise 1 to say something like, "If the stakes of a belief are high and credible, then you should take arguments regarding that belief seriously" then it might work? — Empedocles

That is the main selling point of the argument. But we have concluded, at least for your version, that the burden of providing a convincing argument for the existence of God cannot be avoided. — SophistiCat

It seems that Empedocles might be able to hold on to the qualification of the stakes being both high and credible without providing a convincing proof for God, but rather by simply establishing even the slightest possibility for God. If we define God as the greatest possible being, the stakes of that being existing are high merely by the nature of God. However, to make the argument credible, Empedocles needs only to prove that there is even the slightest possibility that this being exists (which I think is a very easy task). To illustrate this with a scenario:
You are slacking off at your job, and your boss has threatened that if he catches you slacking off again, he's going to fire you. The stakes of you slacking off are high by the nature of the situation, but if your boss is out of town those stakes are not credible. But let's say that you hear a rumor around the office that your boss is going to be back earlier than expected to check on your performance. Regardless of whether that argument is convincing or not, the slight chance that your boss will be back provides enough credibility to the stakes that you would not slack off, because there now exists even the slightest chance that your boss may be back early. In this scenario, it does not seem that the argument for credibility has to be in any way convincing, merely possible.

Your assertion, "2.) God’s omnipotence gives Him power to look at the future."
Is defeated by my argument. God can't do the logically impossible.

I am treating A-theory of time (presentism) as true. — Relativist

Relativist, while God and time may belong on a different forum, I think an understanding of how God can understand the future in A-theory of time pertains to the debate about the Ontological argument by defending @princessofdarkness situation in which God knows the future, but does not determine it. It seems that your objection goes something like this:
1. At a time (t0), a future time (t1) only exists as a series of potentialities
2. A series of potentialities has no truth making capabilities, therefore nothing can be known with epistemological certainty
3. God cannot know what happens at t1 at time t0
4. God cannot be all-knowing (1,3 MP)
Even in an A-theory of time, certainly some propositions exist at that present moment, and God knows the truth of all those propositions at that current moment. So if someone were to say, "Jack is going to drink a beer at t1" God knows the truth of that proposition, and so knows what will happen at t1. It does not seem that A-theory directly eliminates the possibility of God's foreknowledge.

To connect this with the ontological argument, it seems that princessofdarkness's case holds up, and the God can be both omnipotent and omniscient, even in A-theory of time.

Or you could be a B-theorist :)

@Francesco di Piertro could you clarify for me then what the objection is:

Is it that Hell is not a physical place? (So it may be spiritual?)
Hell is not the classic 'fire-and-brimstone' place we might imagine? (Which does not conclude that Hell does not exist, merely we do not picture it correctly)
Or that there is no such thing as Hell?

It seems that in your second premise, even the addition of 'in reality' places you in a very strong position. The refined premise would be:

2. Things that only exist conceptually in the minds of human beings do not actually exist in reality. — Francesco di Piertro

However, even then I would still object to this premise. There are things that exist only in the minds of human that very much so are a reality. Mental illness comes to mind as one of those examples in which it may exist only conceptually in the mind of the patient, but it certainly is a lived reality that exists.

1. If hell exists, there would be Biblical evidence for its existence, or it exists only conceptually in the minds of human beings due to misinterpreting the Bible.
2. Things that only exist conceptually in the minds of human beings do not actually exist.
3. There is no Biblical evidence for the existence of hell.
4. Therefore, hell does not actually exist. — Francesco di Piertro

I would challenge premise 3. The Greek word for hell γέενναν (gaenna, or Gahenna), though used to describe the valley of Hinnom, also carries in its meaning the conceptual idea of "underneath the earth" and the symbolism equated more with the classic view of Hell. Gahenna appears 12 times in the New Testament, linked here: https://www.billmounce.com/greek-dictionary/geenna . Observing how the word is used, we can formulate this argument (assuming some respect for the Bible as true as you mentioned earlier):

1. Either the Bible is discussing the literal valley of Himnon, or it is discussing a more eternal place of punishment and Himnon is a paradigmatic representation of some sort of suffering (Hell).
2. The Bible is not describing the literal valley of Himnon
3. There is a more eternal punishment, Himnon is a paradigmatic representation of some sort of suffering (Hell)
4. Hell exists in the Bible

While I agree with FordFestivaPhilosophy in an annihilationist view of Hell, that still aligns with a biblical view of Hell, as well as acknowledges Hell as real.

new information and calculations do not support the argument for a creative designer — Brillig

Thank you for clarifying. The illustration you used in the first example seems to suggest that the reason the new information and calculations do not support the argument for a creative designer is because the Big Bang came first, and so human's development afterward is in relation to the 'rules' that were established at the Big Bang. However, if we look at the Big Bang first, we are still left with no answer to the question why we are here. Us being here certainly does entail that the necessary requirements for us being here were met, but offers no answer to why. Richard Dawkins responded to this objection called the anthropic principle here: (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hXpX-jLofpM). Dawkins uses and example from John Leslie quoted here: "If fifty sharp shooters all miss me, the response "if they had not missed me I wouldn't be here to consider the fact" is not adequate. Instead, I would naturally conclude that there was some reason why they all missed, such as that they never really intended to kill me. Why would I conclude this? Because my continued existence would be very improbable under the hypothesis thatthey missed me by chance, but not improbable under the hypothesis that there was some reason why they missed me. This question of why would persist no matter what the preconditions of the universe in discussion was. Observing those preconditions, and finding them to be incredibly specific, it is quite rational to then apply those statistics to a Design argument, because it is more likely that those entailing requirements would be so specific if there was an end in mind than by a random generator.

To respond to the idea that a God simply elevates the problem of intelligent design up a level, I propose that this is only a problem if we understand God as something created. If God is the greatest of all possible beings, He must be self-created and self-sustaining. The Universe is evidently not the greatest of all possible beings, as we can, in our own minds, imagine a Universe that is perfect. God, however, is not dependent on any other if He is the greatest of all possible beings, and so is created and sustained within himself.

In Robin Collins’ The Fine Tuning Argument: A Scientific Argument for the Existence of God, he mentions that one of the objections that challenges the core version of fine-tuning argument is the “Who Designed God” objection. The version from George Smith is:

If the universe is wonderfully designed, surely God is even more wonderfully designed. He must, therefore, have had a designer even more wonderful than He is. If God did not require a designer, then there is no reason why such a relatively less wonderful thing as the universe needed one. (1980, p. 56.)

To put it in an argument form:
1. If the universe is designed by God, then God is more wonderfully designed than the universe.
2. If God is wonderfully designed, then he must have had a designer even more wonderful than He is.
3. If God does not have a designer even more wonderful than He is, then God is not more wonderfully designed than the universe.
4. God did not require a designer.
5. Then God is not more wonderfully designed than the universe. (3,4 MP)
6. It is not the case that the universe is wonderfully designed by God. (1,5 MT)

My response is only applicable to the version of “who designed the designer” objection above. I would like to object premise 1 by arguing that even God is the designer of the universe, he does not necessarily need a designer. To lay out my argument:
1. If God who designed the universe needs a designer, then either the designing of intelligent beings is an infinite set of successive events, or there is an Ultimate Designer who is not designed.
2. The designing of intelligent beings is not an infinite set of successive events.
3. It is not the case that there is an Ultimate Designer.
4. Therefore, it is not the case that God who designed the universe needs a designer.

If the designing of intelligent beings is an infinite set of successive events, then the following must be true:
God, who designed the universe has a designer;
God’s designer, who designed God, has a designer;
God’s designer’s designer, who designed God’s designer, has a designer;
…
Consider each level of designing as an event, it is impossible to traverse to the infinite many events before God’s creation and still have God be designed by His designer, and then designed the universe for us to live in. If we were to put the series of event on a time line, and use the designing of the universe as point 0 on the line, the designing of God as -1, and the designing of God’s designer as -2. If it is impossible to trace back to -∞ from 0, how is possible for a series of successive events started from -∞ to progress to 0. Therefore it is impossible for the designing of intelligent beings to be an infinite set of successive events.

If instead of an infinite set of successive events, there is an Ultimate Designer to trace back to, who is not designed and whose existence is necessary rather than contingent. Since the Ultimate Designer has designed the designer who is just relatively less wonderful than him, eventually this will progress to the designing of God, who is the designer of the universe. However, it seems like each designer that is between the Ultimate Designer and God only exist to design what is relatively less wonderful than himself. If the Ultimate Designer is able to design a designer who is relatively more wonderful than God, he is certainly able to design God, who is the designer of the Universe; then all the levels of designers in between the Ultimate Designer and God do not need to exist. In fact, the Ultimate Designer, who is not designed and whose existence is necessary rather than contingent, can just design the universe himself. Then we can simply refer to this Ultimate Designer as God and avoid the issue of who designed the designer. Therefore, even if the universe is designed by God, it doesn’t necessarily follow that God needs to be more wonderfully designed.

Thoughts? — CYU-5

If I understand correctly, you seem to be challenging premise 3 of Collins argument by changing the order in which we view the Big Bang. Instead of wondering how the Big Bang shaped a world so specific that humans emerged, you say that the pre-conditions to the Big Bang are irrelevant to the existence of God in that the Big Bang simply set the world in order and humans are a product of that, not a design element. In formal writing:
1. There are no required conditions for the Big Bang
2. If there are no required conditions for the Big Bang, then the outcome of the Big Bang is essentially random
3. If the outcome is random, it cannot be designed
4. Our existence naturally fits into the laws of the universe established by the outcome of the Big Bang
5. The existence of specific laws of the Universe is irrelevant to the design argument (theism)
My objection to that argument (hopefully I have represented you honestly) lies on premise 1. The idea that there are no required conditions for the big bang falls into the logical fallacy of producing something from nothing. In physics (and I am no physicist) there is the law of conservation of energy which states that energy can neither be created nor destroyed. Thomas Aquinas describes this concept in his “Argument from Motion” (https://philosophy.lander.edu/intro/motion.shtml). While a little elementary in his knowledge of physics, the thought-concept is the same. Something cannot come out of nothing, as something cannot be moved without a mover. In this way, it seems implausible to reject the idea of some sort of Creator to establish conditions for the Big Bang for it to happen (especially considering the results!). If there is a Creator, it follows that the argument of fine-tuning is relevant once more.