Berkeley does provide an instrumentally better theory, if you are referring to defeating skepticism, as he recognizes and fixes a major issue with Locke’s theory. The difference between Berkeley and Locke’s theories are their views on primary and secondary qualities. Locke’s theory includes a distinction between primary and secondary qualities, as he asserted that primary qualities were mind-independent, and that secondary qualities were mind-dependent. Berkeley disagrees with Locke’s distinction, and asserts that both primary and secondary qualities are mind-dependent for several reasons. The first being that just as secondary qualities vary according to the state of the viewer’s senses, Berkeley states that so can primary qualities. Color, a secondary quality, can be said to differ depending upon the circumstances in which it is being looked at, for example if you put a white bed under a green beam, then the bed would appear green instead of the white that it would be seen as in other scenarios. In this same way, Berkeley gives the example of a primary quality, extension, and how it can vary depending upon the vantage point of the person who is observing it. If one is very far away, that person would consider the item as looking very small, whereas if the same person was closer to the object, they would state the opposite about the item.
Another reason that Berkeley gives for disagreeing with Locke is that the two classes of qualities, primary and secondary, are intertwined and cannot be separated. Berkeley (1710) puts this claim well saying, “In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere else.” (p.14) One could not imagine a colorless strawberry or feel a textureless banana, therefore, to assert that primary qualities such as extension, solidity, and number could exist externally without secondary qualities also being present are preposterous in Berkeley’s opinion. Berkeley designates both primary and secondary qualities as ideas, and asserts that ideas can only be like other ideas, that is only existing in the mind and not externally. Through this new classification of primary qualities, Berkeley fixes Locke’s logical discrepancy and presents an instrumentally better theory than Locke.
Berkeley’s view originates from the same empiricism that Locke’s does, but he does not rely on the same arguments he uses to refute Locke. Locke’s view is affected by these worries due to his inaction in taking his arguments to their furthest claims. Locke embraced empiricism, which is the theory that all knowledge is derived from sense-experience, yet Locke still thought of external objects as something whose existence could be known. The problem with this view, that Berkeley goes after, is that, if you cannot use any of the five human senses to detect matter, as those are mind-dependent secondary qualities, and you cannot use primary qualities to detect material objects, as Berkeley showed that those are also mind-dependent, then why would an empiricist believe anything exists? Considering that in the empiricist view the only way they believe knowledge is derived is through their senses, if they cannot obtain any sense-data about external objects, then they have no viable reasons to believe in these objects’ existence.
Berkeley’s attack on abstract objects does put a lot of pressure on materialism, as materialism relies heavily on human’s ability of abstraction and the stipulation that material objects are mind-independent. These are both claims that Berkeley attacks heavily. Though I will concede that Berkeley offers some persuasive arguments against materialism, I would claim that an exploration of the objections to idealism leads to the conclusion that Berkeley’s attack on materialism is not enough to utterly undermine it. Berkeley’s views as a whole overcomes Locke’s, but Berkeley’s overall argument faces powerful issues such as allusions to solipsism, his failure to show that objects are mental because they are known, and his misconception of the contradiction of perceived unperceived items are all major concerns for his argument as whole. Due to all of these issues I would claim that Berkeley’s argument is not sound and therefore does not undermine materialism.

Your argument goes something like this:

If one embraces stoicism, then one needs also to embrace the principle of “indifference” which can lead to becoming apathetic.
One should not embrace something that leads to them becoming apathetic.
Therefore, one should not embrace stoicism.

There are two crucial aspects of stoicism that you are overlooking. Both of my objections will be aimed at your conditional in premise 1, as I assert that your claim that embracing stoicism has the implication of apathy is a wrong one. Though becoming apathetic towards everything is a commonly expressed worry about the Stoic school of philosophy, it is only a worry if one malpractices stoicism and does not grip onto several of its most crucial claims. The first, and most important aspect of stoicism that I believe you are mislabeling is their principle of indifference. Stoics commonly get a wrap for being indifferent towards everything but that is not a claim well-supported by stoicism. Stoics have very distinct passions, only towards internal matters and not external. The reason they label externalities as indifferent is because they are not under the control of the stoic, any matter that does concern the stoic having complete control a stoic has a great deal of care for. Stoics care about living a virtuous life and doing their duty more than the majority of non-stoics. Apathy emerges from a disregard of all passion in life, the stoic’s mentality is not that they should disregard all passions in life, but rather, it is that they place a large importance on the right distribution of passions and expectations. They believe that negative feelings come from the gap that exists between expectations and reality, so by not holding any expectations about the outside world and only over things they control the stoic is only supposed to experience positive emotions. Thus, depression shouldn't be in the mix of true stoicism.
Also, especially going off of the stoic teachings of Epictetus, I think that you mislabel the stoic’s interaction with the outside world. A worry I hold with your version of the stoic’s principle of “indifference”, is that you frame the indifference as if the stoic’s not only do not hold expectations for the outside world, but also do not hold the outside world as being a source of pleasure in any sense. Epictetus’, a philosopher you refer to as being a model of stoicism for you, famous example of being at a feast frames the stoic’s relationship with the outside world in a different way. He asserts that it is okay to take from a plate that is being passed around at a feast and enjoy the food that is presented, as long as you take in moderation. The key that he points out is that the Stoic should not have any expectations for having a feast, the selection of the feast, who is present, or what the food is like. By not having any previous expectations of the outside world, the Stoic will not experience negative expectations that originate through the wrong placement of their interests. Nevertheless, the stoic is definitely allowed to enjoy the external things presented to them in Epictetus’ view, so this complete apathy to everything that you assert that stoicism entails I think is wrongly based. The stoic is supposed to not hold expectations of the outside world, but they may still have interests in the outside world as presented to them.
In conclusion, I assert that the first premise in your argument is misdirected. Apathy is not an implication of stoicism if stoicism is put into practice correctly. By still having passions towards the internal circumstances of themselves, and allowing themselves to receive pleasure from outside circumstances as long as they are not attached to the situation that this pleasure was derived in and did not hold expectations about it, the stoic does not experience the apathy that is your concern.

I disagree with the assertion put forth that human rights are anti-Christian. I agree that when one looks at the ten commandments their purpose are to limit the actions of the followers of Christianity, but that does not put them into opposition with human rights. When laying out the rights of American citizens in the constitution they talk about certain unalienable rights given to humans that cannot be taken away, even by the laws of the United States. I think that this is where the main gap in understanding is for the author of this post. Allow me to give an analogy to illustrate my point.

Under the constitution there are rights given like freedom of speech and freedom of worship that protect people’s rights to speak and worship freely. Now say that there is a child born into a home where the parents of this child tells them that they are not allowed to speak foul language and that they will practice Christianity. By doing these two things are the parents restricting the rights of the child or performing actions in opposition to human rights? Of course not! The parents of this child are simply laying out guidelines for a life that they think will lead the child to success and health.

The parents are not attempting to strip the rights of the child, at the end of the day the child is going to speak and believe whatever they hold to be their own. In the same way when God laid out the Christian decalogue for the Israelites he was not trying to strip them of their rights. As creator God endowed human beings with the freewill that allows them to do these things such as choose what to say and what to believe.

The 10 commandments instead are a moral code that God sets forth for those that choose to follow him to uphold in order to lead a life deemed healthy and successful in the eyes of God. Restricting the rights of those that hear these commandments and not allowing them to break them was never a part of the discussion. In this way the Christian decalogue and human rights are not at odds with each other, but are instead each stepping stones in the determination of the moral code that each human being chooses to uphold.